AVALANCHE, BAD WEATHER Washington, Mt. Rainier This is an
AVALANCHE, BAD WEATHER Washington, Mt. R ainier This is an account of an accident which befell W illi Unsoeld (52) and 21 of his students from The Evergreen State College while attem pting to clim b M t. R ain ier in late February. It covers the essential details chosen from close to 75 pages of reports and newspaper articles. J . P. de St. Croix, a M t. R ain ier Park R anger, recorded this report which covers the early stages of the events: “ T heir (students Je ff Casebolt (21) and Bruce O sterm ann (20)) recollection was that since signing out from P aradise on Sunday, F ebruary 25, 1979, they had spent the night of Sunday cam ped at the base of Panoram a Point. The nights of M onday and T uesday they cam ped in a storm in snow caves m ade by another group at the top of Panoram a Point. On W ednesday, they proceeded up the M u ir Snowfield to Cam p M uir and spent the nights of W ednesday and T hursday at Cam p M u ir in the public shelter. T hey had put a track up C adaver Gap in good w eather on T hursday. “ On F riday, I rem em ber Unsoeld contacting R an ger G ary Olson in Paradise by radio. Unsoeld told Olson then that the avalanche danger was ‘very low ’ and that his
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group would be ascending the C adaver G ap route instead of their planned D isappoint m ent Cleaver route. T he w eather th at day was good. “ C asebolt and O sterm ann inform ed us that all 22 group m em bers spent Friday night, M arch 2, at their high cam p at 11,800 feet on the Ingraham G lacier right up against the north side of G ibraltar Rock. T here was good w eather Saturday m orning when U nsoeld and part of the student group attem pted to reach the sum m it, but they were turned back by w inds and deteriorating visibility and w eather. O n Sunday the w eather was worse and som e of their tents were collapsing (some people spent Saturday night in snow caves at their high cam p ).” O n M onday, the party began its descent to C am p M uir. T he following account is by Ian Yolles (20s), the student who led this effort following the accident: “ T he party, consisting of 21 clim bers and led by W illi U nsoeld, departed from our high cam p on the Ingraham G lacier (located betw een G ibraltar Rock and D isappoint m ent Cleaver at an altitude of 11,800 feet) at 10 a.m . T he im petus to retreat from our high cam p to C am p M uir resulted from the fact that both our food and fuel supply were low, our position on the m ountain was vulnerable due to heavy w inds coupled w ith severe snowfall and resultant drifting, and the knowledge th at the three-day w eather forecast called for deteriorating conditions. “ O u r initial intention was to move down the Ingraham G lacier to C athedral Gap, descend C athedral G ap to the Cowlitz G lacier, and finally to traverse the Cowlitz G lacier across to C am p M uir. U pon arriving at the top of C adaver G ap we altered our route plan and decided to descend C adaver G ap and move directly to C am p M uir. T his decision was based on a com bination of factors w hich led us to believe th at the C adaver G ap route was in fact the preferred alternative given the inherent dangers in both routes. T he ingredients th at com bined to form the final decision were as follows: (a) the Ingraham G lacier presented us w ith serious crevasse dangers; (b) we were fam iliar w ith the C adaver G ap route and had w anded it on our ascent two days before; (c) the C adaver G ap route offered us a m uch m ore direct and shorter route to Cam p M uir; and (d) the m ovem ent of our group was slow, and, given the w eather, we were concerned about the potential for hypotherm ia and the possibilities of not making it to C am p M uir due to the length of the C athedral G ap route. “ As the party collected at the top of C adaver G ap, W illi requested th at each rope team depart in 100-foot intervals. At 12:40 p.m . W illi U nsoeld’s rope team , including Jan ie D iepenbrock (21), Peter M iller (26), and Frank K aplan (20), began their descent down C adaver G ap. At 1:10 p.m . W illi’s rope team was hit by a slab avalanche—the fracture line m easured the entire w idth of C adaver G ap and had a depth of three feet in the center— the estim ated distance of the avalanche slope was 500 feet. T he ava lanche buried W illi to a depth of three feet, Jan ie to a depth of two feet, left Peter buried—but he was able to force his hand up through the snow surface— and Frank partially buried. “ As the avalanche settled, Frank spotted P eter’s arm protruding through the snow, and the first attem pt to extricate the victims centered on F ran k ’s attem pt to dig Peter free. A bout 1:10 p.m . Ian Y olles’ rope team , including Bruce Clifton (24), W anda Schroeder (25), and Dave Ridley (28), arrived at the base of the avalanche. W anda and Bruce assisted Frank in his efforts to revive Peter while Ian and D avid im m ediately followed the rope in order to locate the next victim. After 15 m inutes D avid and Ian recovered Janie, who was lying face dow n in the snow w ith her pack on her back. H er
