Failure and Success on the Nile
October 2010
Failure and Success on the Nile by Jon B. Alterman
.....................................................................
The U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship over the last 30 years has been a failure. Either that, or it’s been a tremendous success. One can make a strong case for both arguments. From the perspective of those who remade U.S.-Egyptian relations in the 1970s, it is hard to imagine that the current relationship meets their ambitions. Three decades after Egypt’s reorientation, and despite almost $100 billion in U.S. assistance, Egypt has one of the most consistently anti-American populations in the entire Middle East. A host of the region’s extremist groups trace their roots to Egypt, including al-Qaeda (which merged the muscle of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad with the brains of Osama bin Laden). Egypt’s economy continues to limp along, with tens of millions mired in poverty despite billions of dollars directed toward strengthening Egypt’s economy. Hundreds of millions of dollars of funding to build institutional capacity in Egypt’s civil society sector, in its governmental bureaucracy and beyond have created patterns of dependency rather than increased self-sufficiency. Indeed, some U.S. government officials complain that decades of assistance have resulted in some organizations that have even less capacity than they started with. Most surprisingly, the U.S.-Egyptian partnership has coincided with Egypt’s decline on the regional stage. Egypt’s Cold War reorientation in the 1970s placed it in the vanguard of a broader regional reorientation toward the United States. Yet, as Egypt became less different than the rest of the region, it also became less influential. A combination of Gulf wealth and conflict far to the east left Egypt a relative bystander on the region’s pressing issues. The deliberate pace of Egypt’s government, combined with the difficulties of swift change in a country of 80 million people, has meant that much of the region’s dynamism came from smaller places that were wealthier, more innovative and more agile. One could be forgiven, then, for seeing Egypt as a poor example of the rewards of partnering with the United States. Such partnership has neither yielded a vibrant Egypt nor a grateful population. Instead, some see the U.S. relationship as throwing a lifeline to a repressive and incompetent government whose failures sustain the very conditions that foment instability in the Middle East. (continued on page 2)
The Middle East Program Hosts Rep. Howard Berman
On September 21st, the CSIS Middle East Program hosted Congressman Howard Berman (D-CA), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, for a discussion addressing Iran’s nuclear threat. Berman argued that preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon is an “absolute necessity,” and that the implementation of a broad and unyielding sanctions regime is the most viable and effective means of achieving this goal. He judged that the other two options–air strikes or acquiescence to a nuclear Iran–are both “far too risky.” Berman emphasized that he is personally committed to making the sanctions work, and affirmed that “Congress will remain deeply engaged on this issue.” Click HERE to learn more about the event. ■
Hidden Afflictions Lebanon commemorated World Mental Health Day this month, but the Lebanese have little to celebrate. According to a 2001-2003 World Health Organization (WHO) survey, nearly one out of five Lebanese suffer from mental illness—yet only four percent of those seek treatment. Lebanon’s challenges are hardly unique in the Middle East. A 20062007 survey that the Iraqi government conducted with the WHO found that 17 percent of Iraqi adults suffer from mental disorders; a 2003 Moroccan national survey put the figure for that country at nearly 50 percent. Depression and anxiety disorders are by far the most common mental illnesses in the Middle East. A 2002 study conducted at primary care centers in Saudi Arabia suggested that up to 20 percent of Saudis are depressed. In conflict-prone Iraq and Palestine, post-traumatic stress disorder is rife. The Gaza Community Mental Health Programme recently concluded that 97.5 percent of children aged 10-19 exhibited symptoms of PTSD in the Gaza Strip. Despite the magnitude of the problem, Middle Eastern governments devote little–if any–of their health budgets to mental health care. Among the individuals who seek treatment, many face misdiagnosis at the hands of primary care physicians who are often overworked and who have little training in mental health. Strained public health budgets and stigmas against acknowledging mental illness have prolonged these deficiencies. Governments have started launching public awareness campaigns about mental health, but providing resources and facilities for treatment will be equally important. ■EW
1800 K Street NW, Washington DC 20006 | p. 202.775.3179 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org/mideast
