WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP WORKING GROUP MEETING D e c e m b e r 4, 1973
T i m e and P l a c e :
10:40 a . m . - 12:02 p . m . , White House Situation R o o m
Participants: Subject: North Korea Chairman:
William R. Smyser
State: A m b a s s a d o r Habib Richard Sneider Donald Ranard Wesley Kriebal Edward Kelley Chip Roe Elizabeth G. V e r v i l l e Defense: Colonel Ralph E. Adams Capt. James Baker Robert L. Yandergrift CIA James Graham
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
NSC Jack Froebe It was Solomon agreed that: Richard Col. Don Stukel . . . the ferry boat scheduled to leave on D e c e m b e r 5 depart as William Hyland u s u aRobert l but that a final decision be rendered by Secretary Kissinger; Maj. McFarlane Jim Barnum . . . a joint State, Defense, NSC cable be sent E m b a s s y Seoul i m m e d i a t e l y informing them of our view of the situation, instructing the E m b a s s y to call for a meeting of the Military A r m i s t i c e C o m m i s s i o n as s o o n as p o s s i b l e , and that the ROK be urged to open the " h o t - l i n e " with Pyongyang; . . . the Soviet Union and the P e o p l e ' s Republic of China will be i n f o r m e d of our concern and the steps we are taking to prevent an incident; . . . State will inform the Japanese of the situation and what we are doing; . . . the leadership of both Houses of Congress be informed immediately of the situation and what steps are being taken by the US.
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
1.
Organization and Purpose M r . Smyser opened the meeting with the explanation that the meeting had been called in o r d e r to formulate a concensus on what our policy should be in regard to North K o r e a ' s demands. If there was no agreement on what we should do, the issues would be clarified and justified and then forwarded for decision at a higher level. M r . Smyser e x p r e s s e d the hope that two papers would emerge f r o m the meeting: (1) a m e m o r a n d u m to Secretary Kissinger defining the issues and options; and (2) a cable to Embassy Seoul, giving our views of the situation and what steps ought to be taken. M r . Smyser also identified five issues to be a d d r e s s e d : (1) how to p r o c e e d with the regular supply convoys; (2) how to talk to the North Koreans (through the Military A r m i s t i c e C o m m i s s i o n (MAC) or " h o t - l i n e " ) ; (3) how to-tell the Soviets and Chinese of our concern; (4) how the situation relates to the UN Command (UNC); and (5) what do we do about the Japanese and the Congress.
2.
CIA View of the Current Situation
M r . Graham gave a brief run-down on the current situation, adding little to what was already known. The f e r r y that was scheduled to leave for one of the islands today turned back because of bad weather. The North Korean Navy continues to patrol along what is t e r m e d the Northern Limit Line. North Korean A r m y units appear to be on alert, and there is some evidence that r e s e r v e f o r c e s are also on alert, but this is uncertain, The joint s e r v i c e e x e r c i s e s have not begun. This is only the second time that this has not happened, and there is no clear explanation for this. On the political front, the North Koreans have made no further claims beyond jurisdiction over the islands. The South Koreans still plan to re-supply the islands. Their naval units are to e s c o r t the supply convoys and have o r d e r s to fire only if fired upon. There are no installations on any of theislands,andnoUSpe
It was M r . Graham's opinion that North K o r e a ' s reasons for provoking the issue at this time a r e basically threefold: (1) a method to get the UNC phased out; (2) to unsettle the ROK; and (3) to weaken South K o r e a ' s c o n fidence in the US at the time when the Korean question is about to c o m e up before the United Nations. Mr. Graham explained that this a s s e s s m e n t is only conjecture, but that the timing in relation to the UN is just too c l o s e to be coincidental. 3.
Status of the South Korean Ships M r . F r o e b e reported f r o m a just-concluded telephone conversation with the UN Command that a f e r r y is scheduled to depart at 0900 (Seoul time) on
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
December 5. It will not be e s c o r t e d . Three ROK v e s s e l s will be maneuvering off the coast. The ROK Air F o r c e is also on strip alert. The departure of the next r e - s u p p l y convoy to Paengnyong-do is uncertain; cover plans are now being developed. 4.
The Military Situation Colonel Adams of Defense reported that there is a heavy concentration of North Korean troops near Saigon-ni conducting e x e r c i s e s . Traditionally, these e x e r c i s e s maneuver f r o m the west toward the east. Defense is currently working up the North Korean o r d e r of battle in the a r e a , and will have a rundown by the afternoon of 4 D e c e m b e r . No US v e s s e l s are in the area.
