Emotions Hold the Self Together
While classical philosophy of mind regards cognitive faculties, such as consciousness, attention and emotions, as autonomous modalities, modern neuroscience teaches us that these should be considered with respect to the experiencing self. Fear, anger, joy or sadness should not be considered as distinct phenomena but in relation to the self which experiences them on the one hand and expresses them on the other. This book endeavours to draw a framework of self-referential emotions as a plane in which the self is active. Using notions from classical and modern analytical philosophy of mind as well as findings from cognitive psychology and neuroscience, the main idea presented here is that emotions, and self-referential emotions in particular, are essential for the constitution of the self. Emotions provide the self with evaluative information about the self’s faring in the world. Moreover, by facilitating communication with other »selves«, emotions further promote understanding of others’ evaluations of the self, enhancing the development of a self-concept and conscious self-experience. It is proposed that highly salient emotional self-reference and evaluative self-experience are at the core of various levels of selfconsciousness. Self-referential emotions therefore might have implications for understanding one’s behavior as well as its breakdown in various pathologies such as in Autism spectrum disorder and affective disorders.
Zinck · Emotions Hold the Self Together
Alexandra Zinck
Emotions Hold the Self Together Self-Consciousness and the Functional Role of Emotion
Zinck_RZ dup.indd 1
16.02.11 11:26
Zinck · Emotions Hold the Self Together
Alexandra Zinck
Emotions Hold the Self Together Self-Consciousness and the Functional Role of Emotion
mentis PADERBORN
Gedruckt mit Unterstützung des Förderungs- und Beihilfefonds Wissenschaft der VG Wort. Einbandabbildung: MAN RAY, Noir et blanche 1926 © Man Ray Trust, Paris/VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn 2011
Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.
Gedruckt auf umweltfreundlichem, chlorfrei gebleichtem und alterungsbeständigem Papier ∞ ISO 9706
© 2011 mentis Verlag GmbH Schulze-Delitzsch-Straße 19, D-33100 Paderborn www.mentis.de Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Dieses Werk sowie einzelne Teile desselben sind urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung in anderen als den gesetzlich zulässigen Fällen ist ohne vorherige Zustimmung des Verlages nicht zulässig. Printed in Germany Einbandgestaltung: Anne Nitsche, Dülmen (www.junit-netzwerk.de) Satz: Rhema – Tim Doherty, Münster [ChH] (www.rhema-verlag.de) Druck: AZ Druck und Datentechnik GmbH, Kempten ISBN 978-3-89785-704-9
For Peter Lyndon
Table of Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5.1
Self-Consciousness in the Philosophy and Sciences of Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.6 1.7 1.7.1 1.7.2 1.7.3 1.7.4 1.8 1.9 2
Emotion as a Special Kind of Cognition
2.1 2.2 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.3
Emotion Is a Kind of Cognition . . . . . . . . . Emotions Are Involved in Cognitive Processes Kinds of Cognitive Processes . . . . . . . . . . . Emotion and Cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emotions Evaluate Information . . . . . . . . .
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55 59 60 63 72
3
Classifying Emotion: A Developmental Account . . . . . .
75
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Introduction: Challenges and Conditions for a Theory of Emotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Outset: The Traditional and the Contemporary Debate . . . . . . .
