The Fiasco That Almost Ended The World
The Fiasco That Almost Ended The World
For 14 days in October 1962, the world stood on the brink of nuclear war. The Soviet Union had secretly stationed nuclear weapons on the island of Cuba and when the government of the United States discovered them and demanded their withdrawal, the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War followed. A single miscalculation made either in the White House or the Kremlin could have precipitated catastrophe. How did this standoff arise? How did the Superpowers extricate themselves from it? Was anything learned from the crisis? Should any party be held more at fault than the other?
JFK: We certainly have been wrong about what he’s trying to do in Cuba. There isn’t any doubt about that [possibly aword uninteligible] . . .
THE CUBAN REVOLUTION
5 In January 1959, Fulgencio Batista, the brutal, American-backed Cuban dictator, was overthrown by the guerrilla army of Fidel Castro Initially president Dwight D.Eisenhower’s administration welcomed the Cuban revolution, for Batista had long been an embarrassing ally, and a friendly, democratic government in Cuba, addressing urgent social reform, would be far more stable and reliable. Yet such views did not last long.
were postponed while Castro secured his grip on power. Yet as ever more vicious anti–American diatribes came from the new leader, his popularity in Cuba grew. In the United States, however, he became increasingly unacceptable. Eisenhower decided that Castro was a communist. Whether this was true then is debatable, but Castro was certainly to turn to communism in the face of US hostility.
For America, Cuba provided a naval base at Guantanamo; it was an exotic, but conveniently close, tourist resort; and low paid Cuban labor made it an attractive investment area, much of the island’s agriculture and industry being American owned. Hence governments in Washington had never hesitated to intervene to protect American interests. The problem `was that Castro could never tackle desperate problems of poverty, ill–health and illiteracy without harming US interests. Indeed to Castro, and to a large proportion of the Cuban people, American domination was a root cause of Cuba’s problems, and it must be ended. Castro in fact articulated a widespread revulsion against this humiliating position. The United States was deeply detested on the island.
Eisenhower ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to overthrow him, and the CIA orchestrated sabotage raids on Cuba to destabilize the regime. Attempts were made to assassinate Castro, reputedly using the mafia (the first of at least eight assassination attempts was planned as early as August 1960). Economic sanctions were imposed, especially against Cuba’s sugar crop, which was its main export. Yet rather than undermine Castro, this hostility made him more secure, and an increasingly bitter and vocal enemy of the United States. In the logic of the Cold War, this made him a potential partner of the Soviet Union. Steadily growing ties with the USSR made him appear a growing threat to US hegemony in the western hemisphere which could not be tolerated.
As American property was expropriated by the new government, Castro’s defeated enemies were treated mercilessly and elections
“Kennedy was probably unaware that there were risks attached to the CIA’s plan. He approved the project...”
THE BAY OF PIGS
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Perhaps Castro hoped that a new president would be less hostile to his revolution. If so, he hoped in vain. Kennedy had used Cuba repeatedly in the election campaign, accusing his Republican opponents of being soft on communism, insisting that Cuba was America’s ‘most glaring failure’, one that endangered the ‘whole Western Hemisphere’. This rhetoric would be difficult to forget once Kennedy was in office. Business interests, alarmed that if Castro was left unpunished he might start a fashion for nationalizing US investments in Latin America, and vocal Cuban exile groups, were determined not to allow him to forget it. Furthermore, Kennedy seems to have been personally offended by Castro, who had defied the might of the United States and refused to be intimidated. Castro’s survival was an affront
to American pride. Kennedy became obsessed with the fear that Castro might prove able to export his revolution to other Latin American nations. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara later admitted the administration was ‘hysterical’ over Castro. Kennedy was even more hostile to Castro than Eisenhower had been, and a great deal less cautious. Kennedy was probably unaware that there were risks attached to the CIA’s plan. He approved the project, which was put together in a remarkably slipshod manner. Mass risings were expected on the basis of nothing more than wishful thinking. Virtually nothing seems to have been done to prepare a new government that might enjoy some degree of popular support. If no mass risings occurred, then the brigade of Cuban exiles was expected to withdraw into the interior and launch a guerrilla campaign. But the chosen landing ground, called the Bay of Pigs, led only to a swamp — and so there was no possibility of this happening. Most bizarrely, Kennedy was
JFK: I would think it would be very valuable to have them go in shortly before the strike, just to build the evidence. I mean, when you’ve got pictures that really show what you were, what was there.
Among the steps taken by the CIA to remove Castro, a brigade of about 1,400 anti — Castro Cuban exiles was raised. The CIA decided to use this force in a large-scale invasion of the island, with the backing of its own air force. This, it was assumed, would trigger mass risings and overthrow Castro’s government. Yet Eisenhower, who had after all been Supreme Allied Commander at D–Day, recognized the risks of failure and hesitated. His successor in January 1961, John F. Kennedy, would be left to decide whether or not to launch the invasion.
BUNDY: How much do we know, uh, [Pat?]? I don’t mean to go behind your judgment here, except that there’s one thing that would be really catastrophic would be to make a judgment here on, on a bad guess as to whether these things are. We mustn’t do that.
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convinced it would be possible to launch this invasion without the world being aware of American involvement. He felt he could convince the international community that Cubans were liberating themselves, using only their own resources. Yet as there was already speculation in the press that the CIA was planning an invasion, this belief was quite astonishing. Kennedy appears to have been swept along by a sense of urgency, and warnings thatthe whole idea was half–baked, for example from Under-secretary of State Chester Bowles, were ignored. Kennedy was not the only one to delude himself. He made it very clear to the CIA that US forces would not intervene if the plan went awry. Senior CIA officers, however, aware of the weaknesses of the plan, remained convinced that once the invasion was launched, US prestige would be so bound up in its success that Kennedy would have to support it. Perhaps this explains why, in April 1961,
they were willing to commit about 1,400 ill–trained, poorly equipped exiles to what became a humiliating fiasco. Everything that could go wrong, did so. Air attacks failed to destroy Castro’s air force completely. Most of the ammunition and communications equipment was destroyed before it could be landed. Castro’s forces fought well, and enjoyed massive popular support. There were no risings, and US forces did nothing to support the exiles. Within two days over 100 exiles had been killed and nearly 1,200 had surrendered.