2 | CSIS Middle East Notes and Comment | October 2010 Such an assessment, however, overlooks many of the successes of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship. First, U.S. aid has brought tremendous progress to the lives of ordinary Egyptians. With U.S. assistance, more Egyptians than ever before have access to clean water, sewage and electricity. Child mortality is only one seventh of what it was in 1975, and life expectancy has increased almost 17 years over the same period. U.S. assistance in family planning has almost halved the number of children born to each woman, providing more resources to each child and easing the strains on Egypt’s housing, infrastructure and employment. In each of these areas, the U.S. contribution has been both substantial and consequential. If Egypt is troubled now, it would be even more troubled had it not been for U.S. assistance. On the governmental level, Egypt has been a consistent U.S. partner on a wide range of issues. Not only has Egypt’s peace with Israel made another major Arab-Israeli war unthinkable, but quiet cooperation against groups such as Hamas has helped bolster more moderate forces in Palestinian politics. On counterterrorism, reportedly close U.S.-Egyptian cooperation on a range of operational activities has saved lives around the world. Despite deep Egyptian reservations about the U.S.-led war in Iraq, Egypt was a reliable conduit for U.S. troops and materiel. More broadly, as radical voices have sought to hijack pan-Arab forums, the Egyptian government has been a force for moderation, consistently calling for deliberateness in the face of overwhelming passions. For all this progress on issues of strategic importance, some in the United States nevertheless see Egypt’s actions as tactically useful but strategically damaging to the United States. Their impact, in this view, is to demonstrate the ease with which authoritarian governments manipulate the United States, sustaining the very conditions that undermine U.S. long-term interests in the Middle East. Seen this way, the United States aids and abets Egypt’s repression by sustaining a broken system. Such a view, however, overestimates the U.S. influence on Egypt. U.S. assistance to Egypt represents less than one percent of Egypt’s current GDP; much of that assistance goes directly to U.S. contractors and never even lands in Egyptian hands. The Egyptian military’s grip on Egyptian public life is neither mediated by nor endorsed by the U.S. government, yet it remains an enduring reality. The United States government can prod or provoke Egypt’s government, but it cannot shape its decisions. The present, then, is a mixed bag. Looking forward three steps would be helpful to pave the way for a better future. The first is rethinking the U.S.-Egyptian aid relationship. After three decades, the aid program has created a sense of codependency and left each side feeling unappreciated. Revisiting U.S. aid levels—on both the economic and military side—should yield a program that is easier to sustain in the United States, meets core Egyptian needs, and takes some of the emotional sting out of U.S.-Egyptian relations. The second is to broaden the Egyptian-American relationship, moving it farther beyond the realm of secret government agencies and building constituencies in both countries for closer ties. Bilateral trade and investment levels remain relatively low, and bolstering these can help diversify and deepen support for the relationship. Third, the United States needs to plan now for a world in which Egypt maintains a wider range of international relationships. Egypt’s current leadership has stuck by close strategic ties with the United States, but a future leadership is likely to take a more creative approach and seek to bolster ties with Russia, China, France and a host of other potential partners. Such a shift could boost Egypt’s role as an independent actor in the region and revive some of Egypt’s regional influence. Such a change need not harm U.S. interests. In many ways, an Egypt that remains friendly to the United States and also holds greater regional sway is more helpful than a reliable Egypt in decline. U.S. policy to Egypt has not been a failure, but its greatest test is yet to come. As many in both countries await Egypt’s leadership transition, the task is not to judge the past, but to plan for a stronger future. ■10/15/2010
Links of Interest Jon Alterman was quoted by the Washington Post in “James Jones to Step Down as National Security Adviser.”
Jon Alterman was quoted by the Financial Times in “Iran Hints at Attempt to Ease U.S. Tensions.”
Jon Alterman was quoted in Bloomberg Businessweek in “West Bank Settlements Shadow Next Peace Talks Round.”
The Middle East Notes and Comment electronic newsletter is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2010 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The CSIS Middle East Program Jon B. Alterman Director
Haim Malka Deputy Director Matthew Burnard Research Associate Michael Dziuban Research Assistant Allison Hutchings Program Coordinator/Research Assistant Ayelet Hanfling Daniel Burns Estee Ward Interns
1800 K Street NW, Washington DC 20006 | p. 202.775.3179 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org/mideast
Failure and Success on the Nile by Jon B. Alterman
.....................................................................