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face was cyanotic and there w as no evidence of breathing or pulse. Upon her recovery, Ian began performing artificial respiration while David followed the rope to find the fourth victim, W illi Unsoeld. “ About 2 p.m ., Sean D owney’s (20) rope team , including Penna D empsey (19) and Je ff Casebolt (21) arrived. Sean and Penna, who is an E .M .T ., took over from Ian and began performing artificial respiration on Jan ie . “ At this point W illi’s body was extricated from compacted snow and Ian began artificial respiration. W illi too was found lying face down in the snow with his pack on his back. His face was cyanotic and there was no evidence of breathing. At this point Frank took the radio from his pack and Peter M iller notified the P aradise rangers of our situation. “ About 2:45 our attem pts to revive the victims were halted. T his decision resulted from a common belief amongst the rescuers that the two victims were in fact dead. This decision was verified by Ian and Penna who are both E .M .T .s. At this point our efforts turned to the rest of the p arty in hopes of retreating to Cam p M u ir safely. By 3 p.m. the entire p arty had collected at the accident site, and Ian, Je ff and Bruce led the p arty to Cam p M uir. W e arrived at M u ir at 4:30 p.m. at which point Ian contacted the P aradise ran gers.” Due to continuing bad weather, it was not until a few days later that the students were able to return to the valley, and not until M arch 10 that rescue personnel were able to recover the bodies of Unsoeld and Diepenbrock. (Source M t. R ain ier N ational Park reports) A nalysis An accident review panel was constituted by T he Evergreen State College and included Ed LaC hapelle, Dee M olenaar, and George Senner. In terms of the direct cause of the accident, they concluded that the avalanche was set off by the first team . “ A p p aren tly,” the report stated, “ the snow was indeed stable at the top of the Gap slope, but this turned out not to be the case farther down, probably due to cross-wind slab deposition among the rocks.” T hey noted that it w as fortunate that the first team triggered the avalanche and subsequent sm all avalanches, because if a later roped team had done so, earlier team s might have been caught. It w as also pointed out that Unsoeld thought that the strong up-slope wind on the Cam p M u ir side of the Gap m ight have removed some snow and dim inished the avalanche danger, but he also had com mented on the possibility of wind slab formation at this site. Over the past two decades, there have been reports of school/college affiliated groups experiencing accidents not unlike this one. Two questions alw ays arise: one is whether the benefits outweigh the inherent risks, and the second is whether the group and esp ecially its leader(s) stepped beyond the bounds of inherent risks. The foundation upon which The Evergreen State College Outdoor Education Program is built is the belief that individuals need to engage in dem anding physical and m ental activities in order to acquire the strength and energy it takes to accom plish som ething worthwhile in life. U nlike m any of the school/college outdoor program s which focus m ostly on teaching technical skills, this program also works consciously and specifically on decision m aking, leadership and followership, coping with risks and stress, and ex am ining values and beliefs.
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Clim bers in general believe that the risks involved in clim bing lea d to the benefits. It is only a question, then, of whether the risks are entered into responsibly; that is, clim bers and leaders of clim bing groups must consider the levels of risk in relation to the stages of development of the risk takers. This addresses the second question which was mentioned, and the answer in this specific case is that the leader had prepared his students adequately and that they were adequately equipped. The question of whether they should have attem pted this climb in the first place was one which in this case was carefully considered by the leader and the students in the light of all important factors. Some students, in fact, rem ained at Cam p M uir, and some did not attem pt even that. The review team correctly pointed out an interesting difference between a risk activity for which there is wide cultural accep tab ility—such as football—and m ountaineering which is still viewed as an aberration in the world of sport. Our culture accepts “ loss-of-time” injuries, which num ber two out of every three p artici pants, in the cu ltu rally supported high-risk sports, but when an injury or death occurs in m ountaineering, every aspect of it is brought under close and w idespread scrutiny. The conclusion draw n from this accident—by the review team and several other experienced clim bers—is that Unsoeld m ade reasonable judgm ents under the circum stances. There are still some concerns which continue to be expressed. To those not fam iliar with the details who ask about the size of the group and the ratio of leadership to this num ber, the facts are that over the m any years M t. R ain ier has been climbed or attem pted (by more than 40,000 clim bers), parties have num bered from one to over 100, and the accidents which have occurred do not relate in any m eaningful w ay to the size of the party. As for leadership, this p articular party contained, as can be seen from the events following the avalanche, a depth of capable leadership ab ility. There are m any guides who would not have taken on this p articular climb with this p articular group, but this is a m atter of personal preference rather than a determ ination as to whether this clim b was proper to attem pt or not. T he reader is rem inded that this report is only a synopsis of m any w ritten and verbal reports, as well as of personal contacts with the individuals involved. T his lengthy an alysis, though brief in relation to the am ount of m aterial available, is provided because this p articular accident has received w idespread coverage and w ill be referred to often in the future. It is essential, therefore, that those interested have the facts available to them. (Source: J . W illiam son)