OPERATION
JFK: But isn’t that. . . . but, as I say, we have to. . . . We never really ever had a case where it’s been quite this, uh. . . . After all, they backed down in, uh, Chinese Commnists in `58. They didn’t go into Laos. Agreed to a ceasefire there.
OPERATION MONGOOSE
11 The Bay of Pigs was a shattering blow to Kennedy, who had to face international ridicule for the fiasco. But Castro did not escape unscathed. Any possibility of mending fences with Washington was lost. He now faced the undying hostility of the United States. A US invasion was not an option in the wake of the Bay of Pigs, since Kennedy could hardly claim to be liberating a people who had rallied to Castro. But the President did authorize the CIA to undertake Operation Mongoose. This amounted to renewed attempts to destabilize the Cuban regime. Sabotage raids multiplied, Castroites were assassinated, foreign suppliers were bribed to send faulty goods to Cuba. Kennedy also warned the Soviet Union against challenging the USA in the western hemisphere. Sending defensive weapons, such as surface to air missiles (SAMs) would be tolerated; surface to surface missiles, which carried nuclear warheads, would not. Perhaps more threateningly, in 1962 a large-scale military exercise was undertaken by US forces in the Caribbean, in which 40,000 military personnel practiced invading an unnamed island to overthrow a dictator threateningly codenamed Ortsac. Kennedy wanted to alarm Castro, and he succeeded. But he also alarmed Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.
The Soviet government had welcomed the Cuban revolution; and as American hostility to it grew, so did Soviet support. Cuba was never really an unquestioning servant of Moscow, but the state was growing increasingly dependent upon Moscow for military and economic aid. In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, Castro had declared his commitment to Communism for the first time. And in Moscow, as in Havana, there was a growing conviction that Kennedy was preparing to invade Cuba. As it was the only communist state in the western hemisphere, Khrushchev could not allow this.
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McNamara: The Soviet Union. In the event that Cuba made any offensive move against this country. Now this lies short of military action against Cuba, direct military action against Cuba. It has some, major defects.
Bundy: Attack who?
SOVIET INITIATIVES
13 Khrushchev also had other concerns. Since the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik 1 in October 1957, Khrushchev had proclaimed an entirely fictitious superiority in Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Kennedy had campaigned for the preidency proclaiming he would match the supposed Soviet advantage, closing the ‘missile gap’ as it was known. Even when he found that the strategic balance was, in reality, heavily in America’s favour, Kennedy still ordered a major expansion of US ICBM forces. Khrushchev, who was desperate to divert resources from the military to domestic reform, was now caught by his own bluff and faced ruinous expense to fill a very real ‘missile gap’ that was in America’s favor. But American actions perhaps suggested a way out for Khrushchev. In 1962 American Jupiter missiles were stationed in Turkey, well within range of Soviet targets. Why not follow their example and station Intermediate Range and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs and MRBMs) in Cuba, where they could threaten most of the continental USA? This would be a cheap way to offset the American missile advantage, it would deter an American invasion of the island, it would be a proportional response to the missiles in Turkey, and it might make the United States more accommodating over other issues, such as Berlin.
West Berlin was a western enclave deep in East Germany. Its very existence repudiated the East German government’s claim to be the legitimate government of all of Germany. Twice (in 1948 and 1958) war had seemed near as the Soviet Union tried to force the west out. In 1961 the Berlin Wall had been built to prevent a mass exodus from East to West Germany. Yet Khrushchev still wished to remove the western presence totally. Also, according to international law, if Cuba was willing to accept these weapons, it was perfectly legitimate to send them. In 1962 Khrushchev decided to send secretly three MRBM and two IRBM regiments to Cuba — a total of about 80 missiles in all. Also sent were 12 tactical, or battlefield, nuclear missiles, to be used by the Soviet commander, at his own discretion, if the island was invaded. Soviet documents released after the ending of the Cold War also suggest that Khrushchev, always a gambler, felt the need to assert himself in the Kremlin, where he still stood in Stalin’s shadow. His only doubt seems to have been that Castro might refuse the missiles, though in fact the Cuban leader accepted them with little hesitation.
THE BLOCKADE
“World War III seemed imminent and, across the globe, terrified people prepared for Armageddon.”
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By August 1962 the first rumors of Soviet missiles in Cuba, from émigré reports and CIA leaks, appeared in the US press. Soviet diplomats, unaware of the project, issued flat denials. This made the sense of shock when they were discovered by a U-2 spy plane, on 14 October 1962, even more profound. Kennedy was stunned. He felt Khrushchev’s conduct was inexplicably provocative. Khrushchev, in fact, had never considered that the presence of missiles in Cuba would be deemed a monstrous threat in the United States. Nor had he realized that Kennedy and the United States would not tolerate the massive blow to their prestige that would result if the weapons were allowed to remain. In fact the weapons would make very little difference to a strategic balance that was massively in America’s favor. But their presence would give the appearance of a weakened America, and in the Cold War
even the ‘doves’ in Excomm were largely agreed that the missiles must go, and without American concessions in return.
appearances were vital. For his part, Kennedy gave no thought to Khrushchev’s motives: the missiles had to be removed, and initially he favored air strikes and an invasion of Cuba to achieve this. Yet the Bay of Pigs had taught Kennedy the dangers of acting impetuously. Within two days, he formed a special advisory group to weigh various options; this was named the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. Excomm — made up of ‘hawks’ who favored the immediate use of force and ‘doves’ who preferred to avoid a conflict – met almost continuously for 13 days and subjected proposals to resolve the crisis to intense scrutiny. The dangers of using force soon became clear. An unprovoked attack, involving air strikes probably followed by an invasion, would be hard to justify; and Castro’s forces would resist and could be expected to fight a prolonged and bitter guerrilla war, the same sort of war they had fought so successfully against Batista. The projected casualties were alarming. Also, large numbers of Soviet technicians would be killed, and this might lead to war between the Superpowers — or Khrushchev might launch the surviving missiles, and at least ten percent of the missiles might survive an air strike. Nevertheless,
RFK: Well, and the fact that if you go there, we’re gonna fire it.
