FALL ON SNOW, LOSS OF CONTROLâVOLUNTARY GLISSADE ...
FALL ON SNOW, LOSS OF CONTROL—VOLUNTARY GLISSADE, AVALANCHE, INADEQUATE EQUIPMENT, WEATHER Idaho, Mount Borah On June 13, 1987, D avid Probst (38), w ho w as a m em ber o f the Idaho M ountain Search and Rescue U nit for several years, w as descending M ount Borah (3950 m eters) w ith three friends w hen he fell 150 m eters to his death. They had started late in the m orning, around 0900. K now ing there was very little snow, they carried only one ice ax w ith them. They reached the sum m it at 1800. Then they started dow n, and w hen they reached the saddle betw een the sum m it and false sum m it, they changed to the Rock Creek descent. The first tw o, Linda Claiborne (30) and Ben Childlaw (35) w ith the ice ax, started ahead o f Probst and Jennifer Sm ith (31). Probst used a rock as a dagger for control on the snow w hile Smith w aited in the rocks above. Probst lost control w hile trying to self-arrest. He disappeared around a bend in the snow field. A t this tim e C laiborne and Childlaw w ere dow n at the fourth snow field. They saw a large mass o f snow com ing down the chute, but no sign o f anyone. They clim bed back up to Smith. A t this point they
searched for Probst, and finding his hat at the second snow field, they started probing for him. T hey also probed the first snow field, but stopped w hen it got too dark to work. They spent ten hours clim bing dow n and hiking out for help. The local sheriff’s rescue group from M ackay responded, but w ere initally not able to get to the victim ’s location because they had no experience or equipment. The three-person team arrived w earing tennis shoes and jeans, carrying one rope and a carton of Pepsi-Cola. A deputy accom panied them. Idaho M ountain Rescue personnel w ere on hand at the staging area. The sheriff indicated that he would have his team go up the m ountain and assess the situation first to see w hat resources were needed. A s night neared, the sheriff got a M A ST helicopter to drop sleeping bags and food for his team. The helicopter flew to 4700 m eters and dropped the supplies. The supplies w ere w ell scattered after their 1250 m eter descent. On June 15, an electrical storm hit, and the sheriff ordered everyone off the m ountain, suspending the search until later in the w eek. The sheriff’s team and Idaho M ountain Rescue returned on June 19. The next day, June 20, rescue teams fine-probed the first snow field. Course probes and tunnels w ere dug on the second field. A n avalanche dog w as used, but alerted many tim es on the snow fields. W hen team s started searching snow field three, the body w as spotted under the snow above a w ater chute w hich Probst had slid into w ith the loose snow. (Source: various new spaper reports; Larry N ovak, and Bob M eridith of Idaho M ountain Search and Rescue; and M erle K ing)
Analysis The late start, an apparently festive group w ith an experienced leader, and a clear day w hich deteriorated late in the afternoon, led to the circum stances w hich turned this situation around. C hoosing a technical descent route w ithout having adequate equipm ent put the group at risk. That Probst used a rock for an ice dagger for self-arrest aid indicates the level o f concern he had. W hile it seem s likely that Probst died quickly, the rescue response w as apparently not handled properly. If the victim had survived the fall, he m ost likely w ould have died by the time he w as finally reached. Technical rescue resources w ere available but do not appear to have been used appropriately. (Source: J. W illiam son)
searched for Probst, and finding his hat at the second snow field, they started probing for him. T hey also probed the first snow field, but stopped w hen it got too dark to work. They spent ten hours clim bing dow n and hiking out for help. The local sheriff’s rescue group from M ackay responded, but w ere initally not able to get to the victim ’s location because they had no experience or equipment. The three-person team arrived w earing tennis shoes and jeans, carrying one rope and a carton of Pepsi-Cola. A deputy accom panied them. Idaho M ountain Rescue personnel w ere on hand at the staging area. The sheriff indicated that he would have his team go up the m ountain and assess the situation first to see w hat resources were needed. A s night neared, the sheriff got a M A ST helicopter to drop sleeping bags and food for his team. The helicopter flew to 4700 m eters and dropped the supplies. The supplies w ere w ell scattered after their 1250 m eter descent. On June 15, an electrical storm hit, and the sheriff ordered everyone off the m ountain, suspending the search until later in the w eek. The sheriff’s team and Idaho M ountain Rescue returned on June 19. The next day, June 20, rescue teams fine-probed the first snow field. Course probes and tunnels w ere dug on the second field. A n avalanche dog w as used, but alerted many tim es on the snow fields. W hen team s started searching snow field three, the body w as spotted under the snow above a w ater chute w hich Probst had slid into w ith the loose snow. (Source: various new spaper reports; Larry N ovak, and Bob M eridith of Idaho M ountain Search and Rescue; and M erle K ing)
Analysis The late start, an apparently festive group w ith an experienced leader, and a clear day w hich deteriorated late in the afternoon, led to the circum stances w hich turned this situation around. C hoosing a technical descent route w ithout having adequate equipm ent put the group at risk. That Probst used a rock for an ice dagger for self-arrest aid indicates the level o f concern he had. W hile it seem s likely that Probst died quickly, the rescue response w as apparently not handled properly. If the victim had survived the fall, he m ost likely w ould have died by the time he w as finally reached. Technical rescue resources w ere available but do not appear to have been used appropriately. (Source: J. W illiam son)