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Self-Experience Is Self-Conscious . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Defining Self-Consciousness: Research and Perspectives . . Phenomenal Features of Self-Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . Representations Underlying Self-Consciousness . . . . . . . Theories of Self-Consciousness in Philosophy . . . . . . . . . A Rationalistic Starting Point: Self-Consciousness in the Philosophy of Descartes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Self-Consciousness in the Philosophy of Language . . . . . Theories of Self-Consciousness in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy with Focus on Developmental Psychology and Cognitive Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Theories of Self-Consciousness in Neuroscience . . . . . . . New Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emotion and Cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Phenomenology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Communication and Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Neuropsychological Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.5.2 1.5.3
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Table of Contents
3.3 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3 3.4 3.4.1 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4 3.4.5 3.5 3.6 3.7
Locating Emotions in the Range of Mental Phenomena Basic Mental Representations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cognitive Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A New Classification of Emotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pre-Emotions As Unfocussed Expressive Emotions . . Basic Emotions: Basic Affect Programs . . . . . . . . . . Primary Cognitive Emotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Secondary Cognitive Emotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Challenges for the Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Advantages of the Developmental Approach . . . . . . . The Nature of Emotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
Self-Referential Emotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.1
Self-Referential Emotion: Specific Functions, Properties and Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Structure of Self-Referential Emotion . . . . . . . . . . . . Specific Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Specific Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Self-Referential Emotions within the Class of Emotions: A First Positioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Self-referential Emotion without “Theory of Mind” and without Language-based Self-Representation . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion and the Extension of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . Self-Feeling, Existential Feelings and Self-Referential Emotion
4.1.1 4.1.2 4.1.3 4.2 4.3 4.3.1 4.4 4.5 5
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Emotion, Understanding Minds and Self-Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.1
Emotions and Self-Consciousness on Basic Non-Conceptual Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Emotions and Self-Consciousness on Conceptual Levels . . 5.2.1 Understanding Minds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 The Consequences of Impaired Understanding of Minds on Emotional Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.3 The Effects of Lacking Emotional Self- and Other-Access on Self-Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Table of Contents
9
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 A Table: Mental Phenomena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 B Theory of Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 C Autism Spectrum Disorder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Preface In this investigation, I intend to show that emotions play a central role for selfconsciousness. Self-consciousness can be intuitively defined as being conscious of oneself as oneself. It comprises being conscious of especially one’s own mental but also of one’s physical states in contrast to being conscious of states of the external world. Traditionally, self-consciousness as one of the most complex and typically human mental phenomena is defined as a cognitive state that is independent of emotions or only disturbed by them. It is the aim of this book to contribute to a new emotion-based theory of human self-consciousness by systematically including emotions. Consequently, it is moreover an aim of the book to develop a theory and classification of emotion. Developing such a theory of self-consciousness and emotion is a project situated within the philosophy of mind. However, it has become more and more clear that reflection upon the mind and mental phenomena is an endeavor that is intricately connected with and profits from being informed by empirical investigations in the sciences of mind, namely cognitive psychology, neuroscience and neurology. These empirical sciences share the mind as topic of investigation with philosophy and by taking a different approach, they contribute a complementary perspective to the philosophical analysis. Furthermore, empirical results represent evidence for the structure and mechanisms of phenomena of the mind which to be able to account for should be a reasonable demand on a philosophical theory. Therefore, the philosophical analysis of emotions and their function for self-consciousness is realized in an interdisciplinary setting, and the argument is systematically informed by significant results and data from empirical studies. It is also based in a naturalistic framework within the philosophy of mind and a representational account in cognitive science (for further elaboration, see chapter 1). The book consists of five chapters. The first is devoted to a detailed exploration of the various approaches to defining self-consciousness in the philosophy and sciences of mind and to setting the frame for the development of a further approach that essentially includes emotion. For my purposes, I have chosen a developmental framework of self-consciousness that consists of three levels which involve an increasing amount of cognitive complexity: These are a phenomenal pre-conceptual, a conceptual and a meta-representational level. The development of a theory of emotion is realized in chapters 2 through 4. The second chapter begins the argument by clarifying the concepts of emotion and cognition. Emotion, so is argued, belongs to the set of cognitive processes in a wide sense which is constituted by the set of information processing mechanisms that are relevant for minimally complex behavior. Emotions are further argued to not oppose other cognitive processes but to centrally be involved in them, such that emotions and other cognitive processes are shown to be interdependent
