That There is Moral Obligation

“The light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light.” - St. Thomas Aquinas, S.T. I-II.91.2 “It is on faith in God, preserved pure and stainless, that man’s morality is based. All efforts to remove from under morality and the moral order the granite foundation of faith and to substitute for it the shifting sands of human regulations, sooner or later lead these individuals or societies to moral degradation. The fool who has said in his heart “there is no God” goes straight to moral corruption (Psalms XIV. 1), and the number of these fools who today are out to sever morality from religion, is legion... To hand over the moral law to man’s subjective opinion, which changes with the times, instead of anchoring it in the holy will of the eternal God and His commandments, is to open wide every door to the forces of destruction.” – Pope Pius XI, Mit Brennender Sorge

THE MORAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD Chapter 1:

What is a Moral Argument for the Existence of God? I. Goal of this course: The goal of this course is to familiarize the student with the moral argument for the existence of God. II. What is a moral argument for the existence of God? Most arguments for the existence of God move from effect to cause. That is, we see certain effects in the world and then infer from that some sort of cause behind those effects that must have some of the characteristics commonly attributed to God. This is the most promising way of knowing God’s existence and the reason why is because God, as traditionally conceived, is not a material object. You cannot go out and literally see God with your eyes. God is a spirit, an immaterial person. So, in order to know that God exists through reason, we infer God’s existence by reasoning from His effects back to Him as the only adequate cause of those effects.

So, in order to know that God exists through reason, we infer God’s existence by reasoning from His effects back to Him as the only adequate cause of those effects.

III. Now, in the moral argument, the effect we are starting with is the existence of morality itself. One of the most obvious facts of human experience is that there seems to be a real right and wrong. As human beings we make moral judgments. Our conscience tells us that we are obligated to do good things, like respect the rights of others, and we are prohibited from doing evil things, like rape, child torture, and things of this sort. These evil things ought not to be done. IV. Not only do we think these judgments are true, but we also think they are very important. People will “fight for their rights”. Many will even sacrifice their lives for what they think is morally right or punish others for doing what is morally wrong. V. That’s not to say we don’t have moral disagreements, or course we do. But, even though we disagree on some particulars, still most of us agree with the overall idea that some things are morally right and other things are morally wrong. VI. Both atheists and theists recognize this. Many atheists share this awareness. Many atheists are good people, kind, and considerate. They would agree that there is a moral law of right and wrong that is obligatory on all people. VII. But now, ask yourself, where does this moral law come from? On what basis are these moral judgments made? Who or what determines this? If we are correct in distinguishing right and wrong, what is it that justifies these claims? 3

This common moral intuition that we are speaking of is an experience of a constraining power, a sanction that says one must do good and avoid evil. This data demands an explanation and the moral argument aims to show that God is the best explanation for this.

VIII. The point of the moral argument is that God, an all good authoritative lawgiver, is the best explanation for the moral law. So, here in this course we are going to explore the “theistic implications” of moral realism (the idea that morality is an objective fact about the world). IX. Now, the data here is unique in that although it is within us, it points to something outside and beyond us. This common moral intuition that we are speaking of is an experience of a constraining power, a sanction that says one must do good and avoid evil. This data demands an explanation and the moral argument aims to show that God is the best explanation for this. X. So, our goal here is to show that morality must have metaphysical foundations. The world has to be a certain way if there is true morality. If one rejects those metaphysical foundations they pull the rug out from underneath morality too. One cannot help themselves to morality if they presuppose a worldview that is at odds with it. XI. This recognition is actually nothing new. The ancient Greek philosopher Plato realized that morality must presuppose certain metaphysical foundations. If we are going to rationally justify morality we need to have an objective standard that we are obligated to follow. XII. The Merits of the Moral Argument – The moral argument has certain advantages to it that other arguments for the existence of God do not have. A. The Moral Argument is Practical - The data is an immediate and unavoidable concern to virtually everyone. The relevance here to all in our everyday lives is immediately apparent. You can get through the day without thinking about the existence or design of the universe, but you can’t though the day without making moral decisions. B. The Moral Argument is “Easier” – Another advantage of this argument is that it is easier to understand in the sense that it is less abstract. The argument is based on an awareness that is most near to us and known by virtually everyone, not from data known only to scientists and philosophers. God is very close to us in our conscience. C. The Moral Argument is Very Relevant – this is a corollary from the first point. Most people don’t sit around and debate about the existence of God per se, but they do debate about morality. And the inherent problem with contemporary moral debates is that often there is no common ground in place for answering fundamental questions. People who have adopted secularism operate on an entirely different set of moral principles. This

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is why having a successful moral debate is virtually impossible. What justifies human value? Where do human rights come from? What makes something right or wrong in the first place? An agreement is very difficult to reach when there is no common moral foundation here. The moral argument may be useful in helping establish that common ground or at least laying bare the root cause of disagreement. XIII. Brief Historical Overview: The moral argument has not been given the prominence it deserves, but it does have a pedigree in the history of philosophy. Different thinkers have expressed its points in different ways. A. In his book The Republic, the ancient Greek philosopher Plato argued that there needs to be a transcendent Good in order to account for morality. In fact, in another book of his, The Laws, Book X, Plato thinks it should be a criminal offense to deny the existence of God because the denial of this truth harms society. The denial of God’s existence leads to bad living and thus is a severe offense against the civil order.

Plato thinks it should be a criminal offense to deny the existence of God because the denial of this truth harms society. The denial of God’s existence leads to bad living and thus is a severe offense against the civil order.

B. The ancient Roman stoic philosopher, Cicero, in his work De Republica, also seemed to think God was needed to account for moral order. He writes: i. “True law is right reason conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil. Whether it enjoins or forbids, the good respect its injunctions, and the wicked treat them with indifference. This law cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is not liable either to derogation or abrogation. Neither the senate nor the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal law of justice. It needs no other expositor and interpreter than our own conscience. It is not one thing at Rome, and another at Athens; one thing today, and another to-morrow; but in all times and nations this universal law must forever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the sovereign master and emperor of all beings. God himself is its author, its promulgator, its enforcer. And he who does not obey it flies from himself, and does violence to the very nature of man. And by so doing he will endure the severest penalties even if he avoid the other evils which are usually accounted punishments.” De Republica III.XXII C. St. Augustine reasoned that God speaks to the conscience of every soul: 5

i. “Since by the hand of our Creator Truth has written upon our hearts that you shall not do to another what you do not wish to happen to you (Mt. 7, 12), this no one was permitted to ignore, even before the Law was given.... But lest men complain that there is something lacking for them, what they did not read in their hearts has been written on tablets. For it is not that they did not have something written, but that they did not want to read it. Rather, what they are forced to see in their consciences is set before their eyes. . .. For you may judge that there is evil in that which you do not wish to suffer, and an inner law, written in your heart itself, forces you to know this.” - St. Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos 57, 1, PL 36. St. Thomas Aquinas wrote that our “conscience binds only in virtue of a divine command, either in written law or in the law inherent in our nature.”

