AP
The Additional Protocol and Modified Small Quantities Protocol
Dr Matthew Cottee International Institute for Strategic Studies, London Myanmar-US/UK Dialogue Nay Pyi Taw 5-6 December 2015
International Safeguards Regime • • • • •
The international safeguards regime is designed to assess whether a country’s nuclear activities are peaceful. To do this the regime relies on specific agreements, which stipulate the responsibilities of states and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The state is required to maintain oversight and control of nuclear activities and provide information on such activities. This is then verified by the IAEA. This process demonstrates that the nuclear material and activities are being used for peaceful purposes and are not being diverted for use in weapons programmes. There are several safeguards agreements, each of which is based on a standard text providing a model framework of procedures and requirements developed by the IAEA and negotiated by states: • Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) • Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) • Additional Protocol (AP)
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA)
The CSA is a bilateral agreement between a state and the IAEA. It is the responsibility of the state to account for nuclear material, which is reported to the IAEA. This agreement also facilitates IAEA visits to verify that nuclear materials are being used for peaceful purposes.
Under the CSA, states should: • set up a system to account for and control nuclear material • report the following information to the agency: initial reports on nuclear material & nuclear facilities record keeping of nuclear activities, imports, exports and updated inventories • allow the IAEA access: • to verify facility design information • conduct ad hoc, routine or special inspections • cooperate with the Agency.
Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) •
• • •
Because there are states that have low levels of nuclear activity or small amounts of nuclear material, a ‘Small Quantities Protocol’ (SQP) was created. This allows such states to temporarily suspend certain elements of their CSA, and the burden that they impose, whilst ensuring that safeguards obligations remain in place. Designed to reduce pressure on resources, both at the IAEA and in SQP states, many of the reporting and access requirements under the CSA are held in abeyance. The first version of the SQP was introduced in 1974, but it was modified in 2005 to include several important additions.
•
• • • •
The Additional Protocol (AP)
Following the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme in the 1990s, traditional safeguards measures were found to be ineffective. Although the IAEA could verify the declared inventory provided by a state, it could not assess whether these declarations were complete. Under the strengthened safeguards system the IAEA is expected to be able to draw broader conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear materials, facilities and activities in states. The Additional Protocol was approved by the IAEA in 1997 and provides tools that enhance its ability to detect any undeclared nuclear facilities and materials. The AP requires the state to collect and report additional information whilst allowing IAEA inspectors greater access to verify nuclear activities.
Information
Administrative
Simplified procedures for inspector designation
Long term multiple entry/exit/transit visas for inspectors within one month of request
• Information related • Access related • Administrative arrangements
The AP therefore provides a comprehensive toolkit of additional measures designed to assist the Agency, divided into three broad categories:
Access Sites of facilities and locations where nuclear material is located to confirm absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities Decommissioned facilities/locations to verify decommissioned status Other locations to resolve a question or inconsistency (after consultation with the state)
AP – additional measures Nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D All locations on specified sites (use of each building) Additional information on activities at a particular location (on request from the agency). Manufacture/assembly of specified nuclear-related equipment Uranium mines and concentration plants, and thorium concentration plants. Source material (such as ore concentrate) Nuclear material exempted under CSA Quarterly reporting on exports and—on request by the agency—imports of specified items Nuclear fuel cycle plans Changes in location and processing of intermediate and high level waste
Modified SQP
• Because the SQP still holds the IAEA’s authority to conduct certain activities in temporary suspension, the modified SQP is another important agreement. • Approved by the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) in September 2005, the modified version seeks to address gaps in the original protocol. Key changes
• Under the modified SQP, states should therefore provide: • an initial report on nuclear material and annual reports thereafter; • early warning if it has been decided that a nuclear facility is to be constructed (SQP status ceases to apply as soon as this occurs); • and access to the IAEA so that it can verify the initial report.
Implementation of both the AP & modified SQP
The AP and modified SQP are both required – they work together to provide the highest level of confidence that nuclear materials and facilities are being used for peaceful uses. •
•
•
The increased authority of the IAEA to conduct safeguards inspections in modified SQP states is still reliant on the initial declaration of materials and facilities. If there are gaps in the initial declaration, the IAEA has no authority to conduct inspections. An AP does not provide for the right of the Agency to verify that a state still qualifies for an SQP, since the SQP holds these rights in abeyance. An AP does not address the IAEA’s need to receive facility design information at an early stage.
