Technology Security & Foreign Disclosure Reform - Amazon Web ...
Technology Security & Foreign Disclosure Reform 11th Annual Firearms Import/Export Conference August 1, 2012 Mr. Gordon Yim Senior Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure Analyst Office of International Cooperation/International Plans and Transactions OUSD(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)/IC/IPT 1
Agenda • Problem Overview • Export Control Reform • Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure (TS&FD) Reform • Defense Exportability Features Initiative • Questions
2
The Problem How How can can the the USG/DOD USG/DOD best best balance balance these these two two demands? demands?
???
Provide required capabilities quickly to allies and partners
What is DOD’s “decision trade space”?
Protect the “crown jewels” of U.S. Defense technology
• What are our strategic objectives wrt to the partner?
• How sensitive is the technology in question?
• What are the partner’s capability requirements?
• What is the partner’s ability to capitalize on the technology in question?
• What capabilities does the partner want? • How urgent is the need? • Is there a higher-priority need for these capabilities? • What is the partner’s capacity to absorb and effectively employ the capabilities in question? • What strategic benefits does the U.S. gain by providing the requested / required capabilities?
• What is the partner’s capability and will to protect sensitive U.S. technology? • What are the risks to the U.S. or its allies/partners if the technology / system is compromised? • How serious are these risks? • Can these risks be mitigated satisfactorily? 3
TS&FD versus Export Approval
USG USG TS&FD TS&FD Approval Approval Service, OSD and USG TS&FD boards meet to determine if release is “the right thing to do”
USG USG Export Export Approval Approval Compliance with the AECA and ITAR – either via an approved Export License or ITAR Exemption 4
What Can DoD Influence? DoD DoD Interagency Interagency
Reducing Congressional notification process timeline
Foreign Policy/ Pol-Mil Considerations
DoS-proposed Congressional Notification process
Tech Security & Foreign Disclosure
Preparing for exportability early in acquisition process – Defense Exportability Features (DEF)
Enhancing DoD TSFD decision processes to provide timeliness, quality and synchronization of release reviews
Export Control Reform
Acquisition Initiatives
Enhancing DoD’s ability to provide urgently-needed capabilities to partners and allies
Ensuring efforts are aligned with general U.S. foreign policy goals – e.g., QME, MTCR
Security Cooperation Reform
Protecting “crown jewels” and fostering economic/national security interests 5
Export Control Reform -- Basic Principles -• Basic Principles – Protect the “Crown Jewels” of U.S. Technology Ensure protection of assets that gives our warfighters a critical edge
– Expedite Technology Sharing and Cooperation with Allies and Partners Build Partnership Capacity Secure ties with Allies and partners; increase cooperation and collaboration
– Enhance and improve enforcement, monitoring, and intelligence capabilities Deny exports to countries and entities of concern
• Basic Elements – – – –
Single Control List Single Export Control Licensing Agency Single IT System to process all licenses Single Export Enforcement Coordination Agenc
6
International Programs Overview International Transaction Mechanisms -Foreign Military Sales (e.g. F-18)
Technology Security & Foreign Disclosure (TS&FD) DoD-Led (State & Intel Community Participation)
Export Control
State – Munitions (Commerce – Dual Use)
State
Yes
- Cooperative Memorandum of Understanding (e.g. JSF) - Direct Commercial Sales (e.g. C-17)
Technology Security& Foreign Disclosure No
Congressional Oversight
Export Control
SFRC HFAC
DoD SASC HASC State
7
TSFD Status Quo – Multiple Entry/Exit – Multiple ‘Pipes’ – PROBLEM #2 Too many entry points/no triage
PROBLEM #3 – Too much autonomy
PROBLEM #4
w/out synchronization & timelines
Too many decision documents Decision
