Implications of Potential Chinese Strategic Missile Defense
Anatomizing the Behavior of Chemical and Biological Non-State Adversaries Gary Ackerman Director, Unconventional Weapons Technology Division, START
Markus Binder Project Manager, START PASCC Semi-Annual Workshop on Strategic Stability and WMD December 5, 2014
Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations presented here are solely those of the authors and are not representative of START, DHS or the United States government.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Anatomizing the Behavior of Chemical and Biological Non-State Adversaries • Project objective was to better characterize CB perpetrators and potential perpetrators: 1. To determine the most likely future CB perpetrators and develop means of proactively identifying them; 2. To develop a deeper understanding of CB adversary behavior and decision making
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Project Parameters • Time Period: Present to 2022. • Nature of Adversaries: Non-state CB end-users (i.e. actual • • •
•
perpetrators) Specification of Adversaries: Where possible, explicitly identify (e.g. Hizballah). Otherwise, generic adversaries permitted Scope of Attack: CB event that causes >50 non-psychogenic injuries or widespread (at least regional) and sustained social disruption. Geographical Scope: Threats to the U.S. homeland and U.S. overseas territories (e.g. Puerto Rico; Guam); ALSO threats to U.S. facilities abroad Type of Materials: The use of ANY harmful chemical or biological materials, as well as attacks on facilities that involve the immediate release of CB materials.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Why? • Significant attention devoted to violent non-state actors (VNSAs) employing CB agents as mass-casualty or mass-disruption weapons. • Valuable research into several aspects: proliferation of materials; vulnerabilities of facilities; technical capabilities required to construct CB weapons; prophylaxis, detection and consequence management • Less attention has been paid to the adversaries themselves: Who are they? What attracts them to CB? Do they display common salient characteristics that can serve as early-warning indicators? How do they make tactical and strategic CB weapons acquisition and deployment decisions? • More detailed specification of the threat component will enable defense practitioners to prioritize risk mitigation investments and increase the capability to interdict CB attacks further ‘left of boom’ (or ‘left of pfffftt’).
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Methodology • The research team adopted a multi-disciplinary analytical approach featuring a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches: – A qualitative analysis based on a combination of: the application of a series of literatureand theory-derived indicators to a set of extant VNSAs and examining past CB perpetrators, using data from the Chemical and Biological Non-State Adversaries Database (CABNSAD). – A quantitative analysis employing a set of statistical models to identify salient characteristics of past CB adversaries particularly with regard to the organizational determinants of their pursuit and effective use of CB weapons. – An analysis using the results of a semi-structured and probabilistic elicitation of leading outside subject matter experts in the CB terrorism and related domains.
• Applying three methodologies more or less independently to the same problem space increased confidence in the results. This derives from the position that, especially with respect to prospective analyses with high levels of uncertainty, each methodological approach carries both strengths and weaknesses, the effect of which can be balanced.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
LITERATURE REVIEW
DATA SOURCES
BIG ALLIED AND DANGEROUS
CABNSAD
SMES
STATISTICAL MODELING MOTIVATON
CAPABILITY SEMI-STRUCTURED ELICITATION
ANALYSIS
SYNTHESIS OF QUALITATIVE DATA
CB ADVERSARY THREAT RANKINGS
INITIAL OUTPUTS
PROBABILISTIC ELICITATION
INDICATORS OF CB THREATS
VISUAL GRAPHICAL DATA OVERVIEW
PHASE 1 OUTPUTS
KEY ASSUMPTIONS CHECK
QUALITY CONTROL
DEVIL’S ADVOCACY
EXTERNAL REVIEW
CASE SELECTION DATA COLLECTION
CONCEPTS OF ADVERSARY BEHAVIOR
ANALYSIS VNSA PROFILE ATTACK SCENARIOS
PHASE 2 OUTPUTS
FUNCTIONAL SUBSET OF CONCEPTS
PROTOTYPE BAYES NET
PHASE 3: COMPUTATIONAL THREAT MODEL
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Multi-method Analysis
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
CHARACTERISTICS OF ANALYSIS Qualitative Analysis Based on review of literature, adversary profiles and analyst expertise.