An AP provides the IAEA with better tools to verify the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations.
The modified SQP provides the IAEA with an initial report of nuclear material, early notification of any decision to construct a nuclear facility, and provides inspectors with access for ad hoc and special inspections.
Progress in Myanmar
• The existing Atomic Energy Law was enacted on 8 June 1998, consisting of 39 articles in 14 chapters. It was primarily aimed at nuclear safety.
• After President Barack Obama’s visit in November 2012, Myanmar announced it would sign the Additional Protocol and submit a modified SQP. Less than one year later, on 17 September 2013, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and state representative Union Minister for Foreign Affairs of Myanmar, H.E. U Wunna Maung Lwin signed the agreement.
• Mission opened in Vienna for closer communication with agencies there.
• Demonstrable progress in areas of chemical and biological weapons and nuclear testing.
Progress in Myanmar
Various seminars and workshops involving EU, Japanese and US officials have taken place in Myanmar
• In 2014, information collected from stakeholders. Second reading of draft laws completed. A new Nuclear Safety Law is also being drafted and regulation prepared. • Translation was one of the main delays identified. Draft Nuclear Safety Law taking shape. • The current strength of Department of Atomic Energy is about 200 employees of which 25% are trainees.
• •
•
Progress in Myanmar
Myanmar is yet to ratify the AP or submit a modified SQP however. The AP will enter into force when the IAEA receives from Myanmar written notification that it’s statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. Have national elections helped or hindered progress? How is legislation developing?
Remaining challenges
• Existing laws are being redrafted, but is there a timeline for submitting a modified SQP and ratifying an AP?
• What are the key challenges facing Myanmar? • Competition for technical/legal resources • Legislation fatigue • Time consuming bureaucratic procedures • Where could international support best be used?
Dr Matthew Cottee
Research Associate, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Programme The International Institute for Strategic Studies Arundel House, 13-15 Arundel Street Temple Place, London WC2R 3DX Tel: +44 (0) 20 7395 9931 Email: [email protected]
Dr Matthew Cottee International Institute for Strategic Studies, London Myanmar-US/UK Dialogue Nay Pyi Taw 5-6 December 2015
International Safeguards Regime • • • • •
The international safeguards regime is designed to assess whether a country’s nuclear activities are peaceful. To do this the regime relies on specific agreements, which stipulate the responsibilities of states and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The state is required to maintain oversight and control of nuclear activities and provide information on such activities. This is then verified by the IAEA. This process demonstrates that the nuclear material and activities are being used for peaceful purposes and are not being diverted for use in weapons programmes. There are several safeguards agreements, each of which is based on a standard text providing a model framework of procedures and requirements developed by the IAEA and negotiated by states: • Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) • Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) • Additional Protocol (AP)
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA)
The CSA is a bilateral agreement between a state and the IAEA. It is the responsibility of the state to account for nuclear material, which is reported to the IAEA. This agreement also facilitates IAEA visits to verify that nuclear materials are being used for peaceful purposes.
Under the CSA, states should: • set up a system to account for and control nuclear material • report the following information to the agency: initial reports on nuclear material & nuclear facilities record keeping of nuclear activities, imports, exports and updated inventories • allow the IAEA access: • to verify facility design information • conduct ad hoc, routine or special inspections • cooperate with the Agency.
Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) •
• • •
Because there are states that have low levels of nuclear activity or small amounts of nuclear material, a ‘Small Quantities Protocol’ (SQP) was created. This allows such states to temporarily suspend certain elements of their CSA, and the burden that they impose, whilst ensuring that safeguards obligations remain in place. Designed to reduce pressure on resources, both at the IAEA and in SQP states, many of the reporting and access requirements under the CSA are held in abeyance. The first version of the SQP was introduced in 1974, but it was modified in 2005 to include several important additions.
•
• • • •
The Additional Protocol (AP)
Following the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme in the 1990s, traditional safeguards measures were found to be ineffective. Although the IAEA could verify the declared inventory provided by a state, it could not assess whether these declarations were complete. Under the strengthened safeguards system the IAEA is expected to be able to draw broader conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear materials, facilities and activities in states. The Additional Protocol was approved by the IAEA in 1997 and provides tools that enhance its ability to detect any undeclared nuclear facilities and materials. The AP requires the state to collect and report additional information whilst allowing IAEA inspectors greater access to verify nuclear activities.
