DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
The Secretary's 8:00 a.m. S Wednesday,75 9 May7,1
taff
Мее ting
PRESENT: THEM SECRETARY OF STATE -- HENRY А. КISSINGER D- Mr. Ingersoll P - Mr. Sisc o M - Mr. Eagleburger, Acting - Mr. Sonnenfeldt AF - Ambassador Mulcahy, Acting ARA - Mr. Rogers ЕA - Mr. Habib EUR - Mr. Lowenstein NEA - Mr. Atherton INR - Mr. Hyland Mr. Lord S/P ЕB - Mr. Enders S/PRS - Mr. Funseth PM - Mr. Vest IO - Ambassador Buffu m H - Ambassador McCloskey L - Mr. Leigh IATF - Ambassador Brown S/S - Mr. Springsteen S - Mr. Bremer
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
[Omitted is material unrelated to the East Asian reaction to events in Indochina.]
SECRETARY KISSENGER: The commitment part is the relatively easier part. I wouldn't bet my
bottom
dollar
when Korea gets invaded, whether Congress will pass а war resolution or an evacuation resolution. MR.
Lоwenstein: I think the most pointed reactions
on points you are making have been in France. SECRETARY KISSENGER : But there it is public and serves their national purposes . MR. Lowenstein: In other places, there just hasn't been any reporting. SECRETARY KISSINGER : I see more intelligence reports that indicate undercurrents of concern than these oral reports indicate, infinitely more. And I am much more concerned with what they think when we tell them we want something done, how they think we will
stick to it; quite
apart from Indochina. What about it, Joe? MR.
Sis со : The only thing I was going to say is,
I just think it is not a question of anybody really basically feeling that our power has diminished in any way. It is a question of will
and intent. And here I think there
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
is real doubt in the minds of а number of these countries, and therefore I think there is а danger of miscalculation in а place such as Korea, in terms of what our will might be in those circumstances. MR. LORD: It goes much further than Vietnam.
I
think Vietnam has been magnified by what has happened -
namely, the legislative paralysis, what has happened in this country in the last twelve years, the general mood.
I think
we have to separate out Vietnam per se from what
has gone just before it in the last few years. This is what makes it more difficult. MR. SISCO: We are giving the image of people who are ready to wash our hands of the situation. You cannot. look at this refugee situation in the context only of the whole history of Vietnam. I think this in part is а manifestation of people kind of throwing up their hands. MR. LORD: I don't think that is the basic reaction. I don't think that is the America reaction. at is а temporary limited phenоmenon. I cannot believe that of the Ameriсan people. MR. SISCO: If you are talking about the refugees,
I would
agree. If you are talking about the broader question,
in terms of commitments overseas and doing something
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
about it, I
t k now.
MR. HABIB: For twenty yea r s а lot of countries, in c l udi ng Asian countries, have looked up the U.S. shield as impenetrable, b e hin d which they could develop economically and nationally. Тhеу full of holes, and they ar
shield
е
no
w see thе shield as
all concerned t hat the U.S.
does n ot p r ov i de the protection th at tney think is
necessary f or t he ir own development. They w i ll move i n one of two directions. Either t he y will attempt to adjust their own policies with respect to the other major powers an d build
up
some k i n d of p rote c ti on, or they a re going to look to
thems el ve s. T he y ar e going t o look to themselves and а геestablishment o f s om e kind o f relationship with u s which gives them some degree of pro t ec t ion. ' SECRETARY KISSINGER: Or both. AR.
