Volume III Issue 5
HEMISPHERE HIGHLIGHTS AMERICAS PROGRAM May 2004, Volume III, Issue 5 www.csis.org
UPCOMING PUBLICATIONS Policy Paper on the Americas Volume XV, Study 3 “Political Reform in Brazil: Promises and Pitfalls” by Amaury de Souza Volume XV, Study 4 “Ogdensburg Revisited: Adapting Canada-U.S. Security Cooperation to the New International Era”, by Ben Rowswell Hemisphere Focus Mexico Alert: “U.S.-Mexico Counter-Narcotic Cooperation”, by Guadalupe González U.S.-Mexico Binational Council Report Managing Mexican Migration to the United States
UPCOMING EVENTS May 7 – Discussion on “Bolivia today” May 19 - Lunch with Quebec Minister of International Relations, Monique Gagnon-Tremblay.
HEADLINES: CANADA UNVEILS THE FRAMEWORK FOR ITS FIRST NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY; SOUTHERN CONE GAS CRISIS AFFECTS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS; MEXICO’S FEDERAL ELECTORAL INSTITUTE FINES POLITICAL PARTIES FOR CAMPAIGN IRREGULARITIES DURING THE 2003 MID-TERM ELECTIONS; HONEYMOON ENDS WITH ARGENTINE PRESIDENT; BOLIVIAN DEMONSTRATORS CALL FOR REMOVAL OF PRESIDENT MESA; RIO FACES NEW WAVE OF VIOLENCE DUE TO GANG RIVALRIES; REELECTION OF PRESIDENT URIBE DOMINATES DEBATE IN COLOMBIA’S CONGRESS; POLLS SHOW FORMER DOMINICAN PRESIDENT LEONEL FERNÁNDEZ LIKELY TO WIN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS DURING THE FIRST ROUND; THE U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT SUSPENDS COOPERATION MEXICO ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE SHARING. WITH
HEMISPHERE WIDE TRADE The European Union and Mercosur exchanged trade offers in April, but the exact content is not known. The stated goal is to complete a free trade agreement between the two groupings some time in the fall. This assumes that some compromise will be found for the entry of Mercosur agricultural products into the EU market in exchange for EU access for industrial products and perhaps some services. This has led to speculation as to whether the Mercosur countries, especially Brazil, will downplay their insistence on reducing or eliminating EU tradedistorting domestic support programs and export subsidies in the Doha Round of the WTO. There is also speculation as to why Mercosur seems to be favoring an agreement with the EU at this stage rather than the FTAA. Sidney Weintraub The United States opened free trade negotiations with Panama this past week. Panama is a banking and shipping center and this presents negotiating issues different from those encountered in the free trade negotiations with the five Central American countries and the Dominican Republic. The parade of bilateral and plurilateral free trade negotiations seems relentless. The United States has concluded FTAs with Canada and Mexico (in NAFTA), Chile, the five Central American
Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20006 • Tel: (202) 775775-3150 • Fax: (202) 466466-4739 • www.csis.org
RECENT EVENTS April 8 - The state of human rights in Venezuela April 9 - Smart Border North Working Group, Border Policy and US-VISIT April 15 - Latin America Technology Forum April 15-16 - Canada Project presenting at Duke University Conference on "Canada-U.S. Security Relations: Partnership or Predicament?" April 20 - Deputy Commander of ISAF April 21 - Book Release, "The U.S. and Mexico: The Bear and the Porcupine," by Former U.S. Amb. to Mexico Jeffrey Davidow April 22 - Conference, President of the Mexican Federal Electoral Institute Luis Carlos Ugalde
RECENT PUBLICATIONS Policy Paper on the Americas Volume XV, Study 1 “Canadian Defense Priorities: What Might the United States Like to See”, by Dwight Mason
U.S.-Mexico Binational Council Report The United States and Mexico: Border Security and the Evolving Security Relationship
countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, in CAFTA), and the Dominican Republic and is now negotiating or planning to negotiate with Panama and most of the Andean countries (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and potentially Bolivia). The only significant Latin American omissions are the four countries of Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay), and Venezuela. If Mercosur and the EU conclude FTA negotiations, this would split the hemisphere (at least for a time) into European- and U.S-affiliated groups, which is less than ideal from the viewpoint of a unified hemisphere. Sidney Weintraub
A new UNDP report released on April 21, Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens' Democracy, shows that the majority of Latin Americans would favor replacing a democratic government with an authoritarian one if this would generate more economic growth. According to the report, nearly 55 percent of all Latin Americans surveyed stated that they would support authoritarianism if it could solve their economic problems. The report was produced by an independent team of Latin American experts, including many former heads of government concerned over the state of democracy in the hemisphere. In a region that only recently rid itself of military dictatorships, the UNDP report on democracy is a serious alert that without economic growth, the progress made in the consolidation of democratic rule in the region could be challenged. The calls for resignation of Bolivia’s president Carlos Mesa only six months after Sánchez de Lozada was forced to resign, social turmoil in Venezuela, electoral transition in Argentina, and increased violence in Colombia reflect strong popular discontent with the economic, political and social conditions in the region. But economic growth without better income distribution is not enough. Latin America is the region with the worst disparities between rich and poor, and that in itself is a major obstacle to democracy. Caroline Ramagem
ENERGY Hemisphere Focus Mexico Alert: “Tax Reform in Mexico”, by Rogelio Ramirez de la O
The Southern Cone Gas Crisis Affects Diplomatic Relations. After rationing gas exports to Chile, Argentina signed a six month contract with Bolivia to import up to four million cubic meters of natural gas a day, under the stipulation that “not even one molecule” of Bolivian gas be redirected to Chile, a nation with which Bolivia has a 125-year old territorial dispute. In addition, Argentina and Bolivia plan to improve infrastructure with the construction of a US$1 billion gas pipeline, to be operational by December 2006. Chile has criticized Argentina’s policies arguing compensation should be offered for the lack of Argentine gas imports; in fact, Chile has been exploring the option of taking Bolivia’s exclusionary position to the WTO. In looking elsewhere, Chile is considering numerous cooperation agreements with Ecuador—including the reduction of
Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20006 • Tel: (202) 775775-3150 • Fax: (202) 466466-4739 • www.csis.org
Chilean tariffs on Ecuadorian hydrocarbons. Meanwhile, Argentine President Kirchner has been studying the creation of an Argentine state oil company in partnership with Brazil and Venezuela, as a central point of an energy plan he will present in May. The energy crisis has provided an opportunity to increase interdependence among the Mercosur countries and the Andean Community. However, in order for cooperation and integration to be sustainable, it is necessary to overcome bitter rivalries and disputes, like those that exist between Bolivia and Chile. Moreover, it is in everyone’s interest—especially Argentina’s, whose economy is growing this year by about 10 percent—to create incentives for investment in the infrastructure of the natural gas sector. Christina Jacobs.
