memorandum - Department of State
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
MEMORANDUM OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Implications of the Libyan Coup: Some Initial Thoughts
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
CENTRAL
INTELLIGEIYCE
AGENCY
OFFICE OF >JATIOp?ALESTIl4ATES
16 September 1969
SUBJECT:
I m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e Libyan Coup: Thowht s*
Some I n i t i a l
The Nature of t h e New Renime 1. The i d e n t i t y of t h e r u l e r s of t h e new Libyan govern-
ment remains u n c l e a r and no a u t h ~ r i t a t i v es t a t e m e n t s of t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s and p r i o r i t i e s have been made.
Nonetheless, t h e y
appear i n c o n t r o l , and continue t~ show a p o s t u r e of mo2eration and caution.
Though avowing "socialism", no Libyan l e a d e r has
mouthed t h e e x t r e m i s t slogans t-ical
of Arab r a d i c a l s .
To t h e
contrary, such themes a s t h e p r o t e c t i o n of f ~ r e i g nl i v e s and property, t h e f u l f i l l m e n t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s , and t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of c o r r u p t i o n and f a v o r i t i s m a t home have been stressed.
*
" ~ o c i a lr e f o r n " has been e ~ p h a s i z e df a r more than
This memorandum was prepared by t h e Office of National Estimates. It was discussed with r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e Office of Current I n t e l l i g e n c e and t h e O f f i c e of Ec~nomicResearch, vho a r e i n g e n e r a l agreement 1 6 t h i t s judgments. GROUP 1 Exclude6 from automatic 2arngrading and declassification
i*ra ~
$?wp$mrL
-
-
l - r m ~ .p VFr-
.
----
--
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State . - ,. E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
_L.-.. _---.-
"
. i . . . .
--
. I
1 -f:
D socialism i n Libyan broadcasts.
I n p r i v a t e C ~ n ~ e r ~ awith t i ~ n ~
US o f f i c i a l s , members of the r u l i n g Revolutionary Comnland Council (RCC)have gone even f'urther, and have given t h e impression of seeking very close r e l a t i o n s with t h e United States. 2.
Such statements may be d e l i b e r a t e dissimulation,
designed t o reduce any t h r e a t of foreign counterrevolutionary intervention.
The RCC probably feareci. US/UK intervention; i n
such circumstances, conciliatory reassurances made good sense. The UK did put I d r i s i n power and signed a mutual defense agreement with him.
A t t h e time of t h e coup, t h e r e were sQme
1,100 B r i t i s h troops near Tobruq, along with an MF base close by.
I n addition there v3s !heelus, with some 5,000 h e r i c a n
personnel, and t h e Sixth F l e e t rJas not f a r away.
3.
Whatever t h e case, the moderate posture of t h e Libyan
regime i s probably temnporary, though t h e r e a r e no very good grounds f o r predicting j u s t when
3r
how t h i s stance w i l l change.
1Je base t h e judgment t h a t it w i l l on the general tendency or" Arab p o l i t i c s over t h e past two decades:
other m i l i t a r y -
dominated revolutionary regimes have tented, almost v i t h o u t exception, t o bec~rclemore l e f t i s t anC extreme with the passage
- 2 -
I
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
of t i n e .
I n Egypt's case t h i s has come a b ~ u under t one leader.
I n Syria and Iraq, it wes t h e r e s u l t of successive m i l i t a r y coups vhich brought ever more r a d i c a l regimes t o pa!er.
4.
Libye could f911m e i t h e r path, o r both.
It has d r e a d y
declared i t s e l f i n t h e Arab revolutionary c a m , and w i l l quickly be receiving asvice from i t s new brethren. t h e ultimate p m e r i n Libya
--
While t h e RCC members
--
r e r a i n shadaw f i g u r e s , rlre Irnoii
t h a t a t l e a s t sorne c i v i l i a n o f f i c i a l s of t h e i r new government w i l l be highly susceptible t o t h i s ty-pe of influence.