Strengths •Incorporates past, extant and future threats. •All non-state actors. •Combination of analysis by project researchers.
Limitations •Not rigorously systematic. •Potential for analyst bias.
Quantitative Modeling Based on historical data (BAAD2; POICN, etc.).
Strengths •Allows for exploring variation in dependent variable. •Takes into account every actor in dataset (including null cases). •Statistical tests of significance and sensitivity possible. •Results / models are reproducible.
Limitations •Limited time-scale of data (1998-2007). •Only includes terrorist/insurgent organizations (no criminal groups; lone actors, etc.). •Cannot make out-of-sample forecasts (i.e., limited to groups in dataset).
Elicitation Combines the judgment of multiple domain experts.
Strengths •Specifically oriented towards future threats. •Heterogeneous expertise (operational; technical; policy; futurist). •All non-state actors.
Limitations •Potential for expert bias. •Relatively non-reproducible. •Lack of specific knowledge of potential listed non-state adversaries.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Key Findings • Threat of non-state chemical or biological weapons pursuit and use continues to lie heavily with jihadists. • Additional significant threat sources – Lone actors (esp. insiders – technical personnel) – Apocalyptic Millenarian Groups – Domestic Right-Wing Extremists – Criminals
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Non-State Adversary Threat Rankings Chemical Non-State Adversary Threat Rankings Qualitative Analysis
Quantitative Modeling
Elicitation
1
Disgruntled Scientist(s) / Technician(s)
1
Al-Qa’ida Central
1
Al-Qa’ida Central
2
Al-Nusrah Front
2
Taliban
2
Hizballah
3
Al-Qa’ida Central
3
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)
3
Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
4
Hizballah
4
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Las FARC)
4
Apocalyptic Millenarian Cult (Domestic)
5
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)
5
Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
5
Right-wing Extremist Group (Domestic)
6
Apocalyptic Millenarian Cult
6
Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
6
Criminal Organization (Domestic)
7
AQAP
7
HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) 7
Lone Actor with a Personal Grudge or Idiosyncratic Motive (Domestic)
8
Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
8
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
8
Unaffiliated cell of Sunni Jihadists (Domestic)
9
Revolutionary Armed Forces of 9 Colombia (Las FARC)
Caucasus Emirate
9
Unspecified Sunni Jihadist Group (Foreign)
10
Lashkar-e-Janghvi (LeJ)
Lashkar-e-Janghvi (LeJ)
10
Left-Wing Group (Domestic)
10
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Non-State Adversary Threat Rankings Biological Non-State Adversary Threat Rankings Qualitative Analysis
Quantitative Modeling
Elicitation
1
Disgruntled Scientist(s) / Technician(s)
1
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)
1
Disgruntled Scientist(s) / Technician(s) (Foreign)
2
Hizballah
2
Al-Qa’ida Central
2
Disgruntled Scientist(s) / Technician(s) (Domestic)
3
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
3
Taliban
3
Al-Qa'ida Central
4
Apocalyptic Millenarian Cult
4
Caucasus Emirate
4
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
5
Al-Nusrah Front
5
Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
5
Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
6
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
6
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
6
Unaffiliated Cell of Sunni Jihadists (Domestic)
7
Environmental Liberation Front 7 (ELF)/Animal Liberation Front (ALF)
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
7
Apocalyptic Millenarian Cult (Domestic)
8
Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Las FARC)
8
Unspecified Environmentalist/Animal Rights Group (Domestic)
9
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 9 (ISIS)
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
9
Unaffiliated cell of Sunni Jihadists (Foreign)
10
Al-Qa’ida Central
HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
10
Unaffiliated Cell of UFO and Related Activists (Domestic)
8
10
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Additional Outputs • A concise yet relatively comprehensive review of the literature related to non-state CB perpetrators that can be utilized as an introduction for training purposes • The most comprehensive open-source database of CB perpetrators ever compiled (CABNSAD), which can continue to be mined for insights by researchers and analysts in a variety of applications, from social network analysis to machine learning. – Includes perpetrators with criminal motivations.
