1160: Enlightenment and Human Understanding Sept. 10th: 1st ...

1160: Enlightenment and Human Understanding Sept. 10th: 1st Lecture master’s office at vanier Term work: 4 in class tests. will give questions ahead of time 1st test: end of october reading: Course kit: Regulae: rules for the direction of understanding. he wrote 36, we will study 12. read pgs 1-49 Course kit: Principles of Philosophy: teaching manual for those who will be teaching cartesian thought. -preface: 202-215 -principles: 216-227 * note: not course kit numbers! original book numbers. -replies to objections II: pgs 30-52 Meditations on First Philosophy: -Introduction: 1-33 -dedication: 33-40 -meditations: 45-100 -reply: 101-104 Immanuel Kant: after descartes: only 3 questions can be raised in a philosophic environment: 1. What can I know? epistemology (the study of knowledge--knowing) 2. What ought I to do? duties and responsibilities: ethics, moral philosophy 3. this question follows from #2--if you do the right thing, you should recieve some sort of reward: What can I hope for? eschatology (the study of last things). is there an afterlife? will you be rewarded? in this course, only look at #2 with Hobbes, and d/n look at #3 in this course 1

the period: the enlightenment: 17th and 18th centuries enlightenment thinkers: general characteristic: dissatisfied with learning of the past. thought of themselves as revolutionaries. outright rejection of the learning of the past-the learning of the past will corrupt you. did not seem themselves as part of a chain of learning going back to the greeks and the hebrews. why were they dissatisfied with learning of the past? (these were not universityeducated thinkers) medieval period: all medieval thinkers were doing exegesis: they studied texts: exegetes, exegetical. all that happened was that the thinkers were exegeting. the texts: -the bible: revealed truth -plato and aristotle medieval thinkers: not two sets of truths, same truths: plato and Aristotle from reason, bible from revelation. -bible and plato and aristotle contained all truths that humans can and should know. but: sometimes the bible and p&a contradicted each other, and p&a contradicted each other. aquinas: the great synthesizes: task: to reconcile bible with p&a descartes: entire dissatisfaction with this way of proceeding scientific revolution underway: newton, Kepler, etc -scientists attempted to prove what it was they were concerned with what makes proof possible? need an accepted method of investigation

2

2 kinds of science: -incredible strides in: -1. mathematics (descartes invented algebra) physical sciences: astronomy, medicine, physics medieval thinkers had no method: c/n establish truth it may be that there are truths in bible and p&a failure of the past: failure to address method. descartes: no such thing as philosophy, there were philosophies in order for this revolution to take place, we need to focus on method -can we learn from mathematicians and science? -physical sciences use observation: experiments. depend on observations descartes argued: difficulty with physical sciences: level of certainty that emerged from these experiments. most that can be said: findings are probable. never certain.--always room for another revolution in science. descartes: i want knowledge that is true for all time. eternal truths. turned to mathematics. the truths in mathematics are eternally true. therefore: mathematics is the only area that will be fruitful. we are not interested in the physical sciences--we are interested in the mathematical sciences. Regulae pg 3: rule 2: only those objects should engage our attention (dubitable, indubitable) half way down pg: “thus in accordance with the above rule or maxim we reject all such probable knowledge, and make it a rule to trust only what is indubitable” bottom of pg: “consequently, if we think of the sciences already discovered, arithmatic and geometry yeild indubitable knowledge...” 3

pg 5: “but one conclusion....direct road toward truth...we should busy ourselves with no other...except arithmatic and geometry” -philosophy is going to copy arithmatic and geometry pg 25, last para, top of 26: “ this method of ours resembles...the...mechanical crafts which d/n need the aid of anything outside of them...own instruments...forced to use at first a hard stone or rough lump of iron (things nature has provided). rock instead of hammer. wood instead of tongs. thus equipped, he would not then set out at once in attempt to...he would first of all fashon a proper hammer, proper tongs...since thus at the outset...rough precents...we should not forthwith we try...we must first employ...are wrong to demand” in the beginning of mechanical crafts there were no proper tools. started with primitive items in nature--used these primitive items to make better tools. once they had better tools, they could practice their craft. philosophy must proceed in exactly the same way. mathematics had no book or manuel on method. yet, mathematical truths were found. seeds or germs of method: b/cm known to the ancient greeks and others--correspond to ‘primitive tools’. given there has been advance in mathematics without method? seeds or germs of mathematical learning. how did they become aware of these? these seeds/germs are already in our minds. innate. pg 10, course kit: “since the usefullness of this method...i am quite ready to believe...nature even conducting them to it. for the human mind has in it something we may call divine...first germs of useful thought...bear fruit of their own accord...simplest sciences give us an instances... ...these two methods...inborn principle” these seeds were given to us by GOD. we can now develop a method PROBLEMS WITH DESCARTES METHOD

4

in regulae: all references to mathematics: held to be certain, indubitable, eternal -we can emulate the method of mathematics to come up with a method of learning in regulae: -rules 1-4: sets out how mathematicians proceed -rules 5-12: adaptation to learning generally--how to make them work beyond mathematics -meditations pg 48: meditation 1: 1st para: “that is probably why our reasoning is not unjust...falsity or uncertainty” 2nd para: “nevertheless...He does permit this” -entertains the possibility of deciept in mathematics meditation 3: pg 59 & top of pg 60: Principles of philosophy pg 220 “we shall also doubt of all other things, even of the proofs of mathematics...God who created us can do anything he wants” what are we to do with this dichotomy? regulae: mathematics is certain elsewhere: god can deceive us main focus of course: epistemology Descartes concerned with areas of epistemology: 1. our cognitive faculties--what enables us to know: knowing faculties in our brain 2. levels of certainty in pursuit of knowledge (b/w indubitability and ignorance) 3. limits of human knowledge: what can we know, and what can’t we know (Can we know God? is God an object of knowledge?) 4. the nature of knowledge (mathematical knowledge is hierarchical: some things have to be known before other things can be known) 5

axiom of equality: things equal to the same thing are equal to each other 2+2=4 3+1=4 2+2=3+1 5.

objects of knowledge. what are mathematicians studying? isosceles triangle: two opposing sides are equal length--base angles are equal. A. -diagram is imperfect B. -mathematician is not talking about the isosceles triangle on the board, but rather the triangle as it is thought (not as it is drawn) -objects of mathematics (what) is not a picture on the board, but the thought of a triangle. -the objects of mathematics are not empirical. -even if there were no triangles in existence, it would still be true that the base angles are equal. the truths do not pertain to physical objects. Sept. 24th: second lecture first test: end of october: 22nd or 29th intro cont: -all enlightenment figures, including descartes, thought were creating a break from the past -not indebted to past, not continuing past -saw selves as revolutionaries -would change state of learning...for all time... -previous: revelation (bible) and reason (plato, aristotle)--exegesis -rejected study of bible as containing all truths -crit: no method for distinguishing truths -hope and confidence: rise of science: newton, kepler, galileo--making progress through a new method. systematic. -learning generally would need to emulate the sciences 6