The entire project was meant to be kept secret until the missiles were operational, and then a fait accompli would be presented to the USA, which would have to learn to live with them. But the project was too big to be kept secret for long. The Soviet technicians were told that speed was their first priority and they made few attempts to camouflage their work, which would probably have been impossible completely to disguise anyway.
Yet there was an alternative to invasion — a naval blockade of Cuba, though President Roosevelt’s term ‘quarantine’ was preferred by Kennedy, as it would be seen as less of a warlike act. This would violate international law, and while it would prevent new weapons arriving, might do little to remove those already on Cuba. But it was a limited and measured response, which would avoid forcing Khrushchev into a corner where he have to fight to avoid utter humiliation. If it failed, the military option was still open. Only on the 22 October, when the blockade was prepared, was news of the missiles and America’s response made public. It caused immense shock in the USA and internationally — it had to, to drown out the Soviet response that they were acting legally and responding in kind to US actions in Turkey. Khrushchev’s reply was to bluster that the USSR would assert its rights on the high seas and to accuse Kennedy of bringing the world to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. Throughout the world forces went on high alert. World War III seemed imminent and, across the globe, terrified people prepared
for Armageddon. On 23 October, as 27 Soviet ships headed towards the blockade, many carrying military equipment, presumably including missile parts, Kennedy, who had assumed that Khrushchev would back down, had to consider what to do if his blockade was defied. As the world stood on the brink of nuclear war, news reached Kennedy that the first Soviet ships had stopped and turned back.
A copy of the This opinion is statement I shaped by am making tonigh obsering the deve concering opment developments in of their agressive Cuba and policy. The the reaction of impirialists, with 18
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You can be sure that we will resist with determination, whatever the case. The Cuban people’s morale is extremely high and the people will confront aggression heroically.
Dear Comrade Khrushchev: Given the analysis of the situation and the reports which have reached us, [I] consider an attack to be most imminent--within the next 24 to 72 hours. There are two possible variants: the first and most probable one is an air attack against certain objectives with the limited aim of destroying them; the second, and though less probable, still possible, is a full invasion. This would require a large force and is the most repunant form of agression, which might restrain them. You can be sure that we will resist with
de-
I would like to briefly express my own personal opinion. If the second variant takes place and the imperialists invade Cuba with the aim of occupying it, the dangers of their aggressive policy are so great that after such an invasion the Soviet Union must never allow circumstances in which the imperialists could carry out a nuclear first strike against it. I tell you this because I believe that the imperialists’ aggressiveness makes them extremely dangerous, and that if they manage to carry out an invasion of Cuba-a brutal act in violation of universal and moral law--then that would be the moment to eliminate this danger forever, in an
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act of the most legitimate self-defense.
However harsh
Sir:
and terrible the solution, there would be no other. This opinion is shaped by observing the development
of their
aggressive policy. The imperialists, without regard for world opinion and against laws and principles, have blockaded the seas, violated our air space, and are preparing to invade, while at the same time blocking any possibility of negtiation, even though they understand the gravity of the problem. You have been, and are, a tireless defender of peace, and I understand that these moments, when the results of your superhuman efforts are so seriously threatened, must be bitter for you. We will maintain our hopes for saving the peace until the last moment, and we are ready to contribute to this in any way we can. But, at the same time, we are serene and ready to confront a situation which we see as very real and imminent. I convey to you the infinite gratitude and recognition of the Cuban people to the Soviet people, who have been so generous and fraternal, along with our profound gratitude and admiration to you personally. We wish you success with the enormous task and great responsibilties which are in your hands.
Fraternally, Fidel Castro
A copy of the statement I am making tonight concerning developments in Cuba and the reaction of my Government there to has been handed to your Ambassador in Washington. In view of the gravity of the developments to which I refer, I want you to know immediately and accurately the position of my Government in this matter. In our discussions and exchanges on Berlin and other international questions, the one thing that has most concerned me has been the possibility that your Government would not correctly understand the
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will and determination of the United States in any given situation, since I have not assumed that you or any other sane man would, in this nuclear age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win and which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world, including the aggressor.
It was in order to avoid any incorrect assessment on the part of your Government with respect to Cuba that I publicly stated that if certain developments in Cuba took place, the United States would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies. Moreover, the Congress adopted a resolution expressing its support of this declared policy. Despite this, the rapid development of long-range missile bases and other offensive weapons systems in Cuba has proceeded. I
At our meeting in Vienna and subsequently, I expressed our readiness and desire to find, through peaceful negotiation, a solution to any and all problems that divide us. At the same time, I made clear that in view of the objectives of the ideology to which you adhere, the United States could not tolerate any action on your part which in a major way disturbed the existing over-all balance of power in the world. I stated that an attempt to force abandonment of our responsibilities and commitments in Berlin would constitute such an action and that the United States would resist with all the power at its command.
must tell you that the United States is determined that this threat to the security of this hemisphere be removed. At the same time, I wish to point out that the action we are taking is the minimum necessary to remove the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere. The fact of this minimum response should not be taken as a basis, however, for any misjudgment on your part. I hope that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or deepen this already grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiations.
