The Multifamily Housing Market and Value-at-Risk Implications for ...
D E PAUL UNIVERSITY
institute for housing studies
Working Paper
The Multifamily Housing Market and Value-at-Risk Implications for Multifamily Lending James D. Shilling, Ph.D.
APRIL 2010
I thank David Barker, Stuart Gabriel, and Andrey Pavlov for their comments and suggestions. I also thank the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for their generous support of this research
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS
• Prices of large (7+ unit) rental properties in Cook County have declined from an index value of 166 in the third quarter of 2006 to 123 in the second quarter of 2009, a decline of 26%. Prices of small (2–6 unit) rental properties in Cook County have fallen from an index value of 193 in the second quarter of 2007 to 104 in the second quarter of 2009, a decline of 46%. • Falling property values in Cook County have put roughly $13 billion of multifamily mortgages (or approximately 30% of the total outstanding multifamily mortgage debt) at risk of default. Total value-at-risk for small 2–6 unit rental properties is $12.6 billion. For large 7+ unit rental properties, the total value-at-risk is $747 million. • Falling property values have meant a rise in multifamily foreclosures. Foreclosures on both small (2–6 unit) and large (7+ unit) properties in Cook County have increased considerably in 2009. As a percent of outstanding loans, foreclosures on small (2–6 unit) properties are between 4 to 14%, depending on income submarket. Among large (7+ unit) properties, foreclosures are between 2 to 8% of outstanding loans in the same income submarkets. By loan cohort, foreclosures are led by loans originated between 2005 and 2007, a period of overlending and over-spending. • Multifamily foreclosures on both small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties are estimated to have impacted more than 32,000 units in the Cook County rental market (as of year-end 2009). In contrast, there are currently about 38,000 single-family units in foreclosure in Cook County. • Falling property values have forced many lenders to “pretend and extend.” Lenders have delayed foreclosures on about $1.5 billion of multifamily mortgage debt in Cook County. • Price declines and deleveraging imply less multifamily mortgage lending in Cook County. Multifamily mortgage debt on small 2–6 unit rental properties in Cook County, on average, grew from $17.4 billion in 2004 to $28.8 billion in 2007, an increase of 66%. Debt on large 7+ unit properties also increased significantly over this same time period, from $5.4 billion in 2004 to $12.5 billion in 2007, an increase of 128%. However, new issuance of multifamily mortgage debt on small 2–6 unit properties in Cook County fell to $5 billion in 2008, down 39% from 2007, and fell even further in 2009. Similarly, the new issuance of multifamily mortgage debt on large 7+ unit properties in Cook County fell to $2.7 billion in 2008, down 45% from 2007, and fell again in 2009. • As local lending institutions have scaled backed their lending to large 7+ unit properties in 2008 and 2009, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have essentially become indispensable to the Cook County multifamily mortgage market. The GSEs’ share of the large 7+ unit multifamily mortgage market in Cook County is around 65 to 70% of all lending. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are also indispensable to the small 2–6 unit multifamily mortgage market in Cook County, but for an altogether different reason. • Disinvestment is occurring as rents and property values are declining. Net rental revenues are currently at or below total operating costs for about 74,000 rental units in the city of Chicago. • Certain short-run policy prescriptions are clear from the analysis, including the need for Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac to provide continued liquidity and stability to the multifamily mortgage market in the immediate term. • The analysis also sees an expanded lending role for FHA in the current environment. FHA multifamily lending has always featured financing for the purchase, construction, and substantial rehabilitation of rental properties, and a strong case can be made that, if any one thing is most needed in this environment, it is joint financing for the purchase and rehabilitation of rental properties. • Long-run policy must necessarily take into account the extent to which Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac subsidize interest and create an incentive to take on excessive debt.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the recent property price declines and foreclosure experience on multifamily mortgages in Cook County (Chicago) over the period 1998 to 2009. Falling property prices in Cook County have put roughly $13 billion of multifamily mortgages (or approximately 30% of the total outstanding multifamily mortgage debt) at risk of default; have led to significant disinvestment by landlords; have caused the percent of multifamily mortgage loans in foreclosure to increase to 6.8% (or about $3 billion); have forced lenders to “pretend and extend” about $1.5 billion of multifamily mortgages to date; and have compelled most banks to cut back on their multifamily mortgage lending significantly, raising the question of what will happen as $15 billion of multifamily mortgage debt (or about 33% of the stock of outstanding debt) matures between 2010 and 2015. Fortunately or unfortunately, as it may be, there is Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Combined, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac currently account for 65 to 70% of all multifamily mortgage originations in Cook County. Thus, as it has turned out, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have become an indispensable part of today’s multifamily mortgage market. Yet many policy advocates would like to reduce the size of the portfolios held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in order to limit the taxpayers’ exposure for high risk single-family mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. However, reducing the size of the portfolios held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the current environment could, all things considered, make the multifamily housing market worse off and the resulting volatility could impose large welfare losses on tenants. The policy implications for the multifamily housing market, however, are markedly different over a longer run than in the immediate situation. Long-run policy, extending beyond the next five years, must necessarily take into account the extent to which Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac subsidize interest and create an incentive to take on excessive debt. Too much debt, as we have seen, can have a destabilizing effect on markets. Thus, over a longer run the theory supports a much more targeted policy approach in dealing with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 2. TREND IN MULTIFAMILY PROPERTY PRICES
This section analyzes the trends in property prices for both small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties in Cook County over the past decade. The methodology used to estimate these price trends is the repeat sales methodology. The data are collected from the Cook County Recorder property sales data. The study analyzes 25,822 repeat sales of small 2–6 unit rental properties and 591 repeat sales of large 7+ unit rental properties. All seventy-seven community areas of Chicago (including 935 census tracts) as well as North Shore suburbs such as Winnetka and Evanston, northwest suburbs such as Schaumburg, Arlington Heights, and parts of Barrington, western suburbs such as Oak Park and La Grange, and south suburbs such as Homewood and Harvey are included in our sample. The sample period is from 1991 to 2009 and all data are quarterly. The methodology measures average price changes in repeat sales of the same property. A multivariate regression is employed to compute the average price changes across the different properties within the sample. Prices of large 7+ unit rental properties in Cook County, after rising dramatically through the 2000s, fell from an index value of 166 in the third quarter of 2006 to 123 in the second quarter of 2009, a decline of 26% (see Figure 1). In real terms, using the Consumer Price Index for Chicago to correct for inflation, the decline in value between these two dates is 30%. The decline is quite similar to the price declines that are taking place in virtually all other multifamily property markets in the U.S.; for example, the NPI apartment price index, a nationwide index of multifamily properties acquired in the private market for investment purposes only by institutional investors, has fallen 21% from its peak in the second quarter of 2008.1 In real terms the NPI apartment price index fell 24%. Figure 1 also plots the data on prices of small 2–6 unit rental buildings in Cook County over the same time period. Beginning in the second quarter of 2007, property prices of small 2–6 unit rental buildings in Cook County started to fall. For another year and a half, the price of small 2–6 unit rental properties falls (as shown in Figure 1) from 193 to 103, a decrease of 46%. The real price decline (deflated using the Consumer Price Index for Chicago)
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Figure 1
Repeat Sales Index of Mul=family Proper=es REPEAT SALES INDEX OF MULTIFAMILY PROPERTIES
Mul=family Property Price Index for Cook County
Price Index (100= 2000 Q1)
250
2-‐6 Unit Structures
7+ Unit Structures
200 150 100 50 0
1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 0Q 0Q 1Q 1Q 2Q 2Q 3Q 3Q 4Q 4Q 5Q 5Q 6Q 6Q 7Q 7Q 8Q 8Q 9Q 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Source: Ins=tute for Housing Studies, DePaul University. January 2010
between the second quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 2009 is 48%, in this case partly sparked by a much bigger run-up in price than we saw in large 7+ unit rental buildings—between the first quarter of 2000 and the second quarter of 2007 (price peak), prices of small 2–6 unit rental buildings in Cook County increased by 61% in real terms, whereas prices of large 7+ unit rental properties increased by only 43% (from the first quarter of 2000 to the third quarter of 2006). These price declines raise a series of concerns, many of which have not been examined before. For example, what is the overall value-at-risk within the multifamily mortgage market that is implied by current property prices? How much of this value-at-risk is coming from loans that were bad from the beginning (where investors over-spent and/or over-levered)? How has this value-at-risk affected the sudden downturn in lending activities within the multifamily mortgage market? Has the multifamily housing market been seriously impaired as a result? Has the value-at-risk grown so large that risky loans are being automatically rolled over as they mature? Would we expect a large number of the impacted rental properties to filter down in value and are we at risk of permanently losing a portion of the foreclosed inventory? What policy prescriptions follow from this assessment? To begin to address these questions, a loss assessment is conducted in the next section using current or contemporaneous debt-tovalue ratios. 3. CONTEMPORANEOUS DEBT-TO-VALUE RATIOS
Falling property values have put scores of multifamily borrowers into extremely vulnerable situations. A simple way to measure the extent of this vulnerability is via current loan-to-value ratios. While a high loan-to-value ratio (i.e., a loan-to-value ratio in excess of 100%) is, by itself, not a sufficient condition to force a borrower into default, it tends to be the main characteristic (for obvious reasons) influencing the default decision. To compute current loan-to-value ratio measures, the following procedure is used. The calculations begin with the actual loan-to-value ratio at loan origination on small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties (which are inferred from mortgage title information). The increases or decreases in the property price index are then used to update the property’s market value over time. The current outstanding principal amount of the loan is computed by finding the loan’s proportion outstanding factor (an amount that depends on three factors—the contract interest rate, the mortgage maturity, and the holding period) and multiplying this factor by the original loan amount. The loan’s contract interest rate and its mortgage maturity are approximated by using survey interest rates and maturities on multifamily mortgages reported for the nation on the whole and matched to origination year. The properties are then ranked on loan-to-value and assigned to one of seven groups.