D. St. Thomas Aquinas wrote that our “conscience binds only in virtue of a divine command, either in written law or in the law inherent in our nature.”1 i. Later prominent thinkers have more explicitly developed the moral argument from Aquinas’ writings as well, such as Garrigou Lagrange and Jacques Maritain. ii. “We maintain that the existence of God can be proved from the fact of moral obligation known by conscience. Let us note, first of all, that proofs of God’s existence can begin with any fact, whether in the sense order, or in the intellectual and moral order… On a superior cause depends whatever is moved or begins to cause, or is contingent, or is imperfect, or is ordained to another. Now practical reason begins with the first principle, i.e., good is to be done, evil is to be avoided, and then begins to regulate our activity by this principle. Further, it is contingent and imperfect, and is related to the truth as the will is to the good. Hence our practical reason, in knowing and commanding good, commands by virtue of a supreme cause, namely, God the Legislator.2 iii. “It is not possible to rationally to justify fundamental moral notions such as the notion of unconditional moral obligation, or inalienable right, or the intrinsic dignity of the human person, without rising to the uncreated Reason from which man and the world proceed and which is the subsistent Good itself. Philosophical reflection on moral life and experience has thus its own proofs for the existence of God.”3 1 De Veritate 17.5 2 Garrigou Lagrange, Beatitude, tr. Patrick Cummings O.S.B. (St. Louis: Herder Book Co. 1956) p. 291-2 3 Jacques Maritain Approaches to God tr. Peter O’Reilly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954) p. 92

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E. The 18th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant argued that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul were necessary presuppositions for morality. F. The 19th century cardinal John Henry Newman is well known for his version of the argument from conscience: i. “[Man] has within his breast a certain commanding dictate, not a mere sentiment, not a mere opinion, or impression, or view of things, but a law, an authoritative voice, bidding him do certain things and avoid others. I do not say that its particular injunctions are always clear, or that they are always consistent with each other; but what I am insisting on here is this, that it commands, that it praises, it blames, it promises, it threatens, it implies a future, and it witnesses the unseen. It is more than a man’s own self. The man himself has not power over it, or only with extreme difficulty; he did not make it, he cannot destroy it. He may silence it in particular cases or directions, he may distort its enunciations, but he cannot, or it is quite the exception if he can, he cannot emancipate himself from it. He can disobey it, he may refuse to use it; but it remains. This is Conscience; and, from the nature of the case, its very existence carries on our minds to a Being exterior to ourselves; for else whence did it come? and to a Being superior to ourselves; else whence its strange, troublesome peremptoriness? I say, without going on to the question what it says, and whether its particular dictates are always as clear and consistent as they might be, its very existence throws us out of ourselves, and beyond ourselves, to go and seek for Him in the height and depth, whose Voice it is. As the sunshine implies that the sun is in the heavens, though we may see it not, as a knocking at our doors at night implies the presence of one outside in the dark who asks for admittance, so this Word within us, not only instructs us up to a certain point, but necessarily raises our minds to the idea of a Teacher, an unseen Teacher.4

I say, without going on to the question what it says, and whether its particular dictates are always as clear and consistent as they might be, its very existence throws us out of ourselves, and beyond ourselves, to go and seek for Him in the height and depth, whose Voice it is.

XIV. C.S. Lewis defends a version of the moral argument in his book The Abolition of Man. XV. The moral argument has many modern day defenders as well.

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John Henry Cardinal Newman, Occasional Sermons: V, Dispositions for Faith

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XVI. Important Clarifications: Before we get in to the moral argument, we need to make a few important clarifications to avoid confusion. A. Clarification #1: The moral argument is not about belief in God but about the existence of God. i. The point here is not that one must believe in God in order to know what is good or to do good things. The moral argument has nothing to do with belief in God. There are plenty of people in the world who do good things but don’t believe in God. ii. Rather the moral argument is about the existence of God. The point is that if God does not exist then there cannot be any moral law at all. B. Clarification #2: The moral argument is not about moral knowledge but about how reality supports morality i. We are not talking about how we know right and wrong. We are talking about what the world must really be like if there is a right and wrong. ii. In other words, we are not focusing on moral epistemology but moral ontology. It’s not about how we know moral laws but what reality has to be like if there is any moral law at all. The point of the moral argument is that the common sense view of morality is incompatible with atheism.

iii. The point of the moral argument is that the common sense view of morality is incompatible with atheism. C. Clarification #3: We are doing philosophy, not theology. We are looking to see what reason can know about God apart from faith in divine revelation. We do not presuppose faith in the Christian religion (although that faith is compatible with what we will be saying here). D. The Theological Origins of Law and Order: The Derivation of Law From A Theistic Perspective i. God has revealed Himself in two ways: God’s general revelation to all and God’s particular revelation to a certain people at a certain time. God’s general revelation is open to all people and is accessible by human reason. In the moral order, this general revelation is known through conscience. XVII. Where is this moral law? This law in this sense (the natural law) doesn’t exist in a book but in the mind of God and in the consciousness of human beings. Physical laws are known by looking at the world, moral laws are known by looking at the dictates of our own conscience.

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XVIII. Chapter Summary A. The moral argument for the existence of God is an argument from effect to cause. We reason from the existence of a moral law back to God as the only adequate cause for this effect. B. Some of the merits of the moral argument are that it is very practical, relatively easier to understand, and is very relevant to modern moral debates. C. The moral argument has a historical pedigree that goes back to the ancient Greek and Roman philosophers. D. Three important clarifications about the moral argument i. The moral argument does not say one has to believe in God in order to do good things. The argument is not about belief in God but about the existence of God. ii. The moral argument is not focused on how we know morality (moral epistemology) but what the world must really be like in order for there to be true morality (moral ontology).

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iii. The moral argument is a philosophical argument that does not presuppose faith. The data of moral obligation is available to everyone through conscience. E. The moral law is known by examining our conscience.

Chapter 2:

Formulating the Moral Argument for the Existence of God “Morality either depends on God or it depends on the will and rationality of man. We either find it or invent it; it rests either on fact or on choice. ….without God there is no reason why we should not decide, some way or another, what is right and wrong, thus leaving ourselves with the huge difficulty of persuading others that they ought to do what we, or some of us, or most of us, have decided (for whatever good reason) they ought to do.” - John Rist, “On Inoculating Moral Philosophy Against God” Aquinas Lecture Series (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 2000) 94. I. The purpose of this section is to learn how to formulate the moral argument. I think we a case for the moral argument can go like this: One of the most obvious facts of human experience is that there seems to be a real right and wrong. As human beings we make moral judgments. Our conscience tells us that we are obligated to do good things, like respect the rights of others, and we are prohibited from doing evil things, like rape, child torture, and things of this sort. These evil things ought not to be done. Not only do we think these judgments are true, but we also think they are very important. People will “fight for their rights”. Many will even sacrifice their lives for what they think is morally right or punish others for doing what is morally wrong. Even though we disagree on some particulars, still most of us agree with the overall idea that some things are morally right and other things are morally wrong.

That’s not to say we don’t have moral disagreements, or course we do. But, even though we disagree on some particulars, still most of us agree with the overall idea that some things are morally right and other things are morally wrong. Both atheists and theists recognize this. Many atheists share this awareness. Many atheists are good people, kind, and considerate. They would agree that there is a moral law of right and wrong that is obligatory on all people. But now ask yourself, where does this moral law come from? On what basis are these moral judgments made? Who or what determines this?