-which sciences would you emulate? empirical sciences: always have recourse to observation: physics, astronomy -did not generate knowledge -probably not certain (if were certain could not be overthrown). revolutions in science a priori sciences: make claims prior to experience: mathematics: arithmetic and geometry (d. founder of algebra) -only here was certainty achievable -the kind of truth is considered eternal (will never change) -2+2=4: truths are indubitable any truth in the empirical sciences (eg: for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction)--can believe is false, even if not. in a priori sciences: the opposite isn’t even thinkable -the denial of the claim is not thinkable how to proceed? 1. figure out what mathematicians do: find out about their method. how do they solve problems? -no book on method... therefore took it upon himself to write this: regulae -take what mathematicians do, and make it an object of study--what do m’s do when they do math? math b/cms the object of study (rules 1-4) -rules 5-12: attempt to adapts rules of math to generation of universal method characterize break w past: 1. which discipline is supreme? medieval thinkers: believed were tied to church and doing the church’s business -theology the supreme form of learning, unchallengable enlightenment thinkers: considered selves completely autonomous, therefore emancipated from the church -philosophy could judge theology--claims of the church had to be adjudicated by philosophy -sit in judgement -philosophy b/cms the supreme science and theology is downgraded

7

2. medieval thinkers: god enlightenment: if god is not the first item that needs to be studied, what is the proper first object of study? human nature. -basing view on mathematics: what is the origin of a mathematical truth? we don’t make them up. (law c/n decree 2+2=5). they are not created by us. there is no obvious creator to mathematic truths -concluded: mathematics come from the mind studying itself. mental. d/n come from the physical world. they come from us. -they come from human nature. -conclusion: if learning generally, and phil in partic, are to undergo a revolution, it must be the case that the truth of phil and learning must also come from human nature. -in order to make inroads we need to study ourselves. 3. medieval theological view: causality tied to theology enlightenment non-theological explanations: difference sense of causality.

-aristotle: figured out causality: if you are going to build smthg--what are the causal factors? bricks, mortar, copper (material stuff) the material cause but bricks won’t build themselves, the efficient cause (need a builder) always pushes. but need a plan--put into proper order: formal cause, blueprint or plan. final causality: purpose for building the house. -in order to understand anything, need to understand 4 types of cause -if you believe in god and responsible for everything in the world, final causality, guides all causal inquiries WHY? if you have a theological explanation, your inquiry must begin with WHY. -why questions presuppose an intellect behind what you are investigating. 8

on the other hand... enlightenment: HOW? becomes the new question. efficient causality seeks: causal explanation in terms of pushes -presupposition in efficient causality: world is a type of machine--guided by causal sequences -final causality ceases to become important 4. med: all truths have already been revealed enlight: we d/n possess all truths. there are new truths to be discovered 5. med: if you think there is a god who created you, your view of yourself in relationship to other pp, wrld, god, all need to be understood (what does god want of me, etc) need to understand self in relation to theological system enlight: rethink rel. to self, others, world, god: rethinking of man’s place in the wrld. DESCARTES CK 210-211: scheme for learning: “Following on this.... -after code of ethics, should study logic, not that of the Schools (all aristotelian--wrote first book on logic--none others for 1500 yrs) BUT logic to discover things we don’t know. (practice on math) -in aristotelian logic: syllogism: two premises and an a conclusion: all men are mortal socrates are a man therefore socrates is mortal

bothered descartes: syllogistic logic is syntactical -rules for the manipulation of symbols

9

-in case of syllogistic argument: conclusion of arg never give you new knowledge -nothing new is given. all that is given is the manipulation of the symbols -conclusion already implicit. only made explicit. therefore never learn anything. can only teach others what you already know. (can only be a pedagogical device) -not suited to revolution and discovery of new truths we need a logic of discovery: -teaches us how to direct our reason : kno. which he is seeking is in the mind. not empirical. already in the mind. a priori. all kno we need is already in our minds, just as all the math we need is already in our minds. -philosophers need to bring out kno in mind which already possesses it. -mathematician: guiding our minds to the relationships that are relevant to solving a mathematical problem. -attempt to give you smthing new (but already in minds) teaches the mind how to seek the kno that is already in the mind metaphysics: aristotle: a book which studies everything rather than particular things -the conditions which holds of things generally. what are the general features of existence. put after a’s work on physics. descartes: should study after logic of discovery: metaphysics studies first principles of human knowledge. what must be known before anything else can be known. -contained in meditations: first principles of hu. kno.--what needs to be known before anything else to be known tree: roots: metaphysics trunk: physics: out of which springs the branches: medicine, mechanics (how the world works), morals regulae: beginning of revolution: paying attn to mathematics: why does math always yield know? CK pgs 3, 4, 5 10

pg 3: “thus in accordance...” pg 5: “but one consideration...certainty equal to the proof of arithmatic and geometry...” WHY DOES D THINK THAT MATHEMATICS IS CERTAIN? 1. (pg 4, bottom) “But now let us proceed...deduction c/n be erroneous... -mistakes in math either: premise incorrect, or were not paying proper attn to the premise. -error in math are always human errors -reasoning in math is infallible--the actual process of reasoning in math is infallible. -error is always human error -therefore must properly prepare you mind 2.

(pg. 5), 2nd para: “this furnishes us with...the former alone deal with an object...so pure and uncomplicated that they need make no assumptions...” -mathematical objects are pure and uncomplicated: thought of isosceles triangle, or right angle triangle -figures in the world can only approximate what we are actually thinking about. no true triangles in nature. only true triangles are in the mind. -true objects of math are non-empirical -”PURE”: means a priori. does not derive from observation. -”UNCOMPLICATED”: can always add to or take away from the thought of an empirical object. empirical objects, as they are thought, are subject to the mind’s control. because of that you can never be certain what is actually in the kitchen at any given time. have no control over physical objects as you are thinking them. -BUT: mathematical objects: content is fixed. “fixed natures.” no room for uncertainty. certainty of math: 1. reasoning is infallible. 2. object has a fixed nature OCT 1ST LECTURE: 11

