White House Situation Room Subject:Korea
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
WASHINGTON S P E C I A L ACTIONS GROUP M E E T I N G August 25, 1976
T i m e and P l a c e : 10:30 a . m . Subject:Korea:
MAC Meeting
-
, White House Situation R o o m and Possible
Participants:
Action /
Chairman:
Henry A .
State:
P h i l i p Habib
DOD:
Military
Kissinger
William Clements
JCS:
Gen. G e o r g e S. Brown
CIA:
G e o r g e Bush
NSC:
W i l l i a m Hyland William Gleysteen
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
Kissinger:
I s e e that S t i l w e l l ' s now beginning to take a tough line even
though he
was s o cautious last week when I was talking of tough a c t i o n .
I saw his incoherent m e s s a g e . proposal
A s I understand it,
the North K o r e a n
is e v i l , i m m o r a l , d a n g e r o u s , etc. but it amounts
to unilateral North K o r e a n withdrawal of t h e i r what's wrong with it.
Would they withdraw
p e r s o n n e l f r o m our side?
guardposts.
I want to know
all t h e i r guardpost and
Supposing we said t h e r e must be f r e e d o m of
m o v e m e n t but that we can a c c e p t the p r o p o s a l to r e m o v e the g u a r d p o s t s ?
Habib: We couldn't send our guards o v e r to t h e i r s i d e . There a r e two kinds of p e r s o n n e l . They a r e suggesting that the s e c u r i t y or guard p e r s o n n e l be split apart, butfother personnelcouldpresumablystill m o v e around within the joint security a r e a . Kissinger:
But we would get rid of the North K o r e a n p o s t s on our side
and this would be a good thing. isi Habib:
T h e r e m a y b e s o m e p r o b l e m of the effect on the a r m i s t i c e a g r e e -
ment. Kissinger: Koreans.
I want to play it as a c o n c e s s i o n on the part of the N o r t h We should c o n s t r u c t our a n s w e r so thattheirproposall o o k s like a c o n c e s -
sion rather than a deal.
Clements:
L e t ' s first get r i d of the g u a r d p o s t s .
H e n r y ' s saying m a k e
it look like we k i c k e d t h e m out.
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
Kissinger:
Yes.
F i r s t get rid of the p o s t s , then deal with the p r o b l e m
of a c c e s s by our s e c u r i t y p e r s o n n e l into t h e i r part of the a r e a .
Clements:
I like that idea.
Our p e o p l e get t r e a t e d so b a d l y .
T h e y get
k i c k e d , spit on, c u r s e d , and we a r e unable t o t e l l our p e o p l e t o p r o t e c t themselves.
E v e r y m o r n i n g they have a s p e c i a l m e e t i n g w h e r e they a r e
t o l d to take abuse and to m a x i m i z e t h e i r r e s t r a i n t .
R e m e m b e r our man
who got k i c k e d in the throat not long ago?
Kissinger: Habib:
Brown:
Who was that?
When?
A Navy c o m m a n d e r who got badly k i c k e d in June 1975.
We had to p r o t e c t the Pentagon the s a m e way during the r i o t s .
Our m e n had to take a l m o s t e n d l e s s abuse without r e a c t i n g . Kissinger:
You know m y p r e f e r e n c e was to hit the b a r r a c k s but that was
overruled.
Now, we have to find a way of winding the thing up.
The
p r a c t i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s w i l l be that they w i l l have r e m o v e d the guardposts.
Clements:
And the guards,
(mistakenly b e l i e v i n g that the N o r t h K o r e a n
b a r r a c k s in the JSA a r e a would be
Kissinger:
T h e i r b a r r a c k s will stay.
r e m o v e d under the August 25 p r o p o s a l )
A s I understand it their two
dismantle nothing. Habib:
I a m reading f r o m the North K o r e a n statement: "In o r d e r to
prevent a conflict between m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l of both sides and in o r d e r that each side insure the s e c u r i t y of e a c h p e r s o n n e l in the c o n f e r e n c e a r e a ,
g
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
P a n m u n j o m , w e b e l i e v e it m o s t r e a s o n a b l e t o separate the securityp e r s o n n e l of both sides in this a r e a with the M D L between t h e m so that they m a y p e r f o r m t h e i r guard duty m o v i n g in t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a r e a only.
