2017 RISE Poster Template - Horizontal
Undergraduate Category: Social Sciences, Business and Law Degree Seeking: Bachelor of Arts in Political Science Abstract ID# 1476
Administrative Action against Sexual Orientation Discrimination: A Study of the EEOC Nicholas Napolio
Opportunity Abstract: How and why did the EEOC extend the definition of “sex” in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include protections against employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation without an explicit legislative mandate? This thesis explores the theories of public bureaucracy of principal-agent theory, agency avoidance theory, and bureaucratic autonomy theory. Further, it explores the relationship between state civil rights commissions (EEOC state-level analogues) and the EEOC to develop a novel theory of bureaucratic federalism that examines the interplay between state and federal agencies with overlapping jurisdictions. Prior quantitative methodologies are replicated with novel data to measure the relationship between the EEOC and the constitutional branches. Qualitative data including interviews with senior EEOC officials is analyzed to understand the internal operations and structure of the EEOC, and to understand the presidential, congressional, and state-level influence on the EEOC. It concludes that the EEOC is a differentiated political actor, influenced by both the constitutional branches and state-level analogues, that expanded Title VII, in furtherance of its own institutional aims, through subregulatory procedures to compel compliance without securing prior external support.
Approach • Theory and prior literature • Interview with senior EEOC attorney • Regression analysis to test relationship between EEOC and Congress • Archival Research
Data or Results
Impact
The EEOC is a differentiated political actor, influenced by both the constitutional branches and statelevel analogues, that expanded Title VII, in furtherance of its own institutional aims, through subregulatory procedures to compel compliance without securing prior external support.
My research has shown both theoretically and empirically that the EEOC is very independent from the elected branches. The EEOC's structure and relationship to the rest of the federal government situated it as a likely institution in which LGBTQ+ rights could coalesce. I also found that the EEOC's close working relationship with state-level anti-discrimination agencies influenced the EEOC's actions. I call this relationship and phenomenon "bureaucratic federalism." Lastly, as this is an evolving issue, my findings about the EEOC's independence help explain why the EEOC has continued enforcing the Civil Rights Act to protect LGBTQ+ folk, despite President Trump's appointment of a new Chair to the Commission.
This research has shown quantitatively that the EEOC’s behavior is related to its oversight subcommittees in Congress and qualitatively that it is responsive to both elected branches. Further, it has shown that the EEOC’s state-level analogues influence the EEOC because of their contractual relationship and incentives, and because of the federalist nature of these bureaucracies. Despite these many influences, the EEOC has its own institutional aims and, because it is an independent agency, it is able to act in furtherance of those aims. Bureaucratic autonomy theory shows that agencies can become autonomous and act on their own prerogatives regardless of whether those actions are consistent with the elected branches preferences, and the EEOC meets the requirements in the literature of independence. Drawing from the legal scholarship on agency avoidance, this research has shown that the EEOC expanded Title VII through subregulatory procedures that compel compliance, but do not require external support from the elected branches nor subject those actions to political controls such as OIRA review, notice-and-comment, or judicial review.
Further, the differences between the EEOC and the Departments of Justice and Education explains why DOJ and DOE rescinded their guidance on transgender rights in bathrooms within one month of President Trump's administration but the EEOC did not. The EEOC’s unique position as an independent political actor within the federal government, and the Departments of Justice and Education’s much less independent positions helps explain the difference in stances on LGBTQ+ rights post-Obama. What my research has shown more generally is the conditions under which bureaucracy can be an agent for progressive change, or an institution to be petitioned for progressive change. Often, bureaucracy is thought to be conservative and an institution that maintains the status quo because it is just supposed to administer laws. However, when a specific agent has independence from the elected branches, and other political circumstances are ripe, it can be an agent for progressive change. And this is of practical concern to activists and lobbyists because it shows another layer of government to petition for change. What my research has also shown is that there are a lot of gaps in the literature, and it has revealed several streams of future research. First, studying bureaucracy as an agent for change rather than an institution that just administers laws. Second, studying the relationship between federal and state agencies I mentioned earlier that I call “bureaucratic federalism.” Third, political science needs to study queer politics more generally. Lastly, the relationship between queer politics and bureaucracy needs to be studied.