12
Preface
capacities of the mind. The reason for the central importance of emotion lies in its evaluative function that is especially important in information processing. The next central point of the book consists of the focus on the properties of emotion (chapter 3). First, criteria are established by which emotions are distinguished from other mental phenomena. Emotions are then described as covering a wide range of phenomena that vary according to different parameters such as complex cognitive, experiential, physiological and behavioral parameters that are relevant for their constitution. Emotion types are constituted by typical patterns that are composed of these features. I argue that despite a strong variation between these patterns of features, emotions still form a unified ontological category characterized by their functional roles that are essentially evaluative and promoting communication, interaction and flexible behavior. In the last part of the chapter, emotions are classified according to four developmental stages: 1. pre-emotions as unfocussed expressive emotion states, 2. basic emotions, 3. primary cognitive emotions and 4. secondary cognitive emotions. During emotional development, four types of basic emotions (fear, anger, joy and sadness) are systematically differentiated into the diversity of more complex emotions. The importance of emotions for self-consciousness is argued to consist in (i) their evaluative function which contributes evaluative information to the representation underlying self-consciousness. The evaluation is independent of complex conceptual cognition and is immediately informative about a relevant state of the subject. It is authentic and self-disclosing in conscious experience and necessary for initiating adequate behavior and orientation within a context. Thus, emotional information constitutes a foundation especially of non-conceptual selfrepresentation. Further, (ii) the emotions’ essentially expressive and communicative function is crucially involved in social communication by which an understanding of others’ mental states about oneself and of own mental states is promoted. This is in itself the foundation of a meta-representation and therefore for the more complex conceptual levels of self-consciousness. Communication between subjects that is mediated by emotions is not only relevant for self-consciousness on complex developmental levels where propositional state ascriptions can be accomplished but also already at early developmental levels. This is discussed in chapter 4, in which I set out to investigate a special subgroup of emotions, namely the self-referential emotions. Self-referential emotions are special self-evaluative emotions in which the intentional object is identical with or intricately related to the subject, such as for instance in shame or pride. In paradigmatic form, they are secondary cognitive emotions that predispose complex cognitive capacities such as the capacity to ascribe propositional states to others (theory of mind) and a conceptual self-representation. I argue that there are furthermore already pre-forms of self-referential emotions that involve non-conceptual self-representations and that these have an important functional role: They contribute to communication between individuals and so promote mentalizing as
Preface
13
a basic and early form of self-understanding and of understanding of other minds. In addition to contributing self-evaluative information for the self-representation, early emotionally mediated social interaction also contributes to the development of complex self-representations. Besides being important for non-conceptual levels of self-consciousness, emotions are also important for conceptual levels of self-consciousness (chapter 5). By examining impairments in emotional self-reference and content of self-ascription subsequent to deficits in the capacity of understanding other minds, which is the main criterion for meta-representations underlying complex conceptual self-consciousness, emotions are shown to be mental states that are especially valuable to be able to access. Again, it is the evaluative information that is invaluable for an adequate self-reference in order to engage in the most appropriate actions for oneself in a given situation. Moreover, understanding of others’ mental, and especially of their evaluative third-person-perspective on oneself, provides important input for the conceptual representation. Without access to one’s own and to others’ emotions, emotional communication is impaired which subsequently also leads to impairments in conceptual self-representation. Together with the capacity of understanding other minds, the evaluative and communicative functions of emotions are thus central for conceptual self-consciousness. The discussion in chapter 5 is strongly supported by input from the developmental disorder of autism. On this basis, an empirically founded philosophical theory of emotions and their functions for self-consciousness will be developed that allows to spell out the interdependence of emotional states and states of self-consciousness. Thereby, a new understanding of two cognitive phenomena is achieved that belong to the core of being human, namely emotion and self-consciousness. There are very many people who have supported me in turning this book into a reality. The encouragement and assistance of teachers, colleagues, friends and family has fundamentally contributed to me accomplishing my doctorate thesis that I submitted at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum in June 2008 and that has now developed into this book. I am very grateful to my supervisor, Albert Newen, first at the University of Tübingen and later at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum, for his support, guidance and encouragement. I have learned a lot as doctorate student in his research group “Self-Consciousness and Concept Formation in Humans”. He challenged and supported my work and moreover gave me the possibility to organize a conference on “Social cognition, Self-Consciousness and Emotion” which took place in Delmenhorst in spring 2007. The ideas for the theory of self-referential emotions were substantially refined by the exchange with the participants at this conference. I would also like to thank my co-supervisor, Logi Gunnarsson, who accompanied the beginnings of my studies of philosophy and has joined me again at the completion of my doctorate project.