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If we are correct in distinguishing right and wrong, what is it that justifies these claims? Although many atheists are good people and follow the moral law, nevertheless atheism cannot account for moral obligation. Let me give you an example of what I mean. Imagine for a second there is no God. Now, go back in time to the first man - just one man existing by himself. Is there any moral law in this world? He’s the only intelligent creature around! Any “morality” here is whatever he makes up! Now, suppose there are two cavemen and we have the first moral disagreement. Let’s say one caveman is a big bully and has beaten up a smaller caveman and stolen his property. The smaller cave man says, “Hey you can’t do that, that’s wrong!” The big caveman says, “Oh yeah, says who?” What is the little caveman to say? If he had friends, he might go get them to beat up the big caveman and get his stuff back. But the big caveman could have friends too! It doesn’t really matter who wins. Just because one side can beat up the other side that doesn’t make them morally right. The smaller caveman might appeal to “evolutionary ethics” and tell the big caveman he is not acting in a way that will benefit the species. But, the big caveman wants to know why he should help the species. Who made up that rule? I think it is clear in such a world that there is no real moral authority here. It’s just one moral opinion against another. No one is obligated to choose either side. We can give these cavemen a shower and a shave, give them a nice corporate job, exchange their clubs for briefcases, and their caves for nice suburban homes, but the moral situation stays the same. No matter how many more men you add in, no matter how much technology you add, still the moral situation does not change. There is no moral authority here. It’s just one moral opinion against the other. Oh yeah, says who? You see, without some all-good independent moral authority to break this standoff, there is no real morality, no true moral law because there is no moral obligation.

Without some all-good independent moral authority to break this standoff, there is no real morality, no true moral law because there is no moral obligation.

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In the world of the atheist there is no authoritative source over and above human opinion who has the authority (author’s rights) to bind us to do good and avoid evil. To paraphrase the great Russian writer Dostoyevsky: “If God does not exist, then all is permissible.” On atheism, choosing between right and wrong is like choosing to eat at Burger King or McDonalds. No one is obligated either way; it’s all a matter of personal preference. But, clearly that’s not right! It seems obvious that it’s wrong to do some things. Honest reflection into our conscience tells us that we are OBLIGATED to do good and avoid evil. It’s REALLY WRONG to torture a child. It doesn’t matter if the torturer thinks he is right. It doesn’t matter if he is bigger than we are. He is still wrong. It is not a matter of personal preference. This seems obviously true and there is no good reason to deny it. So, since atheism cannot account for moral obligation, it cannot account for one of the most obvious facts of human experience. Taking the notion of God, as many do, as an all-good and authoritative moral lawgiver, we can summarize our argument this way: If God does not exist, then there is no moral obligation. But, there is moral obligation. Therefore, God exists.

If God does not exist, then there is no moral obligation. But, there is moral obligation. Therefore, God exists. II. This is one way to formulate the moral argument and in the rest of this course we are going to get into the details of how to understand and defend these premises and how to answer common objections raised against it.

Chapter 3:

What is Moral Obligation, How Do We Know It, and Why Do We Need It? “The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man’s mind so as to be known by him naturally.” – St. Thomas Aquinas 5 I. The purpose of the moral argument is to explain the existence of moral obligation. This concept of moral obligation is obviously then very important 5 S.T. I-II.90.4 ad.1

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for our discussion and so in this section we are going to talk about how we know moral obligation, what it is, and why we need it. II. How Do We Know Moral Obligation? A. The only way we can, by looking in to our conscience. Obligation is not a physical object. It’s not like you can see obligation like you see trees and horses. Knowing moral obligation is an example of non-empirical knowledge. Obligation exists in the human conscience and that is where we have to “look” for it. That means we know moral obligation like we know our own thoughts and acts of the will – through first person introspection (looking “in” to our own mind).

Knowing moral obligation is an example of non-empirical knowledge. Obligation exists in the human conscience and that is where we have to “look” for it.

B. And when we do that we can see that the existence of moral obligation is self-evident. In other words, the existence of moral obligation is known directly by looking in to our own conscience. That we are bound to do good and avoid evil is something that can be intuitively known without having to infer it from something else. C. 18th century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid pointed out that knowing moral obligation is analogous to knowing color. We can only use our eyes to know color; our other faculties are useless for this purpose. In the same way, we know obligation with our moral faculty, conscience, and our other faculties are useless in knowing moral obligation.6 D. Some people may say they cannot “see” any moral obligation in their conscience. But the man who claims he cannot see obligation is like the man who says he cannot see color. Assuming he is being honest and he really cannot see it, it is because his moral faculty is impaired in some way. Philosopher William Lane Craig says such a man is morally handicapped. Just because there are some people are color blind, that doesn’t mean the rest of us cannot clearly see color. In the same way, just because a man’s conscience is so impaired that he cannot see moral obligation, that doesn’t mean that rest of us cannot see it very clearly. III. What Is Moral Obligation?

6 “As we rely upon the clear and distinct testimony of our eyes, concerning the colours and figures of the bodies around us, we have the same reason to rely with security upon the clear and unbiased testimony of our conscience, with regard to what we ought and ought not to do. In many cases, moral worth and demerit are discerned no less clearly by the last of those natural faculties, than figure and colour by the first.” - Thomas Reid, Inquiry and Essays, (Hackett Indianapolis) 1983, p. 323

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A. When we look into our conscience we see that we are bound. That is, our conscience binds us to do certain actions and refrain from others. This binding of our wills is what we mean by moral obligation. Moral obligation is the binding of the will to do or not do something. B. Aquinas says it this way: “Conscience is certainly binding. But, to see how it binds, we must bear in mind that binding, taken metaphorically from corporeal things and applied to spiritual, means imposing necessity.” - De Veritate II.17.3 (emphasis added). C. That’s what binding means, to impose a certain necessity on something. But what kind of “necessity” are we talking about? D. The Nature of Moral Necessity i. Obviously we are talking about a moral necessity, but what is that? With Aquinas, a good way to understand moral necessity is how it is analogous to physical necessity. ii. Physical necessities are described by physical laws. According to physical laws, things in nature have to act in certain ways. The laws of physics, for example, govern how the physical world has to act. Things when dropped obey the law of gravity and are bound fall to the ground. Moral necessities are described by moral laws. Moral law refers to how free agents have to act. Just as physical laws govern physical behavior, moral laws govern moral behavior.

iii. In the same way, moral necessities are described by moral laws. Moral law refers to how free agents have to act. Just as physical laws govern physical behavior, moral laws govern moral behavior. So, when a moral agent acts, they are bound to do good and avoid evil. iv. This moral necessity is like when a physical thing makes another thing do something. Like when a billiards player forces the eight ball into the corner pocket. But moral necessity is different too because here we are talking about a necessity imposed on a free agent that is able to choose. Like when a parent makes a child do their homework. v. Moral necessity is a kind of compelling or forcing that is not physical. And this means moral necessity is a unique and distinct kind of binding. If we think of physical laws as that which cannot be broken, moral laws are that which ought not to be broken. In other words, moral laws are not as rigid as physical laws. Because the compelling is moral and not physical, this law can be broken but it ought not to be. People can act against the moral law and do evil things but they ought not to.

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vi. It is important to realize that moral obligation cannot be understood without introducing the notion of law. The reason why is because anytime a necessity is imposed on the actions of things, law is introduced. Since moral obligation refers to a necessity imposed on the will to do good and avoid evil, the existence of moral obligation is equivalent to the existence of moral law.

Since moral obligation refers to a necessity imposed on the will to do good and avoid evil, the existence of moral obligation is equivalent to the existence of moral law.