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Figure 2A VALUE-AT-RISK ANALYSIS FOR SMALL 2–6 UNIT PROPERTIES Value at Risk Analysis for Small 2‐6 Unit Proper:es Current Measures of Loan to Value
% of Proper:es
25%
21.09%
20%
14.14%
14.07%
15% 8.66%
10% 5%
22.89%
3.48%
5.75%
5.39%
0% 50‐60%
60‐70%
70‐80%
80‐90%
90‐100%
100‐110%
110‐120%
120% or Higher
Loan to Value Ra:o Source, Ins6tute for Housing Studies, January 2010
Figure 2a shows the loan-to-value distribution for small 2–6 unit properties in Cook County as of the second quarter of 2009. Clearly, the distribution is highly skewed to the right. There are 96,000 properties (or 42% of the 2–6 unit universe) with loan-to-value ratios in excess of 100%, and another 30,000 properties (or 21% of the universe) have a loan-to-value ratio between 90 and 100%. Strikingly, 8,000 properties (or 5% of the universe) have loan-to-value ratios in excess of 120%. Figure 2B VALUE-AT-RISK ANALYSIS FOR LARGE 7+ PROPERTIES Value at Risk Analysis for Large 7+ Proper8es Current Measures of Loan to Value % of Proper8es
30%
24.86%
25.36%
25% 20%
15.71%
15.07%
15% 10%
7.06%
4.59%
5%
0.67%
0.05%
110‐120%
120% or Higher
0% 50‐60%
60‐70%
Source, Ins6tute for Housing Studies, January 2010
70‐80%
80‐90%
90‐100%
Loan to Value Ra8o
100‐110%
Figure 2b shows the comparable loan-to-value distribution for large 7+ unit properties in Cook County. The pattern in Figure 2b is much the same as in Figure 2a, although a bit less extreme. Within the top three loan-to-value size categories, there are 475 properties (or about 5% of the 7+ unit universe). One implication of these findings is that there is real potential for defaults to occur (as we are beginning to see) on both small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties.2 In dollar terms, the total value-at-risk VaR on both small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties in Cook County (when measured by the percent of properties in the top loan-to-value size category (120% LTV) in Figures 2a and 2b) is $1.6 billion.3 In contrast, when using the top two loan-to-value size categories in Figures 2a and 2b to measure value-at-risk VaR, the loss exposure is in excess of $6 billion. Obviously, there are several influences that could easily increase the above value-at-risk VaR estimate. Particularly, further property price declines could easily increase value-at-risk VaR. Or lenders could become unwilling to roll over existing loans, causing defaults to rise at loan maturity. Or there could be a further increase in vacancies or decrease in rents, setting off further cash flow problems. Further, there is a significant amount of skewness in the distributions in Figures 2a and 2b. To illustrate, the effect of an additional 10 to 15% decline in property prices would be to increase total value-at-risk VaR in Cook County to about $12.5 billion, which is highly significant.
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Figure 3 MULTIFAMILY FORECLOSURE RATE IN COOK COUNTY BY PROPERTY TYPE Mul$family Foreclosure Rate in Cook County by Property Type Percentage of Loans in Foreclosure*
% of Loans in Foreclosure
2‐6 Unit Property
7+ Unit Property
All Mul:family
12.0% 10.0% 8.0% 6.0% 4.0% 2.0% 0.0% 2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Source: Ins:tute for Housing Studies, DePaul University, January 2010 * Calculated based on outstanding loan amounts.
Were one to draw conclusions from these estimates, one would have to conclude that lenders in Cook County (or nationwide for that matter) are hardly in a position to absorb these potential losses. Assuming the loss exposure calculated above for Cook County can be applied to the other 3,141 counties in the U.S. (albeit a heroic assumption), and re-weighting the results to reflect the actual distribution of small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties nationwide,4 the total value-at-risk VaR for the nation as whole is estimated to be between $300 and $700 billion, which puts the total value-at-risk VaR on par with the subprime mortgage meltdown.5 4. MULTIFAMILY DEFAULT RATES
In 2009, new foreclosure filings continued at a record pace. With the exception of the second quarter of 2009, new foreclosure filings on both small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties were higher than in the same quarter of the previous year. On 2–6 unit rental properties, new foreclosure filings are between 1,900 and 2,100 per quarter. On large 7+ unit rental properties, new foreclosure filings are between 50 and 100 per quarter. 4.1. EIGHTEEN-MONTH TRAILING FORECLOSURE INVENTORY
The eighteen-month trailing foreclosure inventory on both small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties in Cook County in the fourth quarter of 2009 is up year-over-year (see Figure 3). Further, as can be seen in Figure 3, the inventory of foreclosures has substantially gone up in Cook County over the past several years, both on small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties.6 Five years ago, the foreclosure rate (percent of loans in foreclosure) on small 2–6 unit properties was only 1.67%. In contrast, in the fourth quarter of 2009, the foreclosure rate on small 2–6 unit rental properties was in excess of 8.75%. This is a sea-change of behavior.7 Similarly, on large 7+ unit rental properties, foreclosure rates have increased from 0.3% in 2004, to 0.7% in 2007, and to approximately 3% in the fourth quarter of 2009. These numbers generally reflect the trends in the national multifamily CMBS market (see Figure 4). Figure 3 highlights another crucially important fact. The solid gray line in Figure 3 represents the mean foreclosure rate on all multifamily properties in Cook County. Here a foreclosure rate of approximately 7% means that about $3 billion of multifamily mortgage loans in Cook County are currently (as of the fourth quarter of 2009) in foreclosure. Surprisingly enough, these numbers translate into a total number of multifamily rental units impacted of more than 32,000. In contrast, there are currently about 38,000 single-family units in foreclosure in Cook County (which suggests that the multifamily rental market has not been spared in the current financial crisis).
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Figure 4 Foreclosure Rate of Large 7+ Unit Proper@es in Cook County and FORECLOSURE RATE OF LARGE 7+ UNIT PROPERTIES Na@onal Mul@family CMBS Market IN COOK COUNTY AND NATIONAL MULTIFAMILY CMBS MARKET
Foreclosure Rate on 7+ Unit ProperDes
Foreclosure Rate on MulDfamily CMBS SecuriDes
% of Loans in Foreclosure
4.00% 3.50% 3.00% 2.50% 2.00% 1.50% 1.00% 0.50% 0.00% 2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Source: InsDtute for Housing Studies, DePaul University, January 2010 TREPP Inc, CMBS Data, complied by the InsDtute for Housing Studies, January 2010
4.2 FORECLOSURE RATES BY LOAN COHORT
Of the multifamily mortgages originated on small 2–6 unit rental properties between 2005 and 2007 around 15% have already gone into foreclosure (see Figure 5). In contrast, of the multifamily mortgages originated on small 2–6 unit rental properties between 2000 and 2004 the cumulative foreclosure rate is only 5%. It is not easy for so many loans originated between 2005 and 2007 to go into foreclosure unless these loans were bad almost at the first – i.e., unless they suffered from over-lending and over-spending from the beginning. For the earlier loan vintages, there appears to be something of a flattening out of defaults, suggesting that perhaps the early defaults on these loans were “rotten apples” and unusual from the beginning, and now that they have subsequently defaulted we may see less defaults going forward, that is, until the loan matures and the borrower is forced to come up with additional collateral to offset the decline in property value, creating significant risk that these mortgages will default on their principal at loan maturity. The total size of the 2005–2007 loan cohort is quite large. In contrast to the earlier loan cohorts, the 2005–2007 loan cohort of multifamily mortgages originated on small 2–6 unit properties represents about 88% of the total stock of outstanding mortgage debt on small 2–6 unit properties in Cook County. It is certainly possible for foreclosure rates on the loan cohorts 2005–2007 to have higher default rates than loans originated in earlier years. One of the paradoxes of mortgage lending is that lenders do not initially know when property prices are inflated and when they are not. Another paradox is that lenders generally make their worst loans during periods of rising property values, when both good and bad borrowers rush to borrow, over-spending and over-levering along the way. As a result, cohort effects in mortgages can be significant and persistent. Figure 5 MULTIFAMILY FORECLOSURE RATES IN COOK COUNTY Mul$family Foreclosure Rates in Cook County
Foreclosurates by Loan Cohort % of Loans in Foreclosure
0.16
2000
0.14
2001
0.12
2002
0.1
2003
0.08
2004
0.06
2005
0.04
2006
0.02
2007 2008
0 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Loan Age Source: Ins8tute for Housing Studies, DePaul University, January 2010
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Not too surprising, the foreclosure rates of multifamily mortgages originated on large 7+ unit rental properties between 2005 and 2007 are also quite high. Of the multifamily mortgages originated on large 7+ unit rental properties in Cook County between 2005 and 2007, the cumulative foreclosure rate is between 3 and 4.2%. In contrast, on multifamily mortgages originated on large 7+ unit rental properties before 2005, the foreclosure rate is only approximately 2%; surely much more manageable from a public policy perspective. However, as was discussed earlier, the total value-at-risk on large 7+ unit rental properties could essentially increase the foreclosure rate by 1.67 times. Further, it needs to be pointed out that the 2005-2007 loan cohort of multifamily mortgages originated on large 7+ unit rental properties is nearly $11 billion in size, which is approximately 79% of the total stock of outstanding mortgage debt on large 7+ unit rental properties in Cook County. Of these loans, the total VaR is considerably greater than it is on those loans originated before 2005. 4.3 FORECLOSURE RATES BY INCOME SUBMARKETS
Multifamily foreclosures in Cook County are highly concentrated (at least 3 to 4 times higher in concentration) in low- and moderate-income markets compared to high-income markets. To illustrate, in low- and moderateincome markets, multifamily foreclosure rates (as of the fourth quarter of 2009) are as high as 13.9% on small 2–6 unit rental properties and 7.8% on large 7+ unit rental properties. In contrast, in high-income markets multifamily foreclosure rates are only 4.2% on small 2–6 unit rental properties and approximately 2% on large 7+ unit rental properties (see Figure 6).