5.
The Legal Situation M r s . Verville of State reported that it is State's preliminary view that North K o r e a ' s claim that the five islands fall within its t e r r i t o r i a l waters is notlegallyvalid.Under A r t i c l e 15 of the A r m i s t i c e Agreement, North Korean jurisdiction over contiguous waters applies only to the mainland--not the islands. State prefers not t o get into the argument over t e r r i t o r i a l waters as this opens a whole Pandora's Box of
6.
issu
Discussion of the Actions to be Taken A lengthy discussion followed regarding what actions the US might take in response to North K o r e a ' s "challenge" and what North Korea and the ROK might do in response to the actions d i s c u s s e d . There was do agreement as to whether North Korea will or will not attempt to seize the ferry boat on the morning of D e c e m b e r 5. There are strong arguments that the North Koreans want an incident and thus will try s o m e thing, and strong arguments that Pyongyang will do nothing. A discussion of whether it would be in our interest to escalate the matter ended with the agreement that it would not be at this time. There was considerable discussion over the advisability of requesting that leave the decision to Secretary Kissinger. It was A m b a s s a d o r Habib's view that nothing could be done since the ship was due to leave in less than eight hours and the South Koreans probably would not accede to our request, anyway.
On the diplomatic questions, there was a great deal of discussion on whether to inform the Soviet Union and Peking of our concern, whether we should urge the ROK to communicate it's concerns to Pyongyang over
the
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
the " h o t - l i n e " , and whether a meeting of the Military A r m i s t i c e C o m m i s s i o n (MAC) should be called. It was decided that M o s c o w and Peking should be informed of our concern, but in a l o w - k e y manner. E m b a s s y Seoul would be instructed to urge South Korea to openthe" h o t - l i n e " . 7.
Informing our A l l i e s and Congress It was decided that State would inform the Japanese of our concern o v e r the situation and what we are doing to prevent an incident. It was also decided that the leaders of Congress should be told immediately of the be determined later. Congressional leaders will be informed of our demarches to the Russians and Chinese on an "if asked only" b a s i s .
WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP WORKING GROUP MEETING D e c e m b e r 4, 1973
T i m e and P l a c e :
10:40 a . m . - 12:02 p . m . , White House Situation R o o m
Participants: Subject: North Korea Chairman:
William R. Smyser
State: A m b a s s a d o r Habib Richard Sneider Donald Ranard Wesley Kriebal Edward Kelley Chip Roe Elizabeth G. V e r v i l l e Defense: Colonel Ralph E. Adams Capt. James Baker Robert L. Yandergrift CIA James Graham
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
NSC Jack Froebe It was Solomon agreed that: Richard Col. Don Stukel . . . the ferry boat scheduled to leave on D e c e m b e r 5 depart as William Hyland u s u aRobert l but that a final decision be rendered by Secretary Kissinger; Maj. McFarlane Jim Barnum . . . a joint State, Defense, NSC cable be sent E m b a s s y Seoul i m m e d i a t e l y informing them of our view of the situation, instructing the E m b a s s y to call for a meeting of the Military A r m i s t i c e C o m m i s s i o n as s o o n as p o s s i b l e , and that the ROK be urged to open the " h o t - l i n e " with Pyongyang; . . . the Soviet Union and the P e o p l e ' s Republic of China will be i n f o r m e d of our concern and the steps we are taking to prevent an incident; . . . State will inform the Japanese of the situation and what we are doing; . . . the leadership of both Houses of Congress be informed immediately of the situation and what steps are being taken by the US.
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
1.
Organization and Purpose M r . Smyser opened the meeting with the explanation that the meeting had been called in o r d e r to formulate a concensus on what our policy should be in regard to North K o r e a ' s demands. If there was no agreement on what we should do, the issues would be clarified and justified and then forwarded for decision at a higher level. M r . Smyser e x p r e s s e d the hope that two papers would emerge f r o m the meeting: (1) a m e m o r a n d u m to Secretary Kissinger defining the issues and options; and (2) a cable to Embassy Seoul, giving our views of the situation and what steps ought to be taken. M r . Smyser also identified five issues to be a d d r e s s e d : (1) how to p r o c e e d with the regular supply convoys; (2) how to talk to the North Koreans (through the Military A r m i s t i c e C o m m i s s i o n (MAC) or " h o t - l i n e " ) ; (3) how to-tell the Soviets and Chinese of our concern; (4) how the situation relates to the UN Command (UNC); and (5) what do we do about the Japanese and the Congress.