E. Clarification Of Moral Necessity i. We have seen that moral obligation involves a certain necessity or binding of the will about what we ought to do and not do. But, in order to avoid confusion we need to clarify what this means. ii. The reason why is because philosophers have generally recognized there are two ways we can understand this word “ought”. In other words, there are two ways one can be induced to act morally: a. Interest based ought – The first kind of ought is an interest based ought. This type of ought means you ought to do something because it is in your self-interest. Example: “If you want X then you ought to do Y” 1. In philosophy this is called the hypothetical imperative or a hypothetical ought. The reason why we call this a “hypothetical ought” is because it is prefaced by an “if” statement. For example: • If you want to be a good person, then you ought to do such and such. • If you want to promote a healthy society, then you ought to do such and such. b. Duty based ought – The second kind of ought is a duty based ought. This type of ought refers to what you have to do whether you want to or not. 1. One ought to do good and not do evil – period. No conditions or “ifs” involved here. 2. In philosophy this type of ought is called the categorical imperative. The reason why it’s called “categorical” is because it is unconditional. It is a command one is obligated to follow regardless of whether they like it or not. One has to obey. iii. It is important to know that these are two fundamentally distinct types of ought. My interest and my duty are not 15

the same thing. They may happen to involve both but what I want to do and what I have to do is not necessarily the same thing. One type of ought cannot be resolved into the other. iv. So, there are two types of ought, but one is the “ought” of moral obligation. What is the real motive for acting morally? v. Why the interest based ought alone is an inadequate account of moral obligation a. The interest based ought, by itself, is completely worthless to account for objective morality. The reason why is because doing good and avoiding evil is not mandatory here. It’s all conditional and based upon one’s personal desires.

The interest based ought, by itself, is completely worthless to account for objective morality…because doing good and avoiding evil is not mandatory here.

b. Example: If you want to be a good person, then you ought not to rape. But, if you don’t want be a good person, well, according to the interest based ought, there is nothing else to say. c. What if a man doesn’t want to act for the good of society? What if he doesn’t care about acting in a way that promotes the most happiness? What if he just wants to act selfishly? d. If all you have are hypothetical imperatives, all morality collapses down into personal desires, and that is the same as having no morality at all. In such a case, everyone could do whatever they want since there would be no obligation to do otherwise. e. Hypothetical imperatives cannot account for moral obligation because one can deny the “if part” without blame. Acting morally is entirely optional. As philosopher Donald Burt puts it: 1. “Indeed, we might wish that all people would “take the moral point of view,” ... However, there is still no absolute obligation to accept the antecedent. Consequently, no blame can be attached to the denial of the consequent. Any system of ethics which fails to justify an obligation to “take the moral point of view” must become a system of hypothetical imperatives; ultimately morality becomes a matter of free decision.”7 7

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Donald X. Burt, O.S.A.: The Problem of Justifying Moral Obligation: An Aspect of the

vi. Morality must be grounded in the duty based necessity: a. The duty based ought is necessary in order to have any true moral obligation. Here the will is bound to choose good and avoid evil whether one likes it or not. It is not optional, it is mandatory. b. Aquinas calls this duty based necessity a “necessity of justice”.8 It’s the kind of necessity where something is owed to a superior in authority.

The duty based ought is necessary in order to have any true moral obligation. Here the will is bound to choose good and avoid evil whether one likes it or not. It is not optional, it is mandatory.

F. Now that we have clarified what we mean by “moral necessity” we can say more precisely that moral obligation is this dutiful binding of the will to do good and avoid evil. IV. Why Does Morality Need Moral Obligation? A. Now that we know what moral obligation is, we can ask why is it necessary? This is a philosophical question. That good ought to be done and evil ought to be avoided cannot be a question for science. The ought is here is the unique and non-empirical characteristic of ethics. B. The reason why is because this dutiful binding of the will is an inevitable way of understanding morality. Without it, there couldn’t be any morality at all. C. Why? Try to imagine morality without any compelling power to follow it. A moral system where nobody is obligated to follow its dictates. D. In such a case, someone might choose to be moral, but that’s just their choice. A man who chooses not to be moral isn’t guilty of violating any rules or breaking any laws. You may not like what he does, but he has no obligation whatsoever to choose good and avoid evil. So, he’s not doing anything wrong. E. If there is no moral obligation, morality deteriorates into merely a matter a personal preference, but morality based on personal preference is no morality at all. F. If we are not bound to choose good and avoid evil, then that means we can do whatever we want without blame. But, doing whatever we want without blame is the same has having no morality at all. That is precisely what a world without morality is, a Moral Argument for the Existence of God Association, v. 49 1975 p. 73 8 S.T. II-II.104.4

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical

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world where everyone can do whatever they want without blame because there is no obligation to do otherwise. G. In other words, if we are not obligated to do good and avoid evil, then moral nihilism is true. Moral nihilism is the view that morality is “nothing” it does not exist. H. So, there needs to be some compelling force for morality if there is going to be morality at all. Not a physical “push” of course, but a “push” on our wills. And as we have seen, that is exactly what moral obligation is. V. Chapter Summary: A. Knowing moral obligation is not a matter of sense experience. Rather, it is known directly through introspection or by looking in to our own conscience. B. Just because someone might claim they can’t see moral obligation, that doesn’t mean the rest of cannot clearly see it, just as the color blind man who says he can’t see color doesn’t mean the rest of us cannot clearly that either. A philosophical analysis of what moral obligation is reveals that moral obligation is the dutiful binding of the will to do good and avoid evil.

C. A philosophical analysis of what moral obligation is reveals that moral obligation is the dutiful binding of the will to do good and avoid evil. This binding of the will necessarily involves notions of necessity (being bound). Without necessity and command, there couldn’t be any moral obligation at all. D. The existence of moral obligation is equivalent to the existence of a moral law. Once the will is bound, law is introduced. E. The reason why moral obligation is necessary for morality is because without it morality devolves into personal preference, which is the same as having no moral law at all (moral nihilism). F. So that gives you a good overview of what moral obligation is, how we know it, and why it is critical for morality. In the next section we will see why conscience alone is not enough.

Chapter 4:

Why Conscience is Not Enough I. In the last section we talked about the nature of moral obligation as found in conscience. For most people, conscience is the first “go to” point for making moral decisions. When people are faced with a moral problem they usually just consult their conscience. II. But why can’t we just stop with conscience? Why is any further explanation needed? Popular atheist Christopher Hitchens asks:

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A. “I think our knowledge of right and wrong is innate in us. Religion gets its morality from humans. We know that we can’t get along if we permit perjury, theft, murder, rape, all societies at all times, well before the advent of monarchies and certainly, have forbidden it... Socrates called his daemon, it was an inner voice that stopped him when he was trying to take advantage of someone... Why don’t we just assume that we do have some internal compass?” - Christopher Hitchens, “The Morals of an Atheist”. Uncommon Knowledge. August 23, 2007 II. It seems to me that Hitchens is saying here that we are all aware of this moral conscience that is innate in us; so why can’t that be enough? Why do we need anything else? Why can’t we just stop with conscience and that’s all? III. There is a partial truth here. Conscience is a true ground or norm for morality. In philosophy we say that conscience is the proximate norm of morality. Conscience is a good thing, but by itself it is not enough. IV. The reason why is because there are certain aspects to conscience that call for something more. In other words, in addition to this proximate norm of morality there needs to be a remote norm. V. Why? Precisely because of this question: WHERE DOES CONSCIENCE GET ITS BINDING POWER? In other words, what is the adequate cause of moral obligation? VI. Principal Problem: Where does conscience get its binding power? A. Aristotle said we best understand a thing when we know its causes. Given that here we seek to understand moral obligation, we want to know its causes as well. What would we have to have in order for moral obligation to exist? What causes the binding aspect of our conscience? This aspect of conscience demands an explanation. B. Thesis: One cannot be morally obligated unless they have been authoritatively commanded and one cannot be authoritatively commanded unless there is an authoritative commander. C. Why There Is A Necessary Connection Between Moral Obligation, Authoritative Commands, And An Authoritative Commander: The purpose of this section is to argue that moral obligation is unintelligible and cannot exist without these additional elements.

