asean
CHICAGO INTERNATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS CIMUN XII (2015)
ASEAN
BACKGROUND GUIDE
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Table of Contents 1
The Situation in South Sudan ........................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
2
The Threat of Islamic Extremism ................................................................................................... 10
3
The Economic Impact of HIV/AIDS .................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
ASEAN| Background Guide
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1 FURTHERING INTEGRATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Overview: As early as 1959, Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman proposed the launching of an Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) which, apart from Maphilindo, a proposed merger of the Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia into a single nation, was a predecessor of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The original ASA had a brief life because of territorial and political disputes between member countries. Despite the common interest among the countries to contain the influence of communism, ASEAN was not set up primarily as a political-military alliance and therefore did not and still does not have the capability to create collective security forces. Subsequent events made the founding of ASEAN almost prophetic. In July 1969, President Nixon proposed the withdrawal of U.S, military presence in Asia.
This was
simultaneous to the Soviet Union’s suggestion to “set up a system of collective security in Asia” and the British Government’s announcement of its military withdrawal east of the Suez Canal. (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 1997) The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was established to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast nations. Since the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s and through the Global Financial Crisis on the last decade, commendable progress has been made by the member states of the Association in improving economic and human development outcomes both within each country and across countries. Since 1997, the economies of the poorest countries in the
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ASEAN –Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam– have generally grown faster than the richer economies, which has reduced gaps in per-capita incomes. AEASN Economic Community: On December 31 2015, the Association will celebrate the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). ASEAN Community is working greatly to present an association that is outward-looking, peaceful, stable, prosperous, and bound together in partnership for dynamic development. All members are looking to develop post-2015 vision as guidance for the countries to further prosper and grow with a stronger sense of belonging as one community. ASEAN's planned integration of its ten member nations has challenged its citizens to embrace a regional identity. The underlying assumption is that the creation of a regional identity is of special interest to ASEAN and the intent of the 2020 Vision policy document was to reassert the belief in a regional framework designed as an action plan related to human development and civic empowerment. ASEAN members are trying vigorously on being close to its people as part of the overarching theme of a truly people-centered organization. Also, during the last decade, there has been a real effort from of all the members to strengthen the development of small and medium enterprises in the region. All the partner nations are taking greater heights to ensure all promises made under the three pillars of the ASEAN Community (the PoliticalSecurity Community, Economic Community; and Socio-Cultural Community). If the nations are able to work together, we will see in the future a major integration deeper than just an economic one. AEAN Economic Development:
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If we want to understand how we can get a more integrated Southeast Asian nations, it is necessary to analyze one broad set of development outcome: Economic Development (ED). The ED indicator cover four extremely important aspects:
Economic Growth and Macroeconomic Stability: Over the past 15 years, faster growth in the poorest countries of the ASEAN has enabled limited convergence in living standards. However, gaps across member countries remain large. The average income in the richest ASEAN member state is more than 45 times of the poorest, even adjusting for differences in purchasing power.
Countries macroeconomic policies have also generally been sound,
stabilizing fiscal positions. Finally, most ASEAN economies have increased their integration with the global economy since the late-1990s, particularly the lower-income countries and Singapore.
Enterprise Development: Data available on the performance of individual enterprises indicate that, during the period covered by individual surveys, firms in Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam were generally successful in growing their workforces, although a dependence on production-based low-margin manufacturing has been seen as a liability to building a developed economy.
Business Regulation and Facilitation: ASEAN member states have generally eased regulations on private business. Particularly noteworthy is the progress made by Cambodia and Lao PDR. Nonetheless, the ease of doing business varies substantially across ASEAN economies.
Access to Finance: Gaps in access to finance remain large across the ASEAN. Whereas the average proportion of the population holding an account a financial institution is 17 percent in the four poorest countries of the ASEAN, it is 57 percent in the middle –and high
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–income countries of the ASEAN. Disparities exist in the ability to save earnings and access to financial institutions. The rates of economic integration have historically varied enormously in the ASEAN, with the entrepôt of Singapore standing alongside states that until recent decades, existed in virtual economic isolation. The past 15 years has seen a general integration of the ASEAN with the global economy. South China Sea Dispute: One of the biggest concerns of the Southeast Asian region is the island conflicts in the South China Sea (SCS). It is a dispute over territory and sovereignty over ocean areas, and the Paracels and the Spratly - two island chains claimed in whole or in part by a number of countries. Alongside the fully fledged islands, there are dozens of rocky outcrops, atolls, sandbanks and reefs, such as the Scarborough Shoal. Although largely uninhabited, the Paracels and the Spratlys may have reserves of natural resources around them. There has been little detailed exploration of the area, so estimates are largely extrapolated from the mineral wealth of neighboring areas. The sea is also a major shipping route and home to fishing grounds that supply the livelihoods of people across the region. China claims by far the largest portion of territory - an area defined by the "nine-dash line" which stretches hundreds of miles south and east from its most southerly province of Hainan. Beijing says its right to the area goes back centuries to when the Paracel and Spratly Island chains were regarded as integral parts of the Chinese nation, and in 1947 it issued a map detailing its claims. It showed the two island groups falling entirely within its territory. Those claims are mirrored by Taiwan.