So, i n a l l
p r ~ b a b i l i t y ,w i l l be t h e RCC i t s e l f , not wanting i t s image tarnished by accusations t h a t it i s l e s s than sincere or ardent. The Future of Libyan P o l i t i c s
5. Beyond t h i s , the c m p Iraq
--
gotten.
--
as ?id t h e J u l y 1958 one i n
has probably created a preceZent which v i l l r,ot be f ~ r M3st observers i n s i d e and outside of Libya had l ~ n g
believe2 t h a t a r 5 l i t a r y takeover vas unli1;ely i n I d r i s ' l i f e t i r e . The l i t t l e a r r q of 8,000 (with only 200-300 ~ f f i c e r )s was g r e a t l y outnwbered by t h e i*Dyalist p ~ l i c efgrces; it laclred t i a t e s s e n t i a l instrument of Arab revolution, the tad.;.
The s t i l l paverful
t r i b e s i n Cyrenaica were l a y s 1 t o the King, who i n f a c t was generally respected by most Libyam.
The t a s k of s e c r e t l y
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
planning and c a r r y i n g out a cooro'inatec! takeover of t h e p r i n c i p a l population c e n t e r s separated by hundrefs of miles of d e s e r t seemed insu2erable.
6.
But t h e RCC, with some armored c a r s , proved it could,
b e done, and t h i s l e s s o n i s not l i k e l y t o be l o s t on o t h e r Libyans i n t h e f i t u r e .
We Co not :tnov ha? many o f f i c e r s
a p p a r e n t l y mostly c a p t a i n s and l i e u t e n a n t s
--
--
a r e i n t h e RCC,
b u t s u s p e c t t h e group i s small enough t o maintain secrecy end s e c u r i t y and l a r g e enough t o a s s u r e adequate c ' i r e c t i o n and c o m n d a coup
-- perhaps
50 t o 60 people.
Ilor d o we know har
cohesive t h i s group i s , or how s u s c e p t i b l e i t s neri~bersd g h t b e t o p o s s i b l e Algerian or Eggytian i n f l u e m e a r d i n t r i g u e .
In
t h e y e a r s ahead, t h e Libyan arnIy w i l l almost c e r t a i n l y b e expanled ( t h e old r e g i n e had a l r e a 6 y embarked on a program which would upgrade i t s equipment and n e a r l y double i t s s i z e ) . I n t h e new and more heated p o l i t i c a l c l i m t e of Libya, s m a l l c l a n d e s t i n e o f f i c e r groups o f B a a t h i s t , Arab K a t i o n a l i s t s and t h e l i k e w i l l appear; over tirce, soxe may succeed i n s e i z i n g pnlrer. Western K l i t a r y F a c i l i t i e s
7.
The US and t h e UK w i l l l i k e l y b e i n f o r some s t i c k $
times i n t h e y e a r s zhead.
An o v e r r i d i n g theme 3f t h e new
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
government, and of any conceivable successor, i s En aggressive ane n i l i t a n t a n t i - I s r a e l i posture, 2nd American support of I s r a e l ~ J i l lczuse s e r i o u s problems.
For t h e moment, t h e new
government has seid nothing about Wheelus and t h e B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s i n Libya, or made any move a g a i n s t thern.
A s it consolidates i t s hold on p m e r and seeks t o g e t more 2nZ more i n t o t h e mainstream of Arab nationalism, it w i l l probably do so.
It might permit them t o rernain u n t i l t h e respective
t r e a t i e s expire:
f 3 r example, it coul2, under t h e terms of
t h e Base -Rights Agreerfient, formally give n o t i c e t o t h e US i n December 1970 t h a t it must be out of Wheelus w i t h i n a year. But pressures, both i n t e r n a l an6 e x t e r n a l , f o r e a r l i e r removal
w i l l be strong, and w e would give Wheelus only a 50-50 chance of survival u n t i l l a t e
1971
remaining a f t e r t h a t .
