Monopoly • A monopoly market has a single seller • Monopoly Pricing • Monopolist chooses the price that maximizes its profit, given the demand for its product • The price and quantity occur at marginal revenue intersect marginal cost ܴܯൌ ܥܯ • monopolist’s marginal revenue less than price ߲ܲ ܴܯൌ ܲ ܳ ܳ ߲ܳ 2
Finding Profit‐Maximizing Sales Quantity for a Monopoly • Step 1: Quantity Rule – Identify positive sales quantities at which – If more than one, find one with highest profit
• Step 2: Shut‐Down Rule – Check whether the quantity from Step 1 yields higher profit than shutting down
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Monopoly Profit Maximization
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Welfare Effects of Monopoly Pricing
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Monopoly Pricing Strategies • Price Discrimination: Pricing to Extract Surplus • A price discriminating monopolist charges different prices for different units of the good
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Perfect Price Discrimination • Each consumer is charged a different price for each unit given by his willingness to pay • Marginal revenue curve coincides with the market demand curve • Profit‐maximizing sales quantity occurs where the market demand curve crosses the marginal cost curve • Monopolist produces the same quantity as would occur in a competitive industry • No deadweight loss 7
Perfect Price Discrimination Sales Quantity
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Two‐Part Tariffs • Quantity‐dependent pricing plan to maximize profit • Consumers pay a fixed fee plus a separate per‐ unit price for each unit they buy – Examples: amusement parks, rental car companies
• Advantage is simplicity: name just two prices • To maximize profit, set per‐unit charge equal to marginal cost 9
Two‐Part Tariffs
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Profit‐Maximizing Price to Two Groups of Consumers
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Price Discrimination Based on Self‐ Selection • Often firms cannot distinguish between groups of consumers based on observable characteristics • Price discrimination may still be possible • Offer a menu of alternatives
– If properly designed, customers with different willingness to pay will choose different alternatives
• A common practice
– Examples: supermarket discounts for shoppers who clip coupons, wireless phone companies with multiple calling plans 12
Quantity‐Dependent Pricing and Self‐ Selection • A two‐part tariff is not feasible if consumers’ characteristics are not directly observable • If given the choice between two plans with the same per‐minute price, all consumers will opt for the low‐demand (low fixed fee) plan – Consumers will not self‐select based on willingness to pay
• The monopolist can often do better by raising the per‐unit charge above its marginal cost • Can do even better by offering a menu of different two‐part tariffs 13
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Clearvoice Wireless Example • Wireless telephone monopolist in a rural area • Two types of consumers: high and low demand – Distinct monthly demand for each group
• Clearvoice’s marginal cost is 10 cents • If could observe consumer characteristics, would offer two‐part tariff with 10‐cent per‐ minute price – Fixed fee for low‐demand customers: $8 – Fixed fee for high‐demand customers: $40.50 15
Profit‐Maximizing Two‐Part Tariff • Clearvoice wants to offer a single two‐part tariff • Per‐minute price of $0.10 and monthly fee of $8 – All consumer accept
• Which plan is better? – With many low‐demand customers, $8 fee is better
• May be even more profitable to raise per‐minute fee above marginal cost 16
Profit‐Maximizing Two‐Part Tariff • For a monopolist selling to both types of consumers it is profitable to raise the per‐unit price at least a little above marginal cost – Regardless of the types’ relative proportions
• Extract some of high‐demand consumers’ surplus without changing surplus of low‐demand consumer (already zero)
– Raise per‐unit price to get more surplus from high‐demand consumers – Adjust fixed fee so low‐demand consumers’ surplus is unchanged
• The smaller the faction of low‐demand consumer, the more worthwhile it is to raise the per‐unit price 17
Benefits of Raising the Per‐Minute Charge
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Benefits of Raising the Per‐Minute Charge Assume 400 low demand consumers and 100 high demand consumers. Per‐Minute price $0.10 (=MC)