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Preface
Uta Frith offered me the opportunity to spend three months in her laboratory at the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience in London. Large parts of the ideas for self-consciousness, theory of mind and communication were developed in this friendly and inspiring environment. I want to thank her for her continuous support. It is a pleasure for me to thank the members of Albert Newen’s research group for their discussion, feedback and motivational support. Christoph Michel, Ulrike Pompe, Gottfried Vosgerau, Tobias Schlicht, Eva-Maria Jung and Louise RöskaHardy all read parts of the manuscript and helped me with kind and precious suggestions. I would also like to thank Manfred Frank and Frank Hofmann of the University of Tübingen, and Sarah White, Sarah-Jayne Blakemore and Rosie Rogers of UCL London for their valuable comments. I am very grateful to the German National Academic Foundation (Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes) and the Volkswagen Foundation (VolkswagenStiftung) for financial support of my work. I also wish to acknowledge their ideological support through the “Platform of the Life Sciences, Mind Sciences, and the Humanities” and summer schools that gave me numerous possibilities of challenging and pleasurable exchange. I would also like to thank Michael Kienecker and mentis Verlag for the publication of my work. Furthermore, I wish to thank Richard, Barbara and Wolf Dietrich Zinck, Cord Kaldrack, Tim Federhen, Mareike Stoll, Vera Hoffmann, Annkathrin Koepke, Felix Pahl, Sealy Zinck and Shahar Arzy for their continuous inspiration, encouragement and moral support. Keywords: emotion, self-consciousness, cognition, facial expression, communication, interaction, theory of other minds, autism
Zinck · Emotions Hold the Self Together
Alexandra Zinck
Emotions Hold the Self Together Self-Consciousness and the Functional Role of Emotion
Zinck_RZ dup.indd 1
16.02.11 11:26
Zinck · Emotions Hold the Self Together
Alexandra Zinck
Emotions Hold the Self Together Self-Consciousness and the Functional Role of Emotion
mentis PADERBORN
Gedruckt mit Unterstützung des Förderungs- und Beihilfefonds Wissenschaft der VG Wort. Einbandabbildung: MAN RAY, Noir et blanche 1926 © Man Ray Trust, Paris/VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn 2011
Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.
Gedruckt auf umweltfreundlichem, chlorfrei gebleichtem und alterungsbeständigem Papier ∞ ISO 9706
© 2011 mentis Verlag GmbH Schulze-Delitzsch-Straße 19, D-33100 Paderborn www.mentis.de Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Dieses Werk sowie einzelne Teile desselben sind urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung in anderen als den gesetzlich zulässigen Fällen ist ohne vorherige Zustimmung des Verlages nicht zulässig. Printed in Germany Einbandgestaltung: Anne Nitsche, Dülmen (www.junit-netzwerk.de) Satz: Rhema – Tim Doherty, Münster [ChH] (www.rhema-verlag.de) Druck: AZ Druck und Datentechnik GmbH, Kempten ISBN 978-3-89785-704-9
For Peter Lyndon
Table of Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5.1
Self-Consciousness in the Philosophy and Sciences of Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.6 1.7 1.7.1 1.7.2 1.7.3 1.7.4 1.8 1.9 2
Emotion as a Special Kind of Cognition
2.1 2.2 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.3
Emotion Is a Kind of Cognition . . . . . . . . . Emotions Are Involved in Cognitive Processes Kinds of Cognitive Processes . . . . . . . . . . . Emotion and Cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emotions Evaluate Information . . . . . . . . .
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55 59 60 63 72
3
Classifying Emotion: A Developmental Account . . . . . .
75
3.1
Introduction: Challenges and Conditions for a Theory of Emotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Outset: The Traditional and the Contemporary Debate . . . . . . .
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Self-Experience Is Self-Conscious . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Defining Self-Consciousness: Research and Perspectives . . Phenomenal Features of Self-Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . Representations Underlying Self-Consciousness . . . . . . . Theories of Self-Consciousness in Philosophy . . . . . . . . . A Rationalistic Starting Point: Self-Consciousness in the Philosophy of Descartes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Self-Consciousness in the Philosophy of Language . . . . . Theories of Self-Consciousness in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy with Focus on Developmental Psychology and Cognitive Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Theories of Self-Consciousness in Neuroscience . . . . . . . New Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emotion and Cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Phenomenology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Communication and Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Neuropsychological Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.5.2 1.5.3
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Table of Contents
3.3 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3 3.4 3.4.1 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4 3.4.5 3.5 3.6 3.7
Locating Emotions in the Range of Mental Phenomena Basic Mental Representations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cognitive Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A New Classification of Emotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pre-Emotions As Unfocussed Expressive Emotions . . Basic Emotions: Basic Affect Programs . . . . . . . . . . Primary Cognitive Emotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Secondary Cognitive Emotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Challenges for the Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Advantages of the Developmental Approach . . . . . . . The Nature of Emotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Self-Referential Emotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.1