SOUTH AMERICA ARGENTINA
President Kirchner launched a national program to improve security.
Most political analysts consider that the last 30 days have witnessed the end of the honeymoon with which the Argentine public greets new presidents. The change of mood has been marked by three phenomena: the energy crisis; the clash between different internal currents within the Peronist convention; and the popular demand for drastic measures against crime. Juan Carlos Blumberg, whose son Axel was kidnapped and killed, called for a rally before the congressional building demanding reforms in criminal legislation, criminal procedure, and the police forces. The appeal received much media coverage. When 150,000 people spontaneously participated, carrying candles, all major political actors were shocked. Thousands more staged similar rallies in other cities. President Kirchner reacted in a few weeks and launched a national program to improve security that includes major reforms in the police forces, criminal law, and the Judiciary. The plan deals with so many different issues that its evaluation and implementation will demand some time. Many of the proposals will have to be adjusted or simply dropped because they do not really address the problem of security, but respond to the government’s other objectives. President Kirchner’s plan has many flaws but it shows the president’s capacity to retain political initiative. No one in the opposition was able to seize this opportunity to put the executive on the defensive. The end of the honeymoon means, however, that the automatic public support the president received after his inauguration is over. In order to maintain his still high ratings in public opinion polls, he will increasingly have to show results. Carlos M. Regúnaga
BOLIVIA Bolivia’s democracy is facing threats from many fronts.
Demonstrators call for removal of President Mesa. On April 22, 20,000 demonstrators converged on downtown La Paz demanding the resignation of President Carlos Mesa. President Mesa recently reached the six-month mark in office, and his term has been threatened by indigenous protestors, labor protests, and
Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20006 • Tel: (202) 775775-3150 • Fax: (202) 466466-4739 • www.csis.org
disputes over how to handle the issue of gas exports. President Mesa took office after similar street protests forced the resignation of former President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada in October of 2003. In response to the protests over the gas issue, Mesa has announced a July 18 referendum to decide how to resolve the matter. Meanwhile, indigenous leader Evo Morales has accused two Bolivian ministers – Defense Minister Gonzalo Arredondo and Government Minister Alfonso Ferrufino – of plotting to overthrow the Mesa government. Finally, the landless movement is set for another series of land occupations in a number of Bolivian departments. Bolivia’s democracy is facing threats from so many fronts that the government is forced to spend most of its time putting out fires. While many of these groups have legitimate concerns, the tactic of addressing them with actions that threaten the stability of the government is not constructive. Elizabeth Hetzler
BRAZIL
According to Social Watch, Brazil is one of the most violent countries in the world.
The Lula government approval rating has fallen from 66 percent to 51 percent in four months (04/2004).
Rio has been facing a new wave of violence due to gang rivalries over the city's most lucrative cocaine distribution points. More than 1,200 police occupied Rocinha, Rio’s largest slum, since the conflict started over the Easter weekend. Fourteen people were killed, among them drug dealers, police, and civilians. Rio State Public Security Secretary Anthony Garotinho met with the National Secretary of Public Security to discuss the issue. Garotinho requested at least 4,000 federal troops to maintain order until new police can be recruited and trained. This request upset Justice Ministry officials who said that the armed forces were not instruments that could be placed under the command of State authorities whenever they wished. Under the Brazilian constitution, other measures must be taken before special troops can be deployed. It is estimated that the drug trade moves R$ 10 million (US$3.5 million) monthly in Rocinha alone. Many who live in one of Rio’s most affluent neighborhoods are surrounded by slums where the drug gangs fight for drug stations. The state of Rio does not produce drugs or weapons. It is therefore imperative that the federal government take better control over Brazil’s borders to prevent weapon and drug smuggling. Much violence comes with drug trafficking. According to a new study done by Social Watch, an international NGO that monitors poverty eradication, Brazil is one of the most violent countries in the world. Even though Brazil is not at war, the death rate in some of the country’s major cities is comparable to the death rates of countries that are in conflict. Viviane Vanni The Lula administration is feeling the effects of the drop in popularity in the past three months. Lula is having difficulty getting the coalition parties to create alliances for the municipal elections in October. In most capitals, the coalition parties are launching their own candidates, which diminishes PT’s chances of getting elected in at least twelve capitals it hoped to win. The PT itself has already nominated candidates for seven of the twelve capitals. Besides that, the PL (Partido Liberal) has decided to leave the Lula support coalition in the Senate and assume an “independent ally” position. Several factors have caused the considerable decline in the popularity of President Lula and his government. The last cause celebre was the
Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20006 • Tel: (202) 775775-3150 • Fax: (202) 466466-4739 • www.csis.org
Waldomiro political scandal which happened in February leading to Woldomiro’s dismissal. The lack of economic growth evidenced by the 0.02 percent decline in GDP in 2003 and the high interest rates have also had a negative impact among coalition parties and the business sector. The unemployment rate rose to 12.8 percent in Brazil’s major metropolitan cities this month and average salaries have gone down. The minimum wage increase of 8.3 percent, from R$240 ($85) to R$260 ($89), may calm things a little. The landless movement (MST) invasion of lands has also increased in the past month in the States of São Paulo, Pernanbuco, and Bahia. The MST has occupied productive properties owned by multinational and national firms. The increased invasions are an attempt to accelerate the pace at which Lula’s government is redistributing unused land. The government’s approval rating has fallen from 66 percent (12/2003) to 51percent (04/2004).Viviane Vanni
COLOMBIA
Changing constitutional prohibition on reelection goes against a deep Colombian tradition of limiting presidential terms.
Castaño’s disappearance gave evidence the paramilitaries have never been united.
