Nezworski, Jill - HPAI - Midwest Poultry Federation
HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA
PERHAPS
COMPARE AND CONTRAST
What went well. ¢
¢ ¢
¢ ¢
¢
Detection of mortality early Diagnosis in a day Depopulation of live birds Secure disposal Decontamination of “clean” sites DVMs in leadership roles with a network of communication
…and not so well ¢
¢ ¢
¢ ¢
¢
Detection of mortality too late Delayed diagnosis Removing dead from cages Insecure disposal Decontaminating contaminated sites No DVMs influencing the top of the company
DETECTION - FINDING THE DISEASE
OVERCOMING INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE ¢
Many farms were detected basis of increasing mortality
¢
1/3 of cases were detected based on surveillance to obtain movement permits
There was not enough active surveillance The early “popping” of cases made it hard to identify where to do active surveillance Laboratory capacity was already exceeded
DIAGNOSIS ¢
Sensitizing people on what to look for Educating and empowering hourly staff Having a clear chain of command Expecting a few ‘false alarms’ Creating a culture where it is OK to be wrong/over cautious
¢
Long driving distances delayed diagnosis Mailing samples was used in some states Couriers were set up in some instances.
SURVEILLANCE/DIAGNOSIS With any catastrophic event, denial is a common first reaction. With HPAI we need to change to a stance of assuming the worst ¢ Misinformation on best ways to sample ¢
Pointless to sample live/normal birds Early on, need to sample a high percentage of the mortality Sample ALL the dead?
¢
The trick was to figure out what the clinical disease looked like AEAP (as early as possible) What do lab studies tell you? Call up the first case, find out!
CLINICAL PICTURE Can simmer for for a while before mortality starts to accelerate
NEUROLOGIC SIGNS
DEPOPULATION The solution and the problem
DEPOPULATION PRIORITIZATION BASED RISK?
ON
As the disease progresses through a farm the environmental contamination grows ¢ Promoting spread ¢ Are there instances where farm depopulation should be prioritized to reduce the risk of spread ¢
Large farms Small farms close to big farms Areas of high poultry density etc
DELAYED DEPOPULATION AND/OR DETECTION LED TO EXTREME ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION
500 X MORE VIRUS ON FARMS EXPERIENCING HIGH MORTALITY
DEPOPULATION AND DECONTAMINATION ACTIVITIES LED TO SPREAD Dozens of extra people were on the farms ¢ It is hard to clean up everyone PERFECTLY every time ¢
Especially when they are working hard and thoroughly getting dusty and dirty – fingernail to nose to shoe Outside contractors seemed to cross the clean/dirty line many times per day as opposed to farm employees which would do it only twice per day.
WHEN
COVERALLS ARE REMOVED, THE PROBLEM MAY NOT GO AWAY.
We overwhelmed the human carrying capacity of the region.
DECONTAMINATION Minimize people and equipment crossing the clean/dirty line ¢ Acknowledge the limitations of washing vehicles ¢
Cold weather Poor drainage Mud Inadequate supervision
OUTSIDE THE PBA BUT STILL LIKELY ACCUMULATING VIRAL CONTAMINATION
A TRUE TALE OF HOW WE OVERCAME DETECTION, DIAGNOSIS, DEPOPULATION, DISPOSAL AND DECONTAMINATION ISSUES.
COULD WE STOP THE EPIDEMIC BY FINDING GENERATION 1 AND ELIMINATING THEM?