--
and v i r t u a l l y no chance a t a l l of
The B r i t i s h , a l r e a f y c7isliked as t h e
patrons of t h e old regime, a r e u n l i k e l y t j remain a l l t h e way to
1973, when t h e i r mutual Sefense p a c t e x p i r e s . Petroleum Policy
8.
Relations with t h e o i l companies w i l l be a more
complicated matter; i n t h i s f i e l d , such raCical tendencies
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
a s the new regime may have are l i k e l y t o be tempered by p r a c t i c a l considerations.
I Z r i s ' government had already i n i t i a t e d nego-
t i a t i o n s aimed a t s u b s t a n t i d l y r a i s i n g Libya's share of o i l revenues.
These w i l l of course continue, and Libyan demands
may increase.
The new regime may f o l l o T t~h e course of e i t h e r of t h e
other two Arab r a d i c a l o i l producers, I r a q o r Algeria.
The former
has l e f t current operations p r e t t y much alone, though it has prevented t h e US-UK-French owned I r a q Petroleum Compal;gr from expanding i n t o new concession areas. much tougher.
The Algerians have been
Indeed a t t h e time of t h e June
1967 Arab-Israeli
war, they t o ~ kthe extreme s t e p of putting a l l American companies (which controlled only about 1 0 percent of t o t a l output) under Algerian management and forbade the r e p a t r i a t i o n of any earnings, an arrangement s t i l l i n e f f e c t .
With t h e French companies, which
produce t h e bulk of Algeria's petrAewn, t h e government hzs been l e s s harsh, b u t it has not hesitated t o
engage i n harassment i n
the quest f o r more revenue and more output.
The nerr Libyan
government i s l i k e l y t o make s i m i l a r demands on t h e US and UK companies which pro2uce nearly a l l t h e Libyan o i l .
We doubt,
however, t h a t they w i l l be t r e a t e d a s rigorously a s American producers have been i n Algeria, though such treatment cannot be ruled out, e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e event of another m a j ~ rArab-Israeli war.
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
3.
m e r e a r e some r a t h e r persussitre reasnns 17ky Li;>yrn
o i l p o l i c y appears more l i k e l y t o resemble t h a t of Algeria. Like t h e l a t t e r , Libya holds some high cards; i t s o i l comes from west of t h e Suez Canal and i s of a very low sulphur content.
Hence, shipping c o s t s t o Europe a r e lower, and s o a r e
those of r e f i n i n g ; t h e process of removing sulphur t o prevent a i r p o l l u t i o n i s a f a i r l y expensive one.
Further, t h e sheer
magnitude of Libyan output, now over t h r e e m i l l i o n b a r r e l s per day and r a p i d l y climbing, w i l l give t h e regime s t r e n g t h i n dealing with t h e o i l companies.
Even t h e implied t h r e a t of a sudden c u t -
off of these s u p p l i e s which meet a b m t a q u a r t e r of Europe's demand would have d i s r u p t i v e e f f e c t b u t more expensive
--
--
even though a l t e r n a t i v e
sources of supply would be a v a i l a b l e .
Thus
t h e Libyan government i s i n a p o s i t i o n t o g e t progressively more demanding with t h e o i l conpanies.
Hm.7 f a r and how f a s t it
might go w i l l , of course, depen? on hm.7 f a r and h a w f a s t t h e present regime
--
or a successor
--
moves i n a g e n e r a l l y r a d i c a l
d i r e c t i o n , though i n t h e l a s t a n a l y s i s t h e Libyans w i l l not wish t o r i s k l o s i n g t h e i r o i l revenues, on which they a r e almost completely dependent.
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
Consequences i n the Arab World 10.
m e i n s t i t u t i o n of the Khartoum subsidies, the nain-
tenance of a united f r o n t against I s r a e l , and the ending of Nasser's subversive e f f o r t s and h o s t i l e propaganda l u l l e d t h e conservative or moderate Arab governments i n t o a f a l s e sense of security.
--
--
including Libya
We believe t h a t the governments
of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (and Morocco and ~ u n i s i a )may
--
to
varying degrees-- be more susceptible t o overthrow than they were before the Libyan coup.
