Balancing Transparency and Security Considerations in National ...
Balancing Transparency and Security Considerations in National Nuclear Security Arrangements Sharon Squassoni Senior Fellow & Director Proliferation Prevention Program Workshop on Nuclear Security Qingdao, China June 14-15, 2012 Hosted by International Institute for Strategic Studies & China Institute of International Studies
Outline
Context: theory and practice Transparency and international confidence Balancing security against transparency China’s role Cooperation among Centers of Excellence in Asia
www.csis.org | 2
www.csis.org |
Cartoonist: Carl Stoiber
Big Picture Focus here is on national nuclear security arrangements But, the tradeoff between sharing and restricting information is important for many aspects of nuclear terrorism/nuclear security Understanding the threat – globally, regionally, nationally Implementation of summit commitments Transportation security Countering nuclear smuggling Nuclear forensics – national libraries of materials www.csis.org | 4
Theory Trying to prevent intentionally harmful acts -theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts – requires confidentiality to make it more difficult for attackers to overcome defenses. This can result in lack of transparency, which can carry the risk of lessened accountability (i.e., failure to meet standards) at the operator and national levels. Internationally, lack of transparency undermines confidence in regime as a whole and inhibits progress www.csis.org | 5
Theory II Prevention is one objective of nuclear security but there are others: deterrence, detection and response. The balance between sharing and restricting information may differ among them Easier to emphasize restricting information than sharing information E.g., implementing post 9/11 NRC regulations in US
www.csis.org | 6
Balancing security and transparency according to nuclear security objectives Policy Objective
Information Sharing
Information restriction
Deterrence
Information about the strength of measures, approaches can help deter some actors or divert from certain pathways
Restricting information about weaknesses in systems is a crucial defense
Prevention
Information sharing with other countries can help identify threats, solutions
Information security about systems, implementation can prevent penetrations (think Stuxnet)
Preparedness
Sharing best practices across the board (e.g. security culture)
Restricting some information about preparedness can be a crucial defense
Detection & Response
Coordination of national libraries of materials (or an international library) is helpful for nuclear forensics
www.csis.org | 7 Restricting information about sources and methods for detection may be necessary
In Practice Nuclear security firmly a sovereign issue No international verification of commitments under various nuclear-security-related conventions and agreements Limited and voluntary peer review through WINS; IAEA missions
Benefits of sovereignty Low-cost and efficient; flexibility in establishing and implementing national standards
Costs/risks of sovereignty Uneven implementation and little transparency or international confidence www.csis.org | 8
Why is international confidence important? Shared interest in deterring catastrophic nuclear terrorism Potential implications for sustainability of nuclear energy For countries seeking to acquire nuclear power, important to demonstrate governance For countries seeking to sell nuclear power reactors, important to be a responsible supplier and promote nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation.
www.csis.org | 9
Transparency and international confidence
• Goal of transparency
• enhance confidence and minimize misperceptions without compromising national security interests
Transparency to whom? About what? Between operators – e.g., best practices To regulators – implementation by operators To publics – effective regulation Between countries – adherence to standards
www.csis.org | 10
Information Sharing & Security at the 2010 NSS Communique stated that countries agree to share, subject to respective national laws and procedures, information and expertise through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in relevant areas such as nuclear detection, forensics, law enforcement, and the development of new technologies
Work plan encouraged participating states to develop: mechanisms to expand sharing of information on issues, challenges, risks and solutions related to nuclear security, nuclear terrorism and illicit nuclear trafficking in a comprehensive and timely manner; and methods and mechanisms, where appropriate, to enhance bilateral and multilateral collaboration in sharing urgent and relevant information on nuclear security and incidents www.csis.org | 11 involving illicit nuclear trafficking.
Information Security & Sharing at the 2012 NSS Communique We will work to strengthen cooperation among States and encourage them to share information, consistent with national regulations, on individuals involved in trafficking offenses of nuclear and other radioactive materials We also underscore the importance of international cooperation both in technology and human resource development to advance nuclear forensics.