PREPARATION ¢
Empower people to look and act Daily education on evolving clinical signs in turkeys Continue to reinforce the message
¢
Team meetings every morning ¢ What's going on? Status update ¢ How to act ¢ Brief trainings
Adequately staff mid management positions with competent, responsible people Not enough to just say “do it”. Need to say why it is important
ONCE FOUND, WHAT HAPPENED? Farm staff reporting usual mortality by 8am ¢ Area depopulation started ¢ Samples to lab by 10am ¢ In house depopulation of that barn started as soon as positive results reported from state lab. Did not wait for NVSL confirmation ¢ Depopulation completed within 24 hrs ¢
TAKES A WHILE TO TAKE OFF IN A LAYER FACILITY
COMPARISON – VALUE OF EARLY DETECTION Site #2 found via mortality (700) surveillance
Site #1 found via
Could not stay ahead of it
Could have stayed ahead of it
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION AND REPOPULATION TIMELINESS Scenario 1 ¢ Depop started day 1
Scenario 2 ¢ Depop started day 5
23 days depop 43 days to clean 2 days to disinfect 21 days quite time
24 days depop 63 days to clean 18 days to disinfect 21 days quite time
89 days out of business ¢ Also refilled quicker because pullet farms stayed negative ¢
126 days out of business ¢ Longer to refill because pullet farms were also infected ¢
ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES ¢
Site #1 - 39 days post initial positive
¢
0 of 43 samples were PCR positive
Site #2 - 37 days post initial positive
31 of 31 samples were PCR positive
WHERE DO
WE GO FROM HERE
FEW FARMS HAD ¢
CATASTROPHE PLANS
The layer industry failed itself farms mandating its outside crew could not help others This delayed depopulation is areas
¢
Short term gain, but possible long term loss
No realistic plan to depopulate the birds on site No plans for secure carcass disposal
Primary plan ¢ Back up plan ¢
¢
Do you have a catastrophe plan now?
EFFICIENCY STILL TRUMPING BIOSECURITY ¢
Batching vs continuous flow will reduce site entries
¢
Vaccinating Monday and Thursday wk 1, Tuesday wk 2 (3 independent entries)
¢
Vs doing Monday, Tues, Wed. back-to-back-to-back (1 entry)
Appropriate staffing levels?
¢
Not many willing to do
Inside and outside employees eliminate the need to cross the barn door barrier.
New farm sizes. Bigger barns/farms are harder to depopulate in a timely manner.
NOT ADDRESSING BIG
RISKS
Structural vs operational biosecurity ¢ More talk about feed trucks than pullet or spent hen trucks ¢
¢
Stuff that actually goes in the barn
You should make it hard for the system to fail
And put less on the shoulders of a minimum wage employee
NEED
TO REDEFINE THE CLEAN/DIRTY
LINE ¢
All farms must have a clear clean/dirty line
DANISH
ENTRY
Clean side
Bench Dirty Side
ISSUES WITH SHOWERS Take more management than a Danish system ¢ Often designed without a clear clean/dirty line ¢ Lack of supplies ¢ Lack of hot water ¢ Employee conflicts ¢
Laundering of undergarments Sanitation Personal items
A WELL MANAGED DANISH SYSTEM IS AS GOOD AS SHOWERS
DON’T RELY
ON FOOT BATHS
All products require more contact time than is realistic ¢ Do not work in the presence of manure on the shoe ¢
Key Findings • Need absolutely clean boots • Boots actually need to soak for a period of time – NOT INSTANTANEOUS STERILIZATION
PERCEIVED
IMMUNITY:
BIGGEST
RISK OF ALL
I’ve passed an audit ¢ I’m too far away from cases to worry ¢ I have showers ¢ I have/use a truck wash ¢ My farm is not like the ones that were hit ¢
HOW TO GET ‘STUFF’ INTO THE FARM Disinfect and downtime area ¢ Hot room ¢ Load the area ‘dirty’ ¢ Treat ¢ Unload the area ‘clean’ ¢
PROTECTION HAS TO BE MEASURED ¢
Utilize tools like Glow Germ to evaluate compliance
¢
Clean/dirty line
iAuditor is an app that can be set up to help monitor processes Showers Entry room Employee satisfaction with the process
GLOW GERM A powder product that if applied lightly is invisible to the eye ¢ Only visible with UV light ¢ Track on feet and hands just as infectious agents would ¢ Useful tool to assess compliance at the clean dirty line ¢
THE CLEAN/DIRTY
LINE
GLOW GERM APPLIED
HEAVILY
FLUORESCING UNDER UV LIGHT
ENLIST A THREE
YEAR OLD
Tracks all the way across the garage
PAPER
PLAN NOT REAL BIOSECURITY
Coolers ¢ Underpants ¢ Downtime ¢ Rules do not equal compliance ¢
Glow germ Using salmonella to assess C&D
You need a real audit and you need to be critical ¢ Bookshelf biosecurity ¢
COMMUNICATION Large farms should have a veterinarian reporting to top level of management ¢ Need to talk to each other ¢ Confidentiality is not compatible with conquering HPAI ¢
PERHAPS
COMPARE AND CONTRAST
What went well. ¢
¢ ¢
¢ ¢
¢
Detection of mortality early Diagnosis in a day Depopulation of live birds Secure disposal Decontamination of “clean” sites DVMs in leadership roles with a network of communication
…and not so well ¢
¢ ¢
¢ ¢
¢
Detection of mortality too late Delayed diagnosis Removing dead from cages Insecure disposal Decontaminating contaminated sites No DVMs influencing the top of the company
DETECTION - FINDING THE DISEASE
OVERCOMING INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE ¢
Many farms were detected basis of increasing mortality
¢
1/3 of cases were detected based on surveillance to obtain movement permits
There was not enough active surveillance The early “popping” of cases made it hard to identify where to do active surveillance Laboratory capacity was already exceeded
DIAGNOSIS ¢
Sensitizing people on what to look for Educating and empowering hourly staff Having a clear chain of command Expecting a few ‘false alarms’ Creating a culture where it is OK to be wrong/over cautious
¢
Long driving distances delayed diagnosis Mailing samples was used in some states Couriers were set up in some instances.