The re-election of President Alvaro Uribe is dominating debate in Colombia’s congress. The current constitution prohibits a president from ever serving more than one four year term. If the constitution is going to be changed in time for Uribe to present himself for re-election in 2006, the congress must pass the measure four times in the current session of congress, which winds up at the end of June, and then pass it again in a later session. Close observers, even among those who support Uribe, fear the effort to amend the constitution will preempt other reforms awaiting legislative approval, especially the restructuring of the national pension system, which is important to the country’s long-term fiscal health. The amendment process seemed headed for defeat, but in recent days the Conservative Party has declared its support and the popular president began to campaign openly for the amendment. After having surrogates make his case, Uribe says the congress should let “the people decide” whether he should have a second term in office. Recent polls show Uribe with 80 percent public support. Clearly, an ample majority is happy with the lower levels of violence and greater economic activity achieved since his election two years ago, and would be pleased to see him stay in office to consolidate his “democratic security” strategy. There is no obvious presidential successor advocating Uribe’s approach. Yet, changing the constitutional prohibition on reelection – made tougher just in 1991 – goes against a deep Colombian tradition of limiting presidential terms. Phillip McLean The Uribe government’s attempt to demobilize paramilitary forces suffered a setback when Carlos Castaño the best known paramilitary leader, disappeared. Whether Castaño is dead or in hiding is not clear, although little about him or the group he purports to lead has ever been simple. There does seem to have been a firefight at his headquarters in northern Colombia on April 16 resulting in the death of several of his bodyguards. The best interpretation from a welter of contradictory stories is that his camp was attacked by a rival paramilitary band. Some ten years ago Castaño announced he was the head of “the united self-defense forces of Colombia,” or AUC in Spanish, with an armed following estimated from 8,000 to 20,000 and the avowed purpose of opposing communist guerrillas. The government
Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20006 • Tel: (202) 775775-3150 • Fax: (202) 466466-4739 • www.csis.org
entered into negotiations to demobilize all or part of these combined forces. Legislation designed to lure the groups into surrendering with the offer of “alternative penalties” for their past crimes was expected to pass the congress this month (despite the re-election debate). Castaño’s disappearance, however, gave further evidence the paramilitaries have never been “united” and it was unrealistic to expect negotiations would ever lead to a massive demobilization. Most of the “para” bands are involved in the narcotics trade, and that probably was a factor leading to Castaño’s exit. It is also probable that Castaño’s crisis came shortly after President Uribe finally and firmly made clear that negotiations with the paras would not protect him and other para leaders from being extradited to the United States. Phillip McLean
VENEZUELA
To trigger a referendum, the opposition needs more than 500,000 of the 800,000 disputed signatures to be approved.
After many months of haggling, it appears that the Hugo Chávez government and the opposition have agreed on a process to “repair” the 800,000-plus signatures that the National Electoral Council disqualified for technical reasons. The “repair process,” justly named “el reparo”, is fraught with dangers for the opposition because if it accepts the process and doesn’t get enough of the signatures “rectified”, the opposition risks legitimizing the government. On the other hand, if the opposition rejects the “repair” process, it may score a moral victory, but be left with no cards to play, save civil disobedience and possibly violence. To trigger a referendum, the opposition needs more than 500,000 of the 800,000 disputed signatures to be approved, so that when added to the 1.9 million signatures that have already been credited, it totals the 2.4 million required. The opposition is divided on whether to persevere with the process, but ultimately, for lack of options, it will probably buy into it. If so, this will create a monumental challenge to deliver the 500,000-plus needed signatures. Ironically, a recent poll showed that if a referendum were to be held, Chávez would survive it, mostly because of expected abstentions. Miguel Diaz
CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The media has published charges that President Mejía is trying to buy the election with last minute promises.
Almost all public opinion polls still show that former President Leonel Fernández of the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) is likely to win the May 16 presidential elections during the first round of voting. The latest Diario LibreGallup poll, conducted from April 14-18, gives Fernández 54.8 percent of the vote to 27 percent for President Hipólito Mejía of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) and 14 percent for Social Christian (PRSC) candidate Eduardo Estrella. March polls conducted by various national and international polling organizations showed Fernández with an even higher expected vote, several of them over 63 percent. Last week, former Vice President Jacinto Peynado, who had been expected to be the Social Christian candidate until the lesser-known Estrella won the
Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20006 • Tel: (202) 775775-3150 • Fax: (202) 466466-4739 • www.csis.org
nomination, announced that he was backing Fernández. Fernández defeated Peynado in the 1996 elections. The Dominican press continues to publish rumors of violence that would be instigated by members of the PRD on election day as well as charges that President Mejía is trying to buy the election with last minute promises of cheap loans to small business owners and other offers of government largesse IF he is reelected. Lowell Fleischer Both the Dominican Republic and Honduras will soon withdraw their troops from Iraq. Citing the withdrawal of Spanish forces, which he said would expose Dominican troops to more danger, Dominican President Mejía told the press that the country’s 300 soldiers would return home as soon as possible. Also citing security concerns arising from the withdrawal of Spanish forces, Honduras said last week that it will bring its 370 troops home. Nicaragua pulled its forces out in February and there are indications that El Salvador will soon do the same. Some Central Americans, citing the treatment of Chile last year when the Chile-U.S. FTA was held back for 8-9 months, presumably because of Chile’s vote in the UN Security Council, are concerned that the Bush administration might retaliate by putting the Central American Free Trade Agreement on the back burner in order to show its disapproval of the troop withdrawal. In any case, because of election year politics in the United States, it is unlikely that the agreement will be sent to Congress until next year. Lowell Fleischer
NORTH AMERICA CANADA
Canada’s first national security strategy represents another example of the highlevel attention the government has devoted to security.