1st test: Oct. 29th -secondary sources: book or article--not internet--on descartes -selected bibliography in meditations book -a book about the primary source -use: to inform you on other views: 1. explain difficult parts of the text (exegesis) 2. elaboration--illustrate importance. 3. reveal inconsistencies. 4. offer criticisms of the cartesian enterprise. for test: select one author--integrate what he/she says into your answer. discuss relevance of 2ndary source to your answer. (c/n use tweyman as secondary source) proper citations LECTURE the relevance of m. to the cartesian enterprise pg. 4 & 5 CK: exclusive to the R. -where does the certainty of m. come from? -”But now let us proceed...” -yes, there are errors in m. but the mind, in reasoning, is never at fault. the rational processes which give rise to m. are never at fault. the mind is faultless. 2 sources of error: 1. i. inadvertence (lack of attn). ii. lack of understanding the premises. 2. m & g. alone deal with an object pure and uncomplicated: a priori, non-empirical, in the mind already. it is never studying the external wrld. no empirical content. i. nothing depends upon the uncertain senses. ii. cannot leave anything out of a m. idea. cannot be changed--cannot be added to or subtracted from. this is where we can have certainty. what are these faculties? pg. 7 CK: “But lest we...” 12

only 2 ways to know: intuition and deduction pg. 7 CK: “By intuition I understand..” -light of reason: given to us by g-d. like a flashlight. in order for us to see them intellectually. -intuition: a cognitive faculty give to us by g-d. points to things we can know. when 2 things are related, the related objects called relata, singluar relatum: focus of intuition is to see connection b/w to relata. connections sought all a priori. pg. 7: last para: “This evidence...” pg. 8: “Hence now we are in a position...” deduction: moving down frm 1st principles to a conclusion. 2+2=4 3+1=4 axiom of equality 2+2=3+1 -self-evident truths -in deduction: can only attend to one thing at a time--no way to prove the certainty of memory. therefore, always an element of uncertainty. 1. true, certain route to knowledge is intuition--infallible 2. deduction can be questioned 3. but...it is possible to improve the sluggishness of memory: go over the steps repetitively until you could comprehend the entire proof as a single intuition. -since each step is intuition, there is only one cognitive faculty in knowledge: intuition. pg. 19, rule VII “It is necessary to obey...”

13

pg. 10. “Since then the usefulness...” -g-d and nature the same thing for d. -all tools for m., inferences, etc, have come from g-d -progress in the ancients illustrates these divine seeds ...leaving the R... m. beyond the R... -R: written frm perspective of mathematicians: concerned with method -but...in meditations, and p.o.p. d. writes as a philosopher (not a mathematician) -level of certainty required by phil. exceeds of that sought by m-tican. Med. pg 48: 1st para: “why our reasoning is not unjust...” 2nd para: “nevertheless...” 3rd. para: non-believers pg. 59 & 60 “But when I took anything...” POP pg. 220 princ. V why m. is dubitable: A. when two parties disagree on a m. answer 1. confidence is equal: what persuades each of them that they go the right answer? 2. psychological component in m.--irresistibility. 3. psych irresistibility is unreliable 4. but p.i. is the reason we accept mathematical truths--therefore m. truths are dubitable.

14

B. what if everyone agreed? -still doubt -if there is g-d, who is a deceiver, power to have the mind get the wrong answer. C. objection against atheists -g-d’s omnipotence (believers) -non-believers: cause of your existence must be finite--cannot have infinite power. -your ‘finite cause’: would need to believe it intended you to reach the truth. any finite cause, despite its intentions, cannot fully guarantee the effect it has brought about. -atheists have no further guarantee of truth. R: m. is certain Med: m. is dubitable aim of M: -CK 211--1/3 way down: “then when he has acquired a certain skill...” Med: uncover 1st principles of hu. kno. & learning Med. pg 102: “for there is this difference b/w these two cases...” -quest for 1st principles is different in geometry and metaphysics. search c/n be the same. -1st principles of geometry never conflict with the senses. -but...if you try to understand yourself empirically, it is identical with your body but: self is conjunction of mind and body. to ordinary c/s is possible to prove truth of self--not self-evident. -ordinary c/s learns about g-d through experience. -if true idea of g-d brought to pp tied to sense, they would reject it--b/c informed by empirical stuff they have been taught. -in case of metaphysics--we need to be detached from our sense--seek this truth w/o sensory input. a priori. 15

-this requires considerable attention on part of reader. pg. 101 “inattentive and hostile reader” -commitment to unprejudiced self completely--no bodily influences how to unprejudice the mind? -levies an attack on our empirical beliefs

LECTURE OCT 15TH model of learning is m.: deductive arguments: ‘duco’ (leave) ‘de’ (from) foundation of math: begins with axioms: self-evident truths, and premises are added to this. eg: axiom of equality 2+2=4 3+1=4 ______ 2+2=4 why were deductive args taken to be superior? if follows rules of logic, and all premises are true, then the answer cannot not be true -if follows rules of logic then it is true -therefore, greatest tool in seeking truth d.

d.

(pgs 210, 211, preface to p.o.p.) -points out this way of reasoning is not exactly what he is looking for: conclusion does not contain anything new. simply makes the implicit explicit. also has a metaphysical problem with this: in meditations meditations: seeks out axioms/first principles of all human knowledge. 16

argues that first principles of metaphysics are different (pg 101-104) pg. 102 and top of 103 “for there is this difference between the two cases...harmonize with the use of our senses (in m. & geometry)...in the proper deduction of the consequences...even if you are inattentive...on the contrary, nothing in metaphysics causes more trouble than making the perception of its primary principles...cannot be apprehended except...” 1st principles in g. accord with our senses: no opposition with sense and 1st principles, therefore self-evidence of g. 1st principles easily grasped by anyone but 1st principles of metaphysics d/n agree with use we make of our sense. always a conflict between 1st principle and our sense. therefore, 1st principle cannot be apprehended with ease. therefore, d. proposes: influence of the senses must be eliminated person who wants to succeed must be attentive pg. 101 analysis and synthesis: “Analysis shows the true way...” -analysis is the method of metaphysics to uncover 1st principles. method of analysis designed to make us see that they are self-evidently true. important: the student feels as if he has discovers these truths himself d.

wants to establish g-d as his creator. -claim is contradicted by the sense: d/n corroborate this claim -senses would indicate that there is no g-d -senses unable to establish that g-d is my creator -therefore, senses must be eliminated to get at metaphysical truth two different 1st principles: 17

-axiom of equality -g-d is my creator: connection b/w subj and predicate is not obvious. therefore can be an act of denial--this is why wants to lead people to self-discovery 1. 2. 3.

bodily influence must be eliminated we need to give full attention no hostility then you will see in your own minds eye the connection between g-d and your creation. can only be understood through thought (no rhetoric--c/n be persuaded) therefore you need to come to it as though you yourself had discovered it. truths discovered in meditations are personal grasping these truths is not obtained through deduction, but rather through meditation: the mind thinking on itself, guided by d. pg. 102, 1st para “synthesis employs an opposite procedure...thus the reader...even if hostile...compelled to render assent...” pg 102, 3rd para: “but i have used in the meditations, only analysis” FIRST MEDITATION: PREAMBLE goal: seeking 1st principles of hu. kno. --only two possible sources: reason and the sense. -med. 1 concerned exclusively with sense. -determination by voyage into skepticism: wether the findings of the senses can withstand skepticism -how do pp who use their senses regard the world, and truth about the world? -there is a perceiver, and his/her senses. there is the external thing. you must believe that the thing is in the world. no-one has direct contact with the object itself. the best we do is have images of objects.

1. 2.