Self-Referential Emotion: Specific Functions, Properties and Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Structure of Self-Referential Emotion . . . . . . . . . . . . Specific Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Specific Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Self-Referential Emotions within the Class of Emotions: A First Positioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Self-referential Emotion without “Theory of Mind” and without Language-based Self-Representation . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion and the Extension of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . Self-Feeling, Existential Feelings and Self-Referential Emotion
4.1.1 4.1.2 4.1.3 4.2 4.3 4.3.1 4.4 4.5 5
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Emotion, Understanding Minds and Self-Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.1
Emotions and Self-Consciousness on Basic Non-Conceptual Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Emotions and Self-Consciousness on Conceptual Levels . . 5.2.1 Understanding Minds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 The Consequences of Impaired Understanding of Minds on Emotional Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.3 The Effects of Lacking Emotional Self- and Other-Access on Self-Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . 136 . . . . 139 . . . . 140 . . . . 143 . . . . 147 . . . . 150
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
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Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 A Table: Mental Phenomena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 B Theory of Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 C Autism Spectrum Disorder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Preface In this investigation, I intend to show that emotions play a central role for selfconsciousness. Self-consciousness can be intuitively defined as being conscious of oneself as oneself. It comprises being conscious of especially one’s own mental but also of one’s physical states in contrast to being conscious of states of the external world. Traditionally, self-consciousness as one of the most complex and typically human mental phenomena is defined as a cognitive state that is independent of emotions or only disturbed by them. It is the aim of this book to contribute to a new emotion-based theory of human self-consciousness by systematically including emotions. Consequently, it is moreover an aim of the book to develop a theory and classification of emotion. Developing such a theory of self-consciousness and emotion is a project situated within the philosophy of mind. However, it has become more and more clear that reflection upon the mind and mental phenomena is an endeavor that is intricately connected with and profits from being informed by empirical investigations in the sciences of mind, namely cognitive psychology, neuroscience and neurology. These empirical sciences share the mind as topic of investigation with philosophy and by taking a different approach, they contribute a complementary perspective to the philosophical analysis. Furthermore, empirical results represent evidence for the structure and mechanisms of phenomena of the mind which to be able to account for should be a reasonable demand on a philosophical theory. Therefore, the philosophical analysis of emotions and their function for self-consciousness is realized in an interdisciplinary setting, and the argument is systematically informed by significant results and data from empirical studies. It is also based in a naturalistic framework within the philosophy of mind and a representational account in cognitive science (for further elaboration, see chapter 1). The book consists of five chapters. The first is devoted to a detailed exploration of the various approaches to defining self-consciousness in the philosophy and sciences of mind and to setting the frame for the development of a further approach that essentially includes emotion. For my purposes, I have chosen a developmental framework of self-consciousness that consists of three levels which involve an increasing amount of cognitive complexity: These are a phenomenal pre-conceptual, a conceptual and a meta-representational level. The development of a theory of emotion is realized in chapters 2 through 4. The second chapter begins the argument by clarifying the concepts of emotion and cognition. Emotion, so is argued, belongs to the set of cognitive processes in a wide sense which is constituted by the set of information processing mechanisms that are relevant for minimally complex behavior. Emotions are further argued to not oppose other cognitive processes but to centrally be involved in them, such that emotions and other cognitive processes are shown to be interdependent
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capacities of the mind. The reason for the central importance of emotion lies in its evaluative function that is especially important in information processing. The next central point of the book consists of the focus on the properties of emotion (chapter 3). First, criteria are established by which emotions are distinguished from other mental phenomena. Emotions are then described as covering a wide range of phenomena that vary according to different parameters such as complex cognitive, experiential, physiological and behavioral parameters that are relevant for their constitution. Emotion types are constituted by typical patterns that are composed of these features. I argue that despite a strong variation between these patterns of features, emotions still form a unified ontological category characterized by their functional roles that are essentially evaluative and promoting communication, interaction and flexible behavior. In the last part of the chapter, emotions are classified according to four developmental stages: 1. pre-emotions as unfocussed expressive emotion states, 2. basic emotions, 3. primary cognitive emotions and 4. secondary cognitive emotions. During emotional development, four types of basic emotions (fear, anger, joy and sadness) are systematically differentiated into the diversity of more complex emotions. The importance of emotions for self-consciousness is argued to consist in (i) their evaluative function which contributes evaluative information to the representation underlying self-consciousness. The evaluation is independent of complex conceptual cognition and is immediately informative about a relevant state of the subject. It is authentic and self-disclosing in conscious experience and necessary for initiating adequate behavior and orientation within a context. Thus, emotional information constitutes