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group would be ascending the C adaver G ap route instead of their planned D isappoint m ent Cleaver route. T he w eather th at day was good. “ C asebolt and O sterm ann inform ed us that all 22 group m em bers spent Friday night, M arch 2, at their high cam p at 11,800 feet on the Ingraham G lacier right up against the north side of G ibraltar Rock. T here was good w eather Saturday m orning when U nsoeld and part of the student group attem pted to reach the sum m it, but they were turned back by w inds and deteriorating visibility and w eather. O n Sunday the w eather was worse and som e of their tents were collapsing (some people spent Saturday night in snow caves at their high cam p ).” O n M onday, the party began its descent to C am p M uir. T he following account is by Ian Yolles (20s), the student who led this effort following the accident: “ T he party, consisting of 21 clim bers and led by W illi U nsoeld, departed from our high cam p on the Ingraham G lacier (located betw een G ibraltar Rock and D isappoint m ent Cleaver at an altitude of 11,800 feet) at 10 a.m . T he im petus to retreat from our high cam p to C am p M uir resulted from the fact that both our food and fuel supply were low, our position on the m ountain was vulnerable due to heavy w inds coupled w ith severe snowfall and resultant drifting, and the knowledge th at the three-day w eather forecast called for deteriorating conditions. “ O u r initial intention was to move down the Ingraham G lacier to C athedral Gap, descend C athedral G ap to the Cowlitz G lacier, and finally to traverse the Cowlitz G lacier across to C am p M uir. U pon arriving at the top of C adaver G ap we altered our route plan and decided to descend C adaver G ap and move directly to C am p M uir. T his decision was based on a com bination of factors w hich led us to believe th at the C adaver G ap route was in fact the preferred alternative given the inherent dangers in both routes. T he ingredients th at com bined to form the final decision were as follows: (a) the Ingraham G lacier presented us w ith serious crevasse dangers; (b) we were fam iliar w ith the C adaver G ap route and had w anded it on our ascent two days before; (c) the C adaver G ap route offered us a m uch m ore direct and shorter route to Cam p M uir; and (d) the m ovem ent of our group was slow, and, given the w eather, we were concerned about the potential for hypotherm ia and the possibilities of not making it to C am p M uir due to the length of the C athedral G ap route. “ As the party collected at the top of C adaver G ap, W illi requested th at each rope team depart in 100-foot intervals. At 12:40 p.m . W illi U nsoeld’s rope team , including Jan ie D iepenbrock (21), Peter M iller (26), and Frank K aplan (20), began their descent down C adaver G ap. At 1:10 p.m . W illi’s rope team was hit by a slab avalanche—the fracture line m easured the entire w idth of C adaver G ap and had a depth of three feet in the center— the estim ated distance of the avalanche slope was 500 feet. T he ava lanche buried W illi to a depth of three feet, Jan ie to a depth of two feet, left Peter buried—but he was able to force his hand up through the snow surface— and Frank partially buried. “ As the avalanche settled, Frank spotted P eter’s arm protruding through the snow, and the first attem pt to extricate the victims centered on F ran k ’s attem pt to dig Peter free. A bout 1:10 p.m . Ian Y olles’ rope team , including Bruce Clifton (24), W anda Schroeder (25), and Dave Ridley (28), arrived at the base of the avalanche. W anda and Bruce assisted Frank in his efforts to revive Peter while Ian and D avid im m ediately followed the rope in order to locate the next victim. After 15 m inutes D avid and Ian recovered Janie, who was lying face dow n in the snow w ith her pack on her back. H er
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face was cyanotic and there w as no evidence of breathing or pulse. Upon her recovery, Ian began performing artificial respiration while David followed the rope to find the fourth victim, W illi Unsoeld. “ About 2 p.m ., Sean D owney’s (20) rope team , including Penna D empsey (19) and Je ff Casebolt (21) arrived. Sean and Penna, who is an E .M .T ., took over from Ian and began performing artificial respiration on Jan ie . “ At this point W illi’s body was extricated from compacted snow and Ian began artificial respiration. W illi too was found lying face down in the snow with his pack on his back. His face was cyanotic and there was no evidence of breathing. At this point Frank took the radio from his pack and Peter M iller notified the P aradise rangers of our situation. “ About 2:45 our attem pts to revive the victims