Canada unveiled the framework for its first national security strategy on April 27. Entitled “Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy”, the 52-page document outlines a comprehensive security strategy that seeks to respond to three main goals: protecting Canadians at home and abroad; ensuring that Canada is not used as a launching pad for terrorist attacks on its allies; and contributing to national security. Eight main areas comprise the area of focus of the strategy, including intelligence, public health emergencies, and border security. Overall, the strategy commits C$690 million dollars in new security spending, which is earmarked for three main security upgrades: C$137 million to intelligence operations; C$308 million to improve security on Canada's coastlines; and C$85 million for the protection of information services, especially cyber security. Canada’s first national security strategy has an overarching goal of creating an integrated security system, which was one of the major gaps in Canadian security efforts identified in the March report by the Auditor General. More importantly, however, it represents another example of the high-level attention the Martin government has devoted to the issue of security. By creating Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada in December (roughly the Canadian equivalent to the Department of Homeland Security), and by pushing for Canada’s first national security strategy, the Martin government has continued a progression that has seen
Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20006 • Tel: (202) 775775-3150 • Fax: (202) 466466-4739 • www.csis.org
Canadian security policies move closer to the security model of the United States. Such developments are sure to be well received in Washington. Andre Belelieu
Canada is no worse than most countries in handling its national security.
The Task Force concluded that the worst blackout in North American history was largely preventable.
The Auditor General of Canada reported flaws in Canada’s basic security system in its latest March 2004 report. In a chapter called “National Security in Canada-The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Initiative”, Auditor-General Sheila Fraser stated that the majority of the C$7.7 billion allocated in the government’s 2001 budget in response to the 9/11 attacks went to priority areas and met most of the audit criteria. However, the report found serious problems regarding the use of watch lists employed to screen terrorist suspects, mishandled alerts, deferred implementation of fingerprint-analysis systems, current negligence in security investigations on Canadian airport employees, obstacles to communication among security information systems and laxness in intelligence management. On the other hand, the report acknowledges that Canada is no worse than most countries in handling its national security. This report was followed by similar study released by the Senate Committee on National Security and Defense, entitled “National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines”. This report describes Canada as an “unready nation” to face the possible occurrence of a terrorist attack and/or a natural disaster. It is likely that the auditor-general’s report will generate some anxiety in the United States, even though the under secretary for Border and Transportation Security, Asa Hutchinson, dismissed any concerns on the part of DHS. In reaction to the report, the Liberal government announced it will spend approximately C$500 million on a new security plan to address the serious gaps in Canada’s intelligence and security apparatus outlined by Fraser’s report. Genevieve Cote The U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force released its final report on the August 14, 2003 blackout on April 5. Co-chaired by the U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and Canadian Minister of Natural Resources John Efford (who replaced Herb Dhaliwal in December), the Task Force concluded that the worst blackout in North American history was largely preventable. The Task Force offered a series of recommendations to ensure the blackout was not repeated, including the implementation of mandatory and enforceable electricity reliability standards in both the United States and Canada, the strengthening of the institutional framework of the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), addressing deficiencies identified in FirstEnergy (the Ohio utility company whose negligence caused the blackout) and some reliability organizations in the United States by June 30, 2004, and increasing the physical and cyber security of the network. Last August, the blackout plunged parts of the Northeastern United States and Southern Ontario into darkness, in some cases for several days, after a power surge in Ohio affected the entire grid servicing these states and Ontario. The economic cost of the blackout was estimated in the billions of dollars. The blackout represented a wake-up call about the vulnerabilities in shared critical infrastructure between Canada and the United States, and the importance played by first responders in the event of a terrorist attack or terrorist sabotage. In this sense, it was encouraging to see high levels of cooperation between Canadian and American officials both during and in the aftermath of the blackout, as well as during the investigations. Andre Belelieu
Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20006 • Tel: (202) 775775-3150 • Fax: (202) 466466-4739 • www.csis.org
MEXICO
The move marks an aberration from formerly sound cooperation on law enforcement matters.
These sanctions expose one of the more glaring deficiencies in Mexico’s electoral code.
The U.S. Treasury Department suspended cooperation with Mexico on financial intelligence sharing following the disclosure of confidential Treasury documents by Mexico City Mayor Andrés Manuel López Obrador. López Obrador brandished the sensitive information before a press conference on April 15 in an attempt to deflect responsibility for a recent scandal involving misuse of funds by the mayor’s finance secretary. The move marks an aberration from formerly sound cooperation on law enforcement matters, particularly in the area of money laundering and financial crimes prosecution. In an April 21 letter to the Mexican government, the U.S. Treasury Department announced that it would halt information sharing with Mexico until it received adequate assurance that such information would be handled properly and in full compliance with the Treasury Department’s confidentiality requirements. Mexican authorities have responded with assurances that the incident was a regrettable exception to an otherwise firm commitment to upholding the confidentiality of financial information provided to Mexico by the United States. Most observers on both sides of the border concur that the disclosure was an isolated incident. Further, officials in both countries have expressed confidence that cooperation on financial crimes prosecution will resume shortly. These positions reflect the predominant perception in both Mexico and the United States that information sharing in these areas is critical in the fight against global organized crime. Sara Rioff Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) fined political parties for campaign irregularities during the 2003 mid-term elections. On April 19, 2004, the IFE’s 9-member General Council voted unanimously to sanction all 11 political parties that participated in the July 6, 2003 mid-term election for a cumulative total of about $36.7 million dollars (418 million pesos). Of the 11 parties sanctioned, five are no longer registered political parties, having failed to capture the required two percent of the vote in that contest. The fines were levied for such violations as exceeding campaign spending limits, failing to report radio and TV political ad campaigns, and receiving cash contributions in excess of the amounts permitted. The sanctions for the six existing parties totaled approximately $16.5 million dollars, while the sanctions for the now defunct parties totaled $20.2 million dollars. All six existing parties have appealed the fines with the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF). These sanctions expose one of the more glaring deficiencies in Mexico’s electoral code. With political campaigns largely publicly funded, creating political parties has become financially lucrative and therefore prone to abuse. Further, once a political party loses its legal registration, federal authorities are stripped of any legal recourse against that party. While the timing of the IFE’s sanction conforms to a preset timetable, it may prove counterproductive from an institutional standpoint; the Mexican Congress is currently debating the possibility of increasing the IFE’s auditing powers as part of the electoral reform proposal. Armand PeschardSverdrup Contributing Authors: Dr. Sidney Weintraub Director, Americas Program
Miguel Diaz
Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20006 • Tel: (202) 775775-3150 • Fax: (202) 466466-4739 • www.csis.org
Director, South America Project Armand Peschard-Sverdrup Director, Mexico Project Lowell Fleischer Senior Associate Phillip McLean Senior Associate Andre Belelieu Research Associate Beth Hetzler Research Associate
Sara Rioff Research Assistant Viviane Vanni Program Manager Genevieve Cote Intern-Scholar Christina Jacobs Intern-Scholar Caroline Ramagem Intern-Scholar Carlos Regúnaga Argentina Office Director
Hemisphere Highlights is published monthly by the Americas Program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), (CSIS), a private, taxtax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication publication should be understood to be solely those of the authors. © 2004 2004 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20006 • Tel: (202) 775775-3150 • Fax: (202) 466466-4739 • www.csis.org
UPCOMING PUBLICATIONS Policy Paper on the Americas Volume XV, Study 3 “Political Reform in Brazil: Promises and Pitfalls” by Amaury de Souza Volume XV, Study 4 “Ogdensburg Revisited: Adapting Canada-U.S. Security Cooperation to the New International Era”, by Ben Rowswell Hemisphere Focus Mexico Alert: “U.S.-Mexico Counter-Narcotic Cooperation”, by Guadalupe González U.S.-Mexico Binational Council Report Managing Mexican Migration to the United States
UPCOMING EVENTS May 7 – Discussion on “Bolivia today” May 19 - Lunch with Quebec Minister of International Relations, Monique Gagnon-Tremblay.