Thank you to the Office of Undergraduate Research and Creative Endeavors and the Political Science Department for their funding.
Administrative Action against Sexual Orientation Discrimination: A Study of the EEOC Nicholas Napolio
Opportunity Abstract: How and why did the EEOC extend the definition of “sex” in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include protections against employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation without an explicit legislative mandate? This thesis explores the theories of public bureaucracy of principal-agent theory, agency avoidance theory, and bureaucratic autonomy theory. Further, it explores the relationship between state civil rights commissions (EEOC state-level analogues) and the EEOC to develop a novel theory of bureaucratic federalism that examines the interplay between state and federal agencies with overlapping jurisdictions. Prior quantitative methodologies are replicated with novel data to measure the relationship between the EEOC and the constitutional branches. Qualitative data including interviews with senior EEOC officials is analyzed to understand the internal operations and structure of the EEOC, and to understand the presidential, congressional, and state-level influence on the EEOC. It concludes that the EEOC is a differentiated political actor, influenced by both the constitutional branches and state-level analogues, that expanded Title VII, in furtherance of its own institutional aims, through subregulatory procedures to compel compliance without securing prior external support.
Approach • Theory and prior literature • Interview with senior EEOC attorney • Regression analysis to test relationship between EEOC and Congress • Archival Research
Data or Results
Impact
The EEOC is a differentiated political actor, influenced by both the constitutional branches and statelevel analogues, that expanded Title VII, in furtherance of its own institutional aims, through subregulatory procedures to compel compliance without securing prior external support.
My research has shown both theoretically and empirically that the EEOC is very independent from the elected branches. The EEOC's structure and relationship to the rest of the federal government situated it as a likely institution in which LGBTQ+ rights could coalesce. I also found that the EEOC's close working relationship with state-level anti-discrimination agencies influenced the EEOC's actions. I call this relationship and phenomenon "bureaucratic federalism." Lastly, as this is an evolving issue, my findings about the EEOC's independence help explain why the EEOC has continued enforcing the Civil Rights Act to protect LGBTQ+ folk, despite President Trump's appointment of a new Chair to the Commission.
This research has shown quantitatively that the EEOC’s behavior is related to its oversight subcommittees in Congress and qualitatively that it is responsive to both elected branches. Further, it has shown that the EEOC’s state-level analogues influence the EEOC because of their contractual relationship and incentives, and because of the federalist nature of these bureaucracies. Despite these many influences, the EEOC has its own institutional aims and, because it is an independent agency, it is able to act in furtherance of those aims. Bureaucratic autonomy theory shows that agencies can become autonomous and act on their own prerogatives regardless of whether those actions are consistent with the elected branches preferences, and the EEOC meets the requirements in the literature of independence. Drawing from the legal scholarship on agency avoidance, this research has shown that the EEOC expanded Title VII through subregulatory procedures that compel compliance, but do not require external support from the elected branches nor subject those actions to political controls such as OIRA review, notice-and-comment, or judicial review.
Further, the differences between the EEOC and the Departments of Justice and Education explains why DOJ and DOE rescinded their guidance on transgender rights in bathrooms within one month of President Trump's administration but the EEOC did not. The EEOC’s unique position as an independent political actor within the federal government, and the Departments of Justice and Education’s much less independent positions helps explain the difference in stances on LGBTQ+ rights post-Obama. What my research has shown more generally is the conditions under which bureaucracy can be an agent for progressive change, or an institution to be petitioned for progressive change. Often, bureaucracy is thought to be conservative and an institution that maintains the status quo because it is just supposed to administer laws. However, when a specific agent has independence from the elected branches, and other political circumstances are ripe, it can be an agent for progressive change. And this is of practical concern to activists and lobbyists because it shows another layer of government to petition for change. What my research has also shown is that there are a lot of gaps in the literature, and it has revealed several streams of future research. First, studying bureaucracy as an agent for change rather than an institution that just administers laws. Second, studying the relationship between federal and state agencies I mentioned earlier that I call “bureaucratic federalism.” Third, political science needs to study queer politics more generally. Lastly, the relationship between queer politics and bureaucracy needs to be studied.
Thank you to the Office of Undergraduate Research and Creative Endeavors and the Political Science Department for their funding.