There i s evidence of s u b s t a n t i a l
popular discontent i n each country. t h a t of I d r i s
--
Their regimes
--
like
a r e viewed by many of t h e i r c i t i z e n s a s t o o
friendly t o the US, s o f t on I s r a e l , corrupt, an8 unconcerned with the welfare of the ordinary c i t i z e n .
The lesson t h a t a handful
of obscure junior arrsy o f f i c e r s can successfully p u l l off a coup against a conservative regime i n very d i f f i c u l t circumstances
w i l l not be l o s t i n these countries. 11. I f i n t h e next year o r two, one o r more of these
moderate regimes were overthrown, this would not mean t h a t some new and more e f f e c t i v e stage of Arab p o l i t i c a l unity, under Nasser o r anybody e l s e , would be i n t h e offing.
For the most
p a r t , Arab u n i t y has been a myth, but t h e r e has been a f a i r l y
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
I
1
c o n s i s t e n t u n i t y amongst revolutionary Arab s t a t e s on t h e s u b j e c t of I s r a e l .
It should be remembered t h a t , i n t h e
aftermath of t h e June war, t h e Arab r a d i c a l s Algeria included
--
--
I r a q and
s t r o n g l y urged using Arab o i l a s a means
of pressuring t h e US t o change i t s p r o - I s r a e l i p o l i c i e s .
The
r e f u s a l of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya t o j o i n i n k i l l e d t h a t project.
Libya might not be s o r e l u c t a n t again.
Were
new revolutionary governments t o appear i n Kuwait and SauCi Arabia, t h i s could mean very d i f f i c u l t times f o r American o i l companies throughout t h e Arab world.
I n any event, t h e Libyan
coup represents one more s t e p i n a process of p o l a r i z a t i o n i n t h e Middle East, which could s e e t h e Arabs a l l aligned on one s i d e , confronting t h e US a s w e l l a s I s r a e l on t h e other.
MEMORANDUM OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Implications of the Libyan Coup: Some Initial Thoughts
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
CENTRAL
INTELLIGEIYCE
AGENCY
OFFICE OF >JATIOp?ALESTIl4ATES
16 September 1969
SUBJECT:
I m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e Libyan Coup: Thowht s*
Some I n i t i a l
The Nature of t h e New Renime 1. The i d e n t i t y of t h e r u l e r s of t h e new Libyan govern-
ment remains u n c l e a r and no a u t h ~ r i t a t i v es t a t e m e n t s of t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s and p r i o r i t i e s have been made.
Nonetheless, t h e y
appear i n c o n t r o l , and continue t~ show a p o s t u r e of mo2eration and caution.
Though avowing "socialism", no Libyan l e a d e r has
mouthed t h e e x t r e m i s t slogans t-ical
of Arab r a d i c a l s .
To t h e
contrary, such themes a s t h e p r o t e c t i o n of f ~ r e i g nl i v e s and property, t h e f u l f i l l m e n t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s , and t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of c o r r u p t i o n and f a v o r i t i s m a t home have been stressed.
*
" ~ o c i a lr e f o r n " has been e ~ p h a s i z e df a r more than
This memorandum was prepared by t h e Office of National Estimates. It was discussed with r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e Office of Current I n t e l l i g e n c e and t h e O f f i c e of Ec~nomicResearch, vho a r e i n g e n e r a l agreement 1 6 t h i t s judgments. GROUP 1 Exclude6 from automatic 2arngrading and declassification
i*ra ~
$?wp$mrL
-
-
l - r m ~ .p VFr-
.
----
--
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State . - ,. E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
_L.-.. _---.-
"
. i . . . .
--
. I
1 -f:
D socialism i n Libyan broadcasts.
I n p r i v a t e C ~ n ~ e r ~ awith t i ~ n ~
US o f f i c i a l s , members of the r u l i n g Revolutionary Comnland Council (RCC)have gone even f'urther, and have given t h e impression of seeking very close r e l a t i o n s with t h e United States. 2.