Sincerely, John F. Kennedy
RESOLVING THE CRISIS
“A resolution had to be found, Aand resolution to be found, quickly,had before Kennedy and before Kennedy panic wasquickly, pushed by the national was pushed by the to national he had generated launchpanic an he had generated attack on Cuba.”to launch an a tack on Cuba.
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Khrushchev’s message seemed to contain the basis of a settlement. But matters took a turn for the worse. A new message was received from Moscow offering a specific deal by which the missiles in both Turkey and Cuba would be removed and the USA and USSR would jointly guarantee the security of both nations.
This was deemed unacceptable by Excomm, as it would mean backing down in the face of Soviet pressure. Yet Kennedy was interested. It was not an unreasonable deal: the Turkish missiles were obsolete and were soon to be withdrawn anyway, and the crisis was escalating. On 27 October a U–2 was shot down over Cuba. it later turned out on the order of the local Soviet commander on his own initiative. But it seemed initially that Khrushchev was escalating the crisis, something he was in fact desperate to avoid. Kennedy
The President said he had talked to Ambassador Stevenson yesterday whose view was that the phrase “peace in the Caribbean” covers subvesion.
The crisis was not over. Nuclear missiles remained on Cuba and Kennedy was determined to remove them. A resolution had to be found, and quickly, before Kennedy was pushed by the national panic he had generated to launch anattack on Cuba. Both leaders, it is clear, had become horrified at the prospects in front of them. Kennedy, desperate to avoid pushing Khrushchev too far, to the disgust of Excomm ‘hawks’, ordered the navy to allow Soviet and Sovietchartered merchant ships not carrying arms to pass unsearched. Khrushchev, for his part, sent a long, rambling letter to Kennedy, appealing to reason and trust to prevent a catastrophe, and insisting that if US threats to Cuba were ended, the issue of weapons would disappear. We now know, from recently released archives, that Castro was urging Khrushchev to use the missiles if Cuba was invaded. Khrushchev’s response was to order his military commander in Cuba to do nothing of the sort without direct orders from Moscow. Thus both sides were under immense pressure to resolve the crisis.
outraged the ‘hawks’ by ordering the Turkish missiles to be disabled to prevent any accident. In the message to Khrushchev agreed by Excomm, Kennedy insisted that the missiles in Cuba must be removed and offered to end the blockade and pledged not to invade Cuba if that happened. But when he delivered it to the Soviet ambassador, Kennedy’s brother, Robert, added a private message that once this was done, after a few months had passed, the Turkish missiles would be withdrawn (which in fact happened in April 1963).
Had Khrushchev rejected the deal, it is likely that an American invasion of Cuba would have been launched within days. Had the Russian used tactical nuclear weapons, whose presence was not suspected by the Americans, a full-scale thermonuclear war would probably a have followed. But Khrushchev, himself desperate to find a settlement and aware that a non–invasion pledge would meet his most important need, did agree. Tedious and frustrating negotiations followed over the means of verifying the departure of the missiles, largely caused by the obstruction of Castro, who was enraged that Khrushchev had not consulted him over the settlement. In the end the Russian ships departed with their hatches uncovered, allowing the Americans to see the missiles leaving. To repay Castro for his awkwardness, Kennedy refused to confirm the pledge not to invade Cuba. In fact, however, it was observed, though small-scale sabotage raids by the CIA continued
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CREDIT AND BLAME
“Perhaps Kennedy felt he had to make a tough stand after the Bay of Pigs, and – though there is no proof of this – he may have had an eye on the impact this would have on the forthcoming election.”
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Certainly once the enormity of the situation became clear to both men, they showed responsible leadership and a determination to find a peaceful resolution. Both rejected hard–line advice and were careful not to escalate the crisis. Khrushchev might even be said to have shown greater courage in making what was publicly seen as the larger concessions. In the aftermath of the crisis they both worked to improve relations and prevent a recurrence of such a confrontation. The ‘hot line’, allowing direct communication between both leaders, was installed and the Partial Test Ban Treaty of September 1963 signified a first step towards arms controls. Kennedy’s hope to build on these steps, brutally ended by his assassination in November 1963, further heightened his statesman– like image. However, both men had acted recklessly in bringing the crisis about. Khrushchev (and Castro) should have realized the dangers of surreptitiously introducing nuclear weapons
into Cuba. They could not realistically be kept secret, and the US reaction should have been predictable. Conventional forces, perhaps a couple of Soviet armored brigades, should have been enough to deter a US invasion of Cuba, without risking a major confrontation. Kennedy, for his part, allowed his vendetta against Castro to overcome good sense. Operation Mongoose was hardly the act of a statesman. He also rejected the use of discreet diplomacy. A secret message to Moscow, requiring the quiet removal of the missiles, might have avoided a confrontation, though admittedly giving Khrushchev the chance to prevaricate until the missiles were operational. But perhaps Kennedy felt he
had to make a tough stand after the Bay of Pigs, and — though there is no proof of this — he may have had an eye on the impact this would have on the forthcoming Congressional elections.
Martin: Well, it’s a psychological factor that we have sat back and let `em do it to us, that is more important than the direct threat...
Kennedy certainly came out of the crisis with a reputation greatly enhanced in the west. Khrushchev, for his part, was deemed by his colleagues to have suffered a humiliation, and the crisis was one of the issues that led to his being deposed in October 1964.
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In the final analysis, the world was fortunate that the greatest crisis of the Cold War arose when it did. In 1962, Kennedy and Khrushchev had days to consider their position and think through their options. At a later date, when technological advances had made missile launch times shorter and submarines quieter and when decisions could be made in minutes, the consequences could easily have been catastrophic. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, both sides were careful to avoid such circumstances. One Cuban Missile Crisis was enough.