were halted. T his decision resulted from a common belief amongst the rescuers that the two victims were in fact dead. This decision was verified by Ian and Penna who are both E .M .T .s. At this point our efforts turned to the rest of the p arty in hopes of retreating to Cam p M u ir safely. By 3 p.m. the entire p arty had collected at the accident site, and Ian, Je ff and Bruce led the p arty to Cam p M uir. W e arrived at M u ir at 4:30 p.m. at which point Ian contacted the P aradise ran gers.” Due to continuing bad weather, it was not until a few days later that the students were able to return to the valley, and not until M arch 10 that rescue personnel were able to recover the bodies of Unsoeld and Diepenbrock. (Source M t. R ain ier N ational Park reports) A nalysis An accident review panel was constituted by T he Evergreen State College and included Ed LaC hapelle, Dee M olenaar, and George Senner. In terms of the direct cause of the accident, they concluded that the avalanche was set off by the first team . “ A p p aren tly,” the report stated, “ the snow was indeed stable at the top of the Gap slope, but this turned out not to be the case farther down, probably due to cross-wind slab deposition among the rocks.” T hey noted that it w as fortunate that the first team triggered the avalanche and subsequent sm all avalanches, because if a later roped team had done so, earlier team s might have been caught. It w as also pointed out that Unsoeld thought that the strong up-slope wind on the Cam p M u ir side of the Gap m ight have removed some snow and dim inished the avalanche danger, but he also had com mented on the possibility of wind slab formation at this site. Over the past two decades, there have been reports of school/college affiliated groups experiencing accidents not unlike this one. Two questions alw ays arise: one is whether the benefits outweigh the inherent risks, and the second is whether the group and esp ecially its leader(s) stepped beyond the bounds of inherent risks. The foundation upon which The Evergreen State College Outdoor Education Program is built is the belief that individuals need to engage in dem anding physical and m ental activities in order to acquire the strength and energy it takes to accom plish som ething worthwhile in life. U nlike m any of the school/college outdoor program s which focus m ostly on teaching technical skills, this program also works consciously and specifically on decision m aking, leadership and followership, coping with risks and stress, and ex am ining values and beliefs.
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Clim bers in general believe that the risks involved in clim bing lea d to the benefits. It is only a question, then, of whether the risks are entered into responsibly; that is, clim bers and leaders of clim bing groups must consider the levels of risk in relation to the stages of development of the risk takers. This addresses the second question which was mentioned, and the answer in this specific case is that the leader had prepared his students adequately and that they were adequately equipped. The question of whether they should have attem pted this climb in the first place was one which in this case was carefully considered by the leader and the students in the light of all important factors. Some students, in fact, rem ained at Cam p M uir, and some did not attem pt even that. The review team correctly pointed out an interesting difference between a risk activity for which there is wide cultural accep tab ility—such as football—and m ountaineering which is still viewed as an aberration in the world of sport. Our culture accepts “ loss-of-time” injuries, which num ber two out of every three p artici pants, in the cu ltu rally supported high-risk sports, but when an injury or death occurs in m ountaineering, every aspect of it is brought under close and w idespread scrutiny. The conclusion draw n from this accident—by the review team and several other experienced clim bers—is that Unsoeld m ade reasonable judgm ents under the circum stances. There are still some concerns which continue to be expressed. To those not fam iliar with the details who ask about the size of the group and the ratio of leadership to this num ber, the facts are that over the m any years M t. R ain ier has been climbed or attem pted (by more than 40,000 clim bers), parties have num bered from one to over 100, and the accidents which have occurred do not relate in any m eaningful w ay to the size of the party. As for leadership, this p articular party contained, as can be seen from the events following the avalanche, a depth of capable leadership ab ility. There are m any guides who would not have taken on this p articular climb with this p articular group, but this is a m atter of personal preference rather than a determ ination as to whether this clim b was proper to attem pt or not. T he reader is rem inded that this report is only a synopsis of m any w ritten and verbal reports, as well as of personal contacts with the individuals involved. T his lengthy an alysis, though brief in relation to the am ount of m aterial available, is provided because this p articular accident has received w idespread coverage and w ill be referred to often in the future. It is essential, therefore, that those interested have the facts available to them. (Source: J . W illiam son)