Such statements may be d e l i b e r a t e dissimulation,
designed t o reduce any t h r e a t of foreign counterrevolutionary intervention.
The RCC probably feareci. US/UK intervention; i n
such circumstances, conciliatory reassurances made good sense. The UK did put I d r i s i n power and signed a mutual defense agreement with him.
A t t h e time of t h e coup, t h e r e were sQme
1,100 B r i t i s h troops near Tobruq, along with an MF base close by.
I n addition there v3s !heelus, with some 5,000 h e r i c a n
personnel, and t h e Sixth F l e e t rJas not f a r away.
3.
Whatever t h e case, the moderate posture of t h e Libyan
regime i s probably temnporary, though t h e r e a r e no very good grounds f o r predicting j u s t when
3r
how t h i s stance w i l l change.
1Je base t h e judgment t h a t it w i l l on the general tendency or" Arab p o l i t i c s over t h e past two decades:
other m i l i t a r y -
dominated revolutionary regimes have tented, almost v i t h o u t exception, t o bec~rclemore l e f t i s t anC extreme with the passage
- 2 -
I
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
of t i n e .
I n Egypt's case t h i s has come a b ~ u under t one leader.
I n Syria and Iraq, it wes t h e r e s u l t of successive m i l i t a r y coups vhich brought ever more r a d i c a l regimes t o pa!er.
4.
Libye could f911m e i t h e r path, o r both.
It has d r e a d y
declared i t s e l f i n t h e Arab revolutionary c a m , and w i l l quickly be receiving asvice from i t s new brethren. t h e ultimate p m e r i n Libya
--
While t h e RCC members
--
r e r a i n shadaw f i g u r e s , rlre Irnoii
t h a t a t l e a s t sorne c i v i l i a n o f f i c i a l s of t h e i r new government w i l l be highly susceptible t o t h i s ty-pe of influence.
So, i n a l l
p r ~ b a b i l i t y ,w i l l be t h e RCC i t s e l f , not wanting i t s image tarnished by accusations t h a t it i s l e s s than sincere or ardent. The Future of Libyan P o l i t i c s
5. Beyond t h i s , the c m p Iraq
--
gotten.
--
as ?id t h e J u l y 1958 one i n
has probably created a preceZent which v i l l r,ot be f ~ r M3st observers i n s i d e and outside of Libya had l ~ n g
believe2 t h a t a r 5 l i t a r y takeover vas unli1;ely i n I d r i s ' l i f e t i r e . The l i t t l e a r r q of 8,000 (with only 200-300 ~ f f i c e r )s was g r e a t l y outnwbered by t h e i*Dyalist p ~ l i c efgrces; it laclred t i a t e s s e n t i a l instrument of Arab revolution, the tad.;.
The s t i l l paverful
t r i b e s i n Cyrenaica were l a y s 1 t o the King, who i n f a c t was generally respected by most Libyam.
The t a s k of s e c r e t l y
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
planning and c a r r y i n g out a cooro'inatec! takeover of t h e p r i n c i p a l population c e n t e r s separated by hundrefs of miles of d e s e r t seemed insu2erable.
6.
But t h e RCC, with some armored c a r s , proved it could,
b e done, and t h i s l e s s o n i s not l i k e l y t o be l o s t on o t h e r Libyans i n t h e f i t u r e .
We Co not :tnov ha? many o f f i c e r s
a p p a r e n t l y mostly c a p t a i n s and l i e u t e n a n t s
--
--
a r e i n t h e RCC,
b u t s u s p e c t t h e group i s small enough t o maintain secrecy end s e c u r i t y and l a r g e enough t o a s s u r e adequate c ' i r e c t i o n and c o m n d a coup
-- perhaps
50 t o 60 people.
Ilor d o we know har
cohesive t h i s group i s , or how s u s c e p t i b l e i t s neri~bersd g h t b e t o p o s s i b l e Algerian or Eggytian i n f l u e m e a r d i n t r i g u e .