SURVEILLANCE/DIAGNOSIS With any catastrophic event, denial is a common first reaction. With HPAI we need to change to a stance of assuming the worst ¢ Misinformation on best ways to sample ¢
Pointless to sample live/normal birds Early on, need to sample a high percentage of the mortality Sample ALL the dead?
¢
The trick was to figure out what the clinical disease looked like AEAP (as early as possible) What do lab studies tell you? Call up the first case, find out!
CLINICAL PICTURE Can simmer for for a while before mortality starts to accelerate
NEUROLOGIC SIGNS
DEPOPULATION The solution and the problem
DEPOPULATION PRIORITIZATION BASED RISK?
ON
As the disease progresses through a farm the environmental contamination grows ¢ Promoting spread ¢ Are there instances where farm depopulation should be prioritized to reduce the risk of spread ¢
Large farms Small farms close to big farms Areas of high poultry density etc
DELAYED DEPOPULATION AND/OR DETECTION LED TO EXTREME ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION
500 X MORE VIRUS ON FARMS EXPERIENCING HIGH MORTALITY
DEPOPULATION AND DECONTAMINATION ACTIVITIES LED TO SPREAD Dozens of extra people were on the farms ¢ It is hard to clean up everyone PERFECTLY every time ¢
Especially when they are working hard and thoroughly getting dusty and dirty – fingernail to nose to shoe Outside contractors seemed to cross the clean/dirty line many times per day as opposed to farm employees which would do it only twice per day.
WHEN
COVERALLS ARE REMOVED, THE PROBLEM MAY NOT GO AWAY.
We overwhelmed the human carrying capacity of the region.
DECONTAMINATION Minimize people and equipment crossing the clean/dirty line ¢ Acknowledge the limitations of washing vehicles ¢
Cold weather Poor drainage Mud Inadequate supervision
OUTSIDE THE PBA BUT STILL LIKELY ACCUMULATING VIRAL CONTAMINATION
A TRUE TALE OF HOW WE OVERCAME DETECTION, DIAGNOSIS, DEPOPULATION, DISPOSAL AND DECONTAMINATION ISSUES.
COULD WE STOP THE EPIDEMIC BY FINDING GENERATION 1 AND ELIMINATING THEM?
