Office of Nuclear Counterterrorism National Nuclear Security Administration U.S. Department of Energy
Understanding the Nuclear Threat: The Integration of Science with Policy and Governance Jay Tilden, Dan Dalton, Anne Marvin, Brooke Samples PONI Fall Conference September 21-22, 2010
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Overview The U.S. and its international partners must move toward integrating science and technology into policy and operational planning by coordinating efforts both within national governments and among international partners Understanding the nuclear threat is essential to Nuclear Counterterrorism (NCT) and to focusing work to prevent duplication of effort and address capability gaps Need to develop a detailed roadmap for an integrated path forward to address the current culture of competition and create a culture of collaboration Need to address U.S. national governance issues and study whether to institute structures that mirror the successful U.S./UK Stocktake model
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The Vision President Obama: – A world without nuclear weapons – Most “immediate and extreme” threat to global security today comes from nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation
Mitigate risks and move toward nuclear abolition – Nuclear threat reduction efforts – International work to counter nuclear threats
Must understand the full range of nuclear threat devices – Requires scientific and technological understanding
Must better coordinate efforts among the U.S. Interagency and with international partners 3
Understanding the Threat – Essential to Nuclear Threat Reduction
Significant uncertainties associated with Nuclear Threat Device (NTD) design spectrum Difficult to predict the exact nature of the threat prior to discovery – Device composition – Device configuration
Uncertainties directly impact ability to detect, interdict, render safe, perform consequence management, forensics and attribution 4
The Threat and Its Mitigation Evolution of the Nuclear Threat and Threat Reduction Activities – State-based, strategic threat to Sub-state, tactical threat(s) – Requires paralleled evolution of nuclear threat reduction activities
U.S. Domestic Threat Reduction Activities – – – –
Whole-of-government approach Creates integration challenges Interagency cooperation requires effective governance structures External accountability (through international partnerships or Executive/Legislative branch “checks and balances”)
International Threat Reduction Activities – Close cooperation and collaboration with international partners – Established governance structures are currently being expanded to accommodate the evolution of the threat (e.g. - Stocktake NTR) 5
Role of Science in Policy Development Marriage of Policies and Guidance with Science and Technology – NCT policies require accurate and timely scientific and technical knowledge and research & development (R&D) from every source (domestic and international)
NCT Science and Technology Activities – R&D in all areas of nuclear threat devices Material protection and security, detection, intelligence, interdiction, diagnostics, emergency response/disablement, forensics/attribution
– Must inform intelligence, operational planning and related policies
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Challenges to S&T-Policy Integration Wide range of organizations and agencies in U.S. are engaged in NCT activities – Need to determine the scope of redundancy and duplication – Need to identify capability gaps – Need to redirect efforts to address and resolve wasteful duplication and resolve gaps
Zero-sum scrambling for resources creates a culture of competition not collaboration among the various agencies – Gain in resources or expansion of portfolio for one organization is perceived as loss for another, promoting internecine fighting
Lack of external accountability impedes efficacy and efficiency – Need to determine best practices and identify accountability structures
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An Integrated Path Forward Enhance collaboration and cooperation between S&T efforts, the intelligence community, and operational functions Integrate emerging science and technical knowledge with intelligence analysis and policy development and promulgation Continue to work closely with international partners to share best practices, offer peer review, and reinforce work being done by individual nations Continue to leverage stockpile work to ensure the availability of capabilities and facilities to support and understand the “nonstockpile stockpile.” Ensure that governance structures promote efficacy 8
Integrated NCT Implementation NNSA actively engaging the Department of Defense and other agencies Increased Congressional funding for integrated, interagency NCT research and development and intelligence activities US increasing its engagement of international partners on the technical NCT fronts Tighter coordination with Obama administration on NCT activities, challenges, and successes Study options to enhance current governance structures to ensure oversight that facilitates cooperation and coordination among interagency – Governance organization must be the focal point of activities to ensure the effective integration of S&T with policy and operational planning – Need preeminent interagency forum to reach consensus, establish priorities and provide policy guidance and oversight – Possibly model on U.S./UK Stocktake structure or the Nuclear Weapons Council 9
Backup Slides
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NNSA Mission
NNSA is responsible for the management and security of the nation’s nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs. It also responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United States and abroad. Additionally, NNSA federal agents provide safe and secure transportation of nuclear weapons and components and special nuclear materials along with other missions supporting the national security.
