A Case Study

Report 3 Downloads 323 Views
20+YEARS MANAGING A STYLE PURE FIRM THROUGH AUM VOLATILITY A Case Study Brent V. Woods, CFA Chief Executive Officer

*As of 9/30/15. Separately Managed Accounts (SMA) are offered through the firm’s SMA Division. The SMA Division encompasses the firm’s “Separately Managed Account” business (subadvisory “wrap-fee” business with brokerage firms). Non-SMA assets include institutional accounts, pooled investment vehicles, and high net worth accounts outside of SMA (“wrap-fee”) programs. Margin of safety: The margin of safety for any security is defined as the discount of its current market price to what we believe is the intrinsic value of that security. Alpha: A measure of performance on a risk-adjusted basis. It takes the volatility (price risk) of a mutual fund and compares its risk-adjusted performance to a benchmark index. The excess return of the fund relative to the return of the benchmark index is a fund's alpha. Source: Investopedia.com FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

2

All Managers Deal With Investment Risk Must manage general business risks as well Examples of business risks faced by managers:  Unplanned employee departures  Leadership succession  Change in business model/competitive environment  Capitulating to short-term client factors – style drift

 Prioritizing shareholders over investors  Rapid change in AUM/profits

FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 3

Brandes Faced Significant Drop in AUM Once loved, could do no wrong When it turned, it turned…  Some clients lost sight of value – promises to be out of favour at times  Change in investor risk appetite post 2008

 Meaningful under performance in several (but not all) Brandes products through GFC

“…the entire small cap investment committee should be fired.” US-based analyst – 2008

Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 4

Managing a Style Pure Firm Through AUM Flux Today we will discuss how we:  Responded to business challenges/AUM decline  Maintained focus on investment and research  Remained independent and financially sound

Came through: Capacity-constrained firm, well equipped to thrive

FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 5

1995 – 2015 Style Pure, But Volatile AUM 1995

Ended year at $5.7 Billion* AUM

1998

AUM $25 Billion Start to soft close

2003

Hard close

2007

Peak AUM

2008

Global Financial Crisis

2009

Market rebounds

2010

All products open for new clients

2013

Low AUM post - GFC

2015

AUM >$28 Billion today

Throughout our history one single investment approach = Value

*as of 12/31/94 FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 6

How Did We Manage High Growth Pre-GFC? Rational business practices  Added employees – in a controlled, selective manner  Material investments in systems – consultants and employees  Modest product growth – only logical extensions of value  Business management – specialize and professionalize  Tracked employee compensation to industry – not firm AUM

 Expanded ownership group  No debt – all growth internally financed  No acquisitions We were concentrated, knew our AUM could be volatile and managed conservatively FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 7

Impact of GFC 2008 -- 2010 Underperformance in largest products, but not all products Institutional clients behaviour changed:  Emphasis on de-risking  Shift to passive

Reputational challenges due to:  High profile investment misses in the U.S.

 Loss of some large clients

FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 8

Large Client Departures: Examples Large U.S. Client    

Opened: February 5, 1996 Closed: May 6, 2013 Portfolio/AUM: International Equity/ >$700 million at peak Performance 2/5/96 – 5/6/13:  Account = 10.25% annualized (gross of fees)  MSACWFXUS = 5.82%  MSCI EAFE = 4.79%

Large Non U.S. Client    

Opened: October 14, 1998 Closed: January 11, 2011 Portfolio/AUM: Global Equity/approximately $640 million at close, but total relationship >$7 billion at peak Performance 10/14/98 – 1/11/11:  Account = 7.46% annualized (gross of fees)  MSACWFREE = 5.40%  MSCI World = 4.18%

 During relationship, client also closed Asia ex-Japan account (> $700 million; open < 24 months) Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. No investment strategy can assure a profit or protect against loss. The sample client performance is for illustrative purposes only. Other investors in these strategies may have experienced different returns during the periods shown. Please note that all indices are unmanaged and are not available for direct investment. FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 9

Global – Value vs Growth

15%

10%

Above Zero: Value Outperforms

-252bps at 9/30/2015

5%

0%

23 months

-5%

95 months

9 months -10%

Below Zero: Value Underperforms 40 months -15%

Sep-78 Sep-79 Sep-80 Sep-81 Sep-82 Sep-83 Sep-84 Sep-85 Sep-86 Sep-87 Sep-88 Sep-89 Sep-90 Sep-91 Sep-92 Sep-93 Sep-94 Sep-95 Sep-96 Sep-97 Sep-98 Sep-99 Sep-00 Sep-01 Sep-02 Sep-03 Sep-04 Sep-05 Sep-06 Sep-07 Sep-08 Sep-09 Sep-10 Sep-11 Sep-12 Sep-13 Sep-14 Sep-15