This w i l l m a k e both sides have t h e i r guard p o s t s only in t h e i r
r e s p e c t i v e part of the c o n f e r e n c e a r e a .
And this will prevent m i l i t a r y
p e r s o n n e l of both s i d e s f r o m both encountering e a c h other and passing by the posts of the other side. Kissinger;
u
In effect t h e y a r e offering to dismantle t h e i r guardposts
We should say to t h e m : two guard p o s t s on
Then t h e r e will o c c u r no conflicts.
We n o t i c e y o u r p r o p o s a l amounts to r e m o v i n g
o u r side; we have none on your side; we b e l i e v e
t h e r e should be f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t in the zone and suggest that our S e c r e t a r i e s m e e t to d i s c u s s this.
F i r s t we have to get t h e i r a s s u r a n c e s
about the safety of our p e r s o n n e l , then we can d i s c u s s drawing a line.
implementation of
We should play it up a s a retreat on t h e i r part.
Phil - -
you w i l l have to find s o m e f o r m of wordstodo this. Habib:
We will draft a m e s s a g e and we w i l l a l s o draft guidance.
We w i l l
have to c l e a r both with P r e s i d e n t P a r k . K i s s i n g e r : Every time I wanted to hit hard at the North K o r e a n s last w e e k I was told that P a r k didn't want to take m i l i t a r y action.
Now I gather he
wants to do something. Clements: business.
He r e a l l y was playing it v e r y soft at the beginning of this
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
Kissinger:
I think we a r e coming out p r e t t y w e l l .
(Turning to Clements) plan.
But we c a l l e d this meeting to d i s c u s s your
Go ahead and explain it.
Clements:
(Using a m a p of North K o r e a and pointing to the a r e a of Sonjin
Hang H a r b o r ) fuel dump.
We all r e c o g n i z e this c o a s t line is fairly open.
It is easy to get into the h a r b o r .
H e r e is a
I would like to interrupt to
e m p h a s i z e that in Defense we are t r e a t i n g this m a t t e r on a r e a l l y strict "need-to-know" basis. [text not declassified]
Brown:
Better m a k e that N o v e m b e r 1 r a t h e r than D e c e m b e r 1.
Clements:
It will be t o o damned cold.
Kissinger:
How about N o v e m b e r 2?
day.
What would they do?
It m a y not m a k e the front page that
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
C l e m e n t s :[textnotdeclassified]
Kissinger: Bush:
G e o r g e , what do you think?
I think it would be t e r r i b l y r i s k y , but I know you ,don't need our
a d v i c e on that s c o r e .
/
Clements: [text not declassified]
Kissinger: Brown:
What kind of defenses do the N o r t h K o r e a n s have?
T h e y have superb defenses, and the operation would i n v o l v e a
v e r y high r i s k .
The N o r t h K o r e a n s have e x c e l l e n t c o a s t a l r a d a r .
It
would be a v e r y h i g h - r i s k operation. Clements:
I don't c o m p l e t e l y a g r e e with that.
K i s s i n g e r :[textnotdeclassified] C l e m e n t s :[textnotdeclassified]
Kissinger:
What would we have a c h i e v e d if the North K o r e a n s did not
know who did it? Clements:
The advantage would be the e l e m e n t of doubt.
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
Brown:
T h e ywouldhavetoknow we did it if it were worth doing.
Kissinger:
I ' m just thinking the p r o c e s s through.
^
No m a t t e r how we
did it, the North K o r e a n s would c h a r g e us with being r e s p o n s i b l e for it.
Then we would be faced with questioning by the S e n a t e , F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s
C o m m i t t e e and what would Brown:
we say to them?
A c c o r d i n g t o Buchen, we would have to report under the War
P o w e r s A c t t o both the Speaker and the P r e s i d e n t P r o T e m p o r e of the Senate.