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PAGE5 Vietnam hotly disputes China's historical account, saying China had never claimed sovereignty over the islands before the 1940s. Vietnam says it has actively ruled over both the Paracels and the Spratlys since the 17th Century - and has the documents to prove it. The other major claimant in the area is the Philippines, which invokes its geographical proximity to the Spratly Islands as the main basis of its claim for part of the grouping.
Both the Philippines and China lay claim to the Scarborough Shoal (known as Huangyan Island in China) - a little more than 100 miles (160km) from the Philippines and 500 miles from China. Malaysia and Brunei also lay claim to territory in the South China Sea that they say falls within their economic exclusion zones, as defined by UNCLOS - the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Brunei does not claim any of the disputed islands, but Malaysia claims a small number of islands in the Spratlys. In late 2011, ASEAN and China agreed to start negotiations on a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, an agreement that was meant to be formal and binding. ASEAN members began discussing guiding principles for the CoC in January, but the process quickly ran into problems due to divisions within ASEAN between members that have claims in the South China Sea and those that do not (and even divisions among the four ASEAN claimants themselves, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei). The Philippines wanted the code to move beyond conflict management to include conflict-resolution mechanisms outlined in its 2011 proposal to transform the South China Sea into a “zone of peace, freedom, friendship and neutrality.” Other members apparently resisted this move.
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For ASEAN states, the South China Sea brings together questions of both capability and intent. Although neither Chinese capability nor Chinese intent is as strong or as certain as sometimes portrayed by pundits and commentary, recent developments have done much to intensify Southeast Asian states’ concerns about both. Provocative actions are not limited to China, but the power dynamics in China-ASEAN relations meant that Southeast Asian interests (economic and security related) may be more vulnerable in both the short term and the long term. The concern for ASEAN states is not just about whether or not ASEAN can manage tensions in an effective way; the concern is also the damage this issue has done to the reputation of the organization. In particular, ASEAN, as an expression of the collective, has provided these smaller states a means by which to exercise voice and influence that they might not otherwise have had as individual states. In the case of the South China Sea, ASEAN’s four claimant states vary significantly in how they have chosen to approach the SCS disputes and manage the recent intensification of tensions. The Philippines’ and Vietnam’s positions and concerns may make for alarming headlines, Malaysia and Brunei have been notably quiet thus far. The main point here is that until ASEAN’s claimant states agree about how best to approach disputes, it will be difficult to talk about a common ASEAN position (Hiebert, Nguyen and Poling 2014). In another respect, the focus on ASEAN as a source of conflict management may be somewhat misplaced –or, at least, it is worth noting that the kind of role that ASEAN as an institution has been trying to play in the SCS is relatively new. Historically ASEAN has placed the greatest emphasis on preempting conflict or avoiding conflict–that is, practicing self-restraint, establishing domestic developmental conditions conducive to stable status quo states –rather than responding to conflict.
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In general, ASEAN states, despite their differences, share a common interest in the peace and stability of the region and in good, productive relations with China. This last point deserves to be treated seriously and as a reminder that relations are complex and multifaceted. This said, although most ASEAN states recognize China as having legitimate security and interest in the SCS, they have been unnerved by what they see to be China’s lack of self-restraint and intensification of activities in the SCS. Although China has tended to favor bilateral negotiations behind closed doors, other countries want international mediation. But even if the Philippines is successful in its attempts to pursue China at a UN tribunal, China would not be obliged to abide by the ruling. Recent attempts by regional grouping ASEAN to discuss new ideas for resolving the dispute appear to have left the bloc severely divided. Discussion Questions ●
How does the emergence of China as an expanding regional power affect the future of ASEAN?
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How can ASEAN achieve greater economic integration of the region?
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It is possible to consolidate a regional identity given the religious and ethnic heterogeneity between the ASEAN members?
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How can ASEAN create more unity around the South China Sea territorial disputes?
Key Terms ●
2020 Vision Policy document
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Regional Identity
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ASEAN Community
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Spratly Islands
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Paracel Islands
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Resources: Hiebert, Murray, Phuong Nguyen, and Gregory B. Poling. Perspectives on the South China
Sea: Diplomatic, legal, and security dimensions of the dispute. New York: Rownan & Littlefield, 2014. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. ASEAN: Economic co-operation: transition and
transformation. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997. Narine, Shaun. Explaining ASEAN: regionalism in Southeast Asia. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. Alexandra, Lina A. “ASEAN Political-Security Community in 2015: It is possible?” Web. 19 Aug. 2015 https://crawford.anu.edu.au/acde/ip/pdf/lpem/2011/Lina_2011.pdf ASEAN. “Initiative for ASEAN Integration (AI) and Narrowing the Development Gap (NDG).” ASEAN. Web, 19 Aug. 2015 http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economiccommunity/category/initiative-for-asean-integration-and-narrowing-the-development-gap ASEAN. “Bridging the Development Gap: ASEAN Equitable Development Monitor 2014.” ASEAN.
Web,
19
Aug.
2015
http://www.asean.org/images/pdf/2014_upload/ASEAN%20Equitable%20Development%20 Monitor%2020143%20copy.pdf Narjoko, Dionisius. “ASEAN: perspectives on economic integration: achieving the ASEAN
Economic Community agenda: an Indonesian perspective.” Web. 20 Aug. 2015
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43632/1/ASEAN_achieving%20the%20ASEAN%20Economic%20Com munity%20agenda(lsero).pdf Pempel, T.J. Remaping East Asia: The construction of a region. Cornell University Press,
2005.
Web.