One cannot be morally obligated unless they have been authoritatively commanded and one cannot be authoritatively commanded unless there is an authoritative commander.

i. Moral obligation cannot exist without authoritative commands 19

a. First it’s clear that there cannot be moral obligation without commands. The reason why is obvious. If I haven’t been commanded to do or not do some action, I’m not obligated. b. The binding of conscience is not just a necessity by itself, but it is a binding to do or not do some action. The binding of our conscience refers to actions to be done or avoided. So in order to have moral obligation we need this direction to do or not do some action a direction to an end or command. That’s what commands are, they are declarations to do some actions or refrain from others. “Do this” or “Don’t do that”.9 To say, “I am bound, but bound to nothing” is nonsense. c. Secondly of course, it can’t be just any old command. Imagine a spoiled kid demanding that you give him candy. His commands don’t have to be followed. The commands he issues are not authoritative.

9 Aquinas says there is an implied connection between command and obligation “a precept implies the notion of something due. Hence a thing is a matter of precept, in so far as it is something due” (S.T. II-II.44.1)

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d. On the contrary, the command we are talking about in morality is obligatory. It’s the kind of command that demands obedience, one that has to be followed. In other words, the command would have to be authoritative. Without this authority aspect we can’t account for the necessity of obligation. e. So, moral obligation is unintelligible and cannot exist unless there are authoritative moral commands. Or alternatively, one could say unless there is a moral law since the moral law is really just the set of moral commands. f. So, authoritative commands are the proximate cause of moral obligation. g. But that raises the question, where do authoritative commands come from? What kind of thing can issue authoritative commands? ii. Authoritative commands cannot exist without an authoritative commander a. An authoritative commander is the remote cause of moral obligation. b. Authoritative commands cannot exist unless there is an authoritative commander (a moral lawgiver). c. By “authoritative commander” here I mean a person capable of directing free agents and having the right to issue such commands and expect obedience. An authoritative commander for moral obligation would need to have the moral right to impose that obligation and compel humans, by a moral necessity of justice, to obedience. This necessarily calls for a superior to subject relationship.

Authoritative commands cannot exist unless there is an authoritative commander (a moral lawgiver).

d. Why a person? Most of us just recognize this by common sense but it can also be supported philosophically. The command is essentially an act of reason because the commander orders one commanded to do something. The act of commanding then necessarily involves ordering to an end. But ordering to an end or goal can only be done by an intellect that can conceive of goals and understand relationships. The act of commanding then must be traced back to an intellect. Only an intellectual 21

nature can impose obligation because only an intellectual being can issue commands. e. Why authoritative? For the same reason the command has to be authoritative. We are talking about a command that has to be followed and demands obedience. The effect cannot be greater than the cause. If the cause of the command is not authoritative, the command cannot be authoritative either. D. If there is moral obligation there has to be authoritative commands. If there are authoritative commands there has to be an authoritative person to issue those commands. Therefore, if there is moral obligation there has to be an authoritative person. The elements of authoritative commands stemming from an authoritative commander are the necessary and only adequate causes of moral obligation.

E. So, there is a necessary connection between moral obligation, authoritative commands, and an authoritative commander. Notice we are NOT “assuming” this necessary connection, we are arguing for it via reductio ad absurdum. The elements of authoritative commands stemming from an authoritative commander are the necessary and only adequate causes of moral obligation. F. As J.H. Newman said, the very nature of conscience carries our minds to a Being exterior to and superior to ourselves. VII. Given that moral obligation calls for an authoritative commander, who is it? In other words, who is the ultimate source of moral obligation?

Chapter 5:

If God Does Not Exist, There is No Moral Obligation: Defense of Premise 1 “…only the existence of a personal God who is infinite Goodness can fulfill the message of moral values, and can ultimately justify the validity of this obligation.” - Dietrich von Hildebrand Christian Ethics (New York: David McKay 1952) p. 456 “Conscience binds only in virtue of a divine command, either in written law or in the law inherent in our nature.” - St. Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate II. 17.5 I. In this section we are going to see why if God does not exist, there is no moral obligation. This is the first premise in the moral argument. A. If God does not exist, there is no moral obligation B. But there is moral obligation C. Therefore, God exists 22

II. This argument is logically valid, which means if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true as well. III. Here in this section we are going to show why that first premise is true. This is the most important part of the argument. Why should we think this premise is true? IV. We have seen in the prior section why moral obligation ultimately calls for an authoritative commander, but who is that? Who is the ultimate source of moral obligation? A. St. Thomas Aquinas gives us the short answer: i. “Conscience binds only in virtue of a divine command, either in written law or in the law inherent in our nature.” - St. Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate II. 17.5 B. In order to demonstrate this point, let’s consider the alternatives. What are the reasonable options for the source of moral obligation?

V. We can break this question down into three steps. The source of moral obligation is either: 23

A. Personal or impersonal. These options are exhaustive. B. If personal, then either we bind our own conscience or it is bound by another. These options are exhaustive as well. C. If it is bound by another then this is done by either morally imperfect persons (like other men) or a morally perfect person, one of the attributes of God. VI. Why Moral Obligation Cannot Come From An Impersonal Source A. We have already seen that an impersonal source for moral obligation won’t do. Not only do we recognize this intuitively via common sense, but also philosophically speaking, things without intellect and will lack the power to command anything. B. As the philosopher Thomas Reid once wrote: “It is evident that there can be no moral obligation upon inanimate things. To speak of moral obligation upon a tree or stone is ridiculous, because it contradicts every man’s notion of moral obligation.” Thomas Reid, Inquiry and Essays, Hackett Indianapolis, 1983, p. 318 C. Reid is certainly correct and the reason why is that inherent in the very nature of moral obligation is a command to do (or not do) something. And its impossible for unintelligent sources to even know ends let alone bind a thing to one. VII. Why Moral Obligation Cannot Come From Ourselves A. Even though some philosophers have suggested this option, it seems pretty clear that this option is false. B. The reason why is because it is completely meaningless to say we “bind ourselves” That’s like being your own boss. And on this view, one would be free to bind themselves to whatever they wanted. Some may bind themselves to good things like helping the poor, others might bind themselves to evil things like rape and torture. So, the claim that we impose our own moral obligation on ourselves really just boils down to everyone can do whatever they want. And that, as we have seen, is the same as having no morality at all.

C. So, the claim that we impose our own moral obligation on ourselves really just boils down to everyone can do whatever they want. And that, as we have seen, is the same as having no morality at all. D. So, the binding of conscience must be imposed by another.10 10 Along these same lines, Aquinas addresses an objection that human conscience does not bind because “One is bound only by something superior. But the conscience of a man is not superior to the man himself. Therefore, a man is not bound by his conscience.” Aquinas responds by granting the claim that the conscience of man is not superior to the man himself, but still the ob-

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“No man can impose a law upon himself. For law binds the will: and so long as no superior authority commands us, we remain at liberty to choose either alternative. I cannot owe a debt to myself. If the moral law binds us, as we know that it does, this can only be because it comes to us from one who can claim the duty of obedience from us. An essential note of morality is lacking unless we recognize that the command is imposed by an external authority, and yield obedience to it as such. - George Hayward Joyce SJ., Principles of Natural Theology VIII. Why Moral Obligation Cannot Come From Other Men A. If moral obligation comes from other men, which ones? Two commonly given answers are the state and human convention. B. Morality Comes From The State: This is known as legal positivism. On this view, there is no higher moral authority than the state. Here right and wrong is determined solely by the government. Problems with legal positivism are apparent when you consider things like ISIS, the Taliban state, the Nazi state and so on. C. Morality Comes From Human Convention: Morality is just what is socially customary. But of course, some cultures do things that are morally abominable and cultural norms change over time. Is slavery okay just because the majority says it is? What about cultures that mistreat others? What if Nazi culture won over the world, would it be then okay to execute a worldwide extermination of Jewish people? D. The problem with all of these options is that they are morally imperfect; they are often wrong, they often endorse evil, the moral standards vary dramatically from one culture or state to the next and over time. There is no moral stability here, what is right one day can be wrong the next, and there is nothing over and above these fleeting human opinions about what is really right and wrong. This is clearly an inadequate account of morality. E. In other words, man-made ethics is a made up ethics. If morality is based on human judgments and convention then it is worth no more than the people who made it. Other people can make a different morality and a morality that fluctuates like this is no morality at all. F. These different versions of man-made ethics all suffer from the same problem – imperfection, change, relativism, and ultimately, nihilism.