Figure 6
COOK COUNTY FORECLOSURE RATE BY INCOME SUBMARKETS AND PROPERTY TYPE 2–6 Units
7 or More Units
Year Low*
Moderate
High
Low
Moderate
High
1999
3.5%
2.2%
0.5%
0.8%
0.7%
0.1%
2000
4.2%
2.5%
0.5%
0.7%
0.3%
0.0%
2001
6.0%
2.1%
0.8%
1.7%
0.8%
0.1%
2002
7.0%
2.9%
0.9%
2.5%
1.2%
0.2%
2003
4.6%
2.6%
0.7%
1.0%
0.9%
0.2%
2004
5.2%
2.5%
0.7%
3.3%
0.6%
0.1%
2005
4.7%
2.3%
0.5%
2.3%
0.5%
0.0%
2006
6.2%
3.1%
0.8%
1.6%
0.9%
0.8%
2007
9.6%
5.0%
1.7%
3.1%
1.4%
0.1%
2008
12.7%
7.4%
2.4%
3.5%
2.5%
0.1%
2009
13.9%
10.8%
4.2%
7.8%
4.3%
2.1%
* The low-income submarket includes all census tracts where median household income in 2000 was less than 150% of poverty level income for a family of four in 2000 ($26,405). The moderate-income submarket includes all census tracts where 2000 median income for the tract was between 150% and 300% of poverty level income (up to $52,809). The high-income submarket includes all tracts where median income was higher than 300% of household income (above $52,809). Source: Institute for Housing Studies, DePaul University
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As to why foreclosures are highly concentrated in low- and moderate-income markets, the possible explanations are several: the economic recession has had significant impacts on low- and moderate-income households. As a result, low- and moderate-income households have seen their incomes drop considerably. This drop in household income has generally worsened rental affordability for most low- and moderate-income households, despite the fact that rents have dropped. Further, the reduced affordability has meant high overall vacancy rates and lower net effective rents in low- and moderate-income markets, placing strains on property cash flows in these markets. 4.4 FORECLOSURE RATES BY AREA SUBMARKET
By submarket, the highest foreclosure rates on small 2–6 unit rental properties are being experienced by the West, South, and Northwest submarkets. There are 7,000 small 2–6 unit rental properties in foreclosure (representing 21,000 units) located in these three concentrated geographic areas. These 21,000 units constitute over 75% of the small 2–6 unit rental foreclosed inventory in the city of Chicago. Among large 7+ unit rental properties, the highest foreclosure rates are in the West, South, and Northwest submarkets (see Figure 7). These three concentrated geographic areas contain over 65% of the large 7+ unit rental foreclosed inventory (representing 5,000 units). Figure 7 OUTSTANDING FORECLOSURES OF PROPERTIES WITH SEVEN OR MORE UNITS IN CHICAGO, 2009 Q2
Chicago Community Areas 1 – Rogers Park 2 – West Ridge 3 – Uptown 4 – Lincoln Square 5 – North Center 6 – Lake View 7 – Lincoln Park 8 – Near North Side 9 – Edison Park 10 – Norwood Park 11 – Jefferson Park 12 – Forest Glen 13 – North Park 14 – Albany Park 15 – Portage Park 16 – Irving Park 17 – Dunning 18 – Montclare 19 – Belmont Cragin 20 – Hermosa 21 – Avondale 22 – Logan Square 23 – Humboldt Park 24 – West Town 25 – Austin 26 – West Garfield Park 27 – East Garfield Park 28 – Near West Side 29 – North Lawndale 30 – South Lawndale 31 – Lower West Side 32 – Loop 33 – Near South Side 34 – Armour Square 35 – Douglas 36 – Oakland 37 – Fuller Park 38 – Grand Boulevard 39 – Kenwood
40 – Washington Park 41 – Hyde Park 42 – Woodlawn 43 – South Shore 44 – Chatham 45 – Avalon Park 46 – South Chicago 47 – Burnside 48 – Calumet Heights 49 – Roseland 50 – Pullman 51 – South Deering 52 – East Side 53 – West Pullman 54 – Riverdale 55 – Hegewisch 56 – Garfield Ridge 57 – Archer Heights 58 – Brighton Park 59 – McKinley Park 60 – Bridgeport 61 – New City 62 – West Elsdon 63 – Gage Park 64 – Clearing 65 – West Lawn 66 – Chicago Lawn 67 – West Englewood 68 – Englewood 69 – Greater Grand Crossing 70 – Ashburn 71 – Auburn Gresham 72 – Beverly 73 – Washington Heights 74 – Mount Greenwood 75 – Morgan Park 76 – O’Hare 77 – Edgewater
Source: Record Information Services, Cook County Recorder of Deeds data, and U.S. Census Bureau.
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In suburban Cook County, multifamily foreclosure rates are generally much lower than in the city of Chicago as a whole. Suburban Cook County contains approximately 22% (or 161,000 units) of the total rental housing stock in the county. However, suburban Cook County only accounts for 15% (representing 6,500 units) of the multifamily foreclosures in 2009. Further, most rental submarkets in suburban Cook County have foreclosure rates between 0 and 7 % on small 2–6 unit rental properties and between 0 and 1% on large 7+ unit rental properties. 5. MULTIFAMILY LENDING
From a micro perspective, as prices fall, lenders generally become unwilling (and justifiably so) to make any new loans or roll over any existing loans. Under these conditions, lending generally stops (this includes lending on new projects as well as lending to existing projects). While such behavior may be rational from a micro perspective, it can, nonetheless, be counterproductive (as we are seeing today) from a macro perspective. The data reveal an epic decrease in multifamily lending activity in Cook County. Over the period 2004-2007, as illustrated in Figure 8, multifamily mortgage debt on small (2–6 unit) rental properties in Cook County grew from $17 billion in 2004 to $29 billion in 2007, an increase of 70%. Debt on large (7+ unit) rental properties also increased significantly over this same time period, from $5 billion in 2004 to $13 billion in 2007, an increase of 160%. Several reasons for this expansion suggest themselves, ranging from the complete and absolute mispricing of risk, to more liberal lending policies, and to financial deepening (with a broadening of multifamily securitization markets). 0.6604 1.285531 Since 2007, however, conditions in the multifamily mortgage market have changed dramatically. For example, new issuance of multifamily mortgage debt in Cook County in the first half of 2009 reached only $2.4 billion, 2‐6 Unit 7+ down 51% from the first half down 66% from the first half of 2007 (see Figure 9). This decline is 1997 of 2008, 12.01 and 4.55 13.22 4.97 certainly tied to softening1998 conditions in the Cook County rental market. As we have mentioned in a recent IHS 1999 14.74 5.18 2000 14.76 5.51 report, rental markets on the South and West sides of Chicago have witnessed rising vacancies and declining real 2001 15.05 5.54 rents in 2009. One driver2002 is the massive loss 15.25 5.68 of jobs over the past 18 months. According to the Bureau of Labor 2003 17.34 5.18 and Job Statisctics, more 2004 than 186,000 jobs 17.40 5.49 were lost in the Chicago Metropolitan area, which includes Naperville 2005 8.46 and Joliet, from November 200824.87 to November 2009. These job losses are high and are expected to remain high 2006 27.31 10.31 for the next two years. Further, these losses (despite the economic growth we have seen in 2009, and despite 2007 28.90 job 12.54 2008 29.15 14.99 the recent surprise fall in 2009 the jobless rate) have negatively affected the rent-to-income ratios of many renter 29.39 13.78 households, and have caused some households to double up or move back with family members, reducing the overall demand for multifamily housing.
Figure 8
Outstanding Mortgage on Mul6family Proper6es in Cook County OUTSTANDING MORTGAGE ON MULTIFAMILY PROPERTIES IN COOK COUNTY
Debt ($Billions)
40.00 20.00 0.00 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
7+ Unit Rental ProperUes
2‐6 Unit Rental ProperUes
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Source: InsUtute for Housing Studies, DePaul University, January 2010
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Figure 9 TOTAL MULTIFAMILY MORTGAGE ORIGINATIONS Total Mul-family Mortgage Origina-ons in Cook County IN COOK COUNTY
Total Mortgage Amounts ($Millions)
6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 1997 1997 1998 1998 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 Source: InsDtute for Housing Studies, DePaul University, January 2010
13,685,107,673.39
5.1 ADJUSTING CREDIT FLOWS FOR FALLING PROPERTY PRICES The impact of falling property prices on multifamily credit flows in Cook County is shown in Figure 10. Figure 10 plots the actual growth in multifamily credit in Cook County and a credit impulse function measuring the change in multifamily credit relative to multifamily property prices.8 As credit growth has turned negative, multifamily property prices have fallen, implying less overall need for credit. Thus, as shown in Figure 10, our credit impulse function for Cook County turns down less than the actual observed decline in multifamily credit flows during the period 2005-2008. Further, the figure shows a significant upturn in actual multifamily credit flows in 2009 Credit Impulse Credit Flow (measured by the Pleft axis), but only in a relative sense. Actual multifamily credit growth in 2009 is still quite 33.99 36.32 is observed in the credit impulse function (measured by the right axis). The credit negative. A similar pattern 39.63 ‐8.6% ‐5.1% impulse function for in both 2008 and 2009, which says not enough multifamily lending Cook 43.85 County ‐0.2% is negative ‐5.1% 47.86 0.6% 9.4% activity is taking place in Cook County even after conditioning on the (albeit lower) price of multifamily properties. 52.08 2.6% 10.0% 56.72
‐2.2%
6.2%
Obviously, one of the leading causes of the sharp change in the flow of multifamily mortgage credit is the steep 61.72 6.1% 2.0% 69.69 ‐0.2% 2.0% decline in the demand for multifamily CMBS debt over this time period. The decline in multifamily CMBS new 76.64 ‐1.6% 2.0% 75.21 ‐2.0% ‐6.2% issuances began in the third quarter of 2007, but no material setback occurred until the third quarter of 2008. 61.09 ‐6.8% ‐9.4% 9 Since then, the multifamily CMBS 54.81 ‐4.3% market ‐6.6% has been negatively impacted by property market conditions. One obvious way in which this affects multifamily originations is through liquidity costs. Without an active multifamily CMBS market (essentially for mortgages on large 7+ unit rental properties), lenders are less likely to make loans because they are forced to keep the loans on their balance sheet and suffer the liquidity costs. Figure 10 ACTUAL MULTIFAMILY CREDIT FLOWS & CREDIT IMPULSE Actual Mul)family Credit Flows & Credit Impulse Func)ons for Cook FUNCTIONS FOR COOK COUNTY County Credit Impulse
Actual Credit Growth, %
15%
8% 6% 4% 2% 0% ‐2% ‐4% ‐6% ‐8% ‐10%
10% 5% 0% ‐5% ‐10% ‐15% 1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Flow of New Credit Rela)ve to Property Price, %
Credit Flow/Growth
2009
Source: InsYtute for Housing Studiees, DePaul University, January 2010
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Credit Flow/Growth D FLOWS P FORCredit Impulse Credit Flow 5.2 ADJUSTING CREDIT INCOME SUBMARKETS D P CI (AFF85%
Percent of Loans with LTV >85%
Average LTV
Average LTV
% with LTV greater than 85% Average LTV % with LTV+'Mort RaBo for different LTV greater than 85% 80%
60%
30%
20%
20%
10%
10%
0%
0%
50% 40%
09
08
20
07
20
06
20
05
20
04
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
20
99
20
98
19
97
19
96
19
95
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
19
19
91
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Notice that there have been cycles in the loan-to-value ratios on both small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties, with the proportion of small 2–6 unit multifamily loans with loan-to-value ratios above 85% increasing in the mid-1990s, then falling in the late 1990s, only to rise again in the late 2000s. Strikingly, the proportion of large 7+ unit multifamily loans with loan-to-value ratios above 85% increased significantly in the late 2000s.