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PUBLISHED AT MASON GROSS SCHOOL OF THE ARTS 2017
For 14 days in October 1962, the world stood on the brink of nuclear war. The Soviet Union had secretly stationed nuclear weapons on the island of Cuba and when the government of the United States discovered them and demanded their withdrawal, the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War followed. A single miscalculation made either in the White House or the Kremlin could have precipitated catastrophe. How did this standoff arise? How did the Superpowers extricate themselves from it? Was anything learned from the crisis? Should any party be held more at fault than the other?
JFK: We certainly have been wrong about what he’s trying to do in Cuba. There isn’t any doubt about that [possibly aword uninteligible] . . .
THE CUBAN REVOLUTION
5 In January 1959, Fulgencio Batista, the brutal, American-backed Cuban dictator, was overthrown by the guerrilla army of Fidel Castro Initially president Dwight D.Eisenhower’s administration welcomed the Cuban revolution, for Batista had long been an embarrassing ally, and a friendly, democratic government in Cuba, addressing urgent social reform, would be far more stable and reliable. Yet such views did not last long.
were postponed while Castro secured his grip on power. Yet as ever more vicious anti–American diatribes came from the new leader, his popularity in Cuba grew. In the United States, however, he became increasingly unacceptable. Eisenhower decided that Castro was a communist. Whether this was true then is debatable, but Castro was certainly to turn to communism in the face of US hostility.
For America, Cuba provided a naval base at Guantanamo; it was an exotic, but conveniently close, tourist resort; and low paid Cuban labor made it an attractive investment area, much of the island’s agriculture and industry being American owned. Hence governments in Washington had never hesitated to intervene to protect American interests. The problem `was that Castro could never tackle desperate problems of poverty, ill–health and illiteracy without harming US interests. Indeed to Castro, and to a large proportion of the Cuban people, American domination was a root cause of Cuba’s problems, and it must be ended. Castro in fact articulated a widespread revulsion against this humiliating position. The United States was deeply detested on the island.
Eisenhower ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to overthrow him, and the CIA orchestrated sabotage raids on Cuba to destabilize the regime. Attempts were made to assassinate Castro, reputedly using the mafia (the first of at least eight assassination attempts was planned as early as August 1960). Economic sanctions were imposed, especially against Cuba’s sugar crop, which was its main export. Yet rather than undermine Castro, this hostility made him more secure, and an increasingly bitter and vocal enemy of the United States. In the logic of the Cold War, this made him a potential partner of the Soviet Union. Steadily growing ties with the USSR made him appear a growing threat to US hegemony in the western hemisphere which could not be tolerated.
As American property was expropriated by the new government, Castro’s defeated enemies were treated mercilessly and elections
“Kennedy was probably unaware that there were risks attached to the CIA’s plan. He approved the project...”
THE BAY OF PIGS
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Perhaps Castro hoped that a new president would be less hostile to his revolution. If so, he hoped in vain. Kennedy had used Cuba repeatedly in the election campaign, accusing his Republican opponents of being soft on communism, insisting that Cuba was America’s ‘most glaring failure’, one that endangered the ‘whole Western Hemisphere’. This rhetoric would be difficult to forget once Kennedy was in office. Business interests, alarmed that if Castro was left unpunished he might start a fashion for nationalizing US investments in Latin America, and vocal Cuban exile groups, were determined not to allow him to forget it. Furthermore, Kennedy seems to have been personally offended by Castro, who had defied the might of the United States and refused to be intimidated. Castro’s survival was an affront
to American pride. Kennedy became obsessed with the fear that Castro might prove able to export his revolution to other Latin American nations. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara later admitted the administration was ‘hysterical’ over Castro. Kennedy was even more hostile to Castro than Eisenhower had been, and a great deal less cautious. Kennedy was probably unaware that there were risks attached to the CIA’s plan. He approved the project, which was put together in a remarkably slipshod manner. Mass risings were expected on the basis of nothing more than wishful thinking. Virtually nothing seems to have been done to prepare a new government that might enjoy some degree of popular support. If no mass risings occurred, then the brigade of Cuban exiles was expected to withdraw into the interior and launch a guerrilla campaign. But the chosen landing ground, called the Bay of Pigs, led only to a swamp — and so there was no possibility of this happening. Most bizarrely, Kennedy was
JFK: I would think it would be very valuable to have them go in shortly before the strike, just to build the evidence. I mean, when you’ve got pictures that really show what you were, what was there.
Among the steps taken by the CIA to remove Castro, a brigade of about 1,400 anti — Castro Cuban exiles was raised. The CIA decided to use this force in a large-scale invasion of the island, with the backing of its own air force. This, it was assumed, would trigger mass risings and overthrow Castro’s government. Yet Eisenhower, who had after all been Supreme Allied Commander at D–Day, recognized the risks of failure and hesitated. His successor in January 1961, John F. Kennedy, would be left to decide whether or not to launch the invasion.
BUNDY: How much do we know, uh, [Pat?]? I don’t mean to go behind your judgment here, except that there’s one thing that would be really catastrophic would be to make a judgment here on, on a bad guess as to whether these things are. We mustn’t do that.
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convinced it would be possible to launch this invasion without the world being aware of American involvement. He felt he could convince the international community that Cubans were liberating themselves, using only their own resources. Yet as there was already speculation in the press that the CIA was planning an invasion, this belief was quite astonishing. Kennedy appears to have been swept along by a sense of urgency, and warnings thatthe whole idea was half–baked, for example from Under-secretary of State Chester Bowles, were ignored. Kennedy was not the only one to delude himself. He made it very clear to the CIA that US forces would not intervene if the plan went awry. Senior CIA officers, however, aware of the weaknesses of the plan, remained convinced that once the invasion was launched, US prestige would be so bound up in its success that Kennedy would have to support it. Perhaps this explains why, in April 1961,
they were willing to commit about 1,400 ill–trained, poorly equipped exiles to what became a humiliating fiasco. Everything that could go wrong, did so. Air attacks failed to destroy Castro’s air force completely. Most of the ammunition and communications equipment was destroyed before it could be landed. Castro’s forces fought well, and enjoyed massive popular support. There were no risings, and US forces did nothing to support the exiles. Within two days over 100 exiles had been killed and nearly 1,200 had surrendered.
