SOUTH ASIA MONITOR Number 88
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November 3, 2005
Pakistan and Israel: An Emerging Détente An unexpected series of high-level Pakistani overtures to Israel in September shone a sudden spotlight on a relationship that was practically nonexistent until then. The Pakistani move was timed to follow Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, but it was built on years of cautious low-level contacts. We do not foresee Israel and Pakistan taking further action anytime soon, but Pakistan is undoubtedly hoping that its bold gesture will impress its friends in Washington, D.C. A bold stroke: Israeli foreign minister Silvan Shalom’s meeting with Pakistani external affairs minister Khursheed Kasuri in Istanbul in early September was followed by Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf’s address to the American Jewish Congress on the sidelines of the United Nations World Summit in mid-September and a symbolic handshake with Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon a couple of days later. The move took many seasoned South Asia observers by surprise, since Pakistan has never officially recognized Israel and the two countries conduct almost no bilateral trade. The Israeli government hopes that Pakistan’s decision to soften its historically hard-line approach toward Israel will inspire other Muslim countries to follow suit. Pakistan’s motives are less clear. Some have suggested that Pakistan’s move is aimed at countering India’s growing strategic and military relationship with Israel. Others argue that Pakistan is appealing to the powerful American Jewish lobby in order to improve its image in the United States. The answer may include both of these elements as well as other strategic considerations. From Istanbul to New York: Even though the Istanbul meeting reportedly yielded little in the way of substantive policy agreements, its symbolic significance can hardly be overstated. Shortly thereafter, while in New York, Musharraf took the opportunity to speak to the American Jewish Congress, one of the oldest American Jewish organizations and one devoted to the promotion of inter-faith harmony. In that speech, a first for an Islamic head of state, Musharraf made a point of praising Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and emphasizing the bonds between Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. The landmark speech came just three days after President Musharraf shook hands with Prime Minister Sharon at the United Nations World Summit in New York in what the Pakistani press described as a planned chance encounter. Musharraf later declared at a press conference that “Israel is a reality.” Such statements suggest to some that Pakistan may be on the verge of officially recognizing Israel, but while the Israeli press has welcomed this speculation, Musharraf has indicated that such hopes are premature.
A slow and careful approach: President Musharraf is not the first Pakistani leader to cautiously approach Israel. Previous Pakistani leaders, especially Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, certainly thought of reexamining Pakistan’s policy toward Israel. Pakistani diplomats had discreetly contacted representatives from Tel Aviv behind closed doors for some time. There were even reports of Pakistan funneling arms from Israel to the Mujahideen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Musharraf will undoubtedly move forward very slowly. Pakistani politicians are not enthusiastic about any association with Israel, although many of them understand that the country is here to stay and that Musharraf’s contact with it is a recognition of reality. The Islamic parties criticized his move, calling it un-Islamic. Public opinion polls conducted by the Pew organization have found that only 5 percent of Pakistanis have a “very” or “somewhat” favorable opinion of Jews in general. And among Pakistanis who believe some religions to be more violent than others, a majority—51 percent—consider Judaism the most violent of religions. Almost 80 percent of Pakistanis sympathize with the Palestinian side in the conflict with Israel, and 57 percent of Pakistanis do not think there is a way for the Israeli state and Palestinian rights to coexist. Given these circumstances, Musharraf is naturally playing down any hints that Pakistan is about to recognize Israel formally. These early overtures, while certainly significant, have been limited. Pakistan continues to predicate official recognition of Israel and opening of bilateral trade on the creation of a Palestinian state. But as Israel improves its relations with the Arab and Muslim states, Musharraf wants Pakistan to be included in the process. At the same time, he is not prepared to move forward quickly and be seen as overly eager to normalize relations. Israel, however, is decidedly eager to make progress with Pakistan. Israel has full diplomatic relations with only four Muslimmajority states—Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and Mauritania. Morocco began normalizing relations with Israel in the 1990s, but their relationship cooled as the Israeli-Palestinian peace process deteriorated and violence there escalated in 2000. Recently, Israel has pressed for more and better relations with Muslim and Arab states, and dialogues have begun between Israel and Central Asian countries such as Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
South Asia Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3171 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org
Why now? Impact of India-Israel ties: Pakistani government spokesmen explained that the move was a response to Israel’s decision to leave Gaza, an action that in Pakistan’s view improves the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be created. It was also influenced, however, by the cumulative effect of 12 years of expanding Israel-India ties, following India’s decision to normalize relations with Israel in 1992. India had voted against the creation of Israel at the United Nations. Though it had contact with the state of Israel from the start and permitted an Israeli consul to operate in Mumbai and later in Delhi, India kept its distance from Israel and enthusiastically supported the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), even going so far as voting for a UN resolution declaring Zionism to be a form of racism.