Man-made ethics is a made up ethics. If morality is based on human judgments and convention then it is worth no more than the people who made it. Other people can make a different morality and a morality that fluctuates like this is no morality at all.

jection does not succeed because, “Although man is not higher than himself, the one whose precept he knows is higher than man. This is how he is bound by his conscience.” (De Veritate 17.ad 3)

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IX. God As the Source of Moral Obligation A. By process of elimination we can see that a Supremely good Being such as God must be the source of moral obligation. This is the only option that can rescue morality from the tyranny of human opinions. B. As Thomas Aquinas said, “conscience is said to bind by the power of a divine precept.”11 Many atheists like Nietzsche, Sartre, and Bertrand Russell have actually agreed with that claim. C. We can also see that there are good positive reasons for positing a theological justification for moral obligation. God, as traditionally conceived in Christianity at least, fulfills all of the requirements needed for such a foundation. On this view, God is not only all-powerful but all-good and given that He is the creator of everything that exists other than Himself, the entire community of creation is rightfully His. He therefore justly possesses jurisdiction over all of creation and has the right to exercise that authority in promulgating the moral law to which all free creatures are obliged to obey by a necessity of justice. As Aquinas says, D. “Just as God is the first mover of all things that are moved naturally, so too is He the first mover of all wills, as shown above. Therefore just as all natural things are subject to the divine motion by a natural necessity so too all wills, by a kind of necessity of justice, are bound to obey the divine command.” (S.T. II-II.104.4, emphasis added). E. A critical element of morality is missing if we do not recognize this notion that a command has been issued by an authority other than ourselves. If we do not acknowledge that there is a moral authority superior to ourselves then there cannot possibly be any moral law over and above what humans prescribe.

F. If we do not acknowledge that there is a moral authority superior to ourselves then there cannot possibly be any moral law over and above what humans prescribe. G. Atheism, by definition, removes an all good authority from the picture resulting in the destruction of moral obligation H. Without some independent moral authority over and above human beings, all morality collapses into human quibbling about personal preferences. Atheism, by definition, removes an all good authority from the picture resulting in the destruction of moral obligation. I. As Plato once argued, either a transcendent good exists or moral nihilism is true. (Again, moral nihilism is the view that morality is nothing real, it does not exist.) 11 De Veritate 17. 3

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J. “Contemporary writers in ethics, who blithely discourse upon moral right and wrong and moral obligation without any reference to religion, are really just weaving intellectual webs from thin air; which amounts to saying that they discourse without meaning.” Richard Taylor, Ethics, Faith, and Reason (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), p. 7

Chapter 6:

That There is Moral Obligation: Defense of Premise 2 I. In this section we will discuss the second premise of the moral argument. Here is the argument once again: A. If God does not exist, there is no moral obligation B. But there is moral obligation C. Therefore, God exists. II. As we have said, this argument is logically valid and that means if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. And we have good reasons for thinking the first premise is true, that if God does not exist there is no 27

moral obligation. What about the second premise, “There is moral obligation”? How do we know this? III. As we said earlier, the existence of moral obligation is self-evident upon introspection into our conscience. By “self-evident” here we mean something that is known immediately and no further evidence is needed. IV. Take, for example, the existence of your thoughts. How do you know your thoughts exist? It’s not something you have to prove so much as you just “see” it. The direct experience of those thoughts is its own evidence. V. Self-evident truths cannot be demonstrated and they do not need to be. It’s not something that you argue for; rather it is something you directly observe. VI. That it’s wrong to do some things and it’s good to do other things is as obvious as the objects of sense experience. We directly experience them. We don’t try and prove that say, a tree exists in your background other than going and looking. The looking is its own evidence. The same is true with obligation. VII. The man who denies moral obligation denies one of the most evident facts of human experience. VIII. So given the obvious truth of that second premise, the conclusion follows, that therefore God exists. In the next lesson, we will see how much we can know about God from the moral argument.

Chapter 7:

The Nature of God as Known by the Moral Argument I. We have been arguing that God is needed to account for the moral obligation we find in conscience. In this section we will look at the nature of God as known by the moral argument. In other words, what must an ultimate source of moral obligation be like? What attributes must a being have if they are to be the ultimate moral authority? The Source of Moral Obligation Has Three Necessary Characteristics: The source must be a supremely good, authoritative, person.

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II. The Source of Moral Obligation Has Three Necessary Characteristics: The source must be a supremely good, authoritative, person. All three of these characteristics are necessary to account for moral obligation. A. Supremely Good – A god that is not wholly good can be wrong, second guessed or corrected. Hence, the God of the moral argument cannot be “any old god”. An immoral god like a “Saddam Hussein god” won’t work. The source must be supremely good.

B. Authoritative – The source of moral obligation must have the moral right to issue law that oblige humans to obedience. C. Person – Only a personal being, one that can know and choose, is able to issue commands that direct people to goals. III. The point here is that God, as known through the moral argument, is the supremely good authoritative moral legislator for mankind. These are the attributes that follow when we aim to account for moral obligation.

Chapter 8:

Two Important Clarifications on the Moral Argument I. In this section we will clear up two common misunderstandings people have when you say God is the necessary ground for morality. We need to avoid confusing the order of being with the order of knowing and we need to avoid the error of voluntarism. II. Common Misunderstanding 1: Confusing the order of knowing with the order of being A. Sometimes people will object to the moral argument by saying that many people know right and wrong without even acknowledging the existence of God. After all, atheists can know right and wrong and they can do good actions. Therefore, they think, that morality does not depend upon God. B. But this objection misunderstands the point the moral argument is making. When the moral argument says morality depends upon God, it does not say that one first needs to know that God exists before they can recognize any morality at all. C. In fact it is just the opposite. The existence of moral obligation is available to everyone through their conscience. You don’t need to first acknowledge God to see this. D. To better understand this point, we need to make an important distinction between the order of knowing (ordo cognoscendi) vs. the order of being (ordo essendi).

The existence of moral obligation is available to everyone through their conscience. You don’t need to first acknowledge God to see this.