The U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship over the last 30 years has been a failure. Either that, or it’s been a tremendous success. One can make a strong case for both arguments. From the perspective of those who remade U.S.-Egyptian relations in the 1970s, it is hard to imagine that the current relationship meets their ambitions. Three decades after Egypt’s reorientation, and despite almost $100 billion in U.S. assistance, Egypt has one of the most consistently anti-American populations in the entire Middle East. A host of the region’s extremist groups trace their roots to Egypt, including al-Qaeda (which merged the muscle of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad with the brains of Osama bin Laden). Egypt’s economy continues to limp along, with tens of millions mired in poverty despite billions of dollars directed toward strengthening Egypt’s economy. Hundreds of millions of dollars of funding to build institutional capacity in Egypt’s civil society sector, in its governmental bureaucracy and beyond have created patterns of dependency rather than increased self-sufficiency. Indeed, some U.S. government officials complain that decades of assistance have resulted in some organizations that have even less capacity than they started with. Most surprisingly, the U.S.-Egyptian partnership has coincided with Egypt’s decline on the regional stage. Egypt’s Cold War reorientation in the 1970s placed it in the vanguard of a broader regional reorientation toward the United States. Yet, as Egypt became less different than the rest of the region, it also became less influential. A combination of Gulf wealth and conflict far to the east left Egypt a relative bystander on the region’s pressing issues. The deliberate pace of Egypt’s government, combined with the difficulties of swift change in a country of 80 million people, has meant that much of the region’s dynamism came from smaller places that were wealthier, more innovative and more agile. One could be forgiven, then, for seeing Egypt as a poor example of the rewards of partnering with the United States. Such partnership has neither yielded a vibrant Egypt nor a grateful population. Instead, some see the U.S. relationship as throwing a lifeline to a repressive and incompetent government whose failures sustain the very conditions that foment instability in the Middle East. (continued on page 2)
The Middle East Program Hosts Rep. Howard Berman
On September 21st, the CSIS Middle East Program hosted Congressman Howard Berman (D-CA), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, for a discussion addressing Iran’s nuclear threat. Berman argued that preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon is an “absolute necessity,” and that the implementation of a broad and unyielding sanctions regime is the most viable and effective means of achieving this goal. He judged that the other two options–air strikes or acquiescence to a nuclear Iran–are both “far too risky.” Berman emphasized that he is personally committed to making the sanctions work, and affirmed that “Congress will remain deeply engaged on this issue.” Click HERE to learn more about the event. ■
Hidden Afflictions Lebanon commemorated World Mental Health Day this month, but the Lebanese have little to celebrate. According to a 2001-2003 World Health Organization (WHO) survey, nearly one out of five Lebanese suffer from mental illness—yet only four percent of those seek treatment. Lebanon’s challenges are hardly unique in the Middle East. A 20062007 survey that the Iraqi government conducted with the WHO found that 17 percent of Iraqi adults suffer from mental disorders; a 2003 Moroccan national survey put the figure for that country at nearly 50 percent. Depression and anxiety disorders are by far the most common mental illnesses in the Middle East. A 2002 study conducted at primary care centers in Saudi Arabia suggested that up to 20 percent of Saudis are depressed. In conflict-prone Iraq and Palestine, post-traumatic stress disorder is rife. The Gaza Community Mental Health Programme recently concluded that 97.5 percent of children aged 10-19 exhibited symptoms of PTSD in the Gaza Strip. Despite the magnitude of the problem, Middle Eastern governments devote little–if any–of their health budgets to mental health care. Among the individuals who seek treatment, many face misdiagnosis at the hands of primary care physicians who are often overworked and who have little training in mental health. Strained public health budgets and stigmas against acknowledging mental illness have prolonged these deficiencies. Governments have started launching public awareness campaigns about mental health, but providing resources and facilities for treatment will be equally important. ■EW
1800 K Street NW, Washington DC 20006 | p. 202.775.3179 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org/mideast