Winning support in the United States: The other strategic consideration in the Pakistani move to engage with Israel, albeit slowly, is the desire to consolidate relations with the United States. The events of 9/11 made Pakistan a crucial ally in the war on terror; with that has come a windfall of economic and military assistance for Musharraf’s government. But Pakistani policymakers are also aware that many in Washington are concerned about the deep-rooted antiAmericanism in Pakistan’s society and the reach of Islamic terrorists. Two years after the Iraq War began, anger toward the United States pervades Pakistani society. A Pew Research Center poll in 2004 found that 65 percent of Pakistanis polled supported the actions of Osama bin Laden, and over 66 percent felt that America was overreacting to the terrorist threat.
The establishment of formal Indo-Israeli diplomatic relations dramatically changed the policy environment, as their relationship quickly became a strategic one. Both countries considered radical Islamic terrorists threatening. Not surprisingly, security concerns form the foundation of the India-Israel relationship. Israel is India’s second-largest external military supplier after Russia. Israel’s support and training of Indian counterinsurgency forces and its supplies of sophisticated equipment, such as sensors and night vision technology, are integral to the defense of the India-Pakistan border and line of control.
Musharraf’s overture is aimed at improving Pakistan’s image in the United States. He hopes to impress on the U.S. government that his administration is willing to take a risk on behalf of Israel, a U.S. ally. This in turn, he hopes, might neutralize the negative image of Pakistan held by the powerful Jewish-American lobby and perhaps strengthen Pakistan’s position with conservative foreign policy hawks in Washington. Interestingly, these developments are taking place at a time when New Delhi is under pressure from Washington and Tel Aviv to scale back its ties with the hardline regime in Tehran. Some have suggested that this is perhaps the perfect opportunity for Pakistan to counter the India-Israel relationship by taking a more moderate and “enlightened” stand toward Tel Aviv. Pakistan has thus far not faced the same U.S. pressure on Iran, though that could change.
An important ally: President George W. Bush and President Pervez Musharraf in the Oval Office. Photo credit: U.S. Department of State.
For years, Pakistani politicians and intelligence officers have raised fears of an Israeli-Indian combined threat to the country’s security. This thinking was particularly prominent in the period immediately after the Indian nuclear test in 1998 and in 2004 following the Indian Air Force’s purchase from Israel of three advanced Phalcon early warning surveillance planes worth $1.1 billion. At that time, General Shaukat Sultan, director general of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations, commented that “the arrival of such a sophisticated system in our neighborhood… [will] whip a new arms race in the region.” Pakistan’s new contacts with Israel are unlikely to change Israel’s already well-established relationship with India. By moving ahead now, however, the Pakistani government may give Israel second thoughts about deepening the Indo-Israeli military and security relationship, in light of the opportunity to expand Israel’s diplomatic profile in the Muslim world.
Muted opposition: Musharraf’s overture to Israel has provoked some sharp reactions from Islamist parties in Pakistan and from Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups in Palestine, but the response has not been as widespread as many had anticipated. The Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), an alliance of Islamic parties in Pakistan, was the domestic political opposition group most critical of the move. The leadership of the MMA claimed that the Kasuri-Shalom meeting “went against Pakistan’s national interest as well as state policy.” Members of the alliance walked out of parliament in protest and have tried to stir up popular opposition, so far without much success. The most vocal protest, led by MMA president Qazi Hussain Ahmed in Peshawar in the North West Frontier Province, involved only 200 people, who carried banners and chanted slogans denouncing Musharraf and Pakistan’s support for U.S. policies. So far, the muted reaction of the opposition parties and silence of ordinary Pakistanis bodes well for Musharraf’s policy. The United States and China have publicly expressed pleasure at the turn Pakistan-Israel relations have taken. China has historically had a close relationship with Pakistan, and in recent years, the Asian giant has also grown closer to Israel, as their massive military transactions illustrate. Reactions from Arab states have been more cautious, but the Pakistani government says that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority both gave their approval before the initial meetings occurred. Soon after Musharraf and Sharon shook hands,
South Asia Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3171 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org
Afghan president Hamid Karzai expressed his desire to meet with Sharon. The road ahead: Israel is hoping that Pakistan’s gestures will convince other Muslim states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Bangladesh to follow suit. But Pakistan is in no hurry to follow up on these initial moves, especially in the context of the increasing violence in the Middle East. The Pakistani government will find it extremely hard to move toward official recognition of Israel (or any major conciliatory gesture) without concrete signs of a solution to the Palestinian problem.
— Bethany Tindall & Pramit Mitra South Asia Monitor is published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, taxexempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific public policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2005 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
South Asia Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3171 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org