PROBLEM #1 Reactive approach
MILDEPs ~ 150‐200 HLDs/yr
Gov’t Industry • FMS • Direct Comm’l Sale • Cooperative MOUs • Other
ATTR SSG (Arms Transfer & Technology Release Senior Steering Group)
NDP LO/CLO AT COMSEC SAP DSC MTCR NVD/INS Intel DL/WF PNT/GPS GEOINT EW
Policy
Primary
AT&L
Primary
AT&L
Process
NSA & NII
Primary
SAPCO
Specialized
AT&L + Policy
Specialized
Policy
Specialized
DTSA
Specialized
USD(I)
Specialized
NII
Specialized
NII
Specialized
NGA
Specialized
None
No single process
Interagency process Other DoD Components
~150 ‐200 High Level Decisions (HLDs) & Top Level Decisions (TLDs)/yr ~500 Specialized Routine Decisions (SRDs)/ yr
~ 85,000 Routine Decisions (RDs)/ yr
~ 500 SRDs/yr ~ 85K RDs /yr
Decision Decision Decision
PROBLEM #5
Decision Decision Decision Decision Decision
No top level DoD closure process
NSA and NGA based on specialized authorities OSD Staff & DoD Component ‘Core TSFD’ Routine TSFD Decisions based on delegated authority 8
TS&FD Reform Background • DSD established Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure Review Group (TS&FD RG) in July 2010 based on an Export Control reform report recommendation • DSD approved ‘Phase I’ TS&FD RG Findings & Recommendations on Dec 20, 2010 with key follow‐up actions: Establish TS&FD Office (TSFDO) (Feb 14, 2011) Conduct Phase II TS&FD processing ‘trade space’ analysis and report Implement TS&FD RG ‘Good Ideas’ on a rolling basis
• SecDef concurred with this approach on Jan 5, 2011 during Security Cooperative Reform (SCR) Task Force briefing • TS&FD ‘Phase II’ Findings and Recommendations approved by DSD on Apr 15, 2011 – Implementation currently underway 9
New DoD TS&FD System -- Process Overview --
ATTR SSG (Co-Chaired by USD(P) & USD(AT&L))
Guidance & Direction
Guidance & Direction
Policy (NDP) Gov’t Industry Country
AT&L TS&FD
MILDEPs
DoD TS&FD Office
HLDs Other DoD
• FMS • DCS • Cooperative MOUs • Other
CNSS – Committee on National Security Systems DCS – Direct Commercial Sale FMS – Foreign Military Sale HLDs – High Level Decisions (OSD level) MILDEPs – Military Departments MOU – Memorandum of Understanding NDP – National Disclosure Policy RDs ‐‐ Routine Decisions (except for COMSEC and GEOINT) RSCOM – Remote Sensing Committee SRDs – Specialized Routine Decisions (on COMSEC and GEOINT)
CIO TS&FD USD(I) TS&FD (RSCOM)
DoD TS&FD Office
Consolidated Decisions
IF PROBLEM
SRDs
NSA ( for CNSS) & NGA (for RSCOM) based on specialized authorities
Appeal Process
IF PROBLEM
RDs
OSD Staff & DoD Component ‘Core TS&FD’ Routine TS&FD Decisions based on delegated authority
ATTR SSG
DSD or SD
Appeal Decision
Appeal Decision
DTM-053: Attachment 4
10 10
TS&FD Process Transition Plan • Authority: DTM 11‐053 “Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure (TS&FD) Processes” • PURPOSE: Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for the reform of TS&FD processes to minimize process complexities, ensure timeliness and efficient processing of TS&FD release review requests; and implement holistic DoD‐wide release review processes. Provides additional guidance to the DEPSECDEF Memo “Comprehensive Review of DoD TS&FD Processes,” 22 Jul 10 and further delineates the roles and responsibilities of the ATTR SSG. Establishes the TSFDO to serve as the central processing organization for ATTR SG review and adjudication of DoD high level decisions (HLDs) and specialized routine decisions (SRDs) that impact DoD aspects of TS&FD release requests in accordance with its missions and functions. Initiates detailed planning for consolidation and subsequent implementation under the guidance of the ATTR SSG to DoD TS&FD authorities according to their respective member responsibilities. 11
DEF Background Exportability design is rarely incorporated in AT&L programs … Why? Because it isn’t considered or (if it is) it’s not funded Why isn’t it considered? • Because we rarely accept the fact that systems will be exported in the future • Because we focus efforts on meeting defined U.S. warfighter JCIDS requirements rather than undefined Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) requirements Why isn’t it funded? • Because (until FY11 & 12 NDAAs) we haven’t had clear authority to spend U.S. tax dollars “for foreign requirements” • Because we rarely have foreign funds available in early development 12