Rolling 3-Yr. Annualized Relative Returns

Rolling 3-Year Annualized Relative Returns

3-Year Period Ending Rolling 3-Year Annualized Relative Returns; MSCI World Value Index less MSCI World Growth Index Source: MSCI via FactSet As of September 30, 2015. Annualized 3-year rolling returns. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Rolling periods represent a series of overlapping, smaller time periods within a single, longer-term time period. For example, over a 20-year period, there is one 20-year rolling period, eleven 10-year rolling periods, sixteen 5-year rolling periods, and so forth. Value stocks are represented by the MSCI The World Value Index. Growth stocks are represented by the MSCI The World Growth Index. For each period, relative performance was calculated by subtracting the annualized 3-year rolling returns of the MSCI The World Growth Index from the annualized 3-year rolling returns of the MSCI The World Value Index. A negative result in this calculation indicates that growth outperformed while a positive result indicates that value outperformed. Indices are unmanaged and not available for direct investment. MSCI The World Value Index 1-year: -9.33%, 5-year: 7.01%, 10-year: 3.61%. MSCI The World Growth Index 1-year: -0.80%, 5-year: 9.52%, 10-year: 5.78%. The inception date for the MSCI The World Growth and Value Indexes is December 8, 1997. Data prior to this date is the result of back-testing performed by MSCI. There are frequently material differences between back-tested performance and actual results. FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 10

International – Value vs Growth Rolling 3-Year Annualized Relative Returns 15% Above Zero: Value Outperformed

10%

5%

-184bp at 9/30/2015

0%

10 months

Below Zero: Value Underperformed

-5%

77 months

8 months 18 months

Sep-77 Sep-78 Sep-79 Sep-80 Sep-81 Sep-82 Sep-83 Sep-84 Sep-85 Sep-86 Sep-87 Sep-88 Sep-89 Sep-90 Sep-91 Sep-92 Sep-93 Sep-94 Sep-95 Sep-96 Sep-97 Sep-98 Sep-99 Sep-00 Sep-01 Sep-02 Sep-03 Sep-04 Sep-05 Sep-06 Sep-07 Sep-08 Sep-09 Sep-10 Sep-11 Sep-12 Sep-13 Sep-14 Sep-15

-10%

3-Year Period Ending MSCI EAFE VALUE INDEX LESS MSCI EAFE GROWTH INDEX; AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2015 | Source: MSCI via FactSet. Past performance is not a

guarantee of future results. Rolling periods represent a series of overlapping, smaller time periods within a single, longer-time period. For example, over a 20-year period, there is one 20-year period, eleven 10-year rolling periods, sixteen 5-year rolling periods, and so forth. The inception date for the MSCI EAFE Growth and Value Indexes is December 8, 1997. Data prior to this date is the result of back-testing performed by MSCI. There are frequently material differences between back-tested performance and actual results. Please see supplemental performance information in disclosure slide at end of this presentation. FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 11

On the Positive Side What was happening internally?  High degree of employee loyalty – low turnover

 Product performance strong for a number of products coming out of GFC  Many long-term clients remained – and added to their accounts  Important lessons learned

FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 12

How Did We Manage Post GFC? Adjusted business accordingly, but it takes time  Reduced headcount  Continued to track employee compensation with industry  Re-examined investment approach/process  Re-opened products  Re-tooled vehicles: minimums, pricing

 Partners absorbed contraction in profits – their role is to think long term

FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 13

What We Did/Didn’t Do Continued to focus on investment process

What we DID do:

What we DID NOT do:

 Maintained research team

 Follow analyst’s advice – fire team

 Strengthened process

 Broaden business beyond core competencies

 Re-emphasized our time horizon – generate alpha over the long term  Sharpened our message as alpha component and building block

 Launch funds/styles we were not set up to do

 Sell and lose independence

Through all changes the firm remained profitable and debt free

FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 14

Investment Process Review Investment approach broadly correct, but made some mistakes Faced a negative market cycle for value Inputs were generally good, consistent with disciplined strategy What did we miss?  More critical eye on financial leverage  More wary of government/regulator behavior in crisis periods  More conscious of correlated risks when constructing portfolios

No major process revisions – remained confident in the core process and Graham & Dodd value principles

FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 15

Business Lessons Learned Applying lessons to business  Made tough choices – for cyclical and secular reasons  Adopting a more nuanced approach to capacity/closure management  Remained style pure, but more diversified: products, vehicles, distribution  Ensure clients understand our approach and that value goes out of favour  Things can always be more volatile than you expect – plan accordingly

FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 16

“Flat-Footed” on Re-Opening Closed for 10 years in several products, didn’t act fast enough  Didn’t have an up-to-date marketing and sales department  Needed improvements: client communication and setting expectations