(colored glasses change what things look like)--our perception is relative perception always requires a perspective (further away, smaller, vague) 18

3. 4.

tools increase/change senses (microscope, telescope) trickery (circus) perception is representative of reality, it is not that reality itself: representative realism: the ordinary way of approaching the world. data of sense is unquestionable. perceivers are never in direct contact with the external world. but we really want to know if things are really here--we need to know: are my perceptions true of the world?

1.

impossible for me to leave my senses to establish truth of sense data (tied to sense). do my sense-data correspond to reality? (if i see it as blond is it really blond?) 2. correspondence theory of truth (do perceptions correspond to reality?). need to find a feature in perception that, when present, guarantees that sense datum correspond to reality. ...soooo...how do we do that? med. pgs 58, 59 “and the little that i have said...” -features of clarity and distinctness, mind’s signs of truth how med. 1 is set up: (preamble cont.) -principle of evidence: our mind must be operating with principles of evidence -1st principle of evidence is the lowest, least reflective--will isolate clarity and distinctness as a feature--will cover a range of perceptions--admitted into consciousness as true. (perceptions not clear and distinct regarded as false). but -we want indubitably, so if this principle has ever led us to an error in fact or principle (ie, we might have made a mistake) then we must reject principle of evidence, clarity and distinctness, and range of perceptions. hyperbolic doubt 2. come up with a second principle of evidence -one which is more reflective -will also utilize clarity and distinctness -will admit a range of perceptions into consciousness -using this principle, can we still make an error in fact and principle? 19

procedure: dialectic/dialectical: the succeeding principle of evidence improves upon the first one. built upon the failures of the first one. 3. principle of evidence 3: has notion of clarity and distinctness, admits into c/s a range of perceptions, we ask if error in fact/principle is possible...end up rejecting everything again Q: what is the last possible notion of clarity, perceptions, etc? hyperbolic doubt. (most perceptions are probably true) if_____(sufficient condition) then______(necessary condition--sine que non--without which not) oxygen a necessary condition of combustion d.

if dubitable, must be rejected converse: if dubitable, is rejected if not rejected, is indubitable -everything not rejected/accepted must be be indubitable -everything rejected can be dubitable seeking 1st principles which cannot be doubted 1st med: seeking a principle which is indubitable. med: pg. 45 & 45 “to build anew from the foundation....i shall only attack those principles upon which my former beliefs rested...principles are sometimes deceptive” p1: (most naive) the senses are always clear and distinct. perceptions correspond to reality. pg. 46: “but it may be that the senses sometimes deceive us...” 20

therefore, d. rejects. p2: (revised on shortcomings of the first) *look at: pg 151-152 in CK vol 2 (pg 57 CK)

OCTOBER 22ND LECTURE text next week: starts at 8:30. just under two hours. author, journal, journal #, and pg #’s--title, publishing co. brevity not a virtue. use pen. write clearly. last wk: preamble. attacking representative realism. the idea that the best we can have is a perception of the object. how do i know that my perception of the table is an accurate representation? correspondence theory of truth (hoping perception corresponds with reality?). d: we cannot jump out of our skin to look at the table therefore, we have to establish the correspondence though the representation of the table. how can you know, by examining perceptions, that there is a correspondence? we have to find features within perception, which, if present, guarantee that the perception corresponds with the object: clarity and distinctness. are any of our perceptions adequate for this job? med 1: trying to get a clear account of clarity and distinctness how do you seek clarity and distinctness? d: humans utilize principles of evidence. 21

regulatory principles. through principles of evidence that a set of perceptions is emitted as true. in order to test a partic princ of evidence--we need to ask if it has ever produced a mistake. even if it always worked, asks: could there be an error in principle? therefore reject principle, clarity and distinctness, and perceptions. hyperbolic doubt. it goes beyond logic. it is not logical to reject everything based on one doubt. but the search for 1st principles requires this approach. test: principles of evidence which follow the first one are dialectical--each tries to correct the one previous to it. clarity and distinctness are redefined: yields another set of perceptions. the cycle continues. principle of evidence ‘n’--last possible principle of evidence--dfn of clarity and distinctness, a set of perceptions, and rejects everything. end of the quest for 1st principles using perception what is the ‘n’ point? med pg 49 “But it is not sufficient...doubtful but probable...i allow myself to be deceived...judgement no longer dominated by bad usage” the senses are always pushing us into doubt. the hyperbolic doubt works against the senses. where the influence of the senses and the hyperbolic doubt meet we have reached a point of indifference. purpose: to yield to indifference. if you are hostile to this project (pg. 101, 102) it won’t work. starting point of inquiry: no prejudice whatsoever. pg. 49, last para: the evil genius who deceives me. not g-d. another hypothesis. finite power. can deceive you as much it wants. the personification of hyperbolic doubt.

22

med. 1 principles of evidence: pg 45/46 “upheaval of former opinions” -if you find one mistake--whole thing is out. -attack principles of evidence upon which my previous kno. hinged. POE 1(principle of evidence): the senses are always reliable -is indiscriminate in what it takes to be true. how does he know he has made mistakes? -things which are hardly perceptible or very far away -contradiction in what the senses lead to POE 2 (principle of evidence) pg 46 “But it may be that although the senses sometimes deceive me...” ie: the sense turn out to be reliable when our perceptions are clear (highly perceptible) and distinct (knowing the components of an object). one counter-example to this POE: pg. 46, 2nd para, middle: crazy people example... so...the counter example is madness. madness: people who create their own reality that have nothing to do with the external world. not deception but illusion. loss of contact with reality. how does descartes know he is not mad? people who are mad are unable to distinguish reality from illusion. delusion. create own reality, and errors cannot be pointed out. mad pp have true perceptions. need another POE (3): the sense are reliable whenever our perceptions are clear (highly perceptible) and distinct (components known, and there is no reason to doubt 23

the accuracy of our perceptions) POE 3: is there any sense in which it is true to say that normal, non-mad people are delusional? are normal pp delusional? can they tell when they’re not delusional? pg 46: last para: “I am in the habit of sleeping...in my dreams...” same content awake and asleep--the content of wakefulness is reproduced in sleep. there is no way to prove that at any given moment you are awake. cannot prove it. might be asleep now. it means you, like the mad person, is delusional. even though the content of the dream is the same as if you are awake. since have no way to determine waking from sleeping, will assume that i am asleep and that i am dreaming. if it is possible i am dreaming, POE 3 won’t save us. pg. 47: “Now let us assume that we are asleep...” what can we say about our dreams? they distort reality. this means at one time you needed to be in contact with reality. eg centaurs: distortions of reality. it means we must have been in contact with reality in order to then distort it. is there anything in a dream that is true? yes, the components--these components came from reality. even in dreams, there may still be truth in the dream--the components of the dream. POE 4: even if you are now dreaming/delusional, the components of our delusions are clear (highly perceptible) and distinct (can tell components) could we be wrong about this? pg 47: “...or if their imagination is extravagant enough...to invent something...”