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But too much debt can have a destabilizing effect on markets. Thus, the rise in multifamily loans with loan-tovalue ratios above 85% during the late 2000s is hard to justify from a macro perspective. Further, any policy—like GSE subsidized interest—that creates an incentive for too much debt is hard to justify. However, to some extent GSE subsidized interest can be justified as a means of promoting affordable rental housing (assuming the promotion of affordable rental housing is correcting a market failure in the supply of housing). Further, the use of GSE funds to purchase mortgages on multifamily residential housing affordable to very low- and low-income families could make these neighborhoods better off, which means less dislocation costs and lower state and local tax burdens in the future. 11.3 OTHER INTERVENTIONS
Additional interventions like ways of improving on the Community Reinvestment Act or increased tax breaks for landlords (or perhaps income transfers and/or human capital programs) can be rationalized as follows. Holding rents constant, a decrease in leverage (coming about as a result of the deleveraging process that the economy is going through) implies an increase in the weighted average cost of capital and a corresponding decrease in the price of rental housing. But with the cost of providing decent and affordable rental housing held constant, a decrease in property price renders the supply of low- and moderately-priced rental dwelling units financially infeasible. Fundamentally, the problem involved is the high cost of constructing multifamily homes in most communities (a condition which has existed for some time). Also, declines in household incomes in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods have not helped the situation much. Ideally, then, if the production of more and better affordable rental housing is desirable, one obvious solution is for more federally-regulated bank community redevelopment, tougher affordable housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or even increased tax breaks for landlords providing multifamily residential housing affordable to very low and low-income families (these tax breaks are loosely related to housing finance), or perhaps some combination of these three elements.
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ENDNOTES
1 An important problem to realize is that the NPI Index is based on appraised values, and incorporates information into prices much later than transaction prices. In contrast, our repeat sales methodology is based on actual transactions prices. 2 Value-at-risk VaR is expected to be different among small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties. Among the possible reasons are that lending terms (i.e., the loan-to-value ratio, the contract interest rate, the debt-service coverage ratio, and the mortgage maturity) are different among small 2–6 unit rental properties compared with large 7+ unit rental properties. Also, prices of small 2–6 unit rental properties are more susceptible to vacancy spells than are prices of large 7+ unit rental properties, in that if you have a duplex and one unit is vacant, the vacancy rate is 50%. However, if you have a 10-unit rental property and one unit is vacant, the vacancy rate is 10%, which has obvious implications for the value-at-risk VaR on small 2–6 unit rental properties versus large 7+ unit rental properties. 3 Total value-at-risk VaR is calculated by the formula: percent value-at-risk VaR on small 2–6 unit rental properties in Cook County x Outstanding Mortgage Debt on small 2–6 unit rental properties + percent valueat-risk VaR on large 7+ unit rental properties in Cook County x Outstanding Mortgage Debt on large 7+ unit rental properties. The formula makes clear that total value-at-risk VaR is a matter of degree that depends sensitively on the upper tail of the loan-to-value distribution and on the amount of mortgage debt outstanding on small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties. 4 The vast majority of the multifamily housing stock in Cook County (62% of the universe) consists of small 2–6 unit rental properties. That means that Cook County is very much different from most counties in the US. In other counties in the US, small 2–6 unit rental properties generally make up only a small portion (about 20%) of the multifamily housing stock (at least according to American Community Survey data). 5 Outstanding mortgage data used for the purpose of these value-at-risk VaR calculations are the estimates of the Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds. We take the outstanding mortgage debt on small 2–6 unit rental properties nationwide to be about $1.3 trillion (estimated using a fair-share formula based on number of multifamily dwelling units by size of structure) and the outstanding mortgage debt on large 7+ unit rental properties nationwide to be $824 billion (estimated as a residual, by deducting total mortgage debt on multifamily buildings having 5 or 6 units from total multifamily mortgage debt). 6 The foreclosures inventory is an eighteen month trailing calculation from foreclosure filing data obtained from Record Information Services and Property Insight. 7 These increases have occurred despite the moratorium that started in the second quarter of 2009 on foreclosures that prevented lenders from foreclosing for up to 3 months. Moreover, we are told anecdotally that many lenders earlier in the year instituted a self-imposed moratorium on foreclosures aimed at reducing the extended waiting times to take possession of a property because of a longstanding backlog of cases. 8 Our credit impulse function is defined as the year-over-year change in the flow of new multifamily credit relative to the multifamily property price level over time. Thus, if credit changes at a relatively stable rate, the credit impulse function will be zero. If credit growth is volatile, however, changes in the credit impulse function could be large. 9 Total CMBS lending in the US reached a height of $230 billion in 2007, falling to $12 billion in 2008, and falling further to $3 billion in 2009. 10 This market share calculation is the true market share prior to 2008 and an upper bound of the true market share thereafter, given that for the latter period we estimated loan purchases made by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by identifying all loans originated by qualified Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac lenders during this time period and then assuming 100% of these loans are sold. This apparent upward bias in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s
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share of the market is offset, however, to some extent by a downward bias created by not including in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s total loan purchases of seasoned loans purchased from qualified lenders. 11 Two sources of data are central to our estimation of the number of small 2-4 rental properties in Cook County. Compiled from the 2000 Census, we have the total number of 5+ rental units in Cook County. Data from the Cook County Assessor’s Office (for 2000) gives us the total number of 7+ rental units in Cook County. Accordingly, the total number of 5-6 rental units in Cook County is the difference between these two values. Performing this calculation yields a value of 19,442 units. Then, we can subtract this value from the total number of 2–6 rental units in Cook County (for 2000) to obtain an estimate of the total number of 2–4 rental units. This calculation yields a value of 152,434 units (= 171,876 units in small 2–6 unit rental properties – 19,442 units in 5-6 unit rental properties), which is 90% of the total 2–6 rental units in Cook County. 12 It is noteworthy that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac multifamily loans generally have lower interest rates, longer amortizations, and smaller down payments than those on alternative but comparable loans (which, in effect, mean a lower total cost to the borrower). Typically, a 5, 7, 10, 15, or 30-year term is permitted on loans purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Additionally, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will normally allow a loan-to-value ratio of 70 to 75% compared to 60 to 65% on loans provided by institutional lenders. 13 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together also guarantee $52 billion in multifamily mortgage loans on large 5+ unit rental properties. Thus, between Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, they own or back more than $241 billion of multifamily mortgage loans (or around 27% of the $905 billion in US multifamily mortgages outstanding on large 5+ unit rental properties). 14 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together also guarantee $52 billion in multifamily mortgage loans on large 5+ unit rental properties. Thus, between Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, they own or back more than $241 billion of multifamily mortgage loans (or around 27% of the $905 billion in US multifamily mortgages outstanding on large 5+ unit rental properties). 15 The affordability ratio of existing homes (i.e., the ratio of actual household income to qualifying income needed to own a median single-family home) has increased to 1.66 times nationwide and to slightly over 2.00 times in the Midwest, as per the National Association of Realtors. 16 If income is expected to rise again, so that rents will again rise, it may pay to hold the deteriorating units vacant rather than to demolish today and re-build later. In addition, if population is growing, it could also be better to mothball deteriorating units rather than to demolish today and re-build later. 17 Other transaction costs (e.g., the cost of moving) and access to credit may also inhibit the switch from renting to owning. 18 In addition to looking at Cook County as a whole, the value-at-risk VaR analysis looked at four different submarkets based on the percentage of affordable units in each market. For instance, in the “least affordable” market, affordable rental units (for a family of four with an income 150% of poverty) make up less than 30% of the total rental housing stock. Inversely, in the “most affordable” market, affordable units make up more than 70% of the total rental housing stock. In the “less affordable” and the “more affordable” markets affordable housing make up 30-50% and 51-70% of the rental housing stock respectively. 19 For evidence that foreclosure costs are potentially large, see Dan Immergluck and Geoff Smith. 2006. “The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime,” Housing Studies 21(6): 851–866. See also John Harding, Eric Rosenblatt, and V.W. Yao. 2008. “The Contagion Effect of Foreclosed Properties,” Unpublished working paper, and William Apgar and Mark Duda. 2005. “Collateral Damage: the Municipal Impact of Today’s Mortgage Foreclosure Boom,” Minneapolis: Homeownership Preservation Foundation. Anecdotal evidence suggests that foreclosures can massive tenant dislocations, especially among small 2–6 unit rental properties located in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. Further, as the inventory of
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foreclosures and potential foreclosures rise, tenant dislocations will generally rise. 20 The model estimated is 1nD t = 1na 0 + a 1 1nt = a 2 t 2 where D t is the ratio of defaults to the original number of mortgages at mortgage age t and t is the duration of the mortgage. The value of a 0 governs the amplitude of the default curve and the variations in a 1 and a 2 govern the time shape of the default curve. For the period 2005-2009, the complete equation estimated for multifamily mortgage loans on small 2–6 unit rental properties is lnD t = –2.65 + 0.059lnt – 0.11t 2 with R 2 = 0.73 The equation estimated for multifamily mortgage loans on large 7+ unit rental properties is lnD t = –3.83 + 0.715lnt – 0.106t 2 with R 2 = 0.32 21 For the period 2000-2004, the complete equation estimated for small 2–6 unit multifamily mortgage loans is lnD t = –3.92 + 0.655lnt – 0.03t 2 with R 2 = 0.85 The equation estimated for large 7+ unit multifamily mortgage loans is lnD t = –5.33 + 0.157lnt – 0.026t 2 with R 2 = 0.34 22 The simulations are performed under the following assumptions. We set a 0 = x (which governs the amplitude 2 of default), and a 1 = x and a 2 = x (which govern the time shape of defaults) to obtain D t = a 0 t a1 e a2t . We then solve this model for all mortgage ages t to determine the level of default rates. Results of the simulations are shown in figures 15 and 16.
The Institute for Housing Studies (IHS) is a multidisciplinary academic research center that provides data and analysis to inform housing-related policy and resource allocation decisions. IHS was created in 2007 as part of Preservation Compact, a multifaceted initiative to preserve Chicago-area affordable rental housing launched by the Urban Land Institute/Chicago and a coalition of public and private partners, including DePaul, with funding from The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Office Location:
Mailing Address:
14 E. Jackson Blvd., Suite 900
1 E. Jackson Blvd.
Chicago, IL 60604
Chicago, IL 60604-2201
Phone: (312) 362-5906 E-mail: [email protected] Web: ihs.depaul.edu
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institute for housing studies
Working Paper
The Multifamily Housing Market and Value-at-Risk Implications for Multifamily Lending James D. Shilling, Ph.D.