/
Kissinger:
What would we say to t h e m a s to why w e did it?
Clements:
Our A s s i s t a n t G e n e r a l C o u n s e l says you would not have t o
r e p o r t under the War P o w e r s A c t . Kissinger:
They (the C o n g r e s s ) w i l l say that we have to
if we don't want to lie w e would
be
r e p o r t and
f o r c e d t o take a n o - c o m m e n t
line
which would in effect be admitting that we did it.
Brown:
In explaining why we would have t o say that it was a r e s p o n s e
to the m u r d e r of two A m e r i c a n s . K i s s i n g e r : Our explanation would l o o k v e r y weak, p a r t i c u l a r l y after two months ( ? ? ) I respect your position.
L a s t w e e k I was in favor of f i r m action but
it was o v e r r u l e d at V a i l , not by this group. seen the North K o r e a n s so s c a r e d .
It was a t r a g e d y .
I have n e v e r
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
Brown:
Bush:
T h e y didn't get any c o m f o r t f r o m the C h i n e s e o r S o v i e t s .
Or f r o m the third w o r l d .
Clements: Brown:
I like the plan.
I think we should go ahead w o r k i n g out the plan.
K i s s i n g e r : Y e s . D e v e l o p the plan. B r o w n : If w e have the plan d e v e l o p e d , i t would b e ready if w e wanted touseit.[textnotdeclass
Kissinger:
I think this is a good way.
C l e m e n t s : I like it.
It d o e s n ' t have an
overt character.
I have been told
that t h e r e have been 200 other such o p e r a t i o n s andthatnone of t h e s e
Kissinger:
It is different for us with
the War P o w e r s A c t .
don't r e m e m b e r any such o p e r a t i o n s .
What b a r r a c k s w e r e w e going to hit in N o r t h K o r e a ?
Clements:
We thought we would need 36 M a x ( ? ? )
Kissinger:
I a m p o s i t i v e they would not have hit b a c k .
we can't do it now.
Unfortunately,
M y idea had been t o cut down the t r e e , get out of
the JSA, take out the N o r t h K o r e a n b a r r a c k s , and then stand down. Of c o u r s e , t h e r e was the r i s k of further c a s u a l t i e s .
have
I
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
Could we have done it with W a l l e y e s ? it
have taken?
Brown:
How many W a l l e y e s would
Could we hit thebarracksf r o m our side of the D M Z ?
I don't know how many b o m b s it would take b e c a u s e I haven't
studied the t a r g e t , but I ' m sure we could hit it f r o m our side of the D M Z[textnotdeclassifie Kissinger:
(The advantage of a Walleye would b e to) a v o i d c o u n t e r - b a t t e r y
fire. Clements:
Hyland:
Why
would an a i r strike avoid counter-battery f i r e ?
B e c a u s etheywouldnotberespondingtomaskedartillery.(??)
Clements:
I still think they would have r e a c t e d .
Kissinger:
You told m e last w e e k of y o u r c o n c e r n s and a s k e d m e to r e l a y
t h e m t o the P r e s i d e n t , and I did.
But the r e a l p r o b l e m , I think, was not
y o u r c o n c e r n s but the P r e s i d e n t ' s s p e e c h on T h u r s d a y night saying that t h e r e w e r e no A m e r i c a n s in combat anywhere in the w o r l d . P r e s i d e n t was in V a i l and I was on an a i r p l a n e , for conducting m i l i t a r y operations.
S e c o n d , the
not the b e s t a r r a n g e m e n t
I don't think the d e c i s i o n had
anything to do with y o u r r e c o m m e n d a t i o n . If we can first get the North K o r e a n s toguaranteethe safety of our m e n , then w e can c o o p e r a t e with t h e m on p r a c t i c a l plans.
We can say that we
w i l l have our S e c r e t a r i e s w o r k out the p r o b l e m of m o v e m e n t of p e r s o n n e l in the JSA while maintaining the p r i n c i p l e of the f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t . T h e r e a r e t w o things to do.