2 | CSIS Middle East Notes and Comment | October 2010 Such an assessment, however, overlooks many of the successes of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship. First, U.S. aid has brought tremendous progress to the lives of ordinary Egyptians. With U.S. assistance, more Egyptians than ever before have access to clean water, sewage and electricity. Child mortality is only one seventh of what it was in 1975, and life expectancy has increased almost 17 years over the same period. U.S. assistance in family planning has almost halved the number of children born to each woman, providing more resources to each child and easing the strains on Egypt’s housing, infrastructure and employment. In each of these areas, the U.S. contribution has been both substantial and consequential. If Egypt is troubled now, it would be even more troubled had it not been for U.S. assistance. On the governmental level, Egypt has been a consistent U.S. partner on a wide range of issues. Not only has Egypt’s peace with Israel made another major Arab-Israeli war unthinkable, but quiet cooperation against groups such as Hamas has helped bolster more moderate forces in Palestinian politics. On counterterrorism, reportedly close U.S.-Egyptian cooperation on a range of operational activities has saved lives around the world. Despite deep Egyptian reservations about the U.S.-led war in Iraq, Egypt was a reliable conduit for U.S. troops and materiel. More broadly, as radical voices have sought to hijack pan-Arab forums, the Egyptian government has been a force for moderation, consistently calling for deliberateness in the face of overwhelming passions. For all this progress on issues of strategic importance, some in the United States nevertheless see Egypt’s actions as tactically useful but strategically damaging to the United States. Their impact, in this view, is to demonstrate the ease with which authoritarian governments manipulate the United States, sustaining the very conditions that undermine U.S. long-term interests in the Middle East. Seen this way, the United States aids and abets Egypt’s repression by sustaining a broken system. Such a view, however, overestimates the U.S. influence on Egypt. U.S. assistance to Egypt represents less than one percent of Egypt’s current GDP; much of that assistance goes directly to U.S. contractors and never even lands in Egyptian hands. The Egyptian military’s grip on Egyptian public life is neither mediated by nor endorsed by the U.S. government, yet it remains an enduring reality. The United States government can prod or provoke Egypt’s government, but it cannot shape its decisions. The present, then, is a mixed bag. Looking forward three steps would be helpful to pave the way for a better future. The first is rethinking the U.S.-Egyptian aid relationship. After three decades, the aid program has created a sense of codependency and left each side feeling unappreciated. Revisiting U.S. aid levels—on both the economic and military side—should yield a program that is easier to sustain in the United States, meets core Egyptian needs, and takes some of the emotional sting out of U.S.-Egyptian relations. The second is to broaden the Egyptian-American relationship, moving it farther beyond the realm of secret government agencies and building constituencies in both countries for closer ties. Bilateral trade and investment levels remain relatively low, and bolstering these can help diversify and deepen support for the relationship. Third, the United States needs to plan now for a world in which Egypt maintains a wider range of international relationships. Egypt’s current leadership has stuck by close strategic ties with the United States, but a future leadership is likely to take a more creative approach and seek to bolster ties with Russia, China, France and a host of other potential partners. Such a shift could boost Egypt’s role as an independent actor in the region and revive some of Egypt’s regional influence. Such a change need not harm U.S. interests. In many ways, an Egypt that remains friendly to the United States and also holds greater regional sway is more helpful than a reliable Egypt in decline. U.S. policy to Egypt has not been a failure, but its greatest test is yet to come. As many in both countries await Egypt’s leadership transition, the task is not to judge the past, but to plan for a stronger future. ■10/15/2010
Links of Interest Jon Alterman was quoted by the Washington Post in “James Jones to Step Down as National Security Adviser.”
Jon Alterman was quoted by the Financial Times in “Iran Hints at Attempt to Ease U.S. Tensions.”
Jon Alterman was quoted in Bloomberg Businessweek in “West Bank Settlements Shadow Next Peace Talks Round.”
The Middle East Notes and Comment electronic newsletter is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2010 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The CSIS Middle East Program Jon B. Alterman Director
Haim Malka Deputy Director Matthew Burnard Research Associate Michael Dziuban Research Assistant Allison Hutchings Program Coordinator/Research Assistant Ayelet Hanfling Daniel Burns Estee Ward Interns
1800 K Street NW, Washington DC 20006 | p. 202.775.3179 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org/mideast