16
Aug.
2015
http://liu.xplorex.com/sites/liu/files/Publications/Between_Regionalism_and_Regionalization .pdf The Council on Foreign Relations. "Asean's Future and Asian Integration." CFR. Web, 17 Aug. 2015 http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/aseans-future-asian-integration/p29247
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2 THE THREAT OF CYBER TERRORISM TO ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURES Overview: The threat of terrorism is one that looms at the front of all nation’s national security agenda. The global, seemingly ever present, threat of an attack has brought countries to radicalize national defence programs, often to the detriment of citizens’ everyday lives. To bypass this extreme increase in security measures, radical organizations have turned to the world of digital terror, giving small groups, and occasionally individuals, the power to bring down the world’s most powerful nations from the comfort of their homes. Cyberattacks, a “deliberate action to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade or destroy computer systems…or the information…in these systems or networks”1, are the most common tool used to conduct cyber terrorism and are severely common in today’s technologically integrated world. A CNN report found that 5 in 6 large companies globally had been targeted in 20142 and that a further 10.7 Million people had reported to be the victims of identity theft.3 Despite the near ubiquitous threat of cyberattacks, many governments, particularly those in emerging markets, under invest in security measures against such attacks and are left vulnerable to the ever more rising threat of cyber terrorism. The important distinction to be made here and for debate is defining what distinguishes a cyberattack from an act of cyberterrorism. For the purpose of this introductory guide, Cyber Terrorism will be defined as: “[Any] attack on critical infrastructure [including public/private financial institutions]
1 2 3
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cglc/LawOfCyberAttack.pdf http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/14/technology/security/cyber-attack-hacks-security/ http://money.cnn.com/2014/02/06/pf/identity-fraud/
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systems so as to intimidate or coerce a government for ideological, religious or political reasons.”4 The question of protecting nations from instances of cyber terrorism is of particular importance to the ASEAN region due to nations in the reason being 45% more likely to be targeted by cyberattacks than the global average.5 A possible explanation for the region’s particular attraction for cyberattacks is the combination of a rapid increased use of technological tools without adequate regulations and a desire to keep operating costs low to attract foreign investment. While there have been no confirmed examples of cyber terrorism in the region, the current vulnerability could mean that a successfully organized attack could economically cripple the region. Cyber Terrorism Methods/Tools: ●
Distributive Denial of Service (DDOS): the most common form
of attacks that target governments and other larger institutions. It involves the disabling of a specific webpage or site by sending too much internet traffic for the site to handle, shutting down all access to the site. ●
Kinetic Attack: a cyberattack with the specific intent of direct
damage/destruction of real world resources (Ex: hacking of military equipment that results in irreversible physical damage). Though statistically rare, it is considered to be the most potentially threatening form of cyber terrorism.
4
http://www.e-ir.info/2013/09/02/the-threat-of-cyberterrorism-to-critical-infrastructure/
5
http://m.cfoinnovation.com/story/10373/southeast-asian-organizations-face-greater-risk-cyber-attacks-globalaverage
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Advanced Persistent Threat (APT): a network attack in which
an individual gains access to a device/server and remains within the system for a long period of time undetected. Unlike DDOS and APT, no direct damage is done. Rather information is slowly gathered overtime and often is often used for blackmail, threatening to either publish the information publically or sell it to an interested third party. While the previous two methods directly fall under the definition of cyber terrorism as defined earlier, these subsequent techniques can be used on a larger institutional level but are more often than not used to target individuals: ●
Spam: Specific messages sent out to a large audience without
the audience’s consent. While seemingly trivial, a Spam attack on a large enough scale could use up a significant portion of a device’s memory or render multiple forms of online communication useless. ●
Malware: Similar to APT on a smaller scale, Malware is any kind
of software that is installed onto a device without the knowledge of the device’s owner. Once on the device, the software can either harvest private information or cause direct damage to the device. ●
Phishing: attempting to acquire private/valuable information by
pretending to represent a reliable organization/individual over digital communication. Phishing is often embedded with malware to coax internet users to allow for the malicious programs to access their device. The Potential Impact of Cyber Terrorism on Economies:
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A large draw to Cyber Terrorism going into the 21st century is its growing economic efficiency as a weapon of terror. In theory, any individual with advance knowledge and a device costing as little as a couple hundred dollars could commit a devastating cyberattack. Governments around the world spend 60 Billion USD annually to combat the threat of cyber terrorism. This number is dwarfed when compared to the economic investment made to combat conventional (non-cyber) terrorism. United States alone has been approximated to have spent no less than 100 Billion annually fighting conventional terrorism.6 This cost is excluding the intangible losses that come from a wide sense of fear and loss of personal freedoms. The Cyber Terrorism economy, comprised of buying and selling illegally acquired information and services, is worth an estimated 375 Billion USD annually.7 A study conducted by McKinsey & Company found that the global cost of cyberattacks could surpass 3 Trillion USD by the year 2020.8 What makes the economic impact of Cyber Terrorism so high is not just the explicit value of the information and services, but the intangible economic losses. Prolific cyberattacks severely disincentivizes multiple forms of innovation. Cyberattacks create what is known as an innovation tax, as the threat of new ideas being stolen increases so does the cost of protecting such ideas in the first place. Often the lacking assurance that an individual’s idea will remain only theirs is enough for the pursuit of such an idea fruitless. The long term consequences of such an innovation drought greatly hinders the long term growth prospects of a nation’s economy. Another long term effect brought about by weak cyber security is the overall lack of economic efficiency due to a distrust in technological