President President Obama Obama has has outlined outlined aa bold bold nuclear nuclear security security agenda agenda that that makes makes the the NNSA NNSA and and its its core core missions missions more more important important than than ever. ever.
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Countering Nuclear Threats
Motivation & Planning
Material Acquisition
Design & Fabrication
Storage & Movement
Device on Target
DHS/Law Enforcement Detection State & Commerce Department Export Control DTRA Material Protection
Response & Recovery
Forensics
DHS (FEMA) / EPA / HHS Consequence Management
Dept. of Defense / Dept. of Justice Disablement / Disposal / Attribution / Post-Det. Law Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Disablement / Disposal / Attribution / Effects
Intelligence Community (DNI, CIA, DIA, DOE/IN) Collection, Assessments, Analysis, Forensics & Attribution National Nuclear Security Administration Intel Analysis/Material Protection / Fuel Cycles / Device Assessment / Detection / Diagnostics / Disablement / Rad-Chem / Forensics / Weapon Effects / Consequence Management
NNSA NNSA addresses addresses all all non-traditional non-traditional nuclear nuclear threats, threats, concerns, concerns, and and responses responses
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NCT Mission NNSA's Nuclear Counterterrorism (NCT) Program integrates, sustains, and executes key activities and specialized expertise in partnership with the weapons design-, stockpile science-, weapons surety-, and nuclear material-related programs to advise and enable all technical aspects of U.S. Government nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and nuclear counterterrorism missions. The NCT Program works to understand the full range of nuclear threat device (NTD) designs; from an unknown “homemade nuke” or improvised nuclear device (IND) to a weapon from one of the established nuclear weapons states that has fallen out of state control.
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Understanding the Threat The NCT program works with the Counterterrorism and Non-Proliferation Communities to: Secure materials of concern worldwide – Identify nuclear materials of interest in support of the materials security community
Identify likely designs using nuclear and energetic/explosive materials – Ranging from crude improvised nuclear devices to proliferant devices – Ensure designs of concern are shared with community
Enhance detection and diagnostic capabilities – Providing S&T capabilities for the global First Responder and Detection communities
Mitigate the threat of a nuclear detonation – R&D on new/existing NTD Render Safe tools – Modeling of device/design responses to various NTD Render Safe tools
Support the Forensics community to assist in attribution – Use pre-detonation cannon of knowledge and skill sets to inform post-detonation forensics and attribution 14
NCT Activity Areas Management, Security, and Infrastructure – Sigma 20 implementation and maintenance – International technical exchanges
Nuclear Device Characterization – Nuclear and explosive materials characterizations – Device modeling and simulation analysis
Materials Security and Threat Analysis – Signatures, identification and discrimination – Information Management
Diagnostics, Discrimination, and Analysis – Nuclear and explosive material diagnostic – Large-scale experiments
Nuclear Device Vulnerability Exploitation – Development of tools, techniques and procedures – Integrated evaluation documentation and deployment 15
Strategic Objectives The NCT Program’s Strategic Objectives: Achieve the President’s vision of preventing nuclear terrorism Serve as the premier U.S. government program regarding nuclear threat devices – Advise and enable the U.S. government’s nonproliferation, counterproliferation and counterterrorism missions – Collaborate with key international partners to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack
Guide research and development to understand the full spectrum of nuclear threat devices to support the full range of countering nuclear threat activities Provide accurate information to ensure effective response to nuclear terrorism and to inform associated policies Protect sensitive information from disclosure Advocate for the long-term stewardship of the nation’s capability and infrastructure to prevent nuclear terrorism including: – – – – –
Nuclear threat device design and characterization Diagnostics unique to the nuclear counterterrorism threats Materials characterization, including nuclear and energetic materials (explosives) Nuclear Forensics Operational support 16
Questions?
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