Privacy-Enhanced Data Aggregation Scheme ... - Semantic Scholar
Privacy-Enhanced Data Aggregation Scheme Against Internal Attackers in Smart Grid Chun-I Fan, Shi-Yuan Huang, and Yih-Loong Lai IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS VOL. 10, NO. 1, 2014 This is a preliminary version of the research. The final publication is available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org. A correction to the final paper has been published in ResearchGate.
Introduction ●
The development of smart grids will become a global trend ●
Using smart grids can handle bidirection energy flows better
●
Reduce energy consumption
2
Introduction
3
Introduction ●
Smart grid applications ●
Know how much electricity users have consumed
●
Get the average electricity consumption data
4
Introduction ●
The privacy issues of smart grid communication ●
Meter readings are sensitive
●
Attackers may use the consumption data to reveal user lifestyles
5
Introduction ●
Prevent anyone from stealing or tampering with the data ●
External attacker: Hackers
●
Internal attacker: Electricity suppliers
6
Related Works ●
Li et al.'s Scheme ●
●
Garcia et al.'s Scheme ●
●
Privacy-Friendly Energy-Metering Via Homomorphic Encryption
Lu et al.'s Scheme ●
●
Secure Information Aggregation for Smart Grids Using Homomorphic Encryption
EPPA: An Efficient and Privacy-Preserving Aggregation Scheme for Secure Smart Grid Communication
Petrlic's Scheme ●
A Privacy-Preserving Concept for Smart Grids
7
Bottom up
Li et al.'s Scheme
3
1
6
2
4
5
8
Garcia et al.'s Scheme 11
1
1-1
1-2
1-3
1-4
1-5
22
2
2-1
2-2
2-3
2-4
2-5
33
3
3-1
3-2
3-3
3-4
3-5
44
4
4-1
4-2
4-3
4-4
4-5
55
5
5-1
5-2
5-3
5-4
5-5
9
Garcia et al.'s Scheme 11
1-1
2-1
3-1
4-1
5-1
1~5-1
22
1-2
2-2
3-2
4-2
5-2
1~5-2
33
1-3
2-3
3-3
4-3
5-3
1~5-3
44
1-4
2-4
3-4
4-4
5-4
1~5-4
55
1-5
2-5
3-5
4-5
5-5
1~5-5
10
Lu et al.'s Scheme 1 2 3 4 5
11
Lu et al.'s Scheme 1 2 3 4
Aggregate
5
12
Lu et al.'s Scheme 1 2 3 4 5
13
Petrlic's Scheme 1 2 3 4 5
14
Petrlic's Scheme 1 2 3 4 5
15
Internal Attackers ●
Li et al.'s Scheme
●
Garcia et al.'s Scheme
●
Lu et al.'s Scheme
●
Petrlic's Scheme
16
The Propose Scheme ●
Initialization Phase
●
Registration Phase
●
Aggregation Phase
●
Remark (Tree-Based Aggregation Scheme)
17
Overview
18
Overview
19
Overview
20
Initialization Phase
21
Initialization Phase
22
Registration Phase
23
Aggregation Phase
24
Against Internal Attackers
25
Bottom up
Remark (Tree-Based Aggregation Scheme)
26
Bottom up
Remark (Tree-Based Aggregation Scheme)
27
Bottom up
Remark (Tree-Based Aggregation Scheme)
28
Comparison Ours
Li et al.'s Scheme
Garcia et al.'s Scheme
Lu et al.'s Scheme
Petrlic's Scheme
Against External Attackers
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Against Internal Attackers
Yes
No
No
No
No
Data Integrity
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Secure Batch Verification
Yes
N/A
N/A
No
N/A
On/Off-line TTP
Off-line
No
No
On-line
No
Formal Proof
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
: The author claimed that it can prevent internal attackers, but it used a administration approach, not a cryptographic technology. : No batch verification in the scheme.