• A Bayesian Tool that can provide updated risk assessments • Operational products that can be used by intelligence and law enforcement agencies to proactively interdict the threat by – A set of indicators that can be applied to emerging actors to detect shifts in CB threat potential and to assist in the establishment of investigative priorities. – In-depth behavioral profiles of high-priority intelligence targets, including likely TTPs.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Chemical and Biological Non-State Adversary Database (CABNSAD) • Open-source, perpetrator-level dataset (rather than event-level). • Ideologically and criminally motivated perpetrators. – Generally excludes cases of simple spousal violence
• Includes organizations, unaffiliated cells and lone actors • Quantitative and qualitative variables – 43 perpetrator level variables, includes organizational characteristics, pursuit/use logistics and results – 23 individual level variables, includes education, vocation and explosives knowledge – Additional variables to assess uncertainties of CB pursuit/use based on open sources
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
CABNSAD Data Ideologies and Motives of Perpetrators for Employing Chemical/Biological Material
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
CABNSAD Data Methods of Acquisition Employed or Intended by Chemical/Biological Perpetrators Intended Acquisition Method
Chemical/Biological All HighPerpetrators Certainty (N=228) Perpetrators (N=172)
Chemical Biological All HighAll HighPerpetrators Certainty Perpetrators Certainty (N=187) Perpetrators (N=68) Perpetrators (N=134) (N=47)
Gift from State Terrorist Group Criminal Organization Other Purchase from State Terrorist Group Criminal Organization Other Theft from State Terrorist Group Criminal Organization Other Miscellaneous Production Serendipity Barter Bribery/Coercion Unknown
2% 2% 0% 1%
1% 2% 1% 1%
2% 2% 1% 1%
1% 2% 1% 1%
3% 1% 0% 0%
0% 2% 0% 0%
0% 1% 0% 14%
0% 0% 0% 16%
1% 1% 0% 15%
0% 0% 0% 18%
1% 1% 0% 9%
0% 0% 0% 13%
1% 0% 0% 7%
1% 0% 0% 9%
1% 0% 0% 7%
1% 0% 0% 10%
1% 0% 0% 6%
2% 0% 0% 9%
16% 1% 0% 0% 54%
17% 2% 0% 0% 50%
11% 1% 0% 0% 59%
10% 1% 0% 0% 54%
40% 3% 0% 0% 34%
45% 4% 0% 0% 26%
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
CABNSAD Data Education Level of Chemical/Biological Perpetrators, All Perpetrators
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Sample Indicators 1
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Sample Indicators 2
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Bayesian Tool
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Adversary Behavioral Profiles • Conducted on: – – – – – –
Al Qa’ida Hizb’allah Tehrik‐e Taliban Pakistan Generic Disgruntled Scientist Generic Apocalyptic Millenarian Group Generic Right-wing Organization
• Profiles include: historical overview; specific indicators; general behavioral influences; preferred operational methods • Key outputs: likely CB acquisition, transport, C2I and attack modes
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Ongoing Activities • POICN (Profiles of Incidents of CBRN-Use by Non-state actors) – A relational, open-source database including information on terrorist plots, acquisitions, and attacks relating to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents.
• Countering the radicalization of bio-scientists – Reviewing existing government counter-radicalization programs in light of the latest field-specific research to ascertain factors unique to the bio-scientist community and re-tailor programs appropriately.