Defense Exportability Features SEC. 243 FY11 NDAA w/ FY12 NDAA (para (b)) Added SEC. 243. PILOT PROGRAM TO INCLUDE TECHNOLOGY PROTECTION FEATURES DURING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSE SYSTEMS. a) PILOT PROGRAM.—The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a pilot program to develop and incorporate technology protection features in a designated system during the research and development phase of such system. b) COST-SHARING.—Any contract for the design or development of a system resulting from activities specified under subsection (a) for the purpose of enhancing or enabling the exportability of the system either (1) for the development of program protection strategies for the system, or (2) for the design and incorporation of exportability features into the system shall include a cost-sharing provision that requires the contractor to bear at least one half of the cost of such activities. c) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Not later than December 31 of each year in which the Secretary carries out the pilot program established under this section, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the pilot program, including a list of each designated system included in the program. d) TERMINATION.—The pilot program established under this section shall terminate on October 1, 2015. e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: (1) The term “designated system” means any system (including a major system, as defined in section 2302(5) of title 10, United States Code) that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics designates as being included in the pilot program established under this section. (2) The term “technology protection features” means the technical modifications necessary to protect critical program information, including anti-tamper technologies and other systems engineering activities intended to prevent or delay exploitation of critical technologies in a designated system. 13
Building “Exportability” into US Systems Defense Exportability Features (DEF) • 7 programs (6 MDAPs and 1 non-MDAP) selected for DEF pilot program in FY11: ―4 Program Offices in the process of soliciting/executing DEF feasibility studies with FY12 funding ―3 programs reported to be unable to execute FY12 DEF study funding • Study funding will total approximately $1.75M out of $1.89M appropriated, with matching funding from vendors in three programs • AT&L/IC will work closely with the MILDEPs and contractors during study process and facilitate interaction with and feedback from Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure community. • DEF feasibility studies will inform DEF implementation decisions for each program
14
Questions?
15
Agenda • Problem Overview • Export Control Reform • Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure (TS&FD) Reform • Defense Exportability Features Initiative • Questions
2
The Problem How How can can the the USG/DOD USG/DOD best best balance balance these these two two demands? demands?
???
Provide required capabilities quickly to allies and partners
What is DOD’s “decision trade space”?
Protect the “crown jewels” of U.S. Defense technology
• What are our strategic objectives wrt to the partner?
• How sensitive is the technology in question?
• What are the partner’s capability requirements?
• What is the partner’s ability to capitalize on the technology in question?
• What capabilities does the partner want? • How urgent is the need? • Is there a higher-priority need for these capabilities? • What is the partner’s capacity to absorb and effectively employ the capabilities in question? • What strategic benefits does the U.S. gain by providing the requested / required capabilities?