HEADLINES: CANADA UNVEILS THE FRAMEWORK FOR ITS FIRST NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY; SOUTHERN CONE GAS CRISIS AFFECTS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS; MEXICO’S FEDERAL ELECTORAL INSTITUTE FINES POLITICAL PARTIES FOR CAMPAIGN IRREGULARITIES DURING THE 2003 MID-TERM ELECTIONS; HONEYMOON ENDS WITH ARGENTINE PRESIDENT; BOLIVIAN DEMONSTRATORS CALL FOR REMOVAL OF PRESIDENT MESA; RIO FACES NEW WAVE OF VIOLENCE DUE TO GANG RIVALRIES; REELECTION OF PRESIDENT URIBE DOMINATES DEBATE IN COLOMBIA’S CONGRESS; POLLS SHOW FORMER DOMINICAN PRESIDENT LEONEL FERNÁNDEZ LIKELY TO WIN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS DURING THE FIRST ROUND; THE U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT SUSPENDS COOPERATION MEXICO ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE SHARING. WITH
HEMISPHERE WIDE TRADE The European Union and Mercosur exchanged trade offers in April, but the exact content is not known. The stated goal is to complete a free trade agreement between the two groupings some time in the fall. This assumes that some compromise will be found for the entry of Mercosur agricultural products into the EU market in exchange for EU access for industrial products and perhaps some services. This has led to speculation as to whether the Mercosur countries, especially Brazil, will downplay their insistence on reducing or eliminating EU tradedistorting domestic support programs and export subsidies in the Doha Round of the WTO. There is also speculation as to why Mercosur seems to be favoring an agreement with the EU at this stage rather than the FTAA. Sidney Weintraub The United States opened free trade negotiations with Panama this past week. Panama is a banking and shipping center and this presents negotiating issues different from those encountered in the free trade negotiations with the five Central American countries and the Dominican Republic. The parade of bilateral and plurilateral free trade negotiations seems relentless. The United States has concluded FTAs with Canada and Mexico (in NAFTA), Chile, the five Central American
Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20006 • Tel: (202) 775775-3150 • Fax: (202) 466466-4739 • www.csis.org
RECENT EVENTS April 8 - The state of human rights in Venezuela April 9 - Smart Border North Working Group, Border Policy and US-VISIT April 15 - Latin America Technology Forum April 15-16 - Canada Project presenting at Duke University Conference on "Canada-U.S. Security Relations: Partnership or Predicament?" April 20 - Deputy Commander of ISAF April 21 - Book Release, "The U.S. and Mexico: The Bear and the Porcupine," by Former U.S. Amb. to Mexico Jeffrey Davidow April 22 - Conference, President of the Mexican Federal Electoral Institute Luis Carlos Ugalde
RECENT PUBLICATIONS Policy Paper on the Americas Volume XV, Study 1 “Canadian Defense Priorities: What Might the United States Like to See”, by Dwight Mason
U.S.-Mexico Binational Council Report The United States and Mexico: Border Security and the Evolving Security Relationship
countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, in CAFTA), and the Dominican Republic and is now negotiating or planning to negotiate with Panama and most of the Andean countries (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and potentially Bolivia). The only significant Latin American omissions are the four countries of Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay), and Venezuela. If Mercosur and the EU conclude FTA negotiations, this would split the hemisphere (at least for a time) into European- and U.S-affiliated groups, which is less than ideal from the viewpoint of a unified hemisphere. Sidney Weintraub
A new UNDP report released on April 21, Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens' Democracy, shows that the majority of Latin Americans would favor replacing a democratic government with an authoritarian one if this would generate more economic growth. According to the report, nearly 55 percent of all Latin Americans surveyed stated that they would support authoritarianism if it could solve their economic problems. The report was produced by an independent team of Latin American experts, including many former heads of government concerned over the state of democracy in the hemisphere. In a region that only recently rid itself of military dictatorships, the UNDP report on democracy is a serious alert that without economic growth, the progress made in the consolidation of democratic rule in the region could be challenged. The calls for resignation of Bolivia’s president Carlos Mesa only six months after Sánchez de Lozada was forced to resign, social turmoil in Venezuela, electoral transition in Argentina, and increased violence in Colombia reflect strong popular discontent with the economic, political and social conditions in the region. But economic growth without better income distribution is not enough. Latin America is the region with the worst disparities between rich and poor, and that in itself is a major obstacle to democracy. Caroline Ramagem
ENERGY Hemisphere Focus Mexico Alert: “Tax Reform in Mexico”, by Rogelio Ramirez de la O
The Southern Cone Gas Crisis Affects Diplomatic Relations. After rationing gas exports to Chile, Argentina signed a six month contract with Bolivia to import up to four million cubic meters of natural gas a day, under the stipulation that “not even one molecule” of Bolivian gas be redirected to Chile, a nation with which Bolivia has a 125-year old territorial dispute. In addition, Argentina and Bolivia plan to improve infrastructure with the construction of a US$1 billion gas pipeline, to be operational by December 2006. Chile has criticized Argentina’s policies arguing compensation should be offered for the lack of Argentine gas imports; in fact, Chile has been exploring the option of taking Bolivia’s exclusionary position to the WTO. In looking elsewhere, Chile is considering numerous cooperation agreements with Ecuador—including the reduction of
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Chilean tariffs on Ecuadorian hydrocarbons. Meanwhile, Argentine President Kirchner has been studying the creation of an Argentine state oil company in partnership with Brazil and Venezuela, as a central point of an energy plan he will present in May. The energy crisis has provided an opportunity to increase interdependence among the Mercosur countries and the Andean Community. However, in order for cooperation and integration to be sustainable, it is necessary to overcome bitter rivalries and disputes, like those that exist between Bolivia and Chile. Moreover, it is in everyone’s interest—especially Argentina’s, whose economy is growing this year by about 10 percent—to create incentives for investment in the infrastructure of the natural gas sector. Christina Jacobs.