APRIL 2010
I thank David Barker, Stuart Gabriel, and Andrey Pavlov for their comments and suggestions. I also thank the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for their generous support of this research
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS
• Prices of large (7+ unit) rental properties in Cook County have declined from an index value of 166 in the third quarter of 2006 to 123 in the second quarter of 2009, a decline of 26%. Prices of small (2–6 unit) rental properties in Cook County have fallen from an index value of 193 in the second quarter of 2007 to 104 in the second quarter of 2009, a decline of 46%. • Falling property values in Cook County have put roughly $13 billion of multifamily mortgages (or approximately 30% of the total outstanding multifamily mortgage debt) at risk of default. Total value-at-risk for small 2–6 unit rental properties is $12.6 billion. For large 7+ unit rental properties, the total value-at-risk is $747 million. • Falling property values have meant a rise in multifamily foreclosures. Foreclosures on both small (2–6 unit) and large (7+ unit) properties in Cook County have increased considerably in 2009. As a percent of outstanding loans, foreclosures on small (2–6 unit) properties are between 4 to 14%, depending on income submarket. Among large (7+ unit) properties, foreclosures are between 2 to 8% of outstanding loans in the same income submarkets. By loan cohort, foreclosures are led by loans originated between 2005 and 2007, a period of overlending and over-spending. • Multifamily foreclosures on both small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties are estimated to have impacted more than 32,000 units in the Cook County rental market (as of year-end 2009). In contrast, there are currently about 38,000 single-family units in foreclosure in Cook County. • Falling property values have forced many lenders to “pretend and extend.” Lenders have delayed foreclosures on about $1.5 billion of multifamily mortgage debt in Cook County. • Price declines and deleveraging imply less multifamily mortgage lending in Cook County. Multifamily mortgage debt on small 2–6 unit rental properties in Cook County, on average, grew from $17.4 billion in 2004 to $28.8 billion in 2007, an increase of 66%. Debt on large 7+ unit properties also increased significantly over this same time period, from $5.4 billion in 2004 to $12.5 billion in 2007, an increase of 128%. However, new issuance of multifamily mortgage debt on small 2–6 unit properties in Cook County fell to $5 billion in 2008, down 39% from 2007, and fell even further in 2009. Similarly, the new issuance of multifamily mortgage debt on large 7+ unit properties in Cook County fell to $2.7 billion in 2008, down 45% from 2007, and fell again in 2009. • As local lending institutions have scaled backed their lending to large 7+ unit properties in 2008 and 2009, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have essentially become indispensable to the Cook County multifamily mortgage market. The GSEs’ share of the large 7+ unit multifamily mortgage market in Cook County is around 65 to 70% of all lending. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are also indispensable to the small 2–6 unit multifamily mortgage market in Cook County, but for an altogether different reason. • Disinvestment is occurring as rents and property values are declining. Net rental revenues are currently at or below total operating costs for about 74,000 rental units in the city of Chicago. • Certain short-run policy prescriptions are clear from the analysis, including the need for Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac to provide continued liquidity and stability to the multifamily mortgage market in the immediate term. • The analysis also sees an expanded lending role for FHA in the current environment. FHA multifamily lending has always featured financing for the purchase, construction, and substantial rehabilitation of rental properties, and a strong case can be made that, if any one thing is most needed in this environment, it is joint financing for the purchase and rehabilitation of rental properties. • Long-run policy must necessarily take into account the extent to which Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac subsidize interest and create an incentive to take on excessive debt.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the recent property price declines and foreclosure experience on multifamily mortgages in Cook County (Chicago) over the period 1998 to 2009. Falling property prices in Cook County have put roughly $13 billion of multifamily mortgages (or approximately 30% of the total outstanding multifamily mortgage debt) at risk of default; have led to significant disinvestment by landlords; have caused the percent of multifamily mortgage loans in foreclosure to increase to 6.8% (or about $3 billion); have forced lenders to “pretend and extend” about $1.5 billion of multifamily mortgages to date; and have compelled most banks to cut back on their multifamily mortgage lending significantly, raising the question of what will happen as $15 billion of multifamily mortgage debt (or about 33% of the stock of outstanding debt) matures between 2010 and 2015. Fortunately or unfortunately, as it may be, there is Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Combined, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac currently account for 65 to 70% of all multifamily mortgage originations in Cook County. Thus, as it has turned out, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have become an indispensable part of today’s multifamily mortgage market. Yet many policy advocates would like to reduce the size of the portfolios held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in order to limit the taxpayers’ exposure for high risk single-family mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. However, reducing the size of the portfolios held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the current environment could, all things considered, make the multifamily housing market worse off and the resulting volatility could impose large welfare losses on tenants. The policy implications for the multifamily housing market, however, are markedly different over a longer run than in the immediate situation. Long-run policy, extending beyond the next five years, must necessarily take into account the extent to which Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac subsidize interest and create an incentive to take on excessive debt. Too much debt, as we have seen, can have a destabilizing effect on markets. Thus, over a longer run the theory supports a much more targeted policy approach in dealing with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 2. TREND IN MULTIFAMILY PROPERTY PRICES
This section analyzes the trends in property prices for both small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties in Cook County over the past decade. The methodology used to estimate these price trends is the repeat sales methodology. The data are collected from the Cook County Recorder property sales data. The study analyzes 25,822 repeat sales of small 2–6 unit rental properties and 591 repeat sales of large 7+ unit rental properties. All seventy-seven community areas of Chicago (including 935 census tracts) as well as North Shore suburbs such as Winnetka and Evanston, northwest suburbs such as Schaumburg, Arlington Heights, and parts of Barrington, western suburbs such as Oak Park and La Grange, and south suburbs such as Homewood and Harvey are included in our sample. The sample period is from 1991 to 2009 and all data are quarterly. The methodology measures average price changes in repeat sales of the same property. A multivariate regression is employed to compute the average price changes across the different properties within the sample. Prices of large 7+ unit rental properties in Cook County, after rising dramatically through the 2000s, fell from an index value of 166 in the third quarter of 2006 to 123 in the second quarter of 2009, a decline of 26% (see Figure 1). In real terms, using the Consumer Price Index for Chicago to correct for inflation, the decline in value between these two dates is 30%. The decline is quite similar to the price declines that are taking place in virtually all other multifamily property markets in the U.S.; for example, the NPI apartment price index, a nationwide index of multifamily properties acquired in the private market for investment purposes only by institutional investors, has fallen 21% from its peak in the second quarter of 2008.1 In real terms the NPI apartment price index fell 24%. Figure 1 also plots the data on prices of small 2–6 unit rental buildings in Cook County over the same time period. Beginning in the second quarter of 2007, property prices of small 2–6 unit rental buildings in Cook County started to fall. For another year and a half, the price of small 2–6 unit rental properties falls (as shown in Figure 1) from 193 to 103, a decrease of 46%. The real price decline (deflated using the Consumer Price Index for Chicago)
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Figure 1
Repeat Sales Index of Mul=family Proper=es REPEAT SALES INDEX OF MULTIFAMILY PROPERTIES
Mul=family Property Price Index for Cook County
Price Index (100= 2000 Q1)
250
2-‐6 Unit Structures
7+ Unit Structures
200 150 100 50 0
1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 0Q 0Q 1Q 1Q 2Q 2Q 3Q 3Q 4Q 4Q 5Q 5Q 6Q 6Q 7Q 7Q 8Q 8Q 9Q 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Source: Ins=tute for Housing Studies, DePaul University. January 2010
between the second quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 2009 is 48%, in this case partly sparked by a much bigger run-up in price than we saw in large 7+ unit rental buildings—between the first quarter of 2000 and the second quarter of 2007 (price peak), prices of small 2–6 unit rental buildings in Cook County increased by 61% in real terms, whereas prices of large 7+ unit rental properties increased by only 43% (from the first quarter of 2000 to the third quarter of 2006). These price declines raise a series of concerns, many of which have not been examined before. For example, what is the overall value-at-risk within the multifamily mortgage market that is implied by current property prices? How much of this value-at-risk is coming from loans that were bad from the beginning (where investors over-spent and/or over-levered)? How has this value-at-risk affected the sudden downturn in lending activities within the multifamily mortgage market? Has the multifamily housing market been seriously impaired as a result? Has the value-at-risk grown so large that risky loans are being automatically rolled over as they mature? Would we expect a large number of the impacted rental properties to filter down in value and are we at risk of permanently losing a portion of the foreclosed inventory? What policy prescriptions follow from this assessment? To begin to address these questions, a loss assessment is conducted in the next section using current or contemporaneous debt-tovalue ratios. 3. CONTEMPORANEOUS DEBT-TO-VALUE RATIOS
Falling property values have put scores of multifamily borrowers into extremely vulnerable situations. A simple way to measure the extent of this vulnerability is via current loan-to-value ratios. While a high loan-to-value ratio (i.e., a loan-to-value ratio in excess of 100%) is, by itself, not a sufficient condition to force a borrower into default, it tends to be the main characteristic (for obvious reasons) influencing the default decision. To compute current loan-to-value ratio measures, the following procedure is used. The calculations begin with the actual loan-to-value ratio at loan origination on small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties (which are inferred from mortgage title information). The increases or decreases in the property price index are then used to update the property’s market value over time. The current outstanding principal amount of the loan is computed by finding the loan’s proportion outstanding factor (an amount that depends on three factors—the contract interest rate, the mortgage maturity, and the holding period) and multiplying this factor by the original loan amount. The loan’s contract interest rate and its mortgage maturity are approximated by using survey interest rates and maturities on multifamily mortgages reported for the nation on the whole and matched to origination year. The properties are then ranked on loan-to-value and assigned to one of seven groups.