E. The order of knowing refers to what we can come to know first. The order of being refers to what is really first in reality. So the difference is what comes first in knowledge versus what comes first in being. F. When we are talking about the order of knowing, man can first recognize the proximate norm of morality, conscience, and then go on to know the ultimate norm of morality, God. 29

G. But in the order of being it is just the opposite. God first exists, then He promulgates the moral law to humans by means of their conscience. H. VERY IMPORTANT –WHEN WE SAY MORALITY IS DEPENDENT ON GOD WE DO NOT MEAN GOD HAS TO BE FIRST IN THE ORDER OF KNOWLEDGE. WE CAN AND DO KNOW RIGHT AND WRONG BEFORE WE KNOW THAT GOD EXISTS. RATHER, MORALITY DEPENDS UPON GOD IN THE ORDER OF BEING. I. Just like people can know what is in a book without knowing the author, people can know the moral law without inquiring where it comes from. But there wouldn’t be a book at all if the author didn’t exist. J. So, when atheists reject the moral argument by saying they know morality without acknowledging God, that is true. But it proves nothing against the moral argument because we do not claim atheists have to know God first. God is first in the order of being not the order of knowing. 30

III. Common Misunderstanding 2: Avoiding the Error of Voluntarism A. “Voluntarism” is the idea that whatever God commands is good, even if the command is evil. B. The problem with voluntarism is that it divorces God’s will from His wholly good nature. It’s not just God’s power that makes Him the source of moral obligation, but also His supreme Goodness. God here is essentially and infinitely good, and therefore His acts of the will are good too. C. In other words, a thing is not right “just because God wills it” but more precisely “A Supremely good God wills it”. D. It’s not just because God is “stronger” that we are obliged to obey His commands rather it’s because God is the supremely good creator and so He is the only rightful authority to command such things via justice (we owe to Him our very existence).

A thing is not right “ just because God wills it” but more precisely “A Supremely good God wills it”

E. “In God, however, the will is really identical with the intellect, and for this reason the correctness of His will is really the same as His will itself. Consequently the first thing upon which the essential character of all justice depends is the wisdom of the divine intellect,”12 F. “Granted that the truly divine commands of a God whose nature is love, we can assume that actions are wrong because [they are] alien and hostile to that divine nature, and against his will because God does not command what is contrary to his excellence.” John Rist, Real Ethics Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.262 Emphasis added.

Chapter 9:

Answering Common Objections: “When God is hated, every basis of morality is undermined.” - Pius XII, Unity of Human Society 28, 1939 I. Now that we have seen how the moral argument shows that God exists, in this section we are going to respond to common objections against this argument. II. The Begging the Question Objection A. Example: “You cannot know there is moral obligation without first knowing that God exists. So to use morality to argue for God is arguing in a circle and begs the question.”13 12 De Veritate XXIII. 6 13 The begging the question fallacy is when someone tries to argue for a conclusion but in so doing assumes the truth of that conclusion. For example, “I know that God exists because the

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B. Response: The problem with this response is that it confuses the order of knowing with the order of being. It is true that God is first in the order of being; meaning that if God does not exist then there can’t be moral obligation. But that doesn’t mean we first have to know that God exists before we can know there is moral obligation. The reason why is because moral obligation is an effect that can be known immediately by looking in to our conscience. This is supported by the fact that many atheists recognize moral obligation. So moral obligation can be first in the order of knowing and once we know the obligation we can infer the existence of the Obligator. III. The “Which God Do We Follow?” Objection A. Example: “You say God is needed for morality, well which god? The god of Islam, Hinduism or someone else? Unless we know which God you are talking about the argument is worthless. The moral argument shows there needs to be a supremely good and authoritative person superior to human beings in order for there to be any morality at all. Not all gods meet that standard.

B. Response: The moral argument is not trying to demonstrate the truth of any particular religion. All we are claiming is the minimum amount needed for moral obligation. The moral argument shows there needs to be a supremely good and authoritative person superior to human beings in order for there to be any morality at all. Not all gods meet that standard. But as far as which God is that God of the moral argument, that can be determined later by additional argumentation. III. The Euthyphro Dilemma14 A. Example: “You say God is the ground of morality. Well, either an action is good because God commands it or God commands it because it already is good. If you say the first, then God could arbitrarily command any evil act, like rape or child torture, and that would be “good” which is obviously absurd. If you say God commands something because it already is good, well then there was goodness before God’s commands and so God isn’t needed. Either way, goodness cannot depend upon God.” B. Response: This is one of the most overrated arguments in the history of philosophy. In order to better see the problem with it, let’s flesh it out logically. Here is what the objection looks like:

Bible says so, and I know the Bible is right because God wrote it” commits this fallacy. 14 This objection gets its name from one the works of Plato entitled The Euthyphro where this objection is first raised.

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i. Either an action is good because God commands it or God commands an action because it already is good. ii. If an action is good because God commands it, then God could arbitrarily command any evil act and that would be “good”, which is obviously absurd. iii. If God commands an action because it already is good then that means goodness comes before God’s command and so God isn’t needed. iv. Therefore, either absurdity or God isn’t needed for morality. C. The easiest way to respond to this dilemma is to “take it by the horns” 15 and go ahead and accept, for the sake of argument, the two major alternatives, but then go on to show why these two options are not as bad as the objector thinks. D. So, for the sake of argument, we can accept the first premise that an action is good either because God commands it or God commands it because it already is good. What is so bad about that? E. Well, the second premise says that if an action is good merely because God commands it, then God could arbitrarily will anything and that would make it “good”. i. But, this doesn’t follow at all. Suppose we say that an action is good because a supremely good God commands it? Then it would follow that God couldn't arbitrarily command evil. ii. In fact, that’s what classical theists like Aquinas have always held. God is perfect goodness essentially.16 Therefore evil, which is the opposite of goodness, can have no place in God (unless He ceased to be God, which is impossible). And since God is perfect Goodness itself with no evil whatsoever in Him, He cannot possibly will evil:

Since God is perfect Goodness itself with no evil whatsoever in Him, He cannot possibly will evil:

a. “God is the highest good, as has been shown. But the highest good cannot bear any mingling with evil, as neither can the highest hot thing bear any mingling with the cold. The divine will, therefore, cannot be turned to evil.” SCG I.95

15 In logic, taking a dilemma “by the horns” means that one can accept the truth of the major disjunction but deny one or both of the conditional minor premises. 16 Summa Contra Gentiles, I.38

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iii. So, the second premise is false. If a supremely good God commands something, then that command must be good, because a supremely good God cannot command evil. F. The third premise is also false for the same reason. This premise claims that if God commands something because it already is good, that means there is a standard of goodness prior to God’s command and so God isn’t needed for morality. i. But, this doesn’t follow. What if the good standard prior to God’s command is God’s all good nature? In this case, God’s command would adhere to a prior standard, but that prior standard would not be something other than God because it is God’s perfectly good nature itself. There are no negative consequences that come from saying either an action is good because a supremely good God commands it or that God commands an action because it is already good.

G. So, the Euthyphro dilemma doesn’t work because it overlooks the classic understanding of God’s nature as a supremely good being. Once that doctrine is taken into account, there are no negative consequences that come from saying either an action is good because a supremely good God commands it or that God commands an action because it is already good (that is, in harmony with His supremely good nature). V. The “Some People Don’t Know the Moral Law or They Disagree About It” Objection A. Example: “Well if God exists what about people who don’t know the moral law or they disagree about what it says? Surely God would want everyone to know what the moral law says if He existed. Since there are so many people who aren’t sure about it, that shows God doesn’t exist.” B. Response: This deals with the problem of how we know right and wrong not about the existence of right and wrong itself. Nevertheless, our knowledge of the moral law as given in conscience is admittedly imperfect. Christianity holds that there are theological reasons for this and it is one of the reasons why special divine revelation is so important. Still, even in conscience alone, Aquinas argues that everyone knows at least the basic principles of the moral law like one ought to do good and avoid evil. But even if he is wrong about that in some cases, still, ignorance of the moral law no more proves there isn’t one any more than ignorance of mathematics proves there are no mathematical laws. C. The same goes for moral disagreement. Sure we have them but most of us still agree on the general idea that some things are

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morally right and others morally wrong. So while there can be complicated moral questions there are also others that are quite simple and obvious. There are easy and hard problems in morality just like there are easy and hard problems in math. Just because there are complicated moral questions doesn’t mean there isn’t objective moral law any more than complicated math questions doesn’t mean there are objective mathematical laws. We might make mistakes on the complicated issues but still get it right in the basics.