SOUTH AMERICA ARGENTINA
President Kirchner launched a national program to improve security.
Most political analysts consider that the last 30 days have witnessed the end of the honeymoon with which the Argentine public greets new presidents. The change of mood has been marked by three phenomena: the energy crisis; the clash between different internal currents within the Peronist convention; and the popular demand for drastic measures against crime. Juan Carlos Blumberg, whose son Axel was kidnapped and killed, called for a rally before the congressional building demanding reforms in criminal legislation, criminal procedure, and the police forces. The appeal received much media coverage. When 150,000 people spontaneously participated, carrying candles, all major political actors were shocked. Thousands more staged similar rallies in other cities. President Kirchner reacted in a few weeks and launched a national program to improve security that includes major reforms in the police forces, criminal law, and the Judiciary. The plan deals with so many different issues that its evaluation and implementation will demand some time. Many of the proposals will have to be adjusted or simply dropped because they do not really address the problem of security, but respond to the government’s other objectives. President Kirchner’s plan has many flaws but it shows the president’s capacity to retain political initiative. No one in the opposition was able to seize this opportunity to put the executive on the defensive. The end of the honeymoon means, however, that the automatic public support the president received after his inauguration is over. In order to maintain his still high ratings in public opinion polls, he will increasingly have to show results. Carlos M. Regúnaga
BOLIVIA Bolivia’s democracy is facing threats from many fronts.
Demonstrators call for removal of President Mesa. On April 22, 20,000 demonstrators converged on downtown La Paz demanding the resignation of President Carlos Mesa. President Mesa recently reached the six-month mark in office, and his term has been threatened by indigenous protestors, labor protests, and
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disputes over how to handle the issue of gas exports. President Mesa took office after similar street protests forced the resignation of former President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada in October of 2003. In response to the protests over the gas issue, Mesa has announced a July 18 referendum to decide how to resolve the matter. Meanwhile, indigenous leader Evo Morales has accused two Bolivian ministers – Defense Minister Gonzalo Arredondo and Government Minister Alfonso Ferrufino – of plotting to overthrow the Mesa government. Finally, the landless movement is set for another series of land occupations in a number of Bolivian departments. Bolivia’s democracy is facing threats from so many fronts that the government is forced to spend most of its time putting out fires. While many of these groups have legitimate concerns, the tactic of addressing them with actions that threaten the stability of the government is not constructive. Elizabeth Hetzler
BRAZIL
According to Social Watch, Brazil is one of the most violent countries in the world.
The Lula government approval rating has fallen from 66 percent to 51 percent in four months (04/2004).
Rio has been facing a new wave of violence due to gang rivalries over the city's most lucrative cocaine distribution points. More than 1,200 police occupied Rocinha, Rio’s largest slum, since the conflict started over the Easter weekend. Fourteen people were killed, among them drug dealers, police, and civilians. Rio State Public Security Secretary Anthony Garotinho met with the National Secretary of Public Security to discuss the issue. Garotinho requested at least 4,000 federal troops to maintain order until new police can be recruited and trained. This request upset Justice Ministry officials who said that the armed forces were not instruments that could be placed under the command of State authorities whenever they wished. Under the Brazilian constitution, other measures must be taken before special troops can be deployed. It is estimated that the drug trade moves R$ 10 million (US$3.5 million) monthly in Rocinha alone. Many who live in one of Rio’s most affluent neighborhoods are surrounded by slums where the drug gangs fight for drug stations. The state of Rio does not produce drugs or weapons. It is therefore imperative that the federal government take better control over Brazil’s borders to prevent weapon and drug smuggling. Much violence comes with drug trafficking. According to a new study done by Social Watch, an international NGO that monitors poverty eradication, Brazil is one of the most violent countries in the world. Even though Brazil is not at war, the death rate in some of the country’s major cities is comparable to the death rates of countries that are in conflict. Viviane Vanni The Lula administration is feeling the effects of the drop in popularity in the past three months. Lula is having difficulty getting the coalition parties to create alliances for the municipal elections in October. In most capitals, the coalition parties are launching their own candidates, which diminishes PT’s chances of getting elected in at least twelve capitals it hoped to win. The PT itself has already nominated candidates for seven of the twelve capitals. Besides that, the PL (Partido Liberal) has decided to leave the Lula support coalition in the Senate and assume an “independent ally” position. Several factors have caused the considerable decline in the popularity of President Lula and his government. The last cause celebre was the
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Waldomiro political scandal which happened in February leading to Woldomiro’s dismissal. The lack of economic growth evidenced by the 0.02 percent decline in GDP in 2003 and the high interest rates have also had a negative impact among coalition parties and the business sector. The unemployment rate rose to 12.8 percent in Brazil’s major metropolitan cities this month and average salaries have gone down. The minimum wage increase of 8.3 percent, from R$240 ($85) to R$260 ($89), may calm things a little. The landless movement (MST) invasion of lands has also increased in the past month in the States of São Paulo, Pernanbuco, and Bahia. The MST has occupied productive properties owned by multinational and national firms. The increased invasions are an attempt to accelerate the pace at which Lula’s government is redistributing unused land. The government’s approval rating has fallen from 66 percent (12/2003) to 51percent (04/2004).Viviane Vanni
COLOMBIA
Changing constitutional prohibition on reelection goes against a deep Colombian tradition of limiting presidential terms.
Castaño’s disappearance gave evidence the paramilitaries have never been united.