Information
Administrative
Simplified procedures for inspector designation
Long term multiple entry/exit/transit visas for inspectors within one month of request
• Information related • Access related • Administrative arrangements
The AP therefore provides a comprehensive toolkit of additional measures designed to assist the Agency, divided into three broad categories:
Access Sites of facilities and locations where nuclear material is located to confirm absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities Decommissioned facilities/locations to verify decommissioned status Other locations to resolve a question or inconsistency (after consultation with the state)
AP – additional measures Nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D All locations on specified sites (use of each building) Additional information on activities at a particular location (on request from the agency). Manufacture/assembly of specified nuclear-related equipment Uranium mines and concentration plants, and thorium concentration plants. Source material (such as ore concentrate) Nuclear material exempted under CSA Quarterly reporting on exports and—on request by the agency—imports of specified items Nuclear fuel cycle plans Changes in location and processing of intermediate and high level waste
Modified SQP
• Because the SQP still holds the IAEA’s authority to conduct certain activities in temporary suspension, the modified SQP is another important agreement. • Approved by the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) in September 2005, the modified version seeks to address gaps in the original protocol. Key changes
• Under the modified SQP, states should therefore provide: • an initial report on nuclear material and annual reports thereafter; • early warning if it has been decided that a nuclear facility is to be constructed (SQP status ceases to apply as soon as this occurs); • and access to the IAEA so that it can verify the initial report.
Implementation of both the AP & modified SQP
The AP and modified SQP are both required – they work together to provide the highest level of confidence that nuclear materials and facilities are being used for peaceful uses. •
•
•
The increased authority of the IAEA to conduct safeguards inspections in modified SQP states is still reliant on the initial declaration of materials and facilities. If there are gaps in the initial declaration, the IAEA has no authority to conduct inspections. An AP does not provide for the right of the Agency to verify that a state still qualifies for an SQP, since the SQP holds these rights in abeyance. An AP does not address the IAEA’s need to receive facility design information at an early stage.
An AP provides the IAEA with better tools to verify the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations.
The modified SQP provides the IAEA with an initial report of nuclear material, early notification of any decision to construct a nuclear facility, and provides inspectors with access for ad hoc and special inspections.
Progress in Myanmar
• The existing Atomic Energy Law was enacted on 8 June 1998, consisting of 39 articles in 14 chapters. It was primarily aimed at nuclear safety.
• After President Barack Obama’s visit in November 2012, Myanmar announced it would sign the Additional Protocol and submit a modified SQP. Less than one year later, on 17 September 2013, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and state representative Union Minister for Foreign Affairs of Myanmar, H.E. U Wunna Maung Lwin signed the agreement.
• Mission opened in Vienna for closer communication with agencies there.
• Demonstrable progress in areas of chemical and biological weapons and nuclear testing.
Progress in Myanmar
Various seminars and workshops involving EU, Japanese and US officials have taken place in Myanmar
• In 2014, information collected from stakeholders. Second reading of draft laws completed. A new Nuclear Safety Law is also being drafted and regulation prepared. • Translation was one of the main delays identified. Draft Nuclear Safety Law taking shape. • The current strength of Department of Atomic Energy is about 200 employees of which 25% are trainees.
• •
•
Progress in Myanmar
Myanmar is yet to ratify the AP or submit a modified SQP however. The AP will enter into force when the IAEA receives from Myanmar written notification that it’s statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. Have national elections helped or hindered progress? How is legislation developing?
Remaining challenges
• Existing laws are being redrafted, but is there a timeline for submitting a modified SQP and ratifying an AP?
• What are the key challenges facing Myanmar? • Competition for technical/legal resources • Legislation fatigue • Time consuming bureaucratic procedures • Where could international support best be used?
Dr Matthew Cottee
Research Associate, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Programme The International Institute for Strategic Studies Arundel House, 13-15 Arundel Street Temple Place, London WC2R 3DX Tel: +44 (0) 20 7395 9931 Email: [email protected]
