Iran: Deal or No Deal
Iran: Deal or No Deal
National Security Program
Bottom line, the deal will: • Reduce the overall number of centrifuges by two-thirds. • Cut the current stockpile of 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium to 300 kg. • Block all three paths Iran has to obtain a nuclear weapon: uranium, plutonium, and covert. • Increase the breakout time from 2 months to 1 year. • Give IAEA inspectors access to all nuclear facilities and the entire supply chain.
Fordo
(deeply buried facility)
Arak
Before: secretly enriching uranium with advanced centrifuges
Before: heavy-water reactor core capable of producing significant quantities of weapons grade plutonium
After: no uranium enrichment and no fissile material
After: the core will be destroyed or removed from the country
Natanz Before: 9,156 IR-1 centrifuges operating, and no limit on uranium enrichment level
Iran
After: 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges, and no weapons grade uranium enrichment (capped at 3.67%)
Enriched Uranium Uranium Mines
Saghand Before: limited inspector access to mines After: full access to all supply chain activities and continuous surveillance for 25 years
Gachin Before: limited inspector access to mines After: full access to all supply chain activities and continuous surveillance for 25 years
Centrifuge Plutonium Reactor
Map of Iran by FreeVectorMaps.com. © 2015 Third Way. Free for re-use with attribution/link. Concept by Ben Freeman and Peter Billerbeck. Infographic by Clare Jackson.
100 miles
National Security Program
Bottom line, the deal will: • Reduce the overall number of centrifuges by two-thirds. • Cut the current stockpile of 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium to 300 kg. • Block all three paths Iran has to obtain a nuclear weapon: uranium, plutonium, and covert. • Increase the breakout time from 2 months to 1 year. • Give IAEA inspectors access to all nuclear facilities and the entire supply chain.
Fordo
(deeply buried facility)
Arak
Before: secretly enriching uranium with advanced centrifuges
Before: heavy-water reactor core capable of producing significant quantities of weapons grade plutonium
After: no uranium enrichment and no fissile material
After: the core will be destroyed or removed from the country
Natanz Before: 9,156 IR-1 centrifuges operating, and no limit on uranium enrichment level
Iran
After: 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges, and no weapons grade uranium enrichment (capped at 3.67%)
Enriched Uranium Uranium Mines
Saghand Before: limited inspector access to mines After: full access to all supply chain activities and continuous surveillance for 25 years
Gachin Before: limited inspector access to mines After: full access to all supply chain activities and continuous surveillance for 25 years
Centrifuge Plutonium Reactor
Map of Iran by FreeVectorMaps.com. © 2015 Third Way. Free for re-use with attribution/link. Concept by Ben Freeman and Peter Billerbeck. Infographic by Clare Jackson.
100 miles