6
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1693.html http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-economic-impact-cybercrime2.pdf 8 http://www.techrepublic.com/article/cyberattacks-fallout-could-cost-the-global-economy-3-trillion-by2020/ 7
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systems, forcing organizations and businesses to either reduce the usage of technological tools or requiring large investments in cyber security to be made. This latter reason is why cyberattacks are of the most risk to emerging economies, where businesses and other organizations may possibly forgo the cost of security investment for the chance to lower costs and increase initial growth. Bloc Positions: As a whole, the lack of resources and a secure economic base within the African continent makes countering the spread of Islamic militant groups impossible for small nations and difficult and drawn-out operations for relatively larger, more prosperous nations. Kenya, Ethiopia, Burundi, and South Africa currently make up the majority of African Union military contributors, and so they face the brunt of retribution by Islamic terrorist organizations attempting to undermine public support for the missions to deny these groups any territory to control. The capability of individual nations outside those to contribute to the effort varies immensely. Nations that have been afflicted by conflict, such as Libya, Tunisia, Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger, Somalia are at a severe disadvantage when it comes to making troop or material contributions to AU missions because their domestic needs may be too compromised for them to prioritize a larger anti-terrorist fight. Nations like the Central African Republic are battling active insurgencies in their own nation, and cannot spare a single man to fight an outside threat. It may be necessary that these countries focus on rebuilding their interior rather than give time to preventing expansion. Recent Significant Attacks:
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APT 30: In April of 2015, digital security firm FireEye Inc. uncovered a decade long cyber espionage operation. India, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, Nepal, the Philippines and Indonesia were all found to have a similar malware program embedded in multiple government institutions. Telecommunications, legislative, and education sectors seem to have been three major targets of the organized attack. Intellectual property, in the form of pending patents and a plethora of private business documents, are suspected to also have been major targets of the attacks. While there is no confirmation of the government’s involvement, the attack is confirmed to have originated in China, infamous for launching ambitious and successful cyberattacks.9 Lotus Blossom Attacks: In June of 2015, it was revealed that an unknown organization, known as the Lotus Blossom Group, had conducted at least 50 connected cyberattacks across the ASEAN region. The attacks all specifically targeted government and military technologies, revealing weaknesses in the cybersecurity infrastructure of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia as well as many more possible targets. The attacks all utilized the same methodology: multiple instances of advanced phishing to gain information used to access the server, the insertion of a specific Malware program “Elise”, and the extraction of a vast amount of government information. What makes this attack peculiar is the reuse of the specific Malware program. While most APT attacks use a multitude of Malware to extract data and avoid detection, the same program was used in all five confirmed attacks. Certain countries had knowledge of the malicious file before others, however no country had expressed any concern over the attack until Unit 42 had published a report.10
9
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf
10
http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/06/operation-lotus-blossom/
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Major Players: China has long been the world’s most prolific nation when it comes to cyberattacks. It is estimated that approximately 30% of the world’s cyberattacks originate in the state. In a United States’ Department of Defence Report China is looking towards expanding its offensive cyber-front, aiming to cause economic damage and impair critical infrastructure. While a majority of the attacks are government sponsored an ever growing number of cyberattacks originating in China are made by private organizations.11 Indonesia: In October of 2014, Indonesia overtook China to become the leading nation in cyberattack traffic. This dramatic increase, from 19% of the world’s traffic in 2013, to 38% of the world’s traffic in 2014 coincides with an internet speed increase of 125% in the same time period (see fig.1).12 Indonesia was also recently a victim of the ATP30 and Lotus Blossom attacks. Singapore: After being the victim of a major cyberattack by a wing of the Anonymous Hacking group in 2013, Singapore launched a revamped cyber security agency (CSA). The revamped agency recently announced its three tiered plan to combat cybercrime: 1, Enhance the security and resilience of critical information and communication infrastructure. 2, Increase efforts to promote the adoption of appropriate security measures amongst information and businesses. 3, Grow Singapore’s pool of cyber security experts13. It is this thorough this plan that Singapore has become the safest and most prepared nation when it comes to cyberattacks in the region.
11
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-10-18/an-indonesia-overtakes-china-as-top-source-of-cyber-attacktraf/5032428 12
13
https://www.ida.gov.sg/Programmes-Partnership/Store/National-Cyber-Security-Masterplan-2018
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Discussion Questions: ●
Infrastructure is the primary target of many cyber attacks. Which components of infrastructure are likely to be targeted in an attack? How can infrastructure be protected?
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An attack on critical infrastructure could severely stunt the growth of ASEAN nations’ economic development, how can ASEAN nations cooperate to prevent such an attack?
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What distinguishes a cyber attack from an act of terrorism?
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If ASEAN nations were able to find the perpetrators of a cyberterrorist attack, is the legislation in place to prosecute the attackers?
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Cybersecurity in the majority of ASEAN nations is severely underdeveloped - how will regional cybersecurity development be funded? Are the various national cybersecurity systems compatible?
Key Terms: Innovation Tax
DDOS
Kinetic Attack
APT
Spam
Malware
Phishing
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3 [REDACTED]
ASEAN TOPIC III HAS BEEN FLAGGED FOR REDACTION AND IS CURRENTLY BEING REVISED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF SIMULATIONS.