HABIB:
Or b o th. B u t I thin k so far what i s
happe nin g is y ou a re g e tting on e o r the o t he r
For example,
the Th ai s a r e looking to s ome n e w kind o f relationship. Th e Ko re ans a r e l oo king t o a f i rm i ng up o f t h e relationship with u s and a d epe nde n ce and self-reliance on themselves. The F i li pino s are f ounde ring, b ut i n th e end I gue ss th e Filipinos will come ou t, if M a r co s h a s hi s way, t o continued dependency upon us. T he I ndo n e si a ns w ou l d lik e t o
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
come out with dependence on us, but they are uncertain. They don't want to make the accommodations. MR. SISCO: Where do the Chinese and the soviets fit into this as far as Asia is concerned? Are we going to see a resurgence of diplomatic activity on the part of the Chinese in this area? SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Chinese don't want us out of Asia right now. MR . HABIB : I think we are going to see more of a resurgence of soviet activity. What do you think, Bill? г think the soviets are the ones who are going to try-to move
in. MR. HYLAND: In Asia. MR. HABIB: Yes. They will try. MR. INGERSOLL: Henry, this started before the fall of Vietnam. There was a reappraisal going on in Asia since the Nixon Doctrine started. It has been accelerating. SECRETARY KISSINGER: But the Nixon Doctrine meant we will help countries to help themselves. And we must not forget if South Vietnam had not collapsed this year, it would have collapsed next year as a result of an aid cutoff. There is no doubt that military aid to Vietnam would have been
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
absolutely emasculated by this Congress if it had been voted at all. The $300 million supplemental would never have been voted, and tlie new bill, it is inconceivable to me that they would have voted a bill. MR. McCLOSKEY:
I think it is one thing t
and expect that by our own conduct we can convince these countries to stay with the United states. But what i fear is less that they will stay with us than we will be able to manifest the conduct that would convince them to do it.
I
believe if a dust-up occurred in Korea, that you would actually lose in the Congress right now in carrying out that treaty commitment. SЕСRЕТАRY KISSINGER: Well, the
Senate
Relations Committee yesterday they wanted us to resubmit the treaty. If we do that, we will be dead. We will have to resubmit every treaty. MR. BUFFUM:
Mr. secretary, I do think that this
reaction is concentrated largely in. Asia, for obvious reasons. But from the contacts I have had, mostly UN circles admittedly, х think the reports that have been given this morning do
reflect, if there is any common denominator ,a perception on the part of most people that Vietnam has loomed overly large
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
in our own eyes. They have never viewed it with the s аmе degree of seriousness we have, particularly the third world. And what they are looking for is the conclusion we draw in terms of our future foreign policy; are we going to withdraw into ourselves, or are we going to re-engage in ргоblems оf development particularly. And I do think this means on happens in the General Assembly next fall is going to take what exceptional significance, because of the image and posture we ргоject, in terms of the direct сomitment we are ready us.make of the problems of the future, putting the past behind to
SECRETARY KISSBINGER : You kпоw w е cannot make any major commitments
to development right now.
MR. BUFFUM: I don't mean new aid programs, but
а sense of concern and involvement, and even minimal independent constructive proposals.
I think this reflects
both what Bill said -SECRETARY KISSINGER: Are you working on any?
MR. BUFFUM : Yes. SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't happen to believe it will make any difference, but I am strongly in making them. I just think the third world trends are much more powerful and more political, and much less economic and
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
and much less influenced by do-good American speeches. But I am strongly in favor of making them. MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. Secretary, I thought а point you made at lunch yesterday was both educational and necessary, because I'm afraid there is а little confusion developing publicly and, I think, on the Hill, by talking about a reassessment beginning with the Middle East, arid now the possibility of assessing the consequences in the Far East of what happened in Vietnam -- that this is now being misunderstood as а total re-evaluations of all American policy. And I thought the point you were making at lunch yesterday is valid. $0 that the two things are not confused. SECRETARY KISSINGER Which is what? MR. МсСLОSKEY: That there are main lines to American foreign policy which are traditional, which are sound, and which will continue, and that the consequences that we are looking at as а result of Vietnam should not be confused with the desire or a need now to transform or re-evaluate the totality of American foreign policy. Some of this is getting confused on the Hill. Lester Wolff has now said he is going to conduct hearings because there ought to be a reassessment of American foreign policy. And
I
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
think -SECRETARY KISSINGER: Unfortunately , fascinating