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Figure 2A VALUE-AT-RISK ANALYSIS FOR SMALL 2–6 UNIT PROPERTIES Value at Risk Analysis for Small 2‐6 Unit Proper:es Current Measures of Loan to Value
% of Proper:es
25%
21.09%
20%
14.14%
14.07%
15% 8.66%
10% 5%
22.89%
3.48%
5.75%
5.39%
0% 50‐60%
60‐70%
70‐80%
80‐90%
90‐100%
100‐110%
110‐120%
120% or Higher
Loan to Value Ra:o Source, Ins6tute for Housing Studies, January 2010
Figure 2a shows the loan-to-value distribution for small 2–6 unit properties in Cook County as of the second quarter of 2009. Clearly, the distribution is highly skewed to the right. There are 96,000 properties (or 42% of the 2–6 unit universe) with loan-to-value ratios in excess of 100%, and another 30,000 properties (or 21% of the universe) have a loan-to-value ratio between 90 and 100%. Strikingly, 8,000 properties (or 5% of the universe) have loan-to-value ratios in excess of 120%. Figure 2B VALUE-AT-RISK ANALYSIS FOR LARGE 7+ PROPERTIES Value at Risk Analysis for Large 7+ Proper8es Current Measures of Loan to Value % of Proper8es
30%
24.86%
25.36%
25% 20%
15.71%
15.07%
15% 10%
7.06%
4.59%
5%
0.67%
0.05%
110‐120%
120% or Higher
0% 50‐60%
60‐70%
Source, Ins6tute for Housing Studies, January 2010
70‐80%
80‐90%
90‐100%
Loan to Value Ra8o
100‐110%
Figure 2b shows the comparable loan-to-value distribution for large 7+ unit properties in Cook County. The pattern in Figure 2b is much the same as in Figure 2a, although a bit less extreme. Within the top three loan-to-value size categories, there are 475 properties (or about 5% of the 7+ unit universe). One implication of these findings is that there is real potential for defaults to occur (as we are beginning to see) on both small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties.2 In dollar terms, the total value-at-risk VaR on both small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties in Cook County (when measured by the percent of properties in the top loan-to-value size category (120% LTV) in Figures 2a and 2b) is $1.6 billion.3 In contrast, when using the top two loan-to-value size categories in Figures 2a and 2b to measure value-at-risk VaR, the loss exposure is in excess of $6 billion. Obviously, there are several influences that could easily increase the above value-at-risk VaR estimate. Particularly, further property price declines could easily increase value-at-risk VaR. Or lenders could become unwilling to roll over existing loans, causing defaults to rise at loan maturity. Or there could be a further increase in vacancies or decrease in rents, setting off further cash flow problems. Further, there is a significant amount of skewness in the distributions in Figures 2a and 2b. To illustrate, the effect of an additional 10 to 15% decline in property prices would be to increase total value-at-risk VaR in Cook County to about $12.5 billion, which is highly significant.
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Figure 3 MULTIFAMILY FORECLOSURE RATE IN COOK COUNTY BY PROPERTY TYPE Mul$family Foreclosure Rate in Cook County by Property Type Percentage of Loans in Foreclosure*
% of Loans in Foreclosure
2‐6 Unit Property
7+ Unit Property
All Mul:family
12.0% 10.0% 8.0% 6.0% 4.0% 2.0% 0.0% 2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Source: Ins:tute for Housing Studies, DePaul University, January 2010 * Calculated based on outstanding loan amounts.
Were one to draw conclusions from these estimates, one would have to conclude that lenders in Cook County (or nationwide for that matter) are hardly in a position to absorb these potential losses. Assuming the loss exposure calculated above for Cook County can be applied to the other 3,141 counties in the U.S. (albeit a heroic assumption), and re-weighting the results to reflect the actual distribution of small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties nationwide,4 the total value-at-risk VaR for the nation as whole is estimated to be between $300 and $700 billion, which puts the total value-at-risk VaR on par with the subprime mortgage meltdown.5 4. MULTIFAMILY DEFAULT RATES
In 2009, new foreclosure filings continued at a record pace. With the exception of the second quarter of 2009, new foreclosure filings on both small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties were higher than in the same quarter of the previous year. On 2–6 unit rental properties, new foreclosure filings are between 1,900 and 2,100 per quarter. On large 7+ unit rental properties, new foreclosure filings are between 50 and 100 per quarter. 4.1. EIGHTEEN-MONTH TRAILING FORECLOSURE INVENTORY
The eighteen-month trailing foreclosure inventory on both small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties in Cook County in the fourth quarter of 2009 is up year-over-year (see Figure 3). Further, as can be seen in Figure 3, the inventory of foreclosures has substantially gone up in Cook County over the past several years, both on small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties.6 Five years ago, the foreclosure rate (percent of loans in foreclosure) on small 2–6 unit properties was only 1.67%. In contrast, in the fourth quarter of 2009, the foreclosure rate on small 2–6 unit rental properties was in excess of 8.75%. This is a sea-change of behavior.7 Similarly, on large 7+ unit rental properties, foreclosure rates have increased from 0.3% in 2004, to 0.7% in 2007, and to approximately 3% in the fourth quarter of 2009. These numbers generally reflect the trends in the national multifamily CMBS market (see Figure 4). Figure 3 highlights another crucially important fact. The solid gray line in Figure 3 represents the mean foreclosure rate on all multifamily properties in Cook County. Here a foreclosure rate of approximately 7% means that about $3 billion of multifamily mortgage loans in Cook County are currently (as of the fourth quarter of 2009) in foreclosure. Surprisingly enough, these numbers translate into a total number of multifamily rental units impacted of more than 32,000. In contrast, there are currently about 38,000 single-family units in foreclosure in Cook County (which suggests that the multifamily rental market has not been spared in the current financial crisis).
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Figure 4 Foreclosure Rate of Large 7+ Unit Proper@es in Cook County and FORECLOSURE RATE OF LARGE 7+ UNIT PROPERTIES Na@onal Mul@family CMBS Market IN COOK COUNTY AND NATIONAL MULTIFAMILY CMBS MARKET
Foreclosure Rate on 7+ Unit ProperDes
Foreclosure Rate on MulDfamily CMBS SecuriDes
% of Loans in Foreclosure
4.00% 3.50% 3.00% 2.50% 2.00% 1.50% 1.00% 0.50% 0.00% 2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Source: InsDtute for Housing Studies, DePaul University, January 2010 TREPP Inc, CMBS Data, complied by the InsDtute for Housing Studies, January 2010
4.2 FORECLOSURE RATES BY LOAN COHORT
Of the multifamily mortgages originated on small 2–6 unit rental properties between 2005 and 2007 around 15% have already gone into foreclosure (see Figure 5). In contrast, of the multifamily mortgages originated on small 2–6 unit rental properties between 2000 and 2004 the cumulative foreclosure rate is only 5%. It is not easy for so many loans originated between 2005 and 2007 to go into foreclosure unless these loans were bad almost at the first – i.e., unless they suffered from over-lending and over-spending from the beginning. For the earlier loan vintages, there appears to be something of a flattening out of defaults, suggesting that perhaps the early defaults on these loans were “rotten apples” and unusual from the beginning, and now that they have subsequently defaulted we may see less defaults going forward, that is, until the loan matures and the borrower is forced to come up with additional collateral to offset the decline in property value, creating significant risk that these mortgages will default on their principal at loan maturity. The total size of the 2005–2007 loan cohort is quite large. In contrast to the earlier loan cohorts, the 2005–2007 loan cohort of multifamily mortgages originated on small 2–6 unit properties represents about 88% of the total stock of outstanding mortgage debt on small 2–6 unit properties in Cook County. It is certainly possible for foreclosure rates on the loan cohorts 2005–2007 to have higher default rates than loans originated in earlier years. One of the paradoxes of mortgage lending is that lenders do not initially know when property prices are inflated and when they are not. Another paradox is that lenders generally make their worst loans during periods of rising property values, when both good and bad borrowers rush to borrow, over-spending and over-levering along the way. As a result, cohort effects in mortgages can be significant and persistent. Figure 5 MULTIFAMILY FORECLOSURE RATES IN COOK COUNTY Mul$family Foreclosure Rates in Cook County
Foreclosurates by Loan Cohort % of Loans in Foreclosure
0.16
2000
0.14
2001
0.12
2002
0.1
2003
0.08
2004
0.06
2005
0.04
2006
0.02
2007 2008
0 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Loan Age Source: Ins8tute for Housing Studies, DePaul University, January 2010
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Not too surprising, the foreclosure rates of multifamily mortgages originated on large 7+ unit rental properties between 2005 and 2007 are also quite high. Of the multifamily mortgages originated on large 7+ unit rental properties in Cook County between 2005 and 2007, the cumulative foreclosure rate is between 3 and 4.2%. In contrast, on multifamily mortgages originated on large 7+ unit rental properties before 2005, the foreclosure rate is only approximately 2%; surely much more manageable from a public policy perspective. However, as was discussed earlier, the total value-at-risk on large 7+ unit rental properties could essentially increase the foreclosure rate by 1.67 times. Further, it needs to be pointed out that the 2005-2007 loan cohort of multifamily mortgages originated on large 7+ unit rental properties is nearly $11 billion in size, which is approximately 79% of the total stock of outstanding mortgage debt on large 7+ unit rental properties in Cook County. Of these loans, the total VaR is considerably greater than it is on those loans originated before 2005. 4.3 FORECLOSURE RATES BY INCOME SUBMARKETS
Multifamily foreclosures in Cook County are highly concentrated (at least 3 to 4 times higher in concentration) in low- and moderate-income markets compared to high-income markets. To illustrate, in low- and moderateincome markets, multifamily foreclosure rates (as of the fourth quarter of 2009) are as high as 13.9% on small 2–6 unit rental properties and 7.8% on large 7+ unit rental properties. In contrast, in high-income markets multifamily foreclosure rates are only 4.2% on small 2–6 unit rental properties and approximately 2% on large 7+ unit rental properties (see Figure 6).