PLEASE CHECK BACK SOON FOR THE FULL VERSION.
The Association of South East Asian Nations| CIMUN XII
ASEAN
BACKGROUND GUIDE
.
.
.
.
Table of Contents 1
The Situation in South Sudan ........................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
2
The Threat of Islamic Extremism ................................................................................................... 10
3
The Economic Impact of HIV/AIDS .................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
ASEAN| Background Guide
PAGE1
1 FURTHERING INTEGRATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Overview: As early as 1959, Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman proposed the launching of an Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) which, apart from Maphilindo, a proposed merger of the Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia into a single nation, was a predecessor of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The original ASA had a brief life because of territorial and political disputes between member countries. Despite the common interest among the countries to contain the influence of communism, ASEAN was not set up primarily as a political-military alliance and therefore did not and still does not have the capability to create collective security forces. Subsequent events made the founding of ASEAN almost prophetic. In July 1969, President Nixon proposed the withdrawal of U.S, military presence in Asia.
This was
simultaneous to the Soviet Union’s suggestion to “set up a system of collective security in Asia” and the British Government’s announcement of its military withdrawal east of the Suez Canal. (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 1997) The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was established to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast nations. Since the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s and through the Global Financial Crisis on the last decade, commendable progress has been made by the member states of the Association in improving economic and human development outcomes both within each country and across countries. Since 1997, the economies of the poorest countries in the
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ASEAN –Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam– have generally grown faster than the richer economies, which has reduced gaps in per-capita incomes. AEASN Economic Community: On December 31 2015, the Association will celebrate the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). ASEAN Community is working greatly to present an association that is outward-looking, peaceful, stable, prosperous, and bound together in partnership for dynamic development. All members are looking to develop post-2015 vision as guidance for the countries to further prosper and grow with a stronger sense of belonging as one community. ASEAN's planned integration of its ten member nations has challenged its citizens to embrace a regional identity. The underlying assumption is that the creation of a regional identity is of special interest to ASEAN and the intent of the 2020 Vision policy document was to reassert the belief in a regional framework designed as an action plan related to human development and civic empowerment. ASEAN members are trying vigorously on being close to its people as part of the overarching theme of a truly people-centered organization. Also, during the last decade, there has been a real effort from of all the members to strengthen the development of small and medium enterprises in the region. All the partner nations are taking greater heights to ensure all promises made under the three pillars of the ASEAN Community (the PoliticalSecurity Community, Economic Community; and Socio-Cultural Community). If the nations are able to work together, we will see in the future a major integration deeper than just an economic one. AEAN Economic Development:
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If we want to understand how we can get a more integrated Southeast Asian nations, it is necessary to analyze one broad set of development outcome: Economic Development (ED). The ED indicator cover four extremely important aspects:
Economic Growth and Macroeconomic Stability: Over the past 15 years, faster growth in the poorest countries of the ASEAN has enabled limited convergence in living standards. However, gaps across member countries remain large. The average income in the richest ASEAN member state is more than 45 times of the poorest, even adjusting for differences in purchasing power.
Countries macroeconomic policies have also generally been sound,
stabilizing fiscal positions. Finally, most ASEAN economies have increased their integration with the global economy since the late-1990s, particularly the lower-income countries and Singapore.
Enterprise Development: Data available on the performance of individual enterprises indicate that, during the period covered by individual surveys, firms in Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam were generally successful in growing their workforces, although a dependence on production-based low-margin manufacturing has been seen as a liability to building a developed economy.
Business Regulation and Facilitation: ASEAN member states have generally eased regulations on private business. Particularly noteworthy is the progress made by Cambodia and Lao PDR. Nonetheless, the ease of doing business varies substantially across ASEAN economies.
Access to Finance: Gaps in access to finance remain large across the ASEAN. Whereas the average proportion of the population holding an account a financial institution is 17 percent in the four poorest countries of the ASEAN, it is 57 percent in the middle –and high
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–income countries of the ASEAN. Disparities exist in the ability to save earnings and access to financial institutions. The rates of economic integration have historically varied enormously in the ASEAN, with the entrepôt of Singapore standing alongside states that until recent decades, existed in virtual economic isolation. The past 15 years has seen a general integration of the ASEAN with the global economy. South China Sea Dispute: One of the biggest concerns of the Southeast Asian region is the island conflicts in the South China Sea (SCS). It is a dispute over territory and sovereignty over ocean areas, and the Paracels and the Spratly - two island chains claimed in whole or in part by a number of countries. Alongside the fully fledged islands, there are dozens of rocky outcrops, atolls, sandbanks and reefs, such as the Scarborough Shoal. Although largely uninhabited, the Paracels and the Spratlys may have reserves of natural resources around them. There has been little detailed exploration of the area, so estimates are largely extrapolated from the mineral wealth of neighboring areas. The sea is also a major shipping route and home to fishing grounds that supply the livelihoods of people across the region. China claims by far the largest portion of territory - an area defined by the "nine-dash line" which stretches hundreds of miles south and east from its most southerly province of Hainan. Beijing says its right to the area goes back centuries to when the Paracel and Spratly Island chains were regarded as integral parts of the Chinese nation, and in 1947 it issued a map detailing its claims. It showed the two island groups falling entirely within its territory. Those claims are mirrored by Taiwan.