• Consensus Framework for Informing Decision-Making in the Biological Threat Characterization Program – Identifying a particular pathogen as a potential threat agent and devoting resources towards studying it can have counter-productive effects by drawing attention to that agent’s potential as a weapon. – Developing a framework intended to inform the decisions about funding experimental work to characterize biological threats.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Contact Gary Ackerman [email protected] (301) 405-6656
Markus Binder [email protected] (301) 405-9870
www.start.umd.edu
Markus Binder Project Manager, START PASCC Semi-Annual Workshop on Strategic Stability and WMD December 5, 2014
Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations presented here are solely those of the authors and are not representative of START, DHS or the United States government.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Anatomizing the Behavior of Chemical and Biological Non-State Adversaries • Project objective was to better characterize CB perpetrators and potential perpetrators: 1. To determine the most likely future CB perpetrators and develop means of proactively identifying them; 2. To develop a deeper understanding of CB adversary behavior and decision making
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Project Parameters • Time Period: Present to 2022. • Nature of Adversaries: Non-state CB end-users (i.e. actual • • •
•
perpetrators) Specification of Adversaries: Where possible, explicitly identify (e.g. Hizballah). Otherwise, generic adversaries permitted Scope of Attack: CB event that causes >50 non-psychogenic injuries or widespread (at least regional) and sustained social disruption. Geographical Scope: Threats to the U.S. homeland and U.S. overseas territories (e.g. Puerto Rico; Guam); ALSO threats to U.S. facilities abroad Type of Materials: The use of ANY harmful chemical or biological materials, as well as attacks on facilities that involve the immediate release of CB materials.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Why? • Significant attention devoted to violent non-state actors (VNSAs) employing CB agents as mass-casualty or mass-disruption weapons. • Valuable research into several aspects: proliferation of materials; vulnerabilities of facilities; technical capabilities required to construct CB weapons; prophylaxis, detection and consequence management • Less attention has been paid to the adversaries themselves: Who are they? What attracts them to CB? Do they display common salient characteristics that can serve as early-warning indicators? How do they make tactical and strategic CB weapons acquisition and deployment decisions? • More detailed specification of the threat component will enable defense practitioners to prioritize risk mitigation investments and increase the capability to interdict CB attacks further ‘left of boom’ (or ‘left of pfffftt’).
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Methodology • The research team adopted a multi-disciplinary analytical approach featuring a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches: – A qualitative analysis based on a combination of: the application of a series of literatureand theory-derived indicators to a set of extant VNSAs and examining past CB perpetrators, using data from the Chemical and Biological Non-State Adversaries Database (CABNSAD). – A quantitative analysis employing a set of statistical models to identify salient characteristics of past CB adversaries particularly with regard to the organizational determinants of their pursuit and effective use of CB weapons. – An analysis using the results of a semi-structured and probabilistic elicitation of leading outside subject matter experts in the CB terrorism and related domains.
• Applying three methodologies more or less independently to the same problem space increased confidence in the results. This derives from the position that, especially with respect to prospective analyses with high levels of uncertainty, each methodological approach carries both strengths and weaknesses, the effect of which can be balanced.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
LITERATURE REVIEW
DATA SOURCES
BIG ALLIED AND DANGEROUS
CABNSAD
SMES
STATISTICAL MODELING MOTIVATON
CAPABILITY SEMI-STRUCTURED ELICITATION
ANALYSIS
SYNTHESIS OF QUALITATIVE DATA
CB ADVERSARY THREAT RANKINGS
INITIAL OUTPUTS
PROBABILISTIC ELICITATION
INDICATORS OF CB THREATS
VISUAL GRAPHICAL DATA OVERVIEW
PHASE 1 OUTPUTS
KEY ASSUMPTIONS CHECK
QUALITY CONTROL
DEVIL’S ADVOCACY
EXTERNAL REVIEW
CASE SELECTION DATA COLLECTION
CONCEPTS OF ADVERSARY BEHAVIOR
ANALYSIS VNSA PROFILE ATTACK SCENARIOS
PHASE 2 OUTPUTS
FUNCTIONAL SUBSET OF CONCEPTS
PROTOTYPE BAYES NET
PHASE 3: COMPUTATIONAL THREAT MODEL
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Multi-method Analysis
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
CHARACTERISTICS OF ANALYSIS Qualitative Analysis Based on review of literature, adversary profiles and analyst expertise.