In
t h e y e a r s ahead, t h e Libyan arnIy w i l l almost c e r t a i n l y b e expanled ( t h e old r e g i n e had a l r e a 6 y embarked on a program which would upgrade i t s equipment and n e a r l y double i t s s i z e ) . I n t h e new and more heated p o l i t i c a l c l i m t e of Libya, s m a l l c l a n d e s t i n e o f f i c e r groups o f B a a t h i s t , Arab K a t i o n a l i s t s and t h e l i k e w i l l appear; over tirce, soxe may succeed i n s e i z i n g pnlrer. Western K l i t a r y F a c i l i t i e s
7.
The US and t h e UK w i l l l i k e l y b e i n f o r some s t i c k $
times i n t h e y e a r s zhead.
An o v e r r i d i n g theme 3f t h e new
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
government, and of any conceivable successor, i s En aggressive ane n i l i t a n t a n t i - I s r a e l i posture, 2nd American support of I s r a e l ~ J i l lczuse s e r i o u s problems.
For t h e moment, t h e new
government has seid nothing about Wheelus and t h e B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s i n Libya, or made any move a g a i n s t thern.
A s it consolidates i t s hold on p m e r and seeks t o g e t more 2nZ more i n t o t h e mainstream of Arab nationalism, it w i l l probably do so.
It might permit them t o rernain u n t i l t h e respective
t r e a t i e s expire:
f 3 r example, it coul2, under t h e terms of
t h e Base -Rights Agreerfient, formally give n o t i c e t o t h e US i n December 1970 t h a t it must be out of Wheelus w i t h i n a year. But pressures, both i n t e r n a l an6 e x t e r n a l , f o r e a r l i e r removal
w i l l be strong, and w e would give Wheelus only a 50-50 chance of survival u n t i l l a t e
1971
remaining a f t e r t h a t .
--
and v i r t u a l l y no chance a t a l l of
The B r i t i s h , a l r e a f y c7isliked as t h e
patrons of t h e old regime, a r e u n l i k e l y t j remain a l l t h e way to
1973, when t h e i r mutual Sefense p a c t e x p i r e s . Petroleum Policy
8.
Relations with t h e o i l companies w i l l be a more
complicated matter; i n t h i s f i e l d , such raCical tendencies
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
a s the new regime may have are l i k e l y t o be tempered by p r a c t i c a l considerations.
I Z r i s ' government had already i n i t i a t e d nego-
t i a t i o n s aimed a t s u b s t a n t i d l y r a i s i n g Libya's share of o i l revenues.
These w i l l of course continue, and Libyan demands
may increase.
The new regime may f o l l o T t~h e course of e i t h e r of t h e
other two Arab r a d i c a l o i l producers, I r a q o r Algeria.
The former
has l e f t current operations p r e t t y much alone, though it has prevented t h e US-UK-French owned I r a q Petroleum Compal;gr from expanding i n t o new concession areas. much tougher.
The Algerians have been
Indeed a t t h e time of t h e June
1967 Arab-Israeli
war, they t o ~ kthe extreme s t e p of putting a l l American companies (which controlled only about 1 0 percent of t o t a l output) under Algerian management and forbade the r e p a t r i a t i o n of any earnings, an arrangement s t i l l i n e f f e c t .
With t h e French companies, which
produce t h e bulk of Algeria's petrAewn, t h e government hzs been l e s s harsh, b u t it has not hesitated t o
engage i n harassment i n
the quest f o r more revenue and more output.
The nerr Libyan
government i s l i k e l y t o make s i m i l a r demands on t h e US and UK companies which pro2uce nearly a l l t h e Libyan o i l .
We doubt,
however, t h a t they w i l l be t r e a t e d a s rigorously a s American producers have been i n Algeria, though such treatment cannot be ruled out, e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e event of another m a j ~ rArab-Israeli war.