a foundation especially of non-conceptual selfrepresentation. Further, (ii) the emotions’ essentially expressive and communicative function is crucially involved in social communication by which an understanding of others’ mental states about oneself and of own mental states is promoted. This is in itself the foundation of a meta-representation and therefore for the more complex conceptual levels of self-consciousness. Communication between subjects that is mediated by emotions is not only relevant for self-consciousness on complex developmental levels where propositional state ascriptions can be accomplished but also already at early developmental levels. This is discussed in chapter 4, in which I set out to investigate a special subgroup of emotions, namely the self-referential emotions. Self-referential emotions are special self-evaluative emotions in which the intentional object is identical with or intricately related to the subject, such as for instance in shame or pride. In paradigmatic form, they are secondary cognitive emotions that predispose complex cognitive capacities such as the capacity to ascribe propositional states to others (theory of mind) and a conceptual self-representation. I argue that there are furthermore already pre-forms of self-referential emotions that involve non-conceptual self-representations and that these have an important functional role: They contribute to communication between individuals and so promote mentalizing as
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a basic and early form of self-understanding and of understanding of other minds. In addition to contributing self-evaluative information for the self-representation, early emotionally mediated social interaction also contributes to the development of complex self-representations. Besides being important for non-conceptual levels of self-consciousness, emotions are also important for conceptual levels of self-consciousness (chapter 5). By examining impairments in emotional self-reference and content of self-ascription subsequent to deficits in the capacity of understanding other minds, which is the main criterion for meta-representations underlying complex conceptual self-consciousness, emotions are shown to be mental states that are especially valuable to be able to access. Again, it is the evaluative information that is invaluable for an adequate self-reference in order to engage in the most appropriate actions for oneself in a given situation. Moreover, understanding of others’ mental, and especially of their evaluative third-person-perspective on oneself, provides important input for the conceptual representation. Without access to one’s own and to others’ emotions, emotional communication is impaired which subsequently also leads to impairments in conceptual self-representation. Together with the capacity of understanding other minds, the evaluative and communicative functions of emotions are thus central for conceptual self-consciousness. The discussion in chapter 5 is strongly supported by input from the developmental disorder of autism. On this basis, an empirically founded philosophical theory of emotions and their functions for self-consciousness will be developed that allows to spell out the interdependence of emotional states and states of self-consciousness. Thereby, a new understanding of two cognitive phenomena is achieved that belong to the core of being human, namely emotion and self-consciousness. There are very many people who have supported me in turning this book into a reality. The encouragement and assistance of teachers, colleagues, friends and family has fundamentally contributed to me accomplishing my doctorate thesis that I submitted at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum in June 2008 and that has now developed into this book. I am very grateful to my supervisor, Albert Newen, first at the University of Tübingen and later at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum, for his support, guidance and encouragement. I have learned a lot as doctorate student in his research group “Self-Consciousness and Concept Formation in Humans”. He challenged and supported my work and moreover gave me the possibility to organize a conference on “Social cognition, Self-Consciousness and Emotion” which took place in Delmenhorst in spring 2007. The ideas for the theory of self-referential emotions were substantially refined by the exchange with the participants at this conference. I would also like to thank my co-supervisor, Logi Gunnarsson, who accompanied the beginnings of my studies of philosophy and has joined me again at the completion of my doctorate project.
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Uta Frith offered me the opportunity to spend three months in her laboratory at the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience in London. Large parts of the ideas for self-consciousness, theory of mind and communication were developed in this friendly and inspiring environment. I want to thank her for her continuous support. It is a pleasure for me to thank the members of Albert Newen’s research group for their discussion, feedback and motivational support. Christoph Michel, Ulrike Pompe, Gottfried Vosgerau, Tobias Schlicht, Eva-Maria Jung and Louise RöskaHardy all read parts of the manuscript and helped me with kind and precious suggestions. I would also like to thank Manfred Frank and Frank Hofmann of the University of Tübingen, and Sarah White, Sarah-Jayne Blakemore and Rosie Rogers of UCL London for their valuable comments. I am very grateful to the German National Academic Foundation (Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes) and the Volkswagen Foundation (VolkswagenStiftung) for financial support of my work. I also wish to acknowledge their ideological support through the “Platform of the Life Sciences, Mind Sciences, and the Humanities” and summer schools that gave me numerous possibilities of challenging and pleasurable exchange. I would also like to thank Michael Kienecker and mentis Verlag for the publication of my work. Furthermore, I wish to thank Richard, Barbara and Wolf Dietrich Zinck, Cord Kaldrack, Tim Federhen, Mareike Stoll, Vera Hoffmann, Annkathrin Koepke, Felix Pahl, Sealy Zinck and Shahar Arzy for their continuous inspiration, encouragement and moral support. Keywords: emotion, self-consciousness, cognition, facial expression, communication, interaction, theory of other minds, autism
