Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Lee, Kwang Seok Political, Economic, Nonproliferation and Operational Considerations
Background Many MNA proposals for the front-end, but few for the back-end fuel cycle No past proposals have been realized
Regional Fuel Cycle Center (RFCC) of IAEA
For a proposal to be successfully realized, Integrated approach needed considering many
factors in political, economic, nonproliferation and operational perspectives before making the proposal
Political drive alone can not make the case. 1
Why few proposal and no realization Lack of Urgent and Common Needs
Have's : Already have a national program (different spent fuel management policies)
Newcomers : No problem right now (just anticipated problem)
Making all proposals for the others Concerns for forgoing of PUNE rights
In-Between Countries : Looking for internal solutions first
Lack of Economic/Commercial Incentives Lack of Mutual Confidence
Consequences in case of breaking the arrangement
Difficulties to Find Sites for SNF/Waste Facilities
2
Political Consideration Requirements for Participation
No discrimination between have’s and have-not’s
Motivation for Participants and/or Investors
Host country Customer country Supplier country
Composition of Participants
Common political, cultural, economic ties ? Mutual confidence ?
3
Economic Consideration Good Prospects for Economic, Financial and Commercial Viability
Example : URENCO, EURODIF
Consistency with Global Market
No interference of existing market
Creating a New Market
SNF storage
4
Nonproliferation Consideration Reliable and Foreseeable Nonproliferation Benefits
Less needs for sensitive technologies and facilities International control of nuclear materials including SNF Guaranteed transparencies of relevant facilities
Conditions for Nonproliferation Purposes
Conclusion of an intergovernmental agreement IAEA CSA and Additional Protocol, Export control commitments Black Box approach Forgoing of sensitive facilities ? Extra-territorial setting ?
Complimentary Measures for Nuclear Security
Higher security risk due to the increase of international SNF transportation
5
Operational Consideration Organizational Structure and Working Mechanism
Two-tier structure : intergovernmental and operating enterprise Role of international organizations such as IAEA
Practical Difficulties
Require difficult decisions on membership, financing, voting arrangements, condition of access, dispute settlement, etc.
Technical Uncertainties
SNF transportation routes ?
Additional Complications or Risks due to Multinational Features
6
Suggestions Need for Workable Proposals
Easier one first
Needs for New Technologies
To solve long-term SNF management issues
Lessons from Current International RD&D Efforts
GIF, ITER, OECD/NEA Joint Studies
Role of the ROK
Unique status in the global nuclear community Urgent needs for spent fuel management
Multilateral Joint R&D for New Fuel Cycle Technology 7