24

POE 4: predicated on assumption that the mind cannot invent new perceptions. therefore, false. “it is certain all the same that the colors...corporeal nature in general, its extension, quantity or magnitude, place, time...” not matter what you imagine, it still has a shape, a size, is countable, is in a place, and time. 2+2+4 etc. POE 5: for any perception, it is possible to alter its content. but certain representations of reality through which we have no freedom whatsoever. cannot imagine something outside of space, time, numerability, etc. if these are features essential to thinking about an object, they are essential for perceiving an object. the true metaphysical features of objects. ...but is this true? can we say that the materials out of which sensory objects are formed are clear and distinct. so, the most reliable sciences associated with POE 5: arithmetic and geometry--discuss space, time, and numerability, a priori so...how do you refute this? pg. 48 “the concept of an all-powerful g-d...no earth, no heaven, no extended body...” maybe g-d is having me imagine an external time when one does not exist. -intro of the hypothesis of a deceiving deity--the last point in the analysis of representative realism. we cannot have confidence that there is an external world. we may be dreaming, but there is nothing real we are constructing these on. no defense of representative realism providing any principles of knowledge. therefore: conclusion: principles of kno have to be found in mind, not senses. nov. 5th 25

cogito ergo sum: (comes out of principle 7) two arguments on pg 51: arg frm persuasion and arg 2 from deception if i am persuaded or deceived therefore i think last para pg 52: post malicious genius: body: know i exist...but what am i? he can think of himself as existing while denying that he might have a body. therefore, having a body is not essential to his existence--can think of himself as existing without a body. mobility: can i think of myself existing without the ability to move? senses: can i think of myself exiting...? bottom of pg. 52: but what about thinking? thought is a feature that belongs to me. it alone cannot be separated from me. if i cease to think i cease to exist. a thing which thinks thought is necessarily connected to my existence. (not imagination...) exists as a thinking thing. thought experiment: i have now discovered that i am a thing which thinks: a self-evident truth that cannot be shaken from my c/s. -how does he know this is true? -looking for a feature of perception which would corroborate truth. what is it about the thought of me as a thinking thing that persuades me that it is truth? pg 58: internal guarantee for “i exist as a thinking thing” “ and in the little i have just said...discover in myself some other things...i am a thing that 26

thinks...what is requisite to have a truth”--clear and distinct perception of that which i state. i know it is true because i perceive it clearly and distinctly pg 237 of principles: explanation of clarity and distinctness: xlv: “i term that clear which is present and apparent to an attentive mind...distinct--so preceise that it contains within itself nothing that is not clear...” xlvi: pain: clarity: the grasp/hold/handle of the mind on what is before it. pain--stepping on a nail--you really feel it. how well you are able to grasp what is before your mind.-has varying degrees to it. distinctness: capacity of perceiver to enumerate the parts of what is before the mind. the components. can also have varying degrees. if you know the components of something it becomes clear. if distinct then also clear. it is possible for distinctness to be complete. clarity and distinctness--attacked more than any other concept in d’s philosophy. most famous critique: Gassendi. important passage: vol. 2 pg 151-152: objections: (kit pg 57) pertains to pg 59 in meditations--where d introduces clarity and distinctness. “in your third meditation...” “taste of a melon...” objection: clarity and distinctness are subjective -d is trying to make a subjective criterion of truth objective. -two lines, converging, and infinity. asymtotic lines. asymtotic to each other--no matter how far along you go they will never meet. the nature of the construction of the lines in relation to each other. 27

-why is there so much contention over math? -people who face death for the opinions they hold? (-so, dude, give us a method of determining clarity and distinctness) -clarity and distinctness are subjective. d’s reply to g: 213, 214 (kit 58) -not matter what d says to justify what he is doing--not complete answer to g’s question. d knows his answer is insufficient. “But, O flesh...” you who are tied to your bodies are irrelevant to my argument. none of your points count. -because their thinking is bound up in their bodies. (they may not be seeing things clearly and distinctly--they are subjective b/c tied to bodies--need to be untied from body to be objective) we are trying to move from subjective to objective. -the method of getting here i’ve already laid out: in my meditation 1 med 1: if there is the least doubt with respect to perception (and P. of Evidence--and clarity and distinctness) the PoE doubted and perceptions treated as false. what are the features of the perceptions and PoE which you have rejected? hyperbolic doubt applies of perceptions and PoE that are obscure and confused. (5 dialectical ‘tries’ of PoE that are rejected) conclusion: (pg 213, 214) in med 1: though examination of PoE and perceptions admitted into c/s--each rejection, a cluster of obscure and confused perceptions is rejected. upshot: what meditation 1 accomplishes--rids the mind of all obscure and confused perceptions. all perceptions that remain after med 1 are clear and distinct.

28

-distinctions made via hyperbolic doubt but there is more... constructed reply to gassendi: why do we need more? why isn’t what he says enough? show me how to objectively distinguish the clear and distinct from the obscure and confused: (me: listen) d: the clear and distinct survives hyperbolic doubt, the obscure and confused does not. -by end of med. 1 d is confident that all surviving perceptions are truly clear and distinct. med. 3: -all perceptions now are clear and distinct -d bothered by: certain perceptions might be both clear and distinct and false -d now needs to: examine the clear and distinct and determine wether they are true. pg 59 last para: if g-d is deceiving me. (4 stages and 6 weeks) stage 1: official reply to g: (213-214): establishes after med. 1 can demarcate the obscure and confused frm clear and distinct. stage 2: -POP 221 & med 3 pg 60. (kit. 39) Principle VIII principle of non-contradiction med pg 60: “anything that i see a manifest contradiction” -truth of clear and distinct using paradigm of cogito ergo sum, is established by showing that the denial of the cogito results in a contradiction. 29

question: what is the denial of the cogito? which he says is contradictory? denial of the cogito: i think but do not exist. this is a contradiction. when there is a contradiction what you are saying must be false. (me: the mind/body, phenomenology, evan thompson, varela) i think but do not exist--why does d. say this is self-contradictory? for next time read: med 2,3,4 and reply to second set of objections: pg 41-42 OCT. 12th LECTURE principle VII cogito ergo sum: Thought and existence are necessary connected -those who think necessarily exist -thought and existence are necessarily inseparable if you deny ‘i think therefore i am’ you need to try to prove that existence and thought are separable (the denial--i think but do not exist--results in a contradiction) -contradiction occurs when affirm and deny same feature of same existent at same time. -2 arguments analogous to the cogito ergo sum. arg frm persuasion arg from deception -the statements that: “i am persuaded/deceived but do not exist” are self contradictory. therefore the original claim is true. med 3, pg 59: tries to figure out what it is about the cogito ergo sum that persuaded him of its truth. -clear and distinct perception of the cogito ergo sum (pgs 151-152 in vol 2--CK 57--from Gassendi) 30