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PAGE5 Vietnam hotly disputes China's historical account, saying China had never claimed sovereignty over the islands before the 1940s. Vietnam says it has actively ruled over both the Paracels and the Spratlys since the 17th Century - and has the documents to prove it. The other major claimant in the area is the Philippines, which invokes its geographical proximity to the Spratly Islands as the main basis of its claim for part of the grouping.
Both the Philippines and China lay claim to the Scarborough Shoal (known as Huangyan Island in China) - a little more than 100 miles (160km) from the Philippines and 500 miles from China. Malaysia and Brunei also lay claim to territory in the South China Sea that they say falls within their economic exclusion zones, as defined by UNCLOS - the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Brunei does not claim any of the disputed islands, but Malaysia claims a small number of islands in the Spratlys. In late 2011, ASEAN and China agreed to start negotiations on a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, an agreement that was meant to be formal and binding. ASEAN members began discussing guiding principles for the CoC in January, but the process quickly ran into problems due to divisions within ASEAN between members that have claims in the South China Sea and those that do not (and even divisions among the four ASEAN claimants themselves, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei). The Philippines wanted the code to move beyond conflict management to include conflict-resolution mechanisms outlined in its 2011 proposal to transform the South China Sea into a “zone of peace, freedom, friendship and neutrality.” Other members apparently resisted this move.
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For ASEAN states, the South China Sea brings together questions of both capability and intent. Although neither Chinese capability nor Chinese intent is as strong or as certain as sometimes portrayed by pundits and commentary, recent developments have done much to intensify Southeast Asian states’ concerns about both. Provocative actions are not limited to China, but the power dynamics in China-ASEAN relations meant that Southeast Asian interests (economic and security related) may be more vulnerable in both the short term and the long term. The concern for ASEAN states is not just about whether or not ASEAN can manage tensions in an effective way; the concern is also the damage this issue has done to the reputation of the organization. In particular, ASEAN, as an expression of the collective, has provided these smaller states a means by which to exercise voice and influence that they might not otherwise have had as individual states. In the case of the South China Sea, ASEAN’s four claimant states vary significantly in how they have chosen to approach the SCS disputes and manage the recent intensification of tensions. The Philippines’ and Vietnam’s positions and concerns may make for alarming headlines, Malaysia and Brunei have been notably quiet thus far. The main point here is that until ASEAN’s claimant states agree about how best to approach disputes, it will be difficult to talk about a common ASEAN position (Hiebert, Nguyen and Poling 2014). In another respect, the focus on ASEAN as a source of conflict management may be somewhat misplaced –or, at least, it is worth noting that the kind of role that ASEAN as an institution has been trying to play in the SCS is relatively new. Historically ASEAN has placed the greatest emphasis on preempting conflict or avoiding conflict–that is, practicing self-restraint, establishing domestic developmental conditions conducive to stable status quo states –rather than responding to conflict.
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In general, ASEAN states, despite their differences, share a common interest in the peace and stability of the region and in good, productive relations with China. This last point deserves to be treated seriously and as a reminder that relations are complex and multifaceted. This said, although most ASEAN states recognize China as having legitimate security and interest in the SCS, they have been unnerved by what they see to be China’s lack of self-restraint and intensification of activities in the SCS. Although China has tended to favor bilateral negotiations behind closed doors, other countries want international mediation. But even if the Philippines is successful in its attempts to pursue China at a UN tribunal, China would not be obliged to abide by the ruling. Recent attempts by regional grouping ASEAN to discuss new ideas for resolving the dispute appear to have left the bloc severely divided. Discussion Questions ●
How does the emergence of China as an expanding regional power affect the future of ASEAN?
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How can ASEAN achieve greater economic integration of the region?
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It is possible to consolidate a regional identity given the religious and ethnic heterogeneity between the ASEAN members?
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How can ASEAN create more unity around the South China Sea territorial disputes?
Key Terms ●
2020 Vision Policy document
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Regional Identity
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ASEAN Community
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Spratly Islands
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Paracel Islands
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Resources: Hiebert, Murray, Phuong Nguyen, and Gregory B. Poling. Perspectives on the South China
Sea: Diplomatic, legal, and security dimensions of the dispute. New York: Rownan & Littlefield, 2014. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. ASEAN: Economic co-operation: transition and
transformation. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997. Narine, Shaun. Explaining ASEAN: regionalism in Southeast Asia. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. Alexandra, Lina A. “ASEAN Political-Security Community in 2015: It is possible?” Web. 19 Aug. 2015 https://crawford.anu.edu.au/acde/ip/pdf/lpem/2011/Lina_2011.pdf ASEAN. “Initiative for ASEAN Integration (AI) and Narrowing the Development Gap (NDG).” ASEAN. Web, 19 Aug. 2015 http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economiccommunity/category/initiative-for-asean-integration-and-narrowing-the-development-gap ASEAN. “Bridging the Development Gap: ASEAN Equitable Development Monitor 2014.” ASEAN.
Web,
19
Aug.
2015
http://www.asean.org/images/pdf/2014_upload/ASEAN%20Equitable%20Development%20 Monitor%2020143%20copy.pdf Narjoko, Dionisius. “ASEAN: perspectives on economic integration: achieving the ASEAN
Economic Community agenda: an Indonesian perspective.” Web. 20 Aug. 2015
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43632/1/ASEAN_achieving%20the%20ASEAN%20Economic%20Com munity%20agenda(lsero).pdf Pempel, T.J. Remaping East Asia: The construction of a region. Cornell University Press,
2005.