The re-election of President Alvaro Uribe is dominating debate in Colombia’s congress. The current constitution prohibits a president from ever serving more than one four year term. If the constitution is going to be changed in time for Uribe to present himself for re-election in 2006, the congress must pass the measure four times in the current session of congress, which winds up at the end of June, and then pass it again in a later session. Close observers, even among those who support Uribe, fear the effort to amend the constitution will preempt other reforms awaiting legislative approval, especially the restructuring of the national pension system, which is important to the country’s long-term fiscal health. The amendment process seemed headed for defeat, but in recent days the Conservative Party has declared its support and the popular president began to campaign openly for the amendment. After having surrogates make his case, Uribe says the congress should let “the people decide” whether he should have a second term in office. Recent polls show Uribe with 80 percent public support. Clearly, an ample majority is happy with the lower levels of violence and greater economic activity achieved since his election two years ago, and would be pleased to see him stay in office to consolidate his “democratic security” strategy. There is no obvious presidential successor advocating Uribe’s approach. Yet, changing the constitutional prohibition on reelection – made tougher just in 1991 – goes against a deep Colombian tradition of limiting presidential terms. Phillip McLean The Uribe government’s attempt to demobilize paramilitary forces suffered a setback when Carlos Castaño the best known paramilitary leader, disappeared. Whether Castaño is dead or in hiding is not clear, although little about him or the group he purports to lead has ever been simple. There does seem to have been a firefight at his headquarters in northern Colombia on April 16 resulting in the death of several of his bodyguards. The best interpretation from a welter of contradictory stories is that his camp was attacked by a rival paramilitary band. Some ten years ago Castaño announced he was the head of “the united self-defense forces of Colombia,” or AUC in Spanish, with an armed following estimated from 8,000 to 20,000 and the avowed purpose of opposing communist guerrillas. The government
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entered into negotiations to demobilize all or part of these combined forces. Legislation designed to lure the groups into surrendering with the offer of “alternative penalties” for their past crimes was expected to pass the congress this month (despite the re-election debate). Castaño’s disappearance, however, gave further evidence the paramilitaries have never been “united” and it was unrealistic to expect negotiations would ever lead to a massive demobilization. Most of the “para” bands are involved in the narcotics trade, and that probably was a factor leading to Castaño’s exit. It is also probable that Castaño’s crisis came shortly after President Uribe finally and firmly made clear that negotiations with the paras would not protect him and other para leaders from being extradited to the United States. Phillip McLean
VENEZUELA
To trigger a referendum, the opposition needs more than 500,000 of the 800,000 disputed signatures to be approved.
After many months of haggling, it appears that the Hugo Chávez government and the opposition have agreed on a process to “repair” the 800,000-plus signatures that the National Electoral Council disqualified for technical reasons. The “repair process,” justly named “el reparo”, is fraught with dangers for the opposition because if it accepts the process and doesn’t get enough of the signatures “rectified”, the opposition risks legitimizing the government. On the other hand, if the opposition rejects the “repair” process, it may score a moral victory, but be left with no cards to play, save civil disobedience and possibly violence. To trigger a referendum, the opposition needs more than 500,000 of the 800,000 disputed signatures to be approved, so that when added to the 1.9 million signatures that have already been credited, it totals the 2.4 million required. The opposition is divided on whether to persevere with the process, but ultimately, for lack of options, it will probably buy into it. If so, this will create a monumental challenge to deliver the 500,000-plus needed signatures. Ironically, a recent poll showed that if a referendum were to be held, Chávez would survive it, mostly because of expected abstentions. Miguel Diaz
CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The media has published charges that President Mejía is trying to buy the election with last minute promises.
Almost all public opinion polls still show that former President Leonel Fernández of the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) is likely to win the May 16 presidential elections during the first round of voting. The latest Diario LibreGallup poll, conducted from April 14-18, gives Fernández 54.8 percent of the vote to 27 percent for President Hipólito Mejía of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) and 14 percent for Social Christian (PRSC) candidate Eduardo Estrella. March polls conducted by various national and international polling organizations showed Fernández with an even higher expected vote, several of them over 63 percent. Last week, former Vice President Jacinto Peynado, who had been expected to be the Social Christian candidate until the lesser-known Estrella won the
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nomination, announced that he was backing Fernández. Fernández defeated Peynado in the 1996 elections. The Dominican press continues to publish rumors of violence that would be instigated by members of the PRD on election day as well as charges that President Mejía is trying to buy the election with last minute promises of cheap loans to small business owners and other offers of government largesse IF he is reelected. Lowell Fleischer Both the Dominican Republic and Honduras will soon withdraw their troops from Iraq. Citing the withdrawal of Spanish forces, which he said would expose Dominican troops to more danger, Dominican President Mejía told the press that the country’s 300 soldiers would return home as soon as possible. Also citing security concerns arising from the withdrawal of Spanish forces, Honduras said last week that it will bring its 370 troops home. Nicaragua pulled its forces out in February and there are indications that El Salvador will soon do the same. Some Central Americans, citing the treatment of Chile last year when the Chile-U.S. FTA was held back for 8-9 months, presumably because of Chile’s vote in the UN Security Council, are concerned that the Bush administration might retaliate by putting the Central American Free Trade Agreement on the back burner in order to show its disapproval of the troop withdrawal. In any case, because of election year politics in the United States, it is unlikely that the agreement will be sent to Congress until next year. Lowell Fleischer
NORTH AMERICA CANADA
Canada’s first national security strategy represents another example of the highlevel attention the government has devoted to security.
Canada unveiled the framework for its first national security strategy on April 27. Entitled “Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy”, the 52-page document outlines a comprehensive security strategy that seeks to respond to three main goals: protecting Canadians at home and abroad; ensuring that Canada is not used as a launching pad for terrorist attacks on its allies; and contributing to national security. Eight main areas comprise the area of focus of the strategy, including intelligence, public health emergencies, and border security. Overall, the strategy commits C$690 million dollars in new security spending, which is earmarked for three main security upgrades: C$137 million to intelligence operations; C$308 million to improve security on Canada's coastlines; and C$85 million for the protection of information services, especially cyber security. Canada’s first national security strategy has an overarching goal of creating an integrated security system, which was one of the major gaps in Canadian security efforts identified in the March report by the Auditor General. More importantly, however, it represents another example of the high-level attention the Martin government has devoted to the issue of security. By creating Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada in December (roughly the Canadian equivalent to the Department of Homeland Security), and by pushing for Canada’s first national security strategy, the Martin government has continued a progression that has seen
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Canadian security policies move closer to the security model of the United States. Such developments are sure to be well received in Washington. Andre Belelieu
Canada is no worse than most countries in handling its national security.