Gassendi’s point: clarity and distinctness appear to be subjective criteria of truth. bottom of pg 152--give us a method--a criteria to establish objectively that thoughts are clear and distinct. (pg 213, 214 CK 58) -d’s official reply: you asked me to provide an objective criteria and i’ve already done that--in meditation 1: we possess a totality of beliefs. tried of find POE that he could admit beliefs/perceptions into c/s as true. -where error is possible or actual the perceptions must be obscure and confused. obscurity and confusion lead to error. -at end of med. 1 all obscure and confused perceptions have been eliminated. by end of med 1, all that remains is the clear and distinct. includes all the claims in mathematics. med 3: pg 59, 60 “but when i took anything very simple and easy...” acknowledges that mathematics are clear and distinct but envisages the possibility of falsehood being tied to clear and distinct. (template until winter break) 1. clear and distinct. principle 7 and pg. 52: denial of clear and distinct is self-contradictory. -med. 3 pg. 59 bottom of pg, top of 60: g-d can deceive me, but if i see a contraction in the denial i know it is true. proving the existence of g-d (as not a deceiver) pg. 42, 43: “in addition to this...” “in the 4th meditation...” -pg 73 “ For, first of all, i recognize it to be impossible that He should ever deceive me...” -pg 73 “And no doubt respecting this matter could remain...subject to infinitude of errors...” -i should not be making mistakes, and yet i am still making mistakes long sustained argument. focus #2: denial of clear and distinct is self-contradictory pgs 81 & 84 (med) “and even although i had not demonstrated this...” 31

-for the mathematician non-contradiction is psychologically important pg. 14 (med): within cogito ergo sum: the thought of thought and the thought of existence are separate and distinct thoughts. pg. 60 (med) & princ. 7: “Let who will deceive me...” denial of clear and distinct is selfcontradictory--used to establish truth of cogito ergo sum. to deny the cogito: i think but do not exist--self-contradictory. (A.J. Ayer: language, truth, and logic) there are statements whose truth can be proven to be true by establishing that their denial is self-contradictory. “all bachelors are unmarried males” denial “some bachelors are not unmarried males” - ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried male’ are synonyms. rewrite denial: “some bachelors are not bachelors”--contradiction--necessarily false. therefore original statement is necessarily true. subject and predicate are same term. analytic sentence. predicate adds nothing to knowledge of subject. denial is always contradictory. - “all bachelors are happy” “some bachelors are not happy”-- “happy” adds something to knowledge of bachelors. synthetic statement. denial is never contradictory. (CK pg. 38, vol. 2)--not syllogistic. all thinking things exist. denial: “some thinking things do not exist” -thought and existence are separate concepts. therefore this claim is synthetic--it has two concepts in it. denial of synthetic statements are not self-contradictory because predicate is not identical to subject. -either: d. was wrong to say denial of cogito is self-contradictory or we don’t understand--require further study. (pg. 41, 42, vol. 2 CK: 52) making sense of claim that denial of cogito is self-contradictory. pg 41 (CK 52) “to begin with...” pg 42 (CK 53) “it is indeed clear...” -if certitude exists it must be found in clear and distinct perceptions of the intellect--there are some that are so evident, and so simple, we never doubt believing them true...” -even if g-d was trying to deceive re cogito he couldn’t do it. “For we cannot doubt them” (cogito) “without believing it to be true...” 32

logicians call: reductio ad absurdum argument. in logic, absurdity means “contradiction.” contradictions are always false. -P- (opponents position) -three premises--non-controversial -conclusion: P. n P (contradiction, false) -one premise must be defective--otherwise would not get a contradiction. -opponents position is unacceptable because it leads to a contradiction. -if P is false, the denial of P must be true. -show that opponents position is a contradiction, denial must be true. LECTURE NOV. 19TH Winter holiday reading: Hume pg 1-94 Intro part 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 11 nxt term: start with part 10 & 11 Descartes: Med. 3 pg. 58 & 59 “...what is requisite to know something is true...in the cogito ergo sum...clear and distinct...” clarity and distinctness are the mind’s sign of truth 151, 152: objection by gassendi (CK 57) -clear and distinct experiences differ between people -principles of action people hold so clearly and distinctly that they are willing to give their lives for it. -arguments in math: asymtotic lines therefore: we need a criteria which set out when we truly perceive something clearly and distinctly 33

213: reply to gassendi: i’ve already done what you have asked me to do in the proper place (meditation 1) med 1: hyperbolic doubt exposes thoughts and ideas which are obscure and confused. ideas unaffected by hyperbolic doubt are clear and distinct. question: why does D. continue to look for the truth? stage one: answer: med. 3: d. acknowledges that when he thinks about math and the cogito ergo sum, he sees both are taken by the mind to be clear and distinct. -if i invoke the notion of a deceiving deity i can doubt the truth of math -clarity and distinctness are not enough -does not say g-d can deceive about cogito ergo sum stage two: principle 7: pg 221, must be read in conjunction with meditations pg. 60 -contradiction pg 60 med: -it seems to be the case that we can go a further step: the truth of cogito ergo sum and 2+2=4. the denial (i think but do not exist) should end up as a contradiction. (PnP) stage three: Med. pg 60 half way down: “i must inquire into whether there is a g-d...and if he is a deceiver” -needs to establish that there is a g-d and that g-d is not a deceiver. stage four: Med pg 42 & 43: 42, second line: fourth meditation. something more he needs after existence of g-d 34

med 4 pg 73: half way down “desire to deceive” bottom of pg “i cannot be deceived...when i think only of g-d...myself...infinitude of errors” Today: complete construction of stage two: why d. thinks the denial of the clear and distinct is a contradiction. constructed reply to gassendi: denial of true and distinct is contradictory #2. med: pg. 81 & 84 -81: utilizes mathematicians view of math and geometry: “the nature of my mind is such that...” -84: “i am of such a nature...naturally impelled to believe it” -psychological component: clear and distinct is irresistible -the guy who has the wrong answer is just as convinced as the guy who has the right answer. supports gassendi’s argument that it is subjective. b. med. pg. 14 -makes the point that in the case of c.e.s. contains two distinct components: thought of thought thought of existence are separable alfred ayer: cannot figure out how d. can say denial of c.e.s. is a contradiction: i think but do not exist. d. -seems to be saying that the c.e.s.--denial if necessarily false, then original claim must be necessarily true. -denial of some sentences is necessarily false. eg: all bachelors are unmarried males/some bachelors are not unmarried males/some 35

bachelors are not bachelors (PnP) (are and are not simultaneously--contradiction-necessarily false--original statement must be true) i think therefore i exist vol. 2 pg 38: (CK 51) -generalization: all thinking things exist -what happens when you deny it? denial: some thinking things do not exist. is that self-contradictory? no. point b.: thought and existence are separate. -therefore d. cannot mean that the denial of the c.e.s. results in a logical contradiction -what d. means when he says the denial of the clear and distinct is self-contradictory: pg. 41 & 42 (CK 52 & 53) 41: certain clear and distinct perceptions that nothing can shake our confidence in them, regardless of deceiving g-d. -is there such a firm and immutable conviction? 42: cannot occur in sense perception. thirst. jaundiced. “if then, any such certitude does exist...only in clear and distinct perceptions of the intellect” (not senses) -NOT saying all clear and distinct conceptions of the intellect are indubitable--only that there are some so clear and distinct that must be true. math has disappeared from the list. “we cannot doubt them without thinking them...” need to know 3 things to understand this: reductio ad absurdum argument -reductio: reduce -ad: to -absurdum: absurdity