OPERATION
JFK: But isn’t that. . . . but, as I say, we have to. . . . We never really ever had a case where it’s been quite this, uh. . . . After all, they backed down in, uh, Chinese Commnists in `58. They didn’t go into Laos. Agreed to a ceasefire there.
OPERATION MONGOOSE
11 The Bay of Pigs was a shattering blow to Kennedy, who had to face international ridicule for the fiasco. But Castro did not escape unscathed. Any possibility of mending fences with Washington was lost. He now faced the undying hostility of the United States. A US invasion was not an option in the wake of the Bay of Pigs, since Kennedy could hardly claim to be liberating a people who had rallied to Castro. But the President did authorize the CIA to undertake Operation Mongoose. This amounted to renewed attempts to destabilize the Cuban regime. Sabotage raids multiplied, Castroites were assassinated, foreign suppliers were bribed to send faulty goods to Cuba. Kennedy also warned the Soviet Union against challenging the USA in the western hemisphere. Sending defensive weapons, such as surface to air missiles (SAMs) would be tolerated; surface to surface missiles, which carried nuclear warheads, would not. Perhaps more threateningly, in 1962 a large-scale military exercise was undertaken by US forces in the Caribbean, in which 40,000 military personnel practiced invading an unnamed island to overthrow a dictator threateningly codenamed Ortsac. Kennedy wanted to alarm Castro, and he succeeded. But he also alarmed Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.
The Soviet government had welcomed the Cuban revolution; and as American hostility to it grew, so did Soviet support. Cuba was never really an unquestioning servant of Moscow, but the state was growing increasingly dependent upon Moscow for military and economic aid. In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, Castro had declared his commitment to Communism for the first time. And in Moscow, as in Havana, there was a growing conviction that Kennedy was preparing to invade Cuba. As it was the only communist state in the western hemisphere, Khrushchev could not allow this.
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McNamara: The Soviet Union. In the event that Cuba made any offensive move against this country. Now this lies short of military action against Cuba, direct military action against Cuba. It has some, major defects.
Bundy: Attack who?
SOVIET INITIATIVES
13 Khrushchev also had other concerns. Since the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik 1 in October 1957, Khrushchev had proclaimed an entirely fictitious superiority in Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Kennedy had campaigned for the preidency proclaiming he would match the supposed Soviet advantage, closing the ‘missile gap’ as it was known. Even when he found that the strategic balance was, in reality, heavily in America’s favour, Kennedy still ordered a major expansion of US ICBM forces. Khrushchev, who was desperate to divert resources from the military to domestic reform, was now caught by his own bluff and faced ruinous expense to fill a very real ‘missile gap’ that was in America’s favor. But American actions perhaps suggested a way out for Khrushchev. In 1962 American Jupiter missiles were stationed in Turkey, well within range of Soviet targets. Why not follow their example and station Intermediate Range and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs and MRBMs) in Cuba, where they could threaten most of the continental USA? This would be a cheap way to offset the American missile advantage, it would deter an American invasion of the island, it would be a proportional response to the missiles in Turkey, and it might make the United States more accommodating over other issues, such as Berlin.
West Berlin was a western enclave deep in East Germany. Its very existence repudiated the East German government’s claim to be the legitimate government of all of Germany. Twice (in 1948 and 1958) war had seemed near as the Soviet Union tried to force the west out. In 1961 the Berlin Wall had been built to prevent a mass exodus from East to West Germany. Yet Khrushchev still wished to remove the western presence totally. Also, according to international law, if Cuba was willing to accept these weapons, it was perfectly legitimate to send them. In 1962 Khrushchev decided to send secretly three MRBM and two IRBM regiments to Cuba — a total of about 80 missiles in all. Also sent were 12 tactical, or battlefield, nuclear missiles, to be used by the Soviet commander, at his own discretion, if the island was invaded. Soviet documents released after the ending of the Cold War also suggest that Khrushchev, always a gambler, felt the need to assert himself in the Kremlin, where he still stood in Stalin’s shadow. His only doubt seems to have been that Castro might refuse the missiles, though in fact the Cuban leader accepted them with little hesitation.
THE BLOCKADE
“World War III seemed imminent and, across the globe, terrified people prepared for Armageddon.”
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By August 1962 the first rumors of Soviet missiles in Cuba, from émigré reports and CIA leaks, appeared in the US press. Soviet diplomats, unaware of the project, issued flat denials. This made the sense of shock when they were discovered by a U-2 spy plane, on 14 October 1962, even more profound. Kennedy was stunned. He felt Khrushchev’s conduct was inexplicably provocative. Khrushchev, in fact, had never considered that the presence of missiles in Cuba would be deemed a monstrous threat in the United States. Nor had he realized that Kennedy and the United States would not tolerate the massive blow to their prestige that would result if the weapons were allowed to remain. In fact the weapons would make very little difference to a strategic balance that was massively in America’s favor. But their presence would give the appearance of a weakened America, and in the Cold War
even the ‘doves’ in Excomm were largely agreed that the missiles must go, and without American concessions in return.
appearances were vital. For his part, Kennedy gave no thought to Khrushchev’s motives: the missiles had to be removed, and initially he favored air strikes and an invasion of Cuba to achieve this. Yet the Bay of Pigs had taught Kennedy the dangers of acting impetuously. Within two days, he formed a special advisory group to weigh various options; this was named the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. Excomm — made up of ‘hawks’ who favored the immediate use of force and ‘doves’ who preferred to avoid a conflict – met almost continuously for 13 days and subjected proposals to resolve the crisis to intense scrutiny. The dangers of using force soon became clear. An unprovoked attack, involving air strikes probably followed by an invasion, would be hard to justify; and Castro’s forces would resist and could be expected to fight a prolonged and bitter guerrilla war, the same sort of war they had fought so successfully against Batista. The projected casualties were alarming. Also, large numbers of Soviet technicians would be killed, and this might lead to war between the Superpowers — or Khrushchev might launch the surviving missiles, and at least ten percent of the missiles might survive an air strike. Nevertheless,
RFK: Well, and the fact that if you go there, we’re gonna fire it.