Web.
16
Aug.
2015
http://liu.xplorex.com/sites/liu/files/Publications/Between_Regionalism_and_Regionalization .pdf The Council on Foreign Relations. "Asean's Future and Asian Integration." CFR. Web, 17 Aug. 2015 http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/aseans-future-asian-integration/p29247
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2 THE THREAT OF CYBER TERRORISM TO ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURES Overview: The threat of terrorism is one that looms at the front of all nation’s national security agenda. The global, seemingly ever present, threat of an attack has brought countries to radicalize national defence programs, often to the detriment of citizens’ everyday lives. To bypass this extreme increase in security measures, radical organizations have turned to the world of digital terror, giving small groups, and occasionally individuals, the power to bring down the world’s most powerful nations from the comfort of their homes. Cyberattacks, a “deliberate action to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade or destroy computer systems…or the information…in these systems or networks”1, are the most common tool used to conduct cyber terrorism and are severely common in today’s technologically integrated world. A CNN report found that 5 in 6 large companies globally had been targeted in 20142 and that a further 10.7 Million people had reported to be the victims of identity theft.3 Despite the near ubiquitous threat of cyberattacks, many governments, particularly those in emerging markets, under invest in security measures against such attacks and are left vulnerable to the ever more rising threat of cyber terrorism. The important distinction to be made here and for debate is defining what distinguishes a cyberattack from an act of cyberterrorism. For the purpose of this introductory guide, Cyber Terrorism will be defined as: “[Any] attack on critical infrastructure [including public/private financial institutions]
1 2 3
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cglc/LawOfCyberAttack.pdf http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/14/technology/security/cyber-attack-hacks-security/ http://money.cnn.com/2014/02/06/pf/identity-fraud/
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systems so as to intimidate or coerce a government for ideological, religious or political reasons.”4 The question of protecting nations from instances of cyber terrorism is of particular importance to the ASEAN region due to nations in the reason being 45% more likely to be targeted by cyberattacks than the global average.5 A possible explanation for the region’s particular attraction for cyberattacks is the combination of a rapid increased use of technological tools without adequate regulations and a desire to keep operating costs low to attract foreign investment. While there have been no confirmed examples of cyber terrorism in the region, the current vulnerability could mean that a successfully organized attack could economically cripple the region. Cyber Terrorism Methods/Tools: ●
Distributive Denial of Service (DDOS): the most common form
of attacks that target governments and other larger institutions. It involves the disabling of a specific webpage or site by sending too much internet traffic for the site to handle, shutting down all access to the site. ●
Kinetic Attack: a cyberattack with the specific intent of direct
damage/destruction of real world resources (Ex: hacking of military equipment that results in irreversible physical damage). Though statistically rare, it is considered to be the most potentially threatening form of cyber terrorism.
4
http://www.e-ir.info/2013/09/02/the-threat-of-cyberterrorism-to-critical-infrastructure/
5
http://m.cfoinnovation.com/story/10373/southeast-asian-organizations-face-greater-risk-cyber-attacks-globalaverage
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Advanced Persistent Threat (APT): a network attack in which
an individual gains access to a device/server and remains within the system for a long period of time undetected. Unlike DDOS and APT, no direct damage is done. Rather information is slowly gathered overtime and often is often used for blackmail, threatening to either publish the information publically or sell it to an interested third party. While the previous two methods directly fall under the definition of cyber terrorism as defined earlier, these subsequent techniques can be used on a larger institutional level but are more often than not used to target individuals: ●
Spam: Specific messages sent out to a large audience without
the audience’s consent. While seemingly trivial, a Spam attack on a large enough scale could use up a significant portion of a device’s memory or render multiple forms of online communication useless. ●
Malware: Similar to APT on a smaller scale, Malware is any kind
of software that is installed onto a device without the knowledge of the device’s owner. Once on the device, the software can either harvest private information or cause direct damage to the device. ●
Phishing: attempting to acquire private/valuable information by
pretending to represent a reliable organization/individual over digital communication. Phishing is often embedded with malware to coax internet users to allow for the malicious programs to access their device. The Potential Impact of Cyber Terrorism on Economies:
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A large draw to Cyber Terrorism going into the 21st century is its growing economic efficiency as a weapon of terror. In theory, any individual with advance knowledge and a device costing as little as a couple hundred dollars could commit a devastating cyberattack. Governments around the world spend 60 Billion USD annually to combat the threat of cyber terrorism. This number is dwarfed when compared to the economic investment made to combat conventional (non-cyber) terrorism. United States alone has been approximated to have spent no less than 100 Billion annually fighting conventional terrorism.6 This cost is excluding the intangible losses that come from a wide sense of fear and loss of personal freedoms. The Cyber Terrorism economy, comprised of buying and selling illegally acquired information and services, is worth an estimated 375 Billion USD annually.7 A study conducted by McKinsey & Company found that the global cost of cyberattacks could surpass 3 Trillion USD by the year 2020.8 What makes the economic impact of Cyber Terrorism so high is not just the explicit value of the information and services, but the intangible economic losses. Prolific cyberattacks severely disincentivizes multiple forms of innovation. Cyberattacks create what is known as an innovation tax, as the threat of new ideas being stolen increases so does the cost of protecting such ideas in the first place. Often the lacking assurance that an individual’s idea will remain only theirs is enough for the pursuit of such an idea fruitless. The long term consequences of such an innovation drought greatly hinders the long term growth prospects of a nation’s economy. Another long term effect brought about by weak cyber security is the overall lack of economic efficiency due to a distrust in technological