Strengths •Incorporates past, extant and future threats. •All non-state actors. •Combination of analysis by project researchers.
Limitations •Not rigorously systematic. •Potential for analyst bias.
Quantitative Modeling Based on historical data (BAAD2; POICN, etc.).
Strengths •Allows for exploring variation in dependent variable. •Takes into account every actor in dataset (including null cases). •Statistical tests of significance and sensitivity possible. •Results / models are reproducible.
Limitations •Limited time-scale of data (1998-2007). •Only includes terrorist/insurgent organizations (no criminal groups; lone actors, etc.). •Cannot make out-of-sample forecasts (i.e., limited to groups in dataset).
Elicitation Combines the judgment of multiple domain experts.
Strengths •Specifically oriented towards future threats. •Heterogeneous expertise (operational; technical; policy; futurist). •All non-state actors.
Limitations •Potential for expert bias. •Relatively non-reproducible. •Lack of specific knowledge of potential listed non-state adversaries.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Key Findings • Threat of non-state chemical or biological weapons pursuit and use continues to lie heavily with jihadists. • Additional significant threat sources – Lone actors (esp. insiders – technical personnel) – Apocalyptic Millenarian Groups – Domestic Right-Wing Extremists – Criminals
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Non-State Adversary Threat Rankings Chemical Non-State Adversary Threat Rankings Qualitative Analysis
Quantitative Modeling
Elicitation
1
Disgruntled Scientist(s) / Technician(s)
1
Al-Qa’ida Central
1
Al-Qa’ida Central
2
Al-Nusrah Front
2
Taliban
2
Hizballah
3
Al-Qa’ida Central
3
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)
3
Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
4
Hizballah
4
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Las FARC)
4
Apocalyptic Millenarian Cult (Domestic)
5
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)
5
Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
5
Right-wing Extremist Group (Domestic)
6
Apocalyptic Millenarian Cult
6
Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
6
Criminal Organization (Domestic)
7
AQAP
7
HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) 7
Lone Actor with a Personal Grudge or Idiosyncratic Motive (Domestic)
8
Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
8
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
8
Unaffiliated cell of Sunni Jihadists (Domestic)
9
Revolutionary Armed Forces of 9 Colombia (Las FARC)
Caucasus Emirate
9
Unspecified Sunni Jihadist Group (Foreign)
10
Lashkar-e-Janghvi (LeJ)
Lashkar-e-Janghvi (LeJ)
10
Left-Wing Group (Domestic)
10
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Non-State Adversary Threat Rankings Biological Non-State Adversary Threat Rankings Qualitative Analysis
Quantitative Modeling
Elicitation
1
Disgruntled Scientist(s) / Technician(s)
1
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)
1
Disgruntled Scientist(s) / Technician(s) (Foreign)
2
Hizballah
2
Al-Qa’ida Central
2
Disgruntled Scientist(s) / Technician(s) (Domestic)
3
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
3
Taliban
3
Al-Qa'ida Central
4
Apocalyptic Millenarian Cult
4
Caucasus Emirate
4
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
5
Al-Nusrah Front
5
Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
5
Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
6
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
6
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
6
Unaffiliated Cell of Sunni Jihadists (Domestic)
7
Environmental Liberation Front 7 (ELF)/Animal Liberation Front (ALF)
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
7
Apocalyptic Millenarian Cult (Domestic)
8
Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Las FARC)
8
Unspecified Environmentalist/Animal Rights Group (Domestic)
9
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 9 (ISIS)
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
9
Unaffiliated cell of Sunni Jihadists (Foreign)
10
Al-Qa’ida Central
HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
10
Unaffiliated Cell of UFO and Related Activists (Domestic)
8
10
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Additional Outputs • A concise yet relatively comprehensive review of the literature related to non-state CB perpetrators that can be utilized as an introduction for training purposes • The most comprehensive open-source database of CB perpetrators ever compiled (CABNSAD), which can continue to be mined for insights by researchers and analysts in a variety of applications, from social network analysis to machine learning. – Includes perpetrators with criminal motivations.