Figure 6
COOK COUNTY FORECLOSURE RATE BY INCOME SUBMARKETS AND PROPERTY TYPE 2–6 Units
7 or More Units
Year Low*
Moderate
High
Low
Moderate
High
1999
3.5%
2.2%
0.5%
0.8%
0.7%
0.1%
2000
4.2%
2.5%
0.5%
0.7%
0.3%
0.0%
2001
6.0%
2.1%
0.8%
1.7%
0.8%
0.1%
2002
7.0%
2.9%
0.9%
2.5%
1.2%
0.2%
2003
4.6%
2.6%
0.7%
1.0%
0.9%
0.2%
2004
5.2%
2.5%
0.7%
3.3%
0.6%
0.1%
2005
4.7%
2.3%
0.5%
2.3%
0.5%
0.0%
2006
6.2%
3.1%
0.8%
1.6%
0.9%
0.8%
2007
9.6%
5.0%
1.7%
3.1%
1.4%
0.1%
2008
12.7%
7.4%
2.4%
3.5%
2.5%
0.1%
2009
13.9%
10.8%
4.2%
7.8%
4.3%
2.1%
* The low-income submarket includes all census tracts where median household income in 2000 was less than 150% of poverty level income for a family of four in 2000 ($26,405). The moderate-income submarket includes all census tracts where 2000 median income for the tract was between 150% and 300% of poverty level income (up to $52,809). The high-income submarket includes all tracts where median income was higher than 300% of household income (above $52,809). Source: Institute for Housing Studies, DePaul University
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As to why foreclosures are highly concentrated in low- and moderate-income markets, the possible explanations are several: the economic recession has had significant impacts on low- and moderate-income households. As a result, low- and moderate-income households have seen their incomes drop considerably. This drop in household income has generally worsened rental affordability for most low- and moderate-income households, despite the fact that rents have dropped. Further, the reduced affordability has meant high overall vacancy rates and lower net effective rents in low- and moderate-income markets, placing strains on property cash flows in these markets. 4.4 FORECLOSURE RATES BY AREA SUBMARKET
By submarket, the highest foreclosure rates on small 2–6 unit rental properties are being experienced by the West, South, and Northwest submarkets. There are 7,000 small 2–6 unit rental properties in foreclosure (representing 21,000 units) located in these three concentrated geographic areas. These 21,000 units constitute over 75% of the small 2–6 unit rental foreclosed inventory in the city of Chicago. Among large 7+ unit rental properties, the highest foreclosure rates are in the West, South, and Northwest submarkets (see Figure 7). These three concentrated geographic areas contain over 65% of the large 7+ unit rental foreclosed inventory (representing 5,000 units). Figure 7 OUTSTANDING FORECLOSURES OF PROPERTIES WITH SEVEN OR MORE UNITS IN CHICAGO, 2009 Q2
Chicago Community Areas 1 – Rogers Park 2 – West Ridge 3 – Uptown 4 – Lincoln Square 5 – North Center 6 – Lake View 7 – Lincoln Park 8 – Near North Side 9 – Edison Park 10 – Norwood Park 11 – Jefferson Park 12 – Forest Glen 13 – North Park 14 – Albany Park 15 – Portage Park 16 – Irving Park 17 – Dunning 18 – Montclare 19 – Belmont Cragin 20 – Hermosa 21 – Avondale 22 – Logan Square 23 – Humboldt Park 24 – West Town 25 – Austin 26 – West Garfield Park 27 – East Garfield Park 28 – Near West Side 29 – North Lawndale 30 – South Lawndale 31 – Lower West Side 32 – Loop 33 – Near South Side 34 – Armour Square 35 – Douglas 36 – Oakland 37 – Fuller Park 38 – Grand Boulevard 39 – Kenwood
40 – Washington Park 41 – Hyde Park 42 – Woodlawn 43 – South Shore 44 – Chatham 45 – Avalon Park 46 – South Chicago 47 – Burnside 48 – Calumet Heights 49 – Roseland 50 – Pullman 51 – South Deering 52 – East Side 53 – West Pullman 54 – Riverdale 55 – Hegewisch 56 – Garfield Ridge 57 – Archer Heights 58 – Brighton Park 59 – McKinley Park 60 – Bridgeport 61 – New City 62 – West Elsdon 63 – Gage Park 64 – Clearing 65 – West Lawn 66 – Chicago Lawn 67 – West Englewood 68 – Englewood 69 – Greater Grand Crossing 70 – Ashburn 71 – Auburn Gresham 72 – Beverly 73 – Washington Heights 74 – Mount Greenwood 75 – Morgan Park 76 – O’Hare 77 – Edgewater
Source: Record Information Services, Cook County Recorder of Deeds data, and U.S. Census Bureau.
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In suburban Cook County, multifamily foreclosure rates are generally much lower than in the city of Chicago as a whole. Suburban Cook County contains approximately 22% (or 161,000 units) of the total rental housing stock in the county. However, suburban Cook County only accounts for 15% (representing 6,500 units) of the multifamily foreclosures in 2009. Further, most rental submarkets in suburban Cook County have foreclosure rates between 0 and 7 % on small 2–6 unit rental properties and between 0 and 1% on large 7+ unit rental properties. 5. MULTIFAMILY LENDING
From a micro perspective, as prices fall, lenders generally become unwilling (and justifiably so) to make any new loans or roll over any existing loans. Under these conditions, lending generally stops (this includes lending on new projects as well as lending to existing projects). While such behavior may be rational from a micro perspective, it can, nonetheless, be counterproductive (as we are seeing today) from a macro perspective. The data reveal an epic decrease in multifamily lending activity in Cook County. Over the period 2004-2007, as illustrated in Figure 8, multifamily mortgage debt on small (2–6 unit) rental properties in Cook County grew from $17 billion in 2004 to $29 billion in 2007, an increase of 70%. Debt on large (7+ unit) rental properties also increased significantly over this same time period, from $5 billion in 2004 to $13 billion in 2007, an increase of 160%. Several reasons for this expansion suggest themselves, ranging from the complete and absolute mispricing of risk, to more liberal lending policies, and to financial deepening (with a broadening of multifamily securitization markets). 0.6604 1.285531 Since 2007, however, conditions in the multifamily mortgage market have changed dramatically. For example, new issuance of multifamily mortgage debt in Cook County in the first half of 2009 reached only $2.4 billion, 2‐6 Unit 7+ down 51% from the first half down 66% from the first half of 2007 (see Figure 9). This decline is 1997 of 2008, 12.01 and 4.55 13.22 4.97 certainly tied to softening1998 conditions in the Cook County rental market. As we have mentioned in a recent IHS 1999 14.74 5.18 2000 14.76 5.51 report, rental markets on the South and West sides of Chicago have witnessed rising vacancies and declining real 2001 15.05 5.54 rents in 2009. One driver2002 is the massive loss 15.25 5.68 of jobs over the past 18 months. According to the Bureau of Labor 2003 17.34 5.18 and Job Statisctics, more 2004 than 186,000 jobs 17.40 5.49 were lost in the Chicago Metropolitan area, which includes Naperville 2005 8.46 and Joliet, from November 200824.87 to November 2009. These job losses are high and are expected to remain high 2006 27.31 10.31 for the next two years. Further, these losses (despite the economic growth we have seen in 2009, and despite 2007 28.90 job 12.54 2008 29.15 14.99 the recent surprise fall in 2009 the jobless rate) have negatively affected the rent-to-income ratios of many renter 29.39 13.78 households, and have caused some households to double up or move back with family members, reducing the overall demand for multifamily housing.
Figure 8
Outstanding Mortgage on Mul6family Proper6es in Cook County OUTSTANDING MORTGAGE ON MULTIFAMILY PROPERTIES IN COOK COUNTY
Debt ($Billions)
40.00 20.00 0.00 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
7+ Unit Rental ProperUes
2‐6 Unit Rental ProperUes
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Source: InsUtute for Housing Studies, DePaul University, January 2010
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Figure 9 TOTAL MULTIFAMILY MORTGAGE ORIGINATIONS Total Mul-family Mortgage Origina-ons in Cook County IN COOK COUNTY
Total Mortgage Amounts ($Millions)
6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 1997 1997 1998 1998 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 Source: InsDtute for Housing Studies, DePaul University, January 2010
13,685,107,673.39
5.1 ADJUSTING CREDIT FLOWS FOR FALLING PROPERTY PRICES The impact of falling property prices on multifamily credit flows in Cook County is shown in Figure 10. Figure 10 plots the actual growth in multifamily credit in Cook County and a credit impulse function measuring the change in multifamily credit relative to multifamily property prices.8 As credit growth has turned negative, multifamily property prices have fallen, implying less overall need for credit. Thus, as shown in Figure 10, our credit impulse function for Cook County turns down less than the actual observed decline in multifamily credit flows during the period 2005-2008. Further, the figure shows a significant upturn in actual multifamily credit flows in 2009 Credit Impulse Credit Flow (measured by the Pleft axis), but only in a relative sense. Actual multifamily credit growth in 2009 is still quite 33.99 36.32 is observed in the credit impulse function (measured by the right axis). The credit negative. A similar pattern 39.63 ‐8.6% ‐5.1% impulse function for in both 2008 and 2009, which says not enough multifamily lending Cook 43.85 County ‐0.2% is negative ‐5.1% 47.86 0.6% 9.4% activity is taking place in Cook County even after conditioning on the (albeit lower) price of multifamily properties. 52.08 2.6% 10.0% 56.72
‐2.2%
6.2%
Obviously, one of the leading causes of the sharp change in the flow of multifamily mortgage credit is the steep 61.72 6.1% 2.0% 69.69 ‐0.2% 2.0% decline in the demand for multifamily CMBS debt over this time period. The decline in multifamily CMBS new 76.64 ‐1.6% 2.0% 75.21 ‐2.0% ‐6.2% issuances began in the third quarter of 2007, but no material setback occurred until the third quarter of 2008. 61.09 ‐6.8% ‐9.4% 9 Since then, the multifamily CMBS 54.81 ‐4.3% market ‐6.6% has been negatively impacted by property market conditions. One obvious way in which this affects multifamily originations is through liquidity costs. Without an active multifamily CMBS market (essentially for mortgages on large 7+ unit rental properties), lenders are less likely to make loans because they are forced to keep the loans on their balance sheet and suffer the liquidity costs. Figure 10 ACTUAL MULTIFAMILY CREDIT FLOWS & CREDIT IMPULSE Actual Mul)family Credit Flows & Credit Impulse Func)ons for Cook FUNCTIONS FOR COOK COUNTY County Credit Impulse
Actual Credit Growth, %
15%
8% 6% 4% 2% 0% ‐2% ‐4% ‐6% ‐8% ‐10%
10% 5% 0% ‐5% ‐10% ‐15% 1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Flow of New Credit Rela)ve to Property Price, %
Credit Flow/Growth
2009
Source: InsYtute for Housing Studiees, DePaul University, January 2010
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Credit Flow/Growth D FLOWS P FORCredit Impulse Credit Flow 5.2 ADJUSTING CREDIT INCOME SUBMARKETS D P CI (AFF85%
Percent of Loans with LTV >85%
Average LTV
Average LTV
% with LTV greater than 85% Average LTV % with LTV+'Mort RaBo for different LTV greater than 85% 80%
60%
30%
20%
20%
10%
10%
0%
0%
50% 40%
09
08
20
07
20
06
20
05
20
04
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
20
99
20
98
19
97
19
96
19
95
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
19
19
91
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Notice that there have been cycles in the loan-to-value ratios on both small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties, with the proportion of small 2–6 unit multifamily loans with loan-to-value ratios above 85% increasing in the mid-1990s, then falling in the late 1990s, only to rise again in the late 2000s. Strikingly, the proportion of large 7+ unit multifamily loans with loan-to-value ratios above 85% increased significantly in the late 2000s.
