Ivory Coast Jan 2011
Ivory Coast: The Interven0on Dilemma!
1
Scope • Introduc0on • To intervene or not • How such an interven0on would play out • Who would execute it • The ba@le space • Possible impact of such interven0on • Conclusion
2
Introduc0on • The crisis triggered in Côte d’Ivoire by the recent presiden0al elec0on and the refusal of the incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo, to accept defeat, has cons0tuted an unwelcome challenge for sub-‐ regional, regional and interna0onal organisa0ons. • All efforts at media0on by ECOWAS, the AU and the UN have apparently failed and interna0onal recogni0on of the victory of Alassane Oua@ara has led to a situa0on in which ECOWAS may have to make good its threat to remove Gbagbo by force. 3
To intervene or not? • This raises several significant ques0ons: – how such an interven0on would play out, – who would execute it, – The ba@le space – and what the impact of such an interven0on might be.
4
How would it play out • The ECOWAS military chiefs of staff have already met to draU con0ngency plans for a military interven0on and now await poli0cal approval from the regional heads of state. • It appears that any interven0on would take place within the structures of the African Standby Force (ASF) framework as it exists in West Africa.
5
Cont • This is a standby arrangement comprising military, police and civilian components and is consistent with Chapter VIII of the United Na0ons (UN) Charter, which provides for regional peace and security arrangements. • Within the West African context, it is covered by Ar0cle 21 of the ECOWAS Protocol Rela0ng to the Mechanism for Conflict Preven0on, Management, Resolu0on, Peacekeeping and Security of December 1999. 6
Who would Execute it • The ECOWAS Opera0onal Framework ini0ated the standby force process by establishing a Task Force (TF) of 2 773 all ranks, which was cer0fied in 2009 in the form of logis0cs exercise, the remaining 3 727 personnel of the force to complement a brigade of 6 500 all ranks to be ready by 2010. • The TF is structured into two infantry ba@alions (Western and Eastern) and a composite logis0cs ba@alion. The Western Ba@alion is led by Senegal, the Eastern Ba@alion by Nigeria. 7
Cont • The ECOWAS Main Force structure is based on the opera0onal concept that the ini0al ESF Task Force (ESFTF) is there for rapid deployment in prepara0on for that of a more robust, long-‐term, force. • The TF is designed to mobilise quickly and deploy rapidly, and then can be expanded and enhanced into a fully func0onal main force. • It is important to take into account that this is a standby arrangement, and aUer the 2010 AU exercise Amani Africa, which tested the opera0onal capability of Africa’s standby brigades it was acknowledged although much had been achieved, these forma0ons were not yet opera0onally ready to intervene in complex situa0ons such as that currently manifes0ng itself in Côte d’Ivoire. 8
The Ba@le Space • ECOWAS has experience of military interven0on in crisis situa0ons such as those in Sierra Leone and Liberia but these were at the invita0on of the governments of smaller countries. The Ivorian situa0on is somewhat different. • In Côte d’Ivoire a beleagured Laurent Gbagbo retains command of the military, gendarmerie and police. He also s0ll controls the principal ports and airports in the south. In the capital Abidjan he has the support of the majority of the popula0on and a militant youth organisa0on called the Young 9 Patriots.
Cont • The na0onal media, including television remains under his control and is used to mobilise his supporters and discredit the interna0onal community, the United Na0ons Mission (UNOCI) and his domes0c opponents, whom he depicts as agents of foreign forces determined to undermine Ivorian sovereignty. • This has made Abidjan a very hos0le environment, and UNOCI has come under constant a@ack by the youth. 10
Cont • The Ivorian Defence Force numbers some 17 000, mostly light infantry with a small air and naval capacity but virtually no air assets. – Army: 6,500 – Navy: 900 – Air Force: 700
• This is augmented by 7 000 gendarmerie. • Presiden0al Guard: 1,300 • Mili0a:1,500 11
Cont • UNOCI: 7,570 (Addi0onal 2,000 approved) • French force “Licorne” that is also the Rapid Reac0on Force for UNOCI: 900 • Young Patriots: ? • New Forces: 8,000
Possible impact of such interven0on • These are all factors to be taken into considera0on in the event of an ECOWAS interven0on. Any military opera0on would have to be quick and clinical, securing control of the command and control systems, air and naval assets and extrac0ng Gbagbo without engaging serious opposi0on. • This would require the use of a@ack and transport helicopters and a highly mobile force, for which ECOWAS would possibly need external support in the form of enablers, helicopters and possibly a staging plakorm off the coast. 13
Cont • Such an interven0on would also have to deal with the possible consequences in the event of a successful extrac0on, including riots, a@acks on UNOCI, followers of Oua@ara and foreign civilians and property.
Cont • This implies that any interven0on plan must involve all the role players in Côte d’Ivoire, par0cualrly UNOCI and the French force “Licorne” that is also the Rapid Reac0on Force for UNOCI.
Conclusion • All the indica0ons are that an ECOWAS military interven0on must s0ll be seen as a last op0on. • The deteriora0ng situa0on in the country, including con0nued deadly violence against the popula0on and heightened a@acks on UNOCI are the most likely triggers for the difficult decision to intervene.