 Lost touch with new group of decision-makers

Difficult to change perception that we were no longer closed

FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 17

Style Pure and Diversified Across Mandates 12/31/1995 Total: $5,698

9/30/15 Total: $26,146

All Other Strategies 6% International Equity 68%

All Other Strategies 36%

International Equity 37%

Global Equity 26%

Global Equity 27%

Other Strategies include: Emerging Markets Equity European Equity Global Balanced Global Small-Mid Cap Equity International Small-Mid Cap Equity

International Small Cap Equity Japan Equity Other Equity* U.S. Equities*

AUM, $ millions

Other Strategies include: Emerging Markets Equity Emerging Markets Opportunities Emerging Markets Value Equity European Equity Fixed Income** Global Balanced Global Small-Mid Cap Equity

Global Opportunities Value Global Small Cap Equity International Small-Mid Cap Equity International Small Cap Equity Japan Equity Other Equity** U.S. Equities**

*Other Equity and U.S. Equities: Asia ex-Japan, Latin America, EMEA, International Concentrated, Global Concentrated, International Core, Global Core, U.S. Small-Mid Cap Value, U.S. Small Cap Value, U.S. Value. **Fixed Income, Other Equity and U.S. Equities: Canadian Equity, Asia Pacific (ex-Japan), Global Micro Cap, U.S. Small-Mid Cap Value, U.S. Small Cap Value, U.S. Value, Core Plus, Corporate Focus, Enhanced Income, Global Income FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 18

4. It Can Always be More Volatile Than You Think Role of partners  Think/act long term  Prioritize client and employee interests  Remain style pure  Absorb the shock – accept highly variable income

FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 19

Where Are We Now? Purpose – built for value Investment Team:  8 Global Sectors covered by  25 Analysts  13 Research Associates  Responsible for researching company fundamentals  7 Investment Committees responsible for establishing intrinsic value estimates and constructing portfolios

Investment team manages the same process — at any asset level

FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 20

Improvements Paying Off Stronger market presence 5 institutional sales professionals Offices in Singapore (3 employees) and Dublin (7 employees) Canada (Bridgehouse):  55 people  Partnering with Lazard, Sionna and Greystone

YTD gross sales of $3 billion*

Built a retail mutual fund complex to over $3 billion in 3 years

* As of 3/31/15 FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 21

The Key to Endurance Independence and control  Financially sound with no debt  Continuity of culture and care – key staff

 Institutional discipline and long-term focus  Partnership is designed to weather volatility and avoid a liquidity event

“My name stays on the door.” - Charles Brandes

FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 22

Small-Cap Investment Committee

Small-Cap Investment Committee

Committee Member

Title

Years with Firm

Years on Committee

Years Industry Experience

Ralph Birchmeier, CFA

Director

15

13

21

Yingbin Chen, CFA

Director

13

10

13

Mark Costa, CFA

Senior Analyst

15

5

15

Luiz Sauerbronn

Director

13

11

20

As of September 30, 2015

Page 23

Disclosures Unlike bonds issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government or its agencies, stocks and other bonds are not backed by the full faith and credit of the United States. Stock and bond prices will experience market fluctuations. Please note that the value of government securities and bonds in general have an inverse relationship to interest rates. Bonds carry the risk of default, or the risk that an issuer will be unable to make income or principal payment. There is no assurance that private guarantors or insurers will meet their obligations. The credit quality of the investments in the portfolio is no guarantee of the safety or stability of the portfolio. Investments in Asset Backed and Mortgage Backed Securities include additional risks that investors should be aware of such as credit risk, prepayment risk, possible illiquidity and default, as well as increased susceptibility to adverse economic developments. International and emerging markets investing is subject to certain risks such as currency fluctuation and social and political changes; such risks may result in greater share price volatility. The information provided in this material should not be considered a recommendation to purchase or sell any particular security. It should not be assumed that any security transactions, holdings or sectors discussed were or will be profitable, or that the investment recommendations or decisions we make in the future will be profitable or will equal the investment performance discussed herein. Strategies discussed are subject to change at any time by the investment manager in its discretion due to market conditions or opportunities. Please note that all indices are unmanaged and are not available for direct investment. Separately Managed Accounts (SMA) are offered through the firm’s SMA Division, which was created on January 1, 2006. The SMA Division encompasses the firm’s “Separately Managed Account” business (subadvisory “wrap-fee” business with brokerage firms). Non-SMA assets include institutional accounts, pooled investment vehicles, and high-net-worth accounts outside of SMA programs The margin of safety for any security is defined as the discount of its market price to what the firm believes is the intrinsic value of that security. The foregoing reflects the thoughts and opinions of Brandes Investment Partners ® exclusively and is subject to change without notice. Brandes Investment Partners® is a registered trademark of Brandes Investment Partners, L.P. in the United States and Canada.

FOR INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY. NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

Page 24