• What is the partner’s capability and will to protect sensitive U.S. technology? • What are the risks to the U.S. or its allies/partners if the technology / system is compromised? • How serious are these risks? • Can these risks be mitigated satisfactorily? 3
TS&FD versus Export Approval
USG USG TS&FD TS&FD Approval Approval Service, OSD and USG TS&FD boards meet to determine if release is “the right thing to do”
USG USG Export Export Approval Approval Compliance with the AECA and ITAR – either via an approved Export License or ITAR Exemption 4
What Can DoD Influence? DoD DoD Interagency Interagency
Reducing Congressional notification process timeline
Foreign Policy/ Pol-Mil Considerations
DoS-proposed Congressional Notification process
Tech Security & Foreign Disclosure
Preparing for exportability early in acquisition process – Defense Exportability Features (DEF)
Enhancing DoD TSFD decision processes to provide timeliness, quality and synchronization of release reviews
Export Control Reform
Acquisition Initiatives
Enhancing DoD’s ability to provide urgently-needed capabilities to partners and allies
Ensuring efforts are aligned with general U.S. foreign policy goals – e.g., QME, MTCR
Security Cooperation Reform
Protecting “crown jewels” and fostering economic/national security interests 5
Export Control Reform -- Basic Principles -• Basic Principles – Protect the “Crown Jewels” of U.S. Technology Ensure protection of assets that gives our warfighters a critical edge
– Expedite Technology Sharing and Cooperation with Allies and Partners Build Partnership Capacity Secure ties with Allies and partners; increase cooperation and collaboration
– Enhance and improve enforcement, monitoring, and intelligence capabilities Deny exports to countries and entities of concern
• Basic Elements – – – –
Single Control List Single Export Control Licensing Agency Single IT System to process all licenses Single Export Enforcement Coordination Agenc
6
International Programs Overview International Transaction Mechanisms -Foreign Military Sales (e.g. F-18)
Technology Security & Foreign Disclosure (TS&FD) DoD-Led (State & Intel Community Participation)
Export Control
State – Munitions (Commerce – Dual Use)
State
Yes
- Cooperative Memorandum of Understanding (e.g. JSF) - Direct Commercial Sales (e.g. C-17)
Technology Security& Foreign Disclosure No
Congressional Oversight
Export Control
SFRC HFAC
DoD SASC HASC State
7
TSFD Status Quo – Multiple Entry/Exit – Multiple ‘Pipes’ – PROBLEM #2 Too many entry points/no triage
PROBLEM #3 – Too much autonomy
PROBLEM #4
w/out synchronization & timelines
Too many decision documents Decision
PROBLEM #1 Reactive approach
MILDEPs ~ 150‐200 HLDs/yr
Gov’t Industry • FMS • Direct Comm’l Sale • Cooperative MOUs • Other
ATTR SSG (Arms Transfer & Technology Release Senior Steering Group)
NDP LO/CLO AT COMSEC SAP DSC MTCR NVD/INS Intel DL/WF PNT/GPS GEOINT EW
Policy
Primary
AT&L
Primary
AT&L
Process
NSA & NII
Primary
SAPCO
Specialized
AT&L + Policy
Specialized
Policy
Specialized
DTSA
Specialized
USD(I)
Specialized
NII
Specialized
NII
Specialized
NGA
Specialized
None
No single process
Interagency process Other DoD Components
~150 ‐200 High Level Decisions (HLDs) & Top Level Decisions (TLDs)/yr ~500 Specialized Routine Decisions (SRDs)/ yr
~ 85,000 Routine Decisions (RDs)/ yr
~ 500 SRDs/yr ~ 85K RDs /yr
Decision Decision Decision
PROBLEM #5
Decision Decision Decision Decision Decision
No top level DoD closure process
NSA and NGA based on specialized authorities OSD Staff & DoD Component ‘Core TSFD’ Routine TSFD Decisions based on delegated authority 8
TS&FD Reform Background • DSD established Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure Review Group (TS&FD RG) in July 2010 based on an Export Control reform report recommendation • DSD approved ‘Phase I’ TS&FD RG Findings & Recommendations on Dec 20, 2010 with key follow‐up actions: Establish TS&FD Office (TSFDO) (Feb 14, 2011) Conduct Phase II TS&FD processing ‘trade space’ analysis and report Implement TS&FD RG ‘Good Ideas’ on a rolling basis
• SecDef concurred with this approach on Jan 5, 2011 during Security Cooperative Reform (SCR) Task Force briefing • TS&FD ‘Phase II’ Findings and Recommendations approved by DSD on Apr 15, 2011 – Implementation currently underway 9
New DoD TS&FD System -- Process Overview --
ATTR SSG (Co-Chaired by USD(P) & USD(AT&L))
Guidance & Direction
Guidance & Direction
Policy (NDP) Gov’t Industry Country
AT&L TS&FD
MILDEPs
DoD TS&FD Office
HLDs Other DoD
• FMS • DCS • Cooperative MOUs • Other
CNSS – Committee on National Security Systems DCS – Direct Commercial Sale FMS – Foreign Military Sale HLDs – High Level Decisions (OSD level) MILDEPs – Military Departments MOU – Memorandum of Understanding NDP – National Disclosure Policy RDs ‐‐ Routine Decisions (except for COMSEC and GEOINT) RSCOM – Remote Sensing Committee SRDs – Specialized Routine Decisions (on COMSEC and GEOINT)