The entire project was meant to be kept secret until the missiles were operational, and then a fait accompli would be presented to the USA, which would have to learn to live with them. But the project was too big to be kept secret for long. The Soviet technicians were told that speed was their first priority and they made few attempts to camouflage their work, which would probably have been impossible completely to disguise anyway.
Yet there was an alternative to invasion — a naval blockade of Cuba, though President Roosevelt’s term ‘quarantine’ was preferred by Kennedy, as it would be seen as less of a warlike act. This would violate international law, and while it would prevent new weapons arriving, might do little to remove those already on Cuba. But it was a limited and measured response, which would avoid forcing Khrushchev into a corner where he have to fight to avoid utter humiliation. If it failed, the military option was still open. Only on the 22 October, when the blockade was prepared, was news of the missiles and America’s response made public. It caused immense shock in the USA and internationally — it had to, to drown out the Soviet response that they were acting legally and responding in kind to US actions in Turkey. Khrushchev’s reply was to bluster that the USSR would assert its rights on the high seas and to accuse Kennedy of bringing the world to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. Throughout the world forces went on high alert. World War III seemed imminent and, across the globe, terrified people prepared
for Armageddon. On 23 October, as 27 Soviet ships headed towards the blockade, many carrying military equipment, presumably including missile parts, Kennedy, who had assumed that Khrushchev would back down, had to consider what to do if his blockade was defied. As the world stood on the brink of nuclear war, news reached Kennedy that the first Soviet ships had stopped and turned back.
A copy of the This opinion is statement I shaped by am making tonigh obsering the deve concering opment developments in of their agressive Cuba and policy. The the reaction of impirialists, with 18
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You can be sure that we will resist with determination, whatever the case. The Cuban people’s morale is extremely high and the people will confront aggression heroically.
Dear Comrade Khrushchev: Given the analysis of the situation and the reports which have reached us, [I] consider an attack to be most imminent--within the next 24 to 72 hours. There are two possible variants: the first and most probable one is an air attack against certain objectives with the limited aim of destroying them; the second, and though less probable, still possible, is a full invasion. This would require a large force and is the most repunant form of agression, which might restrain them. You can be sure that we will resist with
de-
I would like to briefly express my own personal opinion. If the second variant takes place and the imperialists invade Cuba with the aim of occupying it, the dangers of their aggressive policy are so great that after such an invasion the Soviet Union must never allow circumstances in which the imperialists could carry out a nuclear first strike against it. I tell you this because I believe that the imperialists’ aggressiveness makes them extremely dangerous, and that if they manage to carry out an invasion of Cuba-a brutal act in violation of universal and moral law--then that would be the moment to eliminate this danger forever, in an
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act of the most legitimate self-defense.
However harsh
Sir:
and terrible the solution, there would be no other. This opinion is shaped by observing the development
of their
aggressive policy. The imperialists, without regard for world opinion and against laws and principles, have blockaded the seas, violated our air space, and are preparing to invade, while at the same time blocking any possibility of negtiation, even though they understand the gravity of the problem. You have been, and are, a tireless defender of peace, and I understand that these moments, when the results of your superhuman efforts are so seriously threatened, must be bitter for you. We will maintain our hopes for saving the peace until the last moment, and we are ready to contribute to this in any way we can. But, at the same time, we are serene and ready to confront a situation which we see as very real and imminent. I convey to you the infinite gratitude and recognition of the Cuban people to the Soviet people, who have been so generous and fraternal, along with our profound gratitude and admiration to you personally. We wish you success with the enormous task and great responsibilties which are in your hands.
Fraternally, Fidel Castro
A copy of the statement I am making tonight concerning developments in Cuba and the reaction of my Government there to has been handed to your Ambassador in Washington. In view of the gravity of the developments to which I refer, I want you to know immediately and accurately the position of my Government in this matter. In our discussions and exchanges on Berlin and other international questions, the one thing that has most concerned me has been the possibility that your Government would not correctly understand the
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will and determination of the United States in any given situation, since I have not assumed that you or any other sane man would, in this nuclear age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win and which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world, including the aggressor.
It was in order to avoid any incorrect assessment on the part of your Government with respect to Cuba that I publicly stated that if certain developments in Cuba took place, the United States would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies. Moreover, the Congress adopted a resolution expressing its support of this declared policy. Despite this, the rapid development of long-range missile bases and other offensive weapons systems in Cuba has proceeded. I
At our meeting in Vienna and subsequently, I expressed our readiness and desire to find, through peaceful negotiation, a solution to any and all problems that divide us. At the same time, I made clear that in view of the objectives of the ideology to which you adhere, the United States could not tolerate any action on your part which in a major way disturbed the existing over-all balance of power in the world. I stated that an attempt to force abandonment of our responsibilities and commitments in Berlin would constitute such an action and that the United States would resist with all the power at its command.
must tell you that the United States is determined that this threat to the security of this hemisphere be removed. At the same time, I wish to point out that the action we are taking is the minimum necessary to remove the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere. The fact of this minimum response should not be taken as a basis, however, for any misjudgment on your part. I hope that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or deepen this already grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiations.