29
Security Proofs ●
Semantic Security
●
Unforgeability
●
Batch Verification Security
30
Semantic Security
31
Semantic Security
32
Semantic Security
33
Unforgeability
34
Unforgeability
35
Unforgeability
36
Batch Verification Security
37
Conclusion ●
●
●
Our scheme is the first scheme that can resist internal attackers in smart grids It ensures data integrity and provides a secure batch verification phase for efficient verification We have designed a tree-based aggregation variant for the wireless mesh network architecture
38
Future Works ● ●
●
Eliminate the trusted third party Integrate our scheme into the time-of-use billing system to protect user consumption information Extend our scheme for various types of protocols in smart grids
39
Applied Cryptology Laboratory 2012
40
Introduction ●
The development of smart grids will become a global trend ●
Using smart grids can handle bidirection energy flows better
●
Reduce energy consumption
2
Introduction
3
Introduction ●
Smart grid applications ●
Know how much electricity users have consumed
●
Get the average electricity consumption data
4
Introduction ●
The privacy issues of smart grid communication ●
Meter readings are sensitive
●
Attackers may use the consumption data to reveal user lifestyles
5
Introduction ●
Prevent anyone from stealing or tampering with the data ●
External attacker: Hackers
●
Internal attacker: Electricity suppliers
6
Related Works ●
Li et al.'s Scheme ●
●
Garcia et al.'s Scheme ●
●
Privacy-Friendly Energy-Metering Via Homomorphic Encryption
Lu et al.'s Scheme ●
●
Secure Information Aggregation for Smart Grids Using Homomorphic Encryption
EPPA: An Efficient and Privacy-Preserving Aggregation Scheme for Secure Smart Grid Communication
Petrlic's Scheme ●
A Privacy-Preserving Concept for Smart Grids
7
Bottom up
Li et al.'s Scheme
3
1
6
2
4
5
8
Garcia et al.'s Scheme 11
1
1-1
1-2
1-3
1-4
1-5
22
2
2-1
2-2
2-3
2-4
2-5
33
3
3-1
3-2
3-3
3-4
3-5
44
4
4-1
4-2
4-3
4-4
4-5
55
5
5-1
5-2
5-3
5-4
5-5
9
Garcia et al.'s Scheme 11
1-1
2-1
3-1
4-1
5-1
1~5-1
22
1-2
2-2
3-2
4-2
5-2
1~5-2
33
1-3
2-3
3-3
4-3
5-3
1~5-3
44
1-4
2-4
3-4
4-4
5-4
1~5-4
55
1-5
2-5
3-5
4-5
5-5
1~5-5
10
Lu et al.'s Scheme 1 2 3 4 5
11
Lu et al.'s Scheme 1 2 3 4
Aggregate
5
12
Lu et al.'s Scheme 1 2 3 4 5
13
Petrlic's Scheme 1 2 3 4 5
14
Petrlic's Scheme 1 2 3 4 5
15
Internal Attackers ●
Li et al.'s Scheme
●
Garcia et al.'s Scheme
●
Lu et al.'s Scheme
●
Petrlic's Scheme
16
The Propose Scheme ●
Initialization Phase
●
Registration Phase
●
Aggregation Phase
●
Remark (Tree-Based Aggregation Scheme)
17
Overview
18
Overview
19
Overview
20
Initialization Phase
21
Initialization Phase
22
Registration Phase
23
Aggregation Phase
24
Against Internal Attackers
25
Bottom up
Remark (Tree-Based Aggregation Scheme)
26
Bottom up
Remark (Tree-Based Aggregation Scheme)
27
Bottom up
Remark (Tree-Based Aggregation Scheme)
28
Comparison Ours
Li et al.'s Scheme
Garcia et al.'s Scheme
Lu et al.'s Scheme
Petrlic's Scheme
Against External Attackers
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Against Internal Attackers
Yes
No
No
No
No
Data Integrity
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Secure Batch Verification
Yes
N/A
N/A
No
N/A
On/Off-line TTP
Off-line
No
No
On-line
No
Formal Proof
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
: The author claimed that it can prevent internal attackers, but it used a administration approach, not a cryptographic technology. : No batch verification in the scheme.
29
Security Proofs ●
Semantic Security
●
Unforgeability
●
Batch Verification Security
30
Semantic Security
31
Semantic Security
32
Semantic Security
33
Unforgeability
34
Unforgeability
35
Unforgeability
36
Batch Verification Security
37
Conclusion ●
●
●
Our scheme is the first scheme that can resist internal attackers in smart grids It ensures data integrity and provides a secure batch verification phase for efficient verification We have designed a tree-based aggregation variant for the wireless mesh network architecture
38
Future Works ● ●
●
Eliminate the trusted third party Integrate our scheme into the time-of-use billing system to protect user consumption information Extend our scheme for various types of protocols in smart grids
39
Applied Cryptology Laboratory 2012
40