F i r s t , draft a m e s s a g e on the JSA and s e c o n d ,
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
continue to d e v e l o p the m i l i t a r y plan (for hitting N o r t h K o r e a ) but a l s o look at other t a r g e t s .
Then we will have contingency plans next t i m e
if t h e r e is a further incident. Brown:
I would like to stress once m o r e the c l o s e hold
we have put
on this operation. Clements:
F o r e x a m p l e , Don (Rumsfeld) knows about the plan but H o l c o m b
doesn't. Kissinger:
L e t ' s k e e p our extra deployments in K o r e a until we
get the
guardposts r e m o v e d and get s o m e satisfaction f r o m the N o r t h K o r e a n s . Don't r e m o v e DefCon 3 until we get p o s i t i v e a c t i o n .
L e t ' s t r y to get a
MAC m e e t i n g F r i d a y o r Saturday. Habib:
We will ask t o m o r r o w and get one F r i d a y .
I don't think the N o r t h
K o r e a n s will stall. K i s s i n g e r :Thenafter the m e e t i n g
we can start the drawdown.
After we
get s o m e satisfaction, we can start to m o v e things down but I want to k e e p something t h e r e for a while. Clements:
Brown:
We have in mind keeping s o m e of the F-111's in K o r e a .
We have sent Stilwell a planning m e s s a g e outlining our v i e w s
about drawing down f r o m our current a l e r t but they have been told t o make no changes without execute o r d e r . c o m m e n t s f r o m Stilwell on our plan. through Sunday.
If we a l l o w t h e m to
So far, w e have not had any
The B - 5 2 ' s w i l l continue flying down for a while, we would
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
then have the option of r e s u m i n g t h e m as a p r e s s u r e t a c t i c if the N o r t h K o r e a n s keep giving us t r o u b l e . Kissinger:
(to Habib) A s k for a M A C m e e t i n g on F r i d a y .
Demand
a s s u r a n c e s f r o m the North K o r e a n s for the safety of our m e n and then d i s c u s s the deployment of our s e c u r i t y p e r s o n n e l . to get the guard p o s t s r e m o v e d .
The f i r s t t h i n g is
Then we can let the S e c r e t a r i e s w o r k
out m o v e m e n t of p e r s o n n e l in the JSA. Habib:
I don't think w e should make an a s s u r a n c e about safety a p r e -
condition. Kissinger: Habib:
I want the
principle
accepted
first of a l l .
Why don't we imply that they have a c c e p t e d it o r
talk
on the
assumption that they a r e a c c e p t i n g it? Kissinger:
You can say on the assumption that the North K o r e a n s a c c e p t
demand for a s s u r a n c e s for the safety of our p e r s o n n e l , w e a r e p r e p a r e d to have t h e m r e m o v e t h e i r guardposts on our side and to d i s c u s s the deployment of our s e c u r i t y p e r s o n n e l , while maintaining the p r i n c i p l e of f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t in the JSA. We w i l l d i s c u s s the future of B - 5 2 o p e r a t i o n s next M o n d a y .
WASHINGTON S P E C I A L ACTIONS GROUP M E E T I N G August 25, 1976
T i m e and P l a c e : 10:30 a . m . Subject:Korea:
MAC Meeting
-
, White House Situation R o o m and Possible
Participants:
Action /
Chairman:
Henry A .
State:
P h i l i p Habib
DOD:
Military
Kissinger
William Clements
JCS:
Gen. G e o r g e S. Brown
CIA:
G e o r g e Bush
NSC:
W i l l i a m Hyland William Gleysteen
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
Kissinger:
I s e e that S t i l w e l l ' s now beginning to take a tough line even
though he
was s o cautious last week when I was talking of tough a c t i o n .
I saw his incoherent m e s s a g e . proposal
A s I understand it,
the North K o r e a n
is e v i l , i m m o r a l , d a n g e r o u s , etc. but it amounts
to unilateral North K o r e a n withdrawal of t h e i r what's wrong with it.
Would they withdraw
p e r s o n n e l f r o m our side?
guardposts.