CIO TS&FD USD(I) TS&FD (RSCOM)
DoD TS&FD Office
Consolidated Decisions
IF PROBLEM
SRDs
NSA ( for CNSS) & NGA (for RSCOM) based on specialized authorities
Appeal Process
IF PROBLEM
RDs
OSD Staff & DoD Component ‘Core TS&FD’ Routine TS&FD Decisions based on delegated authority
ATTR SSG
DSD or SD
Appeal Decision
Appeal Decision
DTM-053: Attachment 4
10 10
TS&FD Process Transition Plan • Authority: DTM 11‐053 “Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure (TS&FD) Processes” • PURPOSE: Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for the reform of TS&FD processes to minimize process complexities, ensure timeliness and efficient processing of TS&FD release review requests; and implement holistic DoD‐wide release review processes. Provides additional guidance to the DEPSECDEF Memo “Comprehensive Review of DoD TS&FD Processes,” 22 Jul 10 and further delineates the roles and responsibilities of the ATTR SSG. Establishes the TSFDO to serve as the central processing organization for ATTR SG review and adjudication of DoD high level decisions (HLDs) and specialized routine decisions (SRDs) that impact DoD aspects of TS&FD release requests in accordance with its missions and functions. Initiates detailed planning for consolidation and subsequent implementation under the guidance of the ATTR SSG to DoD TS&FD authorities according to their respective member responsibilities. 11
DEF Background Exportability design is rarely incorporated in AT&L programs … Why? Because it isn’t considered or (if it is) it’s not funded Why isn’t it considered? • Because we rarely accept the fact that systems will be exported in the future • Because we focus efforts on meeting defined U.S. warfighter JCIDS requirements rather than undefined Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) requirements Why isn’t it funded? • Because (until FY11 & 12 NDAAs) we haven’t had clear authority to spend U.S. tax dollars “for foreign requirements” • Because we rarely have foreign funds available in early development 12
Defense Exportability Features SEC. 243 FY11 NDAA w/ FY12 NDAA (para (b)) Added SEC. 243. PILOT PROGRAM TO INCLUDE TECHNOLOGY PROTECTION FEATURES DURING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSE SYSTEMS. a) PILOT PROGRAM.—The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a pilot program to develop and incorporate technology protection features in a designated system during the research and development phase of such system. b) COST-SHARING.—Any contract for the design or development of a system resulting from activities specified under subsection (a) for the purpose of enhancing or enabling the exportability of the system either (1) for the development of program protection strategies for the system, or (2) for the design and incorporation of exportability features into the system shall include a cost-sharing provision that requires the contractor to bear at least one half of the cost of such activities. c) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Not later than December 31 of each year in which the Secretary carries out the pilot program established under this section, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the pilot program, including a list of each designated system included in the program. d) TERMINATION.—The pilot program established under this section shall terminate on October 1, 2015. e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: (1) The term “designated system” means any system (including a major system, as defined in section 2302(5) of title 10, United States Code) that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics designates as being included in the pilot program established under this section. (2) The term “technology protection features” means the technical modifications necessary to protect critical program information, including anti-tamper technologies and other systems engineering activities intended to prevent or delay exploitation of critical technologies in a designated system. 13
Building “Exportability” into US Systems Defense Exportability Features (DEF) • 7 programs (6 MDAPs and 1 non-MDAP) selected for DEF pilot program in FY11: ―4 Program Offices in the process of soliciting/executing DEF feasibility studies with FY12 funding ―3 programs reported to be unable to execute FY12 DEF study funding • Study funding will total approximately $1.75M out of $1.89M appropriated, with matching funding from vendors in three programs • AT&L/IC will work closely with the MILDEPs and contractors during study process and facilitate interaction with and feedback from Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure community. • DEF feasibility studies will inform DEF implementation decisions for each program
14
Questions?
15