Sincerely, John F. Kennedy
RESOLVING THE CRISIS
“A resolution had to be found, Aand resolution to be found, quickly,had before Kennedy and before Kennedy panic wasquickly, pushed by the national was pushed by the to national he had generated launchpanic an he had generated attack on Cuba.”to launch an a tack on Cuba.
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Khrushchev’s message seemed to contain the basis of a settlement. But matters took a turn for the worse. A new message was received from Moscow offering a specific deal by which the missiles in both Turkey and Cuba would be removed and the USA and USSR would jointly guarantee the security of both nations.
This was deemed unacceptable by Excomm, as it would mean backing down in the face of Soviet pressure. Yet Kennedy was interested. It was not an unreasonable deal: the Turkish missiles were obsolete and were soon to be withdrawn anyway, and the crisis was escalating. On 27 October a U–2 was shot down over Cuba. it later turned out on the order of the local Soviet commander on his own initiative. But it seemed initially that Khrushchev was escalating the crisis, something he was in fact desperate to avoid. Kennedy
The President said he had talked to Ambassador Stevenson yesterday whose view was that the phrase “peace in the Caribbean” covers subvesion.
The crisis was not over. Nuclear missiles remained on Cuba and Kennedy was determined to remove them. A resolution had to be found, and quickly, before Kennedy was pushed by the national panic he had generated to launch anattack on Cuba. Both leaders, it is clear, had become horrified at the prospects in front of them. Kennedy, desperate to avoid pushing Khrushchev too far, to the disgust of Excomm ‘hawks’, ordered the navy to allow Soviet and Sovietchartered merchant ships not carrying arms to pass unsearched. Khrushchev, for his part, sent a long, rambling letter to Kennedy, appealing to reason and trust to prevent a catastrophe, and insisting that if US threats to Cuba were ended, the issue of weapons would disappear. We now know, from recently released archives, that Castro was urging Khrushchev to use the missiles if Cuba was invaded. Khrushchev’s response was to order his military commander in Cuba to do nothing of the sort without direct orders from Moscow. Thus both sides were under immense pressure to resolve the crisis.
outraged the ‘hawks’ by ordering the Turkish missiles to be disabled to prevent any accident. In the message to Khrushchev agreed by Excomm, Kennedy insisted that the missiles in Cuba must be removed and offered to end the blockade and pledged not to invade Cuba if that happened. But when he delivered it to the Soviet ambassador, Kennedy’s brother, Robert, added a private message that once this was done, after a few months had passed, the Turkish missiles would be withdrawn (which in fact happened in April 1963).
Had Khrushchev rejected the deal, it is likely that an American invasion of Cuba would have been launched within days. Had the Russian used tactical nuclear weapons, whose presence was not suspected by the Americans, a full-scale thermonuclear war would probably a have followed. But Khrushchev, himself desperate to find a settlement and aware that a non–invasion pledge would meet his most important need, did agree. Tedious and frustrating negotiations followed over the means of verifying the departure of the missiles, largely caused by the obstruction of Castro, who was enraged that Khrushchev had not consulted him over the settlement. In the end the Russian ships departed with their hatches uncovered, allowing the Americans to see the missiles leaving. To repay Castro for his awkwardness, Kennedy refused to confirm the pledge not to invade Cuba. In fact, however, it was observed, though small-scale sabotage raids by the CIA continued
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CREDIT AND BLAME
“Perhaps Kennedy felt he had to make a tough stand after the Bay of Pigs, and – though there is no proof of this – he may have had an eye on the impact this would have on the forthcoming election.”
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Certainly once the enormity of the situation became clear to both men, they showed responsible leadership and a determination to find a peaceful resolution. Both rejected hard–line advice and were careful not to escalate the crisis. Khrushchev might even be said to have shown greater courage in making what was publicly seen as the larger concessions. In the aftermath of the crisis they both worked to improve relations and prevent a recurrence of such a confrontation. The ‘hot line’, allowing direct communication between both leaders, was installed and the Partial Test Ban Treaty of September 1963 signified a first step towards arms controls. Kennedy’s hope to build on these steps, brutally ended by his assassination in November 1963, further heightened his statesman– like image. However, both men had acted recklessly in bringing the crisis about. Khrushchev (and Castro) should have realized the dangers of surreptitiously introducing nuclear weapons
into Cuba. They could not realistically be kept secret, and the US reaction should have been predictable. Conventional forces, perhaps a couple of Soviet armored brigades, should have been enough to deter a US invasion of Cuba, without risking a major confrontation. Kennedy, for his part, allowed his vendetta against Castro to overcome good sense. Operation Mongoose was hardly the act of a statesman. He also rejected the use of discreet diplomacy. A secret message to Moscow, requiring the quiet removal of the missiles, might have avoided a confrontation, though admittedly giving Khrushchev the chance to prevaricate until the missiles were operational. But perhaps Kennedy felt he
had to make a tough stand after the Bay of Pigs, and — though there is no proof of this — he may have had an eye on the impact this would have on the forthcoming Congressional elections.
Martin: Well, it’s a psychological factor that we have sat back and let `em do it to us, that is more important than the direct threat...
Kennedy certainly came out of the crisis with a reputation greatly enhanced in the west. Khrushchev, for his part, was deemed by his colleagues to have suffered a humiliation, and the crisis was one of the issues that led to his being deposed in October 1964.
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In the final analysis, the world was fortunate that the greatest crisis of the Cold War arose when it did. In 1962, Kennedy and Khrushchev had days to consider their position and think through their options. At a later date, when technological advances had made missile launch times shorter and submarines quieter and when decisions could be made in minutes, the consequences could easily have been catastrophic. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, both sides were careful to avoid such circumstances. One Cuban Missile Crisis was enough.
38 DESIGNED BY RICHARD SIGGILLINO DESIGN 2A
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SOCURCES: HISTORY TODAY JFK LIBARY
PUBLISHED AT MASON GROSS SCHOOL OF THE ARTS 2017