I want to know
all t h e i r guardpost and
Supposing we said t h e r e must be f r e e d o m of
m o v e m e n t but that we can a c c e p t the p r o p o s a l to r e m o v e the g u a r d p o s t s ?
Habib: We couldn't send our guards o v e r to t h e i r s i d e . There a r e two kinds of p e r s o n n e l . They a r e suggesting that the s e c u r i t y or guard p e r s o n n e l be split apart, butfother personnelcouldpresumablystill m o v e around within the joint security a r e a . Kissinger:
But we would get rid of the North K o r e a n p o s t s on our side
and this would be a good thing. isi Habib:
T h e r e m a y b e s o m e p r o b l e m of the effect on the a r m i s t i c e a g r e e -
ment. Kissinger: Koreans.
I want to play it as a c o n c e s s i o n on the part of the N o r t h We should c o n s t r u c t our a n s w e r so thattheirproposall o o k s like a c o n c e s -
sion rather than a deal.
Clements:
L e t ' s first get r i d of the g u a r d p o s t s .
H e n r y ' s saying m a k e
it look like we k i c k e d t h e m out.
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
Kissinger:
Yes.
F i r s t get rid of the p o s t s , then deal with the p r o b l e m
of a c c e s s by our s e c u r i t y p e r s o n n e l into t h e i r part of the a r e a .
Clements:
I like that idea.
Our p e o p l e get t r e a t e d so b a d l y .
T h e y get
k i c k e d , spit on, c u r s e d , and we a r e unable t o t e l l our p e o p l e t o p r o t e c t themselves.
E v e r y m o r n i n g they have a s p e c i a l m e e t i n g w h e r e they a r e
t o l d to take abuse and to m a x i m i z e t h e i r r e s t r a i n t .
R e m e m b e r our man
who got k i c k e d in the throat not long ago?
Kissinger: Habib:
Brown:
Who was that?
When?
A Navy c o m m a n d e r who got badly k i c k e d in June 1975.
We had to p r o t e c t the Pentagon the s a m e way during the r i o t s .
Our m e n had to take a l m o s t e n d l e s s abuse without r e a c t i n g . Kissinger:
You know m y p r e f e r e n c e was to hit the b a r r a c k s but that was
overruled.
Now, we have to find a way of winding the thing up.
The
p r a c t i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s w i l l be that they w i l l have r e m o v e d the guardposts.
Clements:
And the guards,
(mistakenly b e l i e v i n g that the N o r t h K o r e a n
b a r r a c k s in the JSA a r e a would be
Kissinger:
T h e i r b a r r a c k s will stay.
r e m o v e d under the August 25 p r o p o s a l )
A s I understand it their two
dismantle nothing. Habib:
I a m reading f r o m the North K o r e a n statement: "In o r d e r to
prevent a conflict between m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l of both sides and in o r d e r that each side insure the s e c u r i t y of e a c h p e r s o n n e l in the c o n f e r e n c e a r e a ,
g
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
P a n m u n j o m , w e b e l i e v e it m o s t r e a s o n a b l e t o separate the securityp e r s o n n e l of both sides in this a r e a with the M D L between t h e m so that they m a y p e r f o r m t h e i r guard duty m o v i n g in t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a r e a only.
This w i l l m a k e both sides have t h e i r guard p o s t s only in t h e i r
r e s p e c t i v e part of the c o n f e r e n c e a r e a .
And this will prevent m i l i t a r y
p e r s o n n e l of both s i d e s f r o m both encountering e a c h other and passing by the posts of the other side. Kissinger;
u
In effect t h e y a r e offering to dismantle t h e i r guardposts
We should say to t h e m : two guard p o s t s on
Then t h e r e will o c c u r no conflicts.
We n o t i c e y o u r p r o p o s a l amounts to r e m o v i n g
o u r side; we have none on your side; we b e l i e v e
t h e r e should be f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t in the zone and suggest that our S e c r e t a r i e s m e e t to d i s c u s s this.