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But too much debt can have a destabilizing effect on markets. Thus, the rise in multifamily loans with loan-tovalue ratios above 85% during the late 2000s is hard to justify from a macro perspective. Further, any policy—like GSE subsidized interest—that creates an incentive for too much debt is hard to justify. However, to some extent GSE subsidized interest can be justified as a means of promoting affordable rental housing (assuming the promotion of affordable rental housing is correcting a market failure in the supply of housing). Further, the use of GSE funds to purchase mortgages on multifamily residential housing affordable to very low- and low-income families could make these neighborhoods better off, which means less dislocation costs and lower state and local tax burdens in the future. 11.3 OTHER INTERVENTIONS
Additional interventions like ways of improving on the Community Reinvestment Act or increased tax breaks for landlords (or perhaps income transfers and/or human capital programs) can be rationalized as follows. Holding rents constant, a decrease in leverage (coming about as a result of the deleveraging process that the economy is going through) implies an increase in the weighted average cost of capital and a corresponding decrease in the price of rental housing. But with the cost of providing decent and affordable rental housing held constant, a decrease in property price renders the supply of low- and moderately-priced rental dwelling units financially infeasible. Fundamentally, the problem involved is the high cost of constructing multifamily homes in most communities (a condition which has existed for some time). Also, declines in household incomes in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods have not helped the situation much. Ideally, then, if the production of more and better affordable rental housing is desirable, one obvious solution is for more federally-regulated bank community redevelopment, tougher affordable housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or even increased tax breaks for landlords providing multifamily residential housing affordable to very low and low-income families (these tax breaks are loosely related to housing finance), or perhaps some combination of these three elements.
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ENDNOTES
1 An important problem to realize is that the NPI Index is based on appraised values, and incorporates information into prices much later than transaction prices. In contrast, our repeat sales methodology is based on actual transactions prices. 2 Value-at-risk VaR is expected to be different among small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties. Among the possible reasons are that lending terms (i.e., the loan-to-value ratio, the contract interest rate, the debt-service coverage ratio, and the mortgage maturity) are different among small 2–6 unit rental properties compared with large 7+ unit rental properties. Also, prices of small 2–6 unit rental properties are more susceptible to vacancy spells than are prices of large 7+ unit rental properties, in that if you have a duplex and one unit is vacant, the vacancy rate is 50%. However, if you have a 10-unit rental property and one unit is vacant, the vacancy rate is 10%, which has obvious implications for the value-at-risk VaR on small 2–6 unit rental properties versus large 7+ unit rental properties. 3 Total value-at-risk VaR is calculated by the formula: percent value-at-risk VaR on small 2–6 unit rental properties in Cook County x Outstanding Mortgage Debt on small 2–6 unit rental properties + percent valueat-risk VaR on large 7+ unit rental properties in Cook County x Outstanding Mortgage Debt on large 7+ unit rental properties. The formula makes clear that total value-at-risk VaR is a matter of degree that depends sensitively on the upper tail of the loan-to-value distribution and on the amount of mortgage debt outstanding on small 2–6 unit rental properties and large 7+ unit rental properties. 4 The vast majority of the multifamily housing stock in Cook County (62% of the universe) consists of small 2–6 unit rental properties. That means that Cook County is very much different from most counties in the US. In other counties in the US, small 2–6 unit rental properties generally make up only a small portion (about 20%) of the multifamily housing stock (at least according to American Community Survey data). 5 Outstanding mortgage data used for the purpose of these value-at-risk VaR calculations are the estimates of the Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds. We take the outstanding mortgage debt on small 2–6 unit rental properties nationwide to be about $1.3 trillion (estimated using a fair-share formula based on number of multifamily dwelling units by size of structure) and the outstanding mortgage debt on large 7+ unit rental properties nationwide to be $824 billion (estimated as a residual, by deducting total mortgage debt on multifamily buildings having 5 or 6 units from total multifamily mortgage debt). 6 The foreclosures inventory is an eighteen month trailing calculation from foreclosure filing data obtained from Record Information Services and Property Insight. 7 These increases have occurred despite the moratorium that started in the second quarter of 2009 on foreclosures that prevented lenders from foreclosing for up to 3 months. Moreover, we are told anecdotally that many lenders earlier in the year instituted a self-imposed moratorium on foreclosures aimed at reducing the extended waiting times to take possession of a property because of a longstanding backlog of cases. 8 Our credit impulse function is defined as the year-over-year change in the flow of new multifamily credit relative to the multifamily property price level over time. Thus, if credit changes at a relatively stable rate, the credit impulse function will be zero. If credit growth is volatile, however, changes in the credit impulse function could be large. 9 Total CMBS lending in the US reached a height of $230 billion in 2007, falling to $12 billion in 2008, and falling further to $3 billion in 2009. 10 This market share calculation is the true market share prior to 2008 and an upper bound of the true market share thereafter, given that for the latter period we estimated loan purchases made by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by identifying all loans originated by qualified Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac lenders during this time period and then assuming 100% of these loans are sold. This apparent upward bias in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s
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share of the market is offset, however, to some extent by a downward bias created by not including in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s total loan purchases of seasoned loans purchased from qualified lenders. 11 Two sources of data are central to our estimation of the number of small 2-4 rental properties in Cook County. Compiled from the 2000 Census, we have the total number of 5+ rental units in Cook County. Data from the Cook County Assessor’s Office (for 2000) gives us the total number of 7+ rental units in Cook County. Accordingly, the total number of 5-6 rental units in Cook County is the difference between these two values. Performing this calculation yields a value of 19,442 units. Then, we can subtract this value from the total number of 2–6 rental units in Cook County (for 2000) to obtain an estimate of the total number of 2–4 rental units. This calculation yields a value of 152,434 units (= 171,876 units in small 2–6 unit rental properties – 19,442 units in 5-6 unit rental properties), which is 90% of the total 2–6 rental units in Cook County. 12 It is noteworthy that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac multifamily loans generally have lower interest rates, longer amortizations, and smaller down payments than those on alternative but comparable loans (which, in effect, mean a lower total cost to the borrower). Typically, a 5, 7, 10, 15, or 30-year term is permitted on loans purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Additionally, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will normally allow a loan-to-value ratio of 70 to 75% compared to 60 to 65% on loans provided by institutional lenders. 13 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together also guarantee $52 billion in multifamily mortgage loans on large 5+ unit rental properties. Thus, between Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, they own or back more than $241 billion of multifamily mortgage loans (or around 27% of the $905 billion in US multifamily mortgages outstanding on large 5+ unit rental properties). 14 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together also guarantee $52 billion in multifamily mortgage loans on large 5+ unit rental properties. Thus, between Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, they own or back more than $241 billion of multifamily mortgage loans (or around 27% of the $905 billion in US multifamily mortgages outstanding on large 5+ unit rental properties). 15 The affordability ratio of existing homes (i.e., the ratio of actual household income to qualifying income needed to own a median single-family home) has increased to 1.66 times nationwide and to slightly over 2.00 times in the Midwest, as per the National Association of Realtors. 16 If income is expected to rise again, so that rents will again rise, it may pay to hold the deteriorating units vacant rather than to demolish today and re-build later. In addition, if population is growing, it could also be better to mothball deteriorating units rather than to demolish today and re-build later. 17 Other transaction costs (e.g., the cost of moving) and access to credit may also inhibit the switch from renting to owning. 18 In addition to looking at Cook County as a whole, the value-at-risk VaR analysis looked at four different submarkets based on the percentage of affordable units in each market. For instance, in the “least affordable” market, affordable rental units (for a family of four with an income 150% of poverty) make up less than 30% of the total rental housing stock. Inversely, in the “most affordable” market, affordable units make up more than 70% of the total rental housing stock. In the “less affordable” and the “more affordable” markets affordable housing make up 30-50% and 51-70% of the rental housing stock respectively. 19 For evidence that foreclosure costs are potentially large, see Dan Immergluck and Geoff Smith. 2006. “The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime,” Housing Studies 21(6): 851–866. See also John Harding, Eric Rosenblatt, and V.W. Yao. 2008. “The Contagion Effect of Foreclosed Properties,” Unpublished working paper, and William Apgar and Mark Duda. 2005. “Collateral Damage: the Municipal Impact of Today’s Mortgage Foreclosure Boom,” Minneapolis: Homeownership Preservation Foundation. Anecdotal evidence suggests that foreclosures can massive tenant dislocations, especially among small 2–6 unit rental properties located in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. Further, as the inventory of
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foreclosures and potential foreclosures rise, tenant dislocations will generally rise. 20 The model estimated is 1nD t = 1na 0 + a 1 1nt = a 2 t 2 where D t is the ratio of defaults to the original number of mortgages at mortgage age t and t is the duration of the mortgage. The value of a 0 governs the amplitude of the default curve and the variations in a 1 and a 2 govern the time shape of the default curve. For the period 2005-2009, the complete equation estimated for multifamily mortgage loans on small 2–6 unit rental properties is lnD t = –2.65 + 0.059lnt – 0.11t 2 with R 2 = 0.73 The equation estimated for multifamily mortgage loans on large 7+ unit rental properties is lnD t = –3.83 + 0.715lnt – 0.106t 2 with R 2 = 0.32 21 For the period 2000-2004, the complete equation estimated for small 2–6 unit multifamily mortgage loans is lnD t = –3.92 + 0.655lnt – 0.03t 2 with R 2 = 0.85 The equation estimated for large 7+ unit multifamily mortgage loans is lnD t = –5.33 + 0.157lnt – 0.026t 2 with R 2 = 0.34 22 The simulations are performed under the following assumptions. We set a 0 = x (which governs the amplitude 2 of default), and a 1 = x and a 2 = x (which govern the time shape of defaults) to obtain D t = a 0 t a1 e a2t . We then solve this model for all mortgage ages t to determine the level of default rates. Results of the simulations are shown in figures 15 and 16.
The Institute for Housing Studies (IHS) is a multidisciplinary academic research center that provides data and analysis to inform housing-related policy and resource allocation decisions. IHS was created in 2007 as part of Preservation Compact, a multifaceted initiative to preserve Chicago-area affordable rental housing launched by the Urban Land Institute/Chicago and a coalition of public and private partners, including DePaul, with funding from The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Office Location:
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