• A Bayesian Tool that can provide updated risk assessments • Operational products that can be used by intelligence and law enforcement agencies to proactively interdict the threat by – A set of indicators that can be applied to emerging actors to detect shifts in CB threat potential and to assist in the establishment of investigative priorities. – In-depth behavioral profiles of high-priority intelligence targets, including likely TTPs.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Chemical and Biological Non-State Adversary Database (CABNSAD) • Open-source, perpetrator-level dataset (rather than event-level). • Ideologically and criminally motivated perpetrators. – Generally excludes cases of simple spousal violence
• Includes organizations, unaffiliated cells and lone actors • Quantitative and qualitative variables – 43 perpetrator level variables, includes organizational characteristics, pursuit/use logistics and results – 23 individual level variables, includes education, vocation and explosives knowledge – Additional variables to assess uncertainties of CB pursuit/use based on open sources
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
CABNSAD Data Ideologies and Motives of Perpetrators for Employing Chemical/Biological Material
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
CABNSAD Data Methods of Acquisition Employed or Intended by Chemical/Biological Perpetrators Intended Acquisition Method
Chemical/Biological All HighPerpetrators Certainty (N=228) Perpetrators (N=172)
Chemical Biological All HighAll HighPerpetrators Certainty Perpetrators Certainty (N=187) Perpetrators (N=68) Perpetrators (N=134) (N=47)
Gift from State Terrorist Group Criminal Organization Other Purchase from State Terrorist Group Criminal Organization Other Theft from State Terrorist Group Criminal Organization Other Miscellaneous Production Serendipity Barter Bribery/Coercion Unknown
2% 2% 0% 1%
1% 2% 1% 1%
2% 2% 1% 1%
1% 2% 1% 1%
3% 1% 0% 0%
0% 2% 0% 0%
0% 1% 0% 14%
0% 0% 0% 16%
1% 1% 0% 15%
0% 0% 0% 18%
1% 1% 0% 9%
0% 0% 0% 13%
1% 0% 0% 7%
1% 0% 0% 9%
1% 0% 0% 7%
1% 0% 0% 10%
1% 0% 0% 6%
2% 0% 0% 9%
16% 1% 0% 0% 54%
17% 2% 0% 0% 50%
11% 1% 0% 0% 59%
10% 1% 0% 0% 54%
40% 3% 0% 0% 34%
45% 4% 0% 0% 26%
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
CABNSAD Data Education Level of Chemical/Biological Perpetrators, All Perpetrators
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Sample Indicators 1
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Sample Indicators 2
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Bayesian Tool
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Adversary Behavioral Profiles • Conducted on: – – – – – –
Al Qa’ida Hizb’allah Tehrik‐e Taliban Pakistan Generic Disgruntled Scientist Generic Apocalyptic Millenarian Group Generic Right-wing Organization
• Profiles include: historical overview; specific indicators; general behavioral influences; preferred operational methods • Key outputs: likely CB acquisition, transport, C2I and attack modes
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Ongoing Activities • POICN (Profiles of Incidents of CBRN-Use by Non-state actors) – A relational, open-source database including information on terrorist plots, acquisitions, and attacks relating to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents.
• Countering the radicalization of bio-scientists – Reviewing existing government counter-radicalization programs in light of the latest field-specific research to ascertain factors unique to the bio-scientist community and re-tailor programs appropriately.
• Consensus Framework for Informing Decision-Making in the Biological Threat Characterization Program – Identifying a particular pathogen as a potential threat agent and devoting resources towards studying it can have counter-productive effects by drawing attention to that agent’s potential as a weapon. – Developing a framework intended to inform the decisions about funding experimental work to characterize biological threats.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
Contact Gary Ackerman [email protected] (301) 405-6656
Markus Binder [email protected] (301) 405-9870
www.start.umd.edu