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
3.
m e r e a r e some r a t h e r persussitre reasnns 17ky Li;>yrn
o i l p o l i c y appears more l i k e l y t o resemble t h a t of Algeria. Like t h e l a t t e r , Libya holds some high cards; i t s o i l comes from west of t h e Suez Canal and i s of a very low sulphur content.
Hence, shipping c o s t s t o Europe a r e lower, and s o a r e
those of r e f i n i n g ; t h e process of removing sulphur t o prevent a i r p o l l u t i o n i s a f a i r l y expensive one.
Further, t h e sheer
magnitude of Libyan output, now over t h r e e m i l l i o n b a r r e l s per day and r a p i d l y climbing, w i l l give t h e regime s t r e n g t h i n dealing with t h e o i l companies.
Even t h e implied t h r e a t of a sudden c u t -
off of these s u p p l i e s which meet a b m t a q u a r t e r of Europe's demand would have d i s r u p t i v e e f f e c t b u t more expensive
--
--
even though a l t e r n a t i v e
sources of supply would be a v a i l a b l e .
Thus
t h e Libyan government i s i n a p o s i t i o n t o g e t progressively more demanding with t h e o i l conpanies.
Hm.7 f a r and how f a s t it
might go w i l l , of course, depen? on hm.7 f a r and h a w f a s t t h e present regime
--
or a successor
--
moves i n a g e n e r a l l y r a d i c a l
d i r e c t i o n , though i n t h e l a s t a n a l y s i s t h e Libyans w i l l not wish t o r i s k l o s i n g t h e i r o i l revenues, on which they a r e almost completely dependent.
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
Consequences i n the Arab World 10.
m e i n s t i t u t i o n of the Khartoum subsidies, the nain-
tenance of a united f r o n t against I s r a e l , and the ending of Nasser's subversive e f f o r t s and h o s t i l e propaganda l u l l e d t h e conservative or moderate Arab governments i n t o a f a l s e sense of security.
--
--
including Libya
We believe t h a t the governments
of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (and Morocco and ~ u n i s i a )may
--
to
varying degrees-- be more susceptible t o overthrow than they were before the Libyan coup.
There i s evidence of s u b s t a n t i a l
popular discontent i n each country. t h a t of I d r i s
--
Their regimes
--
like
a r e viewed by many of t h e i r c i t i z e n s a s t o o
friendly t o the US, s o f t on I s r a e l , corrupt, an8 unconcerned with the welfare of the ordinary c i t i z e n .
The lesson t h a t a handful
of obscure junior arrsy o f f i c e r s can successfully p u l l off a coup against a conservative regime i n very d i f f i c u l t circumstances
w i l l not be l o s t i n these countries. 11. I f i n t h e next year o r two, one o r more of these
moderate regimes were overthrown, this would not mean t h a t some new and more e f f e c t i v e stage of Arab p o l i t i c a l unity, under Nasser o r anybody e l s e , would be i n t h e offing.
For the most
p a r t , Arab u n i t y has been a myth, but t h e r e has been a f a i r l y
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007
I
1
c o n s i s t e n t u n i t y amongst revolutionary Arab s t a t e s on t h e s u b j e c t of I s r a e l .
It should be remembered t h a t , i n t h e
aftermath of t h e June war, t h e Arab r a d i c a l s Algeria included
--
--
I r a q and
s t r o n g l y urged using Arab o i l a s a means
of pressuring t h e US t o change i t s p r o - I s r a e l i p o l i c i e s .
The
r e f u s a l of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya t o j o i n i n k i l l e d t h a t project.
Libya might not be s o r e l u c t a n t again.
Were
new revolutionary governments t o appear i n Kuwait and SauCi Arabia, t h i s could mean very d i f f i c u l t times f o r American o i l companies throughout t h e Arab world.
I n any event, t h e Libyan
coup represents one more s t e p i n a process of p o l a r i z a t i o n i n t h e Middle East, which could s e e t h e Arabs a l l aligned on one s i d e , confronting t h e US a s w e l l a s I s r a e l on t h e other.