2.
CIA View of the Current Situation
M r . Graham gave a brief run-down on the current situation, adding little to what was already known. The f e r r y that was scheduled to leave for one of the islands today turned back because of bad weather. The North Korean Navy continues to patrol along what is t e r m e d the Northern Limit Line. North Korean A r m y units appear to be on alert, and there is some evidence that r e s e r v e f o r c e s are also on alert, but this is uncertain, The joint s e r v i c e e x e r c i s e s have not begun. This is only the second time that this has not happened, and there is no clear explanation for this. On the political front, the North Koreans have made no further claims beyond jurisdiction over the islands. The South Koreans still plan to re-supply the islands. Their naval units are to e s c o r t the supply convoys and have o r d e r s to fire only if fired upon. There are no installations on any of theislands,andnoUSpe
It was M r . Graham's opinion that North K o r e a ' s reasons for provoking the issue at this time a r e basically threefold: (1) a method to get the UNC phased out; (2) to unsettle the ROK; and (3) to weaken South K o r e a ' s c o n fidence in the US at the time when the Korean question is about to c o m e up before the United Nations. Mr. Graham explained that this a s s e s s m e n t is only conjecture, but that the timing in relation to the UN is just too c l o s e to be coincidental. 3.
Status of the South Korean Ships M r . F r o e b e reported f r o m a just-concluded telephone conversation with the UN Command that a f e r r y is scheduled to depart at 0900 (Seoul time) on
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
December 5. It will not be e s c o r t e d . Three ROK v e s s e l s will be maneuvering off the coast. The ROK Air F o r c e is also on strip alert. The departure of the next r e - s u p p l y convoy to Paengnyong-do is uncertain; cover plans are now being developed. 4.
The Military Situation Colonel Adams of Defense reported that there is a heavy concentration of North Korean troops near Saigon-ni conducting e x e r c i s e s . Traditionally, these e x e r c i s e s maneuver f r o m the west toward the east. Defense is currently working up the North Korean o r d e r of battle in the a r e a , and will have a rundown by the afternoon of 4 D e c e m b e r . No US v e s s e l s are in the area.
5.
The Legal Situation M r s . Verville of State reported that it is State's preliminary view that North K o r e a ' s claim that the five islands fall within its t e r r i t o r i a l waters is notlegallyvalid.Under A r t i c l e 15 of the A r m i s t i c e Agreement, North Korean jurisdiction over contiguous waters applies only to the mainland--not the islands. State prefers not t o get into the argument over t e r r i t o r i a l waters as this opens a whole Pandora's Box of
6.
issu
Discussion of the Actions to be Taken A lengthy discussion followed regarding what actions the US might take in response to North K o r e a ' s "challenge" and what North Korea and the ROK might do in response to the actions d i s c u s s e d . There was do agreement as to whether North Korea will or will not attempt to seize the ferry boat on the morning of D e c e m b e r 5. There are strong arguments that the North Koreans want an incident and thus will try s o m e thing, and strong arguments that Pyongyang will do nothing. A discussion of whether it would be in our interest to escalate the matter ended with the agreement that it would not be at this time. There was considerable discussion over the advisability of requesting that leave the decision to Secretary Kissinger. It was A m b a s s a d o r Habib's view that nothing could be done since the ship was due to leave in less than eight hours and the South Koreans probably would not accede to our request, anyway.
On the diplomatic questions, there was a great deal of discussion on whether to inform the Soviet Union and Peking of our concern, whether we should urge the ROK to communicate it's concerns to Pyongyang over
the
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
the " h o t - l i n e " , and whether a meeting of the Military A r m i s t i c e C o m m i s s i o n (MAC) should be called. It was decided that M o s c o w and Peking should be informed of our concern, but in a l o w - k e y manner. E m b a s s y Seoul would be instructed to urge South Korea to openthe" h o t - l i n e " . 7.
Informing our A l l i e s and Congress It was decided that State would inform the Japanese of our concern o v e r the situation and what we are doing to prevent an incident. It was also decided that the leaders of Congress should be told immediately of the be determined later. Congressional leaders will be informed of our demarches to the Russians and Chinese on an "if asked only" b a s i s .