36

-reduced something to absurdity -absurdity means contradiction or self-contradictory -catch your opponent off-guard. opponent can’t get out of it -start with opponent’s position (P) -add premises that your opponent agrees to -what comes of it is a contradiction (PnP) -conclusion: necessary falsehood -lets see where the difficulty in the premises are--if none, then the opponents original position is reduced to absurdity and necessarily false. -your position is necessarily true hypothetical syllogism: eg: ‘if you study then you’ll pass’ ‘if you pass then you’ll get a good job’ conclusion: antecedent “if you study” consequent “then you’ll pass” always contains two if/then sentences consequence of first sentence identical to the antecedent of the second -conclusion: connects first antecedent with the second consequence -two hypothetical syllogism arguments in this passage. enthymeme (entheymematic) valid argument but one of the premises is missing. (eg: if you pass, you’ll get a good job--missing premise) arg. 1. passage on pg 42 (CK 53) if cogito is doubted then it must be thought if the cogito is thought it is believed to be true. (cannot think it without believing it to be true) therefore if the cogito is doubted then it is believed to be true. 37

therefore we can never doubt them arg. 2. there are times when the conclusion of an argument can serve as the first premise of another argument. first premise: therefore if the cogito is doubted then it is believed to be true -this argument is an enthymeme--not enough given in the text to see all the premises. -so what is the second premise? --has consequent of the first premise as its antecendent second premise: if the cogito is believed to be true then it cannot be doubted conclusion: therefore if the cogito is doubted, then it cannot be doubted. purpose: denial of c.e.s is self-contradictory -what does he mean? the denial of the c.e.s is self-contradictory the denial of the c.e.s is self-contradictory subject to two interpretations: 1. (the denial of the c.e.s is self-contradictory) --‘self-contradictory’ modifies ‘the denial of the c.e.s’ the denial of the c.e.s: some thinking things do not exist (but thinking and existence are separate--so d. cannot mean this) 2. the denial of the c.e.s is self-contradictory -what is self-contradictory is not the statement ‘the denial of the c.e.s’ but the denial itself. -not referring to the proposition but rather the act of denial--if you try to deny it you cannot deny it. 38

c.e.s is such that it can never be denied start with opponents position, reduce it to absurdity, therefore showing their own position is true. opponent: c.e.s can be doubted d.: if you try to doubt it you cannot doubt it. -therefore: it leads to a contradiction if you try to doubt it -conclusion: therefore, it cannot be doubted d.: doesn’t matter what considerations you bring forward--if you try to doubt it, deceiving g-d, etc, all tools of skepticism and hyperbolic doubt necessarily fail. -therefore, no way to establish doubt of c.e.s., can be accepted as necessarily true. -but cannot do the same thing with math--deceiving g-d works! LECTURE NOV. 26TH -clear and distinct is irresistible. if the cogito is doubted then its is thought if the cogito is thought then it is believed to be true if the cogito ergo sum is doubted, then it is believed to be true if the cogito is believed to be true, it cannot be doubted conclusion: if the cogito is doubted then it cannot be doubted. the (denial) of the cogito is self-contradictory the (denial of the cogito) is self-contradictory--denial: i think but do not exist. there is no contradiction of this because the thought of thought and the thought of existence are separate concepts (cogito is a synthetic proposition)

39

all clear and distinct connection are such that if you doubt them you cannot doubt them -if clear and distinct connections are doubted they cannot be thought etc (cogito ergo sum arguments work for clear and distinct connections) why is the (denial) of the cogito is self-contradictory: (Rules: 42, rule 12, CK 25) -necessary union of things: eg: figure/extension, motion/duration, 7=(4+3) -if two concepts are necessarily connected then are inseparable. if you think the first relatum, you have to think the second, otherwise you can’t think it. -what is the test of that? try to think one without the other. figure/extension: a shape without a space motion/duration 7=(4+3) thought/existence all clear and distinct connection are such that if you doubt them you cannot doubt them i think therefore i am if something moves then time must pass 7=4+3 pg 41 (CK 52) -some truths even g-d cannot get us to doubt--impenetrable to hyperbolic doubt. pg. 42 (CK 53) -some truths so evident...(mathematical equations are not in this list) cogito: not even a deceiving g-d can shape the cogito. -conceptually: denial is always self-contradictory. -yet, denial of each proves its truth, cannot be denied

motion/duration: denial not self-contradictory 7=(4+3): denial not self-contradictory

40

thought/existence: test of contradiction proves its claim motion/duration: denial not self-contradictory 7(does not)=(4+3): math is representational. things in reality. we still needs to establish this as an accurate representation of reality.

thought/existence: test of contradiction proves its claim med: 52, 53: cogito is not representational therefore: the way you intuit it is the way it is -cannot doubt the truth of the cogito. stage 2 (reply to gassendi) -denial of clear and distinct: proves the cogito, but does not prove math is true med pg. 59: last paragraph med pg. 60: needs to know about g-d for truth of mathematics -w/o g-d can never be certain of anything (except cogito) stage 3: proving g-d created d. and is not a deceiver. -(trying to establish truth of math) med 3: truth of g-d med 3: 60-68: outwardly: 1st proof of the existence of g-d pg. 68: 2nd last para: “to speak the truth...wether i who have the idea of g-d can exist if there is no g-d” 2nd proof for existence of g-d: end 68-71 pg. 71-72: (not last para) needs to prove: g-d exists as his creator. that g-d is not a deceiver. -then, no reason to suspect that g-d is trying to deceive me 211 principles of phil (CK 34) 41

-kno. of g-d is a first principle -what is a first principle? it cannot depend on anything else. must be known in and of itself. the truth of the first principle should be self-evident. -kno. of a first principle c/n be the conclusion of an argument. (disconnect between 211 p.o.p and med 3) med. 101-104: geometry: never a problem establishing 1st principles--always agrees with what the senses are reporting (never a conflict). start with 1st principle, add premises, come to conclusion. but in metaphysics: 1st princples do not agree with senses. cannot simply articulate it and expect people to agree. med. pg. 102 1st principles of metaphysics: preparation is needed before you can understand the truths. med. pg 101 (bottom) top 102: make it as if you had discovered it--conceptual discovery (analysis) synthesis: geometers med. pg. 103: this is why analysis for meditations method of analysis: a number of functions removes sensory influence and prejudice--leaves the mind only with innate ideas. method of analysis: rids of sensory prejudice and guides you to appropriate ideas and their connections--see truth of these 1st principles. therefore: meditations are not arguments. it helps unprejudice mind. and guides you to correct relata. -med: is a didactic device--a way of teaching. med: pg. 101 -analysis: he understands the matter no less perfectly as if he had discovered it for 42