The Task Force concluded that the worst blackout in North American history was largely preventable.
The Auditor General of Canada reported flaws in Canada’s basic security system in its latest March 2004 report. In a chapter called “National Security in Canada-The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Initiative”, Auditor-General Sheila Fraser stated that the majority of the C$7.7 billion allocated in the government’s 2001 budget in response to the 9/11 attacks went to priority areas and met most of the audit criteria. However, the report found serious problems regarding the use of watch lists employed to screen terrorist suspects, mishandled alerts, deferred implementation of fingerprint-analysis systems, current negligence in security investigations on Canadian airport employees, obstacles to communication among security information systems and laxness in intelligence management. On the other hand, the report acknowledges that Canada is no worse than most countries in handling its national security. This report was followed by similar study released by the Senate Committee on National Security and Defense, entitled “National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines”. This report describes Canada as an “unready nation” to face the possible occurrence of a terrorist attack and/or a natural disaster. It is likely that the auditor-general’s report will generate some anxiety in the United States, even though the under secretary for Border and Transportation Security, Asa Hutchinson, dismissed any concerns on the part of DHS. In reaction to the report, the Liberal government announced it will spend approximately C$500 million on a new security plan to address the serious gaps in Canada’s intelligence and security apparatus outlined by Fraser’s report. Genevieve Cote The U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force released its final report on the August 14, 2003 blackout on April 5. Co-chaired by the U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and Canadian Minister of Natural Resources John Efford (who replaced Herb Dhaliwal in December), the Task Force concluded that the worst blackout in North American history was largely preventable. The Task Force offered a series of recommendations to ensure the blackout was not repeated, including the implementation of mandatory and enforceable electricity reliability standards in both the United States and Canada, the strengthening of the institutional framework of the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), addressing deficiencies identified in FirstEnergy (the Ohio utility company whose negligence caused the blackout) and some reliability organizations in the United States by June 30, 2004, and increasing the physical and cyber security of the network. Last August, the blackout plunged parts of the Northeastern United States and Southern Ontario into darkness, in some cases for several days, after a power surge in Ohio affected the entire grid servicing these states and Ontario. The economic cost of the blackout was estimated in the billions of dollars. The blackout represented a wake-up call about the vulnerabilities in shared critical infrastructure between Canada and the United States, and the importance played by first responders in the event of a terrorist attack or terrorist sabotage. In this sense, it was encouraging to see high levels of cooperation between Canadian and American officials both during and in the aftermath of the blackout, as well as during the investigations. Andre Belelieu
Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20006 • Tel: (202) 775775-3150 • Fax: (202) 466466-4739 • www.csis.org
MEXICO
The move marks an aberration from formerly sound cooperation on law enforcement matters.
These sanctions expose one of the more glaring deficiencies in Mexico’s electoral code.
The U.S. Treasury Department suspended cooperation with Mexico on financial intelligence sharing following the disclosure of confidential Treasury documents by Mexico City Mayor Andrés Manuel López Obrador. López Obrador brandished the sensitive information before a press conference on April 15 in an attempt to deflect responsibility for a recent scandal involving misuse of funds by the mayor’s finance secretary. The move marks an aberration from formerly sound cooperation on law enforcement matters, particularly in the area of money laundering and financial crimes prosecution. In an April 21 letter to the Mexican government, the U.S. Treasury Department announced that it would halt information sharing with Mexico until it received adequate assurance that such information would be handled properly and in full compliance with the Treasury Department’s confidentiality requirements. Mexican authorities have responded with assurances that the incident was a regrettable exception to an otherwise firm commitment to upholding the confidentiality of financial information provided to Mexico by the United States. Most observers on both sides of the border concur that the disclosure was an isolated incident. Further, officials in both countries have expressed confidence that cooperation on financial crimes prosecution will resume shortly. These positions reflect the predominant perception in both Mexico and the United States that information sharing in these areas is critical in the fight against global organized crime. Sara Rioff Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) fined political parties for campaign irregularities during the 2003 mid-term elections. On April 19, 2004, the IFE’s 9-member General Council voted unanimously to sanction all 11 political parties that participated in the July 6, 2003 mid-term election for a cumulative total of about $36.7 million dollars (418 million pesos). Of the 11 parties sanctioned, five are no longer registered political parties, having failed to capture the required two percent of the vote in that contest. The fines were levied for such violations as exceeding campaign spending limits, failing to report radio and TV political ad campaigns, and receiving cash contributions in excess of the amounts permitted. The sanctions for the six existing parties totaled approximately $16.5 million dollars, while the sanctions for the now defunct parties totaled $20.2 million dollars. All six existing parties have appealed the fines with the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF). These sanctions expose one of the more glaring deficiencies in Mexico’s electoral code. With political campaigns largely publicly funded, creating political parties has become financially lucrative and therefore prone to abuse. Further, once a political party loses its legal registration, federal authorities are stripped of any legal recourse against that party. While the timing of the IFE’s sanction conforms to a preset timetable, it may prove counterproductive from an institutional standpoint; the Mexican Congress is currently debating the possibility of increasing the IFE’s auditing powers as part of the electoral reform proposal. Armand PeschardSverdrup Contributing Authors: Dr. Sidney Weintraub Director, Americas Program
Miguel Diaz
Americas Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20006 • Tel: (202) 775775-3150 • Fax: (202) 466466-4739 • www.csis.org
Director, South America Project Armand Peschard-Sverdrup Director, Mexico Project Lowell Fleischer Senior Associate Phillip McLean Senior Associate Andre Belelieu Research Associate Beth Hetzler Research Associate
Sara Rioff Research Assistant Viviane Vanni Program Manager Genevieve Cote Intern-Scholar Christina Jacobs Intern-Scholar Caroline Ramagem Intern-Scholar Carlos Regúnaga Argentina Office Director
Hemisphere Highlights is published monthly by the Americas Program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), (CSIS), a private, taxtax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication publication should be understood to be solely those of the authors. © 2004 2004 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
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