Just because there are complicated moral questions doesn’t mean there isn’t objective moral law any more than complicated math questions doesn’t mean there are objective mathematical laws.

VI. The “Why Should I Care What God Thinks?” Objection A. Example: “You say why should we care about what other men say, but the God answer is no better. Why ought I to care about what God thinks or do what He says?” B. Response: The cases are not parallel. Positing the existence of God satisfies all of the conditions for moral obligation. Trying to ground morality in the decisions of other human beings clearly does not. Humans are morally imperfect, they often make moral errors, their moral views change over time and they often disagree with each other about what is right and wrong. This is clearly not an adequate basis for moral obligation. C. But, all of these inadequacies are removed once we ground morality in God. God by definition, is not morally imperfect, but is wholly good and does not make moral errors. So, to ask why I should follow the decisions of an absolutely good God is nothing like asking why I should follow the decisions of other human beings. With God, the conditions for moral obligation are completely satisfied, with humans they are not. VII. The Evolution Objection A. Example: “Morality just comes from evolution. We are genetically directed to act with compassion towards others because it benefits our species.” B. Response: If that’s all it is then there is no moral obligation at all. How can someone be morally obligated to the dictates of random chance forces? C. Imagine if a Scrabble box fell off the shelf and spilled out a random set of letters that said, “Be good” or if while you were eating alphabet soup the floating letters formed the phrase, “Do not

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kill”.17 Commands that come about by chance forces are things that come about by unintelligent amoral forces. Clearly these accidentally formed “commands” are not really commands at all and can be justifiably ignored. D. The same can be said of the blind chance formation of DNA information through socio-biological development. A man may be very grateful that such development got him here, but there is no good reason to say he is bound to listen to his accidentally formed genetic information now any more than an accidentally arranged sentence in alphabet soup! Why choose one over the other? VIII. The Morality Is Based On Society Objection A. Example: “Morality is just decided upon by society.” B. Response: Really? Who took the vote? Nobody asked me, did they ask you? Which society got to decide all of this? What about when a society is divided? What about moral reformers that go against the dominant view of society, should we obey them? Like when slavery was widely accepted in the 19th century, were the abolitionists acting immorally by wanting to get rid of slavery? Should a German have obeyed society during the Nazi era? C. These questions cannot be given a good answer because basing morality on the shifting sands of human decision IX. The “You Haven’t Really Proved God” Objection The moral argument doesn’t claim to prove everything about God. What it does show is that there must be, at least one, supremely good authoritative person that enacts the moral law for all human beings.

A. Example: “The moral argument doesn’t prove that God exists because there could be many moral lawgivers. Plus, there is no reason to think the moral lawgiver needs to be immaterial, eternal, or any of those other things you claim God is. So, the moral argument hasn’t proven that God exists after all.” B. Response: You can’t fault an argument for what it is not attempting to show. The moral argument doesn’t claim to prove everything about God. What it does show is that there must be, at least one, supremely good authoritative person that enacts the moral law for all human beings. Since this is what many people mean by God we can say that the moral argument does show that God exists. X. The “Morality is Just In One’s Best Interest” Objection A. Example: “Morality is just based on one’s best interest. It’s in everyone’s best interest to be moral, that’s all that is needed.”

17 This example is owed to Francis Beckwith at Baylor University.

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B. Response: This isn’t always true. Sometimes doing the right thing can run right up against your best interest. It may be in your best interest to steal money so that you can pay for an expensive car repair. In such a case, doing the right thing is not in your personal interest, but can still be the right thing to do. So, acting morally doesn’t always “pay off ”. One might be sneaky enough or powerful enough to evil and get away with it so that they don’t have to face the negative consequences of acting immorally. C. So, there has to be more to morality than just personal interest. Obligation and duty need to be accounted for. XI. The Islamic Terrorist Argument A. Example: “The Islamic terrorist also believes morality comes from God, and they think they are entitled to kill people because of it! So, this shows the absurdity of such an idea.” B. Response: Even a sound account of morality can be abused. In this case, some claim God has commanded them to kill the innocent. But our response to those who abuse divine commandments in this way is the same as the atheist’s response, namely, that God didn’t really say that. In other words, the problem here is with the terrorists moral epistemology (how we know morality) not moral ontology (what the world really has to be like if there is a moral law at all). The Islamic terrorist may have their moral ontology correct, but their moral epistemology is wrong. They are right in thinking moral obligation is ultimately grounded in divine command, but they are wrong in thinking that God has commanded them to kill the innocent. C. Just because a correct moral theory can be abused, that doesn’t mean that moral theory is wrong. Abusus non tollit usum (abuse does not take away from legitimate use). XII. The Moral Nihilist’s Objection

Just because a correct moral theory can be abused, that doesn’t mean that moral theory is wrong.

A. Example: “I deny that there are any moral norms or obligations so the argument doesn’t work.” B. Response: This is a denial of the second premise of the moral argument, namely, that there is moral obligation. Yet the existence of moral obligation is self-evident, and so this objection does nothing more than deny the obvious. Does this objector really believe there is no moral difference between say feeding an innocent child and brutally harming her? The nihilist’s response sounds suspiciously insincere. The moral introspection 37

here must be honest. If the atheist wants to deny the data, nothing more can be said and they should perhaps be left to confront it when they are alone. C. In fact, the theist can be perfectly happy to chalk this response off as a victory and a backhanded concession to the strength of the moral argument. Atheism fails to account for one of the most obvious aspects of our common experience. From the theist’s perspective, the atheist has conceded a square of reality to theism, akin to losing a major piece in chess match, and in doing so the atheist is one step further removed from reality. Unless someone can provide some proof showing that God does not exist, there is no good reason to deny our common intuitions about moral obligation.

D. Finally, unless someone can provide some proof showing that God does not exist, there is no good reason to deny our common intuitions about moral obligation. E. For any skeptical argument one could give about denying our moral intuitions, one could give a parallel skeptical argument for why one should deny our intuitive experience of the external world.18

Chapter 10: Summary

“Certainly one of the most dangerous errors of our age is the claim to separate morality from religion, thus removing all solid basis for any legislation... Take away this basis, and with it all moral law falls, and there is no remedy left to stop the gradual but inevitable destruction of peoples, families, the State, civilization itself.” - Pope Pius XI, Caritate Christi Compulsi (On the Sacred Heart) 24 May 1932. If one admits moral realism, there are REALLY ONLY TWO POSSIBLE RESPONSES to the moral argument, either morality requires obligation or it does not I. Obligation is not needed for morality II. Obligation is needed for morality but can be had without God III. There is an inseverable connection between God and morality IV. Moral values fit comfortably well in a theistic universe and by contrast, a world in which God does not exist is a world that cannot account for common sense moral truths. When anyone says someone ought to do such and such and ought to avoid doing so and so, they are assuming a world that is radically at odds with atheism. If they claim to be atheists, they are oblivious to the way their moral language is unhinged from what is really 18 This point is indebted to William Lane Craig of Biola University.

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needed to root those very moral norms that they themselves profess. A worldview that cannot justify the most basic moral claims doesn’t seem like the world we live in and any worldview that cannot consistently call killing an innocent child for fun absolutely and always wrong is a worldview that should be rejected.

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