Multinational Statement on Information Security (examples): Development and/or optimization of a set of national guidance and grading systems for nuclear information security, including on what information can be publicly www.csis.org disclosed
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Balancing security & transparency • National Level Requirements for sharing or restricting information • Regulatory requirements (operator to regulator) • Legal/policy requirements (regulator to lawmakers)
• Public accountability, if any
• International Level • No accountability, just voluntary guidelines • Peer reviews (voluntary) require certain amount of transparency
www.csis.org | 13
Balancing security & transparency • US NRC: • There must be an appropriate balance between the public’s right to information so they can meaningfully participate in the regulatory processes and the need to protect sensitive security information from inadvertent release or unauthorized disclosure. (2008)
• NTI Index: • States must strike a balance, however, between undermining security through too much transparency and undermining international understanding and assurance through excessive secrecy
www.csis.org | 14
China’s Role All countries face inherent challenges in balancing transparency and security considerations Nuclear weapon states face particular challenges with respect to fissile material holdings, lack of comprehensive safeguards • Nuclear exporters have responsibility to ensure that recipients are meeting international standards for safety, security, governance & nonproliferation
www.csis.org | 15
Cooperation among Centers of Excellence • China, Japan & ROK have a stake in promoting nuclear security, not just in NE Asia but also in Southeast Asia, in countries interested in developing nuclear energy – e.g., Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore. • Chinese, Japanese and Korean centers of excellence for nuclear security could collaborate in these areas: • Regional threat briefings • Tracking implementation of 2012 summit commitments • Information security & exchange • Impact of fuel cycle choices on nuclear security www.csis.org | 16
Contact information Proliferation Prevention Program @ www.csis.org [email protected] 202 775-3293
www.csis.org | 17
Outline
Context: theory and practice Transparency and international confidence Balancing security against transparency China’s role Cooperation among Centers of Excellence in Asia
www.csis.org | 2
www.csis.org |
Cartoonist: Carl Stoiber
Big Picture Focus here is on national nuclear security arrangements But, the tradeoff between sharing and restricting information is important for many aspects of nuclear terrorism/nuclear security Understanding the threat – globally, regionally, nationally Implementation of summit commitments Transportation security Countering nuclear smuggling Nuclear forensics – national libraries of materials www.csis.org | 4
Theory Trying to prevent intentionally harmful acts -theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts – requires confidentiality to make it more difficult for attackers to overcome defenses. This can result in lack of transparency, which can carry the risk of lessened accountability (i.e., failure to meet standards) at the operator and national levels. Internationally, lack of transparency undermines confidence in regime as a whole and inhibits progress www.csis.org | 5
Theory II Prevention is one objective of nuclear security but there are others: deterrence, detection and response. The balance between sharing and restricting information may differ among them Easier to emphasize restricting information than sharing information E.g., implementing post 9/11 NRC regulations in US
www.csis.org | 6
Balancing security and transparency according to nuclear security objectives Policy Objective
Information Sharing
Information restriction
Deterrence
Information about the strength of measures, approaches can help deter some actors or divert from certain pathways
Restricting information about weaknesses in systems is a crucial defense
Prevention
Information sharing with other countries can help identify threats, solutions
Information security about systems, implementation can prevent penetrations (think Stuxnet)
Preparedness
Sharing best practices across the board (e.g. security culture)
Restricting some information about preparedness can be a crucial defense
Detection & Response
Coordination of national libraries of materials (or an international library) is helpful for nuclear forensics
www.csis.org | 7 Restricting information about sources and methods for detection may be necessary
In Practice Nuclear security firmly a sovereign issue No international verification of commitments under various nuclear-security-related conventions and agreements Limited and voluntary peer review through WINS; IAEA missions
Benefits of sovereignty Low-cost and efficient; flexibility in establishing and implementing national standards
Costs/risks of sovereignty Uneven implementation and little transparency or international confidence www.csis.org | 8
Why is international confidence important? Shared interest in deterring catastrophic nuclear terrorism Potential implications for sustainability of nuclear energy For countries seeking to acquire nuclear power, important to demonstrate governance For countries seeking to sell nuclear power reactors, important to be a responsible supplier and promote nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation.
www.csis.org | 9
Transparency and international confidence
• Goal of transparency
• enhance confidence and minimize misperceptions without compromising national security interests
Transparency to whom? About what? Between operators – e.g., best practices To regulators – implementation by operators To publics – effective regulation Between countries – adherence to standards
www.csis.org | 10
Information Sharing & Security at the 2010 NSS Communique stated that countries agree to share, subject to respective national laws and procedures, information and expertise through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in relevant areas such as nuclear detection, forensics, law enforcement, and the development of new technologies
Work plan encouraged participating states to develop: mechanisms to expand sharing of information on issues, challenges, risks and solutions related to nuclear security, nuclear terrorism and illicit nuclear trafficking in a comprehensive and timely manner; and methods and mechanisms, where appropriate, to enhance bilateral and multilateral collaboration in sharing urgent and relevant information on nuclear security and incidents www.csis.org | 11 involving illicit nuclear trafficking.
Information Security & Sharing at the 2012 NSS Communique We will work to strengthen cooperation among States and encourage them to share information, consistent with national regulations, on individuals involved in trafficking offenses of nuclear and other radioactive materials We also underscore the importance of international cooperation both in technology and human resource development to advance nuclear forensics.
Multinational Statement on Information Security (examples): Development and/or optimization of a set of national guidance and grading systems for nuclear information security, including on what information can be publicly www.csis.org disclosed
| 12
Balancing security & transparency • National Level Requirements for sharing or restricting information • Regulatory requirements (operator to regulator) • Legal/policy requirements (regulator to lawmakers)
• Public accountability, if any
• International Level • No accountability, just voluntary guidelines • Peer reviews (voluntary) require certain amount of transparency
www.csis.org | 13
Balancing security & transparency • US NRC: • There must be an appropriate balance between the public’s right to information so they can meaningfully participate in the regulatory processes and the need to protect sensitive security information from inadvertent release or unauthorized disclosure. (2008)
• NTI Index: • States must strike a balance, however, between undermining security through too much transparency and undermining international understanding and assurance through excessive secrecy
www.csis.org | 14
China’s Role All countries face inherent challenges in balancing transparency and security considerations Nuclear weapon states face particular challenges with respect to fissile material holdings, lack of comprehensive safeguards • Nuclear exporters have responsibility to ensure that recipients are meeting international standards for safety, security, governance & nonproliferation
www.csis.org | 15
Cooperation among Centers of Excellence • China, Japan & ROK have a stake in promoting nuclear security, not just in NE Asia but also in Southeast Asia, in countries interested in developing nuclear energy – e.g., Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore. • Chinese, Japanese and Korean centers of excellence for nuclear security could collaborate in these areas: • Regional threat briefings • Tracking implementation of 2012 summit commitments • Information security & exchange • Impact of fuel cycle choices on nuclear security www.csis.org | 16
Contact information Proliferation Prevention Program @ www.csis.org [email protected] 202 775-3293
www.csis.org | 17