6
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1693.html http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-economic-impact-cybercrime2.pdf 8 http://www.techrepublic.com/article/cyberattacks-fallout-could-cost-the-global-economy-3-trillion-by2020/ 7
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systems, forcing organizations and businesses to either reduce the usage of technological tools or requiring large investments in cyber security to be made. This latter reason is why cyberattacks are of the most risk to emerging economies, where businesses and other organizations may possibly forgo the cost of security investment for the chance to lower costs and increase initial growth. Bloc Positions: As a whole, the lack of resources and a secure economic base within the African continent makes countering the spread of Islamic militant groups impossible for small nations and difficult and drawn-out operations for relatively larger, more prosperous nations. Kenya, Ethiopia, Burundi, and South Africa currently make up the majority of African Union military contributors, and so they face the brunt of retribution by Islamic terrorist organizations attempting to undermine public support for the missions to deny these groups any territory to control. The capability of individual nations outside those to contribute to the effort varies immensely. Nations that have been afflicted by conflict, such as Libya, Tunisia, Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger, Somalia are at a severe disadvantage when it comes to making troop or material contributions to AU missions because their domestic needs may be too compromised for them to prioritize a larger anti-terrorist fight. Nations like the Central African Republic are battling active insurgencies in their own nation, and cannot spare a single man to fight an outside threat. It may be necessary that these countries focus on rebuilding their interior rather than give time to preventing expansion. Recent Significant Attacks:
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APT 30: In April of 2015, digital security firm FireEye Inc. uncovered a decade long cyber espionage operation. India, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, Nepal, the Philippines and Indonesia were all found to have a similar malware program embedded in multiple government institutions. Telecommunications, legislative, and education sectors seem to have been three major targets of the organized attack. Intellectual property, in the form of pending patents and a plethora of private business documents, are suspected to also have been major targets of the attacks. While there is no confirmation of the government’s involvement, the attack is confirmed to have originated in China, infamous for launching ambitious and successful cyberattacks.9 Lotus Blossom Attacks: In June of 2015, it was revealed that an unknown organization, known as the Lotus Blossom Group, had conducted at least 50 connected cyberattacks across the ASEAN region. The attacks all specifically targeted government and military technologies, revealing weaknesses in the cybersecurity infrastructure of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia as well as many more possible targets. The attacks all utilized the same methodology: multiple instances of advanced phishing to gain information used to access the server, the insertion of a specific Malware program “Elise”, and the extraction of a vast amount of government information. What makes this attack peculiar is the reuse of the specific Malware program. While most APT attacks use a multitude of Malware to extract data and avoid detection, the same program was used in all five confirmed attacks. Certain countries had knowledge of the malicious file before others, however no country had expressed any concern over the attack until Unit 42 had published a report.10
9
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf
10
http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/06/operation-lotus-blossom/
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Major Players: China has long been the world’s most prolific nation when it comes to cyberattacks. It is estimated that approximately 30% of the world’s cyberattacks originate in the state. In a United States’ Department of Defence Report China is looking towards expanding its offensive cyber-front, aiming to cause economic damage and impair critical infrastructure. While a majority of the attacks are government sponsored an ever growing number of cyberattacks originating in China are made by private organizations.11 Indonesia: In October of 2014, Indonesia overtook China to become the leading nation in cyberattack traffic. This dramatic increase, from 19% of the world’s traffic in 2013, to 38% of the world’s traffic in 2014 coincides with an internet speed increase of 125% in the same time period (see fig.1).12 Indonesia was also recently a victim of the ATP30 and Lotus Blossom attacks. Singapore: After being the victim of a major cyberattack by a wing of the Anonymous Hacking group in 2013, Singapore launched a revamped cyber security agency (CSA). The revamped agency recently announced its three tiered plan to combat cybercrime: 1, Enhance the security and resilience of critical information and communication infrastructure. 2, Increase efforts to promote the adoption of appropriate security measures amongst information and businesses. 3, Grow Singapore’s pool of cyber security experts13. It is this thorough this plan that Singapore has become the safest and most prepared nation when it comes to cyberattacks in the region.
11
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-10-18/an-indonesia-overtakes-china-as-top-source-of-cyber-attacktraf/5032428 12
13
https://www.ida.gov.sg/Programmes-Partnership/Store/National-Cyber-Security-Masterplan-2018
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Discussion Questions: ●
Infrastructure is the primary target of many cyber attacks. Which components of infrastructure are likely to be targeted in an attack? How can infrastructure be protected?
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An attack on critical infrastructure could severely stunt the growth of ASEAN nations’ economic development, how can ASEAN nations cooperate to prevent such an attack?
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What distinguishes a cyber attack from an act of terrorism?
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If ASEAN nations were able to find the perpetrators of a cyberterrorist attack, is the legislation in place to prosecute the attackers?
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Cybersecurity in the majority of ASEAN nations is severely underdeveloped - how will regional cybersecurity development be funded? Are the various national cybersecurity systems compatible?
Key Terms: Innovation Tax
DDOS
Kinetic Attack
APT
Spam
Malware
Phishing
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3 [REDACTED]
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