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1
Scope • Introduc0on • To intervene or not • How such an interven0on would play out • Who would execute it • The ba@le space • Possible impact of such interven0on • Conclusion
2
Introduc0on • The crisis triggered in Côte d’Ivoire by the recent presiden0al elec0on and the refusal of the incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo, to accept defeat, has cons0tuted an unwelcome challenge for sub-‐ regional, regional and interna0onal organisa0ons. • All efforts at media0on by ECOWAS, the AU and the UN have apparently failed and interna0onal recogni0on of the victory of Alassane Oua@ara has led to a situa0on in which ECOWAS may have to make good its threat to remove Gbagbo by force. 3
To intervene or not? • This raises several significant ques0ons: – how such an interven0on would play out, – who would execute it, – The ba@le space – and what the impact of such an interven0on might be.
4
How would it play out • The ECOWAS military chiefs of staff have already met to draU con0ngency plans for a military interven0on and now await poli0cal approval from the regional heads of state. • It appears that any interven0on would take place within the structures of the African Standby Force (ASF) framework as it exists in West Africa.
5
Cont • This is a standby arrangement comprising military, police and civilian components and is consistent with Chapter VIII of the United Na0ons (UN) Charter, which provides for regional peace and security arrangements. • Within the West African context, it is covered by Ar0cle 21 of the ECOWAS Protocol Rela0ng to the Mechanism for Conflict Preven0on, Management, Resolu0on, Peacekeeping and Security of December 1999. 6
Who would Execute it • The ECOWAS Opera0onal Framework ini0ated the standby force process by establishing a Task Force (TF) of 2 773 all ranks, which was cer0fied in 2009 in the form of logis0cs exercise, the remaining 3 727 personnel of the force to complement a brigade of 6 500 all ranks to be ready by 2010. • The TF is structured into two infantry ba@alions (Western and Eastern) and a composite logis0cs ba@alion. The Western Ba@alion is led by Senegal, the Eastern Ba@alion by Nigeria. 7
Cont • The ECOWAS Main Force structure is based on the opera0onal concept that the ini0al ESF Task Force (ESFTF) is there for rapid deployment in prepara0on for that of a more robust, long-‐term, force. • The TF is designed to mobilise quickly and deploy rapidly, and then can be expanded and enhanced into a fully func0onal main force. • It is important to take into account that this is a standby arrangement, and aUer the 2010 AU exercise Amani Africa, which tested the opera0onal capability of Africa’s standby brigades it was acknowledged although much had been achieved, these forma0ons were not yet opera0onally ready to intervene in complex situa0ons such as that currently manifes0ng itself in Côte d’Ivoire. 8
The Ba@le Space • ECOWAS has experience of military interven0on in crisis situa0ons such as those in Sierra Leone and Liberia but these were at the invita0on of the governments of smaller countries. The Ivorian situa0on is somewhat different. • In Côte d’Ivoire a beleagured Laurent Gbagbo retains command of the military, gendarmerie and police. He also s0ll controls the principal ports and airports in the south. In the capital Abidjan he has the support of the majority of the popula0on and a militant youth organisa0on called the Young 9 Patriots.
Cont • The na0onal media, including television remains under his control and is used to mobilise his supporters and discredit the interna0onal community, the United Na0ons Mission (UNOCI) and his domes0c opponents, whom he depicts as agents of foreign forces determined to undermine Ivorian sovereignty. • This has made Abidjan a very hos0le environment, and UNOCI has come under constant a@ack by the youth. 10
Cont • The Ivorian Defence Force numbers some 17 000, mostly light infantry with a small air and naval capacity but virtually no air assets. – Army: 6,500 – Navy: 900 – Air Force: 700
• This is augmented by 7 000 gendarmerie. • Presiden0al Guard: 1,300 • Mili0a:1,500 11
Cont • UNOCI: 7,570 (Addi0onal 2,000 approved) • French force “Licorne” that is also the Rapid Reac0on Force for UNOCI: 900 • Young Patriots: ? • New Forces: 8,000
Possible impact of such interven0on • These are all factors to be taken into considera0on in the event of an ECOWAS interven0on. Any military opera0on would have to be quick and clinical, securing control of the command and control systems, air and naval assets and extrac0ng Gbagbo without engaging serious opposi0on. • This would require the use of a@ack and transport helicopters and a highly mobile force, for which ECOWAS would possibly need external support in the form of enablers, helicopters and possibly a staging plakorm off the coast. 13
Cont • Such an interven0on would also have to deal with the possible consequences in the event of a successful extrac0on, including riots, a@acks on UNOCI, followers of Oua@ara and foreign civilians and property.
Cont • This implies that any interven0on plan must involve all the role players in Côte d’Ivoire, par0cualrly UNOCI and the French force “Licorne” that is also the Rapid Reac0on Force for UNOCI.
Conclusion • All the indica0ons are that an ECOWAS military interven0on must s0ll be seen as a last op0on. • The deteriora0ng situa0on in the country, including con0nued deadly violence against the popula0on and heightened a@acks on UNOCI are the most likely triggers for the difficult decision to intervene.
www.issafrica.org