PREPARATION ¢
Empower people to look and act Daily education on evolving clinical signs in turkeys Continue to reinforce the message
¢
Team meetings every morning ¢ What's going on? Status update ¢ How to act ¢ Brief trainings
Adequately staff mid management positions with competent, responsible people Not enough to just say “do it”. Need to say why it is important
ONCE FOUND, WHAT HAPPENED? Farm staff reporting usual mortality by 8am ¢ Area depopulation started ¢ Samples to lab by 10am ¢ In house depopulation of that barn started as soon as positive results reported from state lab. Did not wait for NVSL confirmation ¢ Depopulation completed within 24 hrs ¢
TAKES A WHILE TO TAKE OFF IN A LAYER FACILITY
COMPARISON – VALUE OF EARLY DETECTION Site #2 found via mortality (700) surveillance
Site #1 found via
Could not stay ahead of it
Could have stayed ahead of it
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION AND REPOPULATION TIMELINESS Scenario 1 ¢ Depop started day 1
Scenario 2 ¢ Depop started day 5
23 days depop 43 days to clean 2 days to disinfect 21 days quite time
24 days depop 63 days to clean 18 days to disinfect 21 days quite time
89 days out of business ¢ Also refilled quicker because pullet farms stayed negative ¢
126 days out of business ¢ Longer to refill because pullet farms were also infected ¢
ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES ¢
Site #1 - 39 days post initial positive
¢
0 of 43 samples were PCR positive
Site #2 - 37 days post initial positive
31 of 31 samples were PCR positive
WHERE DO
WE GO FROM HERE
FEW FARMS HAD ¢
CATASTROPHE PLANS
The layer industry failed itself farms mandating its outside crew could not help others This delayed depopulation is areas
¢
Short term gain, but possible long term loss
No realistic plan to depopulate the birds on site No plans for secure carcass disposal
Primary plan ¢ Back up plan ¢
¢
Do you have a catastrophe plan now?
EFFICIENCY STILL TRUMPING BIOSECURITY ¢
Batching vs continuous flow will reduce site entries
¢
Vaccinating Monday and Thursday wk 1, Tuesday wk 2 (3 independent entries)
¢
Vs doing Monday, Tues, Wed. back-to-back-to-back (1 entry)
Appropriate staffing levels?
¢
Not many willing to do
Inside and outside employees eliminate the need to cross the barn door barrier.
New farm sizes. Bigger barns/farms are harder to depopulate in a timely manner.
NOT ADDRESSING BIG
RISKS
Structural vs operational biosecurity ¢ More talk about feed trucks than pullet or spent hen trucks ¢
¢
Stuff that actually goes in the barn
You should make it hard for the system to fail
And put less on the shoulders of a minimum wage employee
NEED
TO REDEFINE THE CLEAN/DIRTY
LINE ¢
All farms must have a clear clean/dirty line
DANISH
ENTRY
Clean side
Bench Dirty Side
ISSUES WITH SHOWERS Take more management than a Danish system ¢ Often designed without a clear clean/dirty line ¢ Lack of supplies ¢ Lack of hot water ¢ Employee conflicts ¢
Laundering of undergarments Sanitation Personal items
A WELL MANAGED DANISH SYSTEM IS AS GOOD AS SHOWERS
DON’T RELY
ON FOOT BATHS
All products require more contact time than is realistic ¢ Do not work in the presence of manure on the shoe ¢
Key Findings • Need absolutely clean boots • Boots actually need to soak for a period of time – NOT INSTANTANEOUS STERILIZATION
PERCEIVED
IMMUNITY:
BIGGEST
RISK OF ALL
I’ve passed an audit ¢ I’m too far away from cases to worry ¢ I have showers ¢ I have/use a truck wash ¢ My farm is not like the ones that were hit ¢
HOW TO GET ‘STUFF’ INTO THE FARM Disinfect and downtime area ¢ Hot room ¢ Load the area ‘dirty’ ¢ Treat ¢ Unload the area ‘clean’ ¢
PROTECTION HAS TO BE MEASURED ¢
Utilize tools like Glow Germ to evaluate compliance
¢
Clean/dirty line
iAuditor is an app that can be set up to help monitor processes Showers Entry room Employee satisfaction with the process
GLOW GERM A powder product that if applied lightly is invisible to the eye ¢ Only visible with UV light ¢ Track on feet and hands just as infectious agents would ¢ Useful tool to assess compliance at the clean dirty line ¢
THE CLEAN/DIRTY
LINE
GLOW GERM APPLIED
HEAVILY
FLUORESCING UNDER UV LIGHT
ENLIST A THREE
YEAR OLD
Tracks all the way across the garage
PAPER
PLAN NOT REAL BIOSECURITY
Coolers ¢ Underpants ¢ Downtime ¢ Rules do not equal compliance ¢
Glow germ Using salmonella to assess C&D
You need a real audit and you need to be critical ¢ Bookshelf biosecurity ¢
COMMUNICATION Large farms should have a veterinarian reporting to top level of management ¢ Need to talk to each other ¢ Confidentiality is not compatible with conquering HPAI ¢