himself. pentimento (art form) -surface/top: non-controversial -put the true art underneath the non-controversial. -remove non-controversial part -technique for hiding something. -surface meditation plus meditative portion (only in the mind) -kno. of mind: all intellectual, not in language. -by reading the surface words, it should assist us to meditate on what he says, to an act of self-discovery. med. pg. 63, 1st 2 paras: both proof for existence of g-d: objective and formal reality -ideas as representing things -objective reality: how does the idea inform me of the object in the world--the way the idea presents the existence of x -proof of existence: where did i get these ideas? LECTURE: DEC. 3rd. Preface to the p.o.p “meditations...which contains the first principles of knowledge...principle attributes of gd” -med: 1st principles of hu kno: kno of g-d first principle: has to be known first -all other kno depends on it -it cannot be known through anything else--cannot be dependent on any other kno to be known--has to be self-sufficient -needs to be self-evident -pg. 101-104 in med: 102, 2nd last paragraph: contrasts geometry and metaphysics: first principles harmonize with use we make of senses (nothing you can perceive 43

contradicts a geometric 1st principle)--geometry is mechanical. metaphysics: kno. of gd: “on the contrary, nothing in metaphysics causes more trouble than making its first principles clear and distinct” eg: ‘g-d exists as my creator’--self-evident, but does not present itself as self-evident, because of sensory prejudice. prejudices us from seeing the self-evidence of the first principle. therefore we need a method by which self-evidence of metaphysical first principles be grasped. -removes sensory prejudice -directs the attention to the true idea of g-d as implanted in our minds by g-d himself med 1: lets pretend g-d is deceiving us. med 3&4: g-d c/n be a deceiver: establishes that g-d is veracious (only seeks the truth) -the idea of g-d in med 1 is not the true idea of g-d (if it was, you would see that g-d c/n be a deceiver)--possible to have false ideas of g-d (such as in med. 1). if you have a false idea of g-d, you can never establish the first principle that g-d is my creator. -in order to understand and accept that g-d is my creator, must be holding the true understanding of g-d -pg 101: med: analysis: method that metaphysicians use. “analysis shows the true way...so if the reader care to follow it...makes it as much his own as if he had discovered it...inattentive or hostile reader...” begins with words on the page, but, by directing our attn, clearing prejudice, gets us to see the truth -art form pentimento: method uses worlds to uncover the truth--true idea of g-d in mind. -if you achieve the understanding of the true understanding of g-d as if you discovered it for yourself. -med: pg. 72: last para: “but before i consider...other truths...it seems to me right to pause to contemplate g-d himself...consider, admire, adore...dazzled by he light.” -med. 4: no argument, just a contemplative aesthetic experience -desire to die: to be with g-d -aesthetic element: connection b/w philosophy and art -med: pg. 60: 1/3 of way down page: “not satisfied that there is a g-d---must inquire 44

whether there is a good--and if he could be a deceiver. -med: pg. 63: 1st new para: “if ideas are only taken as modes of thought....when we consider them as images....idea of g-d has more objective reality...and from this...something cannot proceed from nothing, and cannot create anything equal or better than yourself. -ideas as representational: they are not all equal -idea of color: cannot exist on its own -horse: exists of own -angels: dont have bodies -g-d uncreated creator color: less objective reality than horse etc causal argument: must be a cause creating that objective reality -cause of an idea possesses formally what the thing possesses objecitively. -assess causes of possible objective realities Med. pg. 65: concludes: has, within himself, the formal reality to produce the object reality in all the ideas he has except for the idea of g-d med. pg. 66: “the idea of g-d...g-d necessarily exists” -of any other idea i possess formally what is produce objectivity, except with g-d med. pg. 68 bottom of pg (connects with pg. 60, end of on-going paragraph. -only g-d can be the cause of the idea of g-d -what more is there that needs to be discovered? breakthrough: g-d caused d. pg. 68: “to speak the truth...i see nothing in all that i have just said...” -why the idea of g-d can only come from g-d 45

-inquire if he could exist if he was not created by g-d Med. pg., 70: “possibly this being on which i depend...maybe a lesser being... “this can cannot be...” “so far as my parents are concerned--they do conserve me, re-create me moment from moment. -proof of g-ds existence proof 1: idea of g-d caused by g-d proof 2: i think. i have the idea of g-d: (error in reasoning). logical fallacy: since idea of g-d was put in me by g-d, g-d created me (incoherent) med. 1: if g-d is a deceiver, he could be deceiving me about mathetmatic med 1: how do i know g-d is not a deciever med. 3: calculating the formal reality and causes of ideas. med 3: proofs has calculation as their basis. -by standards established my med. 1, med 3 is dubitable med 1: calculation untrustworthy med 3: based on calculations med. 3: without calculations, it does not work proof 1: g-d caused idea of g-d proof 2: g-d caused descartes proof 2: have: idea of self & idea of g-d g-d caused idea of g-d, but how does that prove that g-d caused the being that has that idea? meditation: helps the mind remove prejudice, guides to appropriate ideas 46

-parents: finite (c/n give d. idea of g-d) therefore idea of g-d must come from g-d -meditation: figure out what conditions need to hold in order for something to be true: what would have to be the connection b/w the idea of g-d and the idea of d. such that gd causing the idea of g-d causing, you could also say that g-d caused the idea of self. WRONG ANSWER: special relationship between idea of g-d and idea of self. cannot be a contingent relationship (like a ball and color). the two ideas (self and g-d) are inseparable. a necessary connection b/w idea of g-d and idea of d. vol. 1 pg 42&42: discusses necessary connections: figure and extension, motion and duration. BUT doesn’t work for g-d. even if you know the cause of a shape, you don’t know the cause of the space the shape is in. you know cause of motion, but doesn’t tell you the cause of the passage of time. NOT: the connection between idea of self, and idea of g-d pg. 71 in Med: 2nd last para: “it only remains to me to examine into the manner...nor is it a fiction in my mind...consequently the only alternative is that the idea of g-d is innate in me, just as the idea of myself is innate in me” in order to make the case that if you know the idea of g-d, you also know cause of d: cannot reduce it to a necessary connection between two ideas. RIGHT ANSWER: they are the same idea. not two ideas. only one idea. both the awareness of self and the awareness of g-d. pg. 71, Med, last para: “g-d, in creating me, place this idea with me, the mark of the workman printed on his work. the mark should not be different from the idea itself...” How can the idea of g-d be the same as the self? pg. 221 in CK: --last page in descartes part of CK. vol. 2: (also pg. 21 in med.--intro) “when you ask whence i get proof that the idea of g-d...” idea of g-d stands to idea of self as: 47

-technique of painting stands to the painting -the painter has left the technique of the painting in the painting -painting made up of content and the technique. -both content and technique are both together in one idea. -art critics can see the technique--not just the painting--to prove the identity of the painter -this is what d. has done with the idea of g-d -idea of g-d is mark of workman imprinted on the work -certainty of the existence of g-d is as great as the certainty of existence of self. to know g-d is to know own existence.

48