F i r s t we have to get t h e i r a s s u r a n c e s
about the safety of our p e r s o n n e l , then we can d i s c u s s drawing a line.
implementation of
We should play it up a s a retreat on t h e i r part.
Phil - -
you w i l l have to find s o m e f o r m of wordstodo this. Habib:
We will draft a m e s s a g e and we w i l l a l s o draft guidance.
We w i l l
have to c l e a r both with P r e s i d e n t P a r k . K i s s i n g e r : Every time I wanted to hit hard at the North K o r e a n s last w e e k I was told that P a r k didn't want to take m i l i t a r y action.
Now I gather he
wants to do something. Clements: business.
He r e a l l y was playing it v e r y soft at the beginning of this
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Kissinger:
I think we a r e coming out p r e t t y w e l l .
(Turning to Clements) plan.
But we c a l l e d this meeting to d i s c u s s your
Go ahead and explain it.
Clements:
(Using a m a p of North K o r e a and pointing to the a r e a of Sonjin
Hang H a r b o r ) fuel dump.
We all r e c o g n i z e this c o a s t line is fairly open.
It is easy to get into the h a r b o r .
H e r e is a
I would like to interrupt to
e m p h a s i z e that in Defense we are t r e a t i n g this m a t t e r on a r e a l l y strict "need-to-know" basis. [text not declassified]
Brown:
Better m a k e that N o v e m b e r 1 r a t h e r than D e c e m b e r 1.
Clements:
It will be t o o damned cold.
Kissinger:
How about N o v e m b e r 2?
day.
What would they do?
It m a y not m a k e the front page that
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
C l e m e n t s :[textnotdeclassified]
Kissinger: Bush:
G e o r g e , what do you think?
I think it would be t e r r i b l y r i s k y , but I know you ,don't need our
a d v i c e on that s c o r e .
/
Clements: [text not declassified]
Kissinger: Brown:
What kind of defenses do the N o r t h K o r e a n s have?
T h e y have superb defenses, and the operation would i n v o l v e a
v e r y high r i s k .
The N o r t h K o r e a n s have e x c e l l e n t c o a s t a l r a d a r .
It
would be a v e r y h i g h - r i s k operation. Clements:
I don't c o m p l e t e l y a g r e e with that.
K i s s i n g e r :[textnotdeclassified] C l e m e n t s :[textnotdeclassified]
Kissinger:
What would we have a c h i e v e d if the North K o r e a n s did not
know who did it? Clements:
The advantage would be the e l e m e n t of doubt.
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
Brown:
T h e ywouldhavetoknow we did it if it were worth doing.
Kissinger:
I ' m just thinking the p r o c e s s through.
^
No m a t t e r how we
did it, the North K o r e a n s would c h a r g e us with being r e s p o n s i b l e for it.
Then we would be faced with questioning by the S e n a t e , F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s
C o m m i t t e e and what would Brown:
we say to them?
A c c o r d i n g t o Buchen, we would have to report under the War
P o w e r s A c t t o both the Speaker and the P r e s i d e n t P r o T e m p o r e of the Senate.
/
Kissinger:
What would we say to t h e m a s to why w e did it?
Clements:
Our A s s i s t a n t G e n e r a l C o u n s e l says you would not have t o
r e p o r t under the War P o w e r s A c t . Kissinger:
They (the C o n g r e s s ) w i l l say that we have to
if we don't want to lie w e would
be
r e p o r t and
f o r c e d t o take a n o - c o m m e n t
line
which would in effect be admitting that we did it.
Brown:
In explaining why we would have t o say that it was a r e s p o n s e
to the m u r d e r of two A m e r i c a n s . K i s s i n g e r : Our explanation would l o o k v e r y weak, p a r t i c u l a r l y after two months ( ? ? ) I respect your position.
L a s t w e e k I was in favor of f i r m action but
it was o v e r r u l e d at V a i l , not by this group. seen the North K o r e a n s so s c a r e d .
It was a t r a g e d y .
I have n e v e r
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
Brown:
Bush:
T h e y didn't get any c o m f o r t f r o m the C h i n e s e o r S o v i e t s .
Or f r o m the third w o r l d .
Clements: Brown:
I like the plan.
I think we should go ahead w o r k i n g out the plan.
K i s s i n g e r : Y e s . D e v e l o p the plan. B r o w n : If w e have the plan d e v e l o p e d , i t would b e ready if w e wanted touseit.[textnotdeclass
Kissinger:
I think this is a good way.
C l e m e n t s : I like it.
It d o e s n ' t have an
overt character.
I have been told
that t h e r e have been 200 other such o p e r a t i o n s andthatnone of t h e s e
Kissinger:
It is different for us with
the War P o w e r s A c t .
don't r e m e m b e r any such o p e r a t i o n s .
What b a r r a c k s w e r e w e going to hit in N o r t h K o r e a ?
Clements:
We thought we would need 36 M a x ( ? ? )
Kissinger:
I a m p o s i t i v e they would not have hit b a c k .
we can't do it now.
Unfortunately,
M y idea had been t o cut down the t r e e , get out of
the JSA, take out the N o r t h K o r e a n b a r r a c k s , and then stand down. Of c o u r s e , t h e r e was the r i s k of further c a s u a l t i e s .
have
I
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
Could we have done it with W a l l e y e s ? it
have taken?
Brown:
How many W a l l e y e s would
Could we hit thebarracksf r o m our side of the D M Z ?
I don't know how many b o m b s it would take b e c a u s e I haven't
studied the t a r g e t , but I ' m sure we could hit it f r o m our side of the D M Z[textnotdeclassifie Kissinger:
(The advantage of a Walleye would b e to) a v o i d c o u n t e r - b a t t e r y
fire. Clements:
Hyland:
Why
would an a i r strike avoid counter-battery f i r e ?
B e c a u s etheywouldnotberespondingtomaskedartillery.(??)
Clements:
I still think they would have r e a c t e d .
Kissinger:
You told m e last w e e k of y o u r c o n c e r n s and a s k e d m e to r e l a y
t h e m t o the P r e s i d e n t , and I did.
But the r e a l p r o b l e m , I think, was not
y o u r c o n c e r n s but the P r e s i d e n t ' s s p e e c h on T h u r s d a y night saying that t h e r e w e r e no A m e r i c a n s in combat anywhere in the w o r l d . P r e s i d e n t was in V a i l and I was on an a i r p l a n e , for conducting m i l i t a r y operations.
S e c o n d , the
not the b e s t a r r a n g e m e n t
I don't think the d e c i s i o n had
anything to do with y o u r r e c o m m e n d a t i o n . If we can first get the North K o r e a n s toguaranteethe safety of our m e n , then w e can c o o p e r a t e with t h e m on p r a c t i c a l plans.
We can say that we
w i l l have our S e c r e t a r i e s w o r k out the p r o b l e m of m o v e m e n t of p e r s o n n e l in the JSA while maintaining the p r i n c i p l e of the f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t . T h e r e a r e t w o things to do.
F i r s t , draft a m e s s a g e on the JSA and s e c o n d ,
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
continue to d e v e l o p the m i l i t a r y plan (for hitting N o r t h K o r e a ) but a l s o look at other t a r g e t s .
Then we will have contingency plans next t i m e
if t h e r e is a further incident. Brown:
I would like to stress once m o r e the c l o s e hold
we have put
on this operation. Clements:
F o r e x a m p l e , Don (Rumsfeld) knows about the plan but H o l c o m b
doesn't. Kissinger:
L e t ' s k e e p our extra deployments in K o r e a until we
get the
guardposts r e m o v e d and get s o m e satisfaction f r o m the N o r t h K o r e a n s . Don't r e m o v e DefCon 3 until we get p o s i t i v e a c t i o n .
L e t ' s t r y to get a
MAC m e e t i n g F r i d a y o r Saturday. Habib:
We will ask t o m o r r o w and get one F r i d a y .
I don't think the N o r t h
K o r e a n s will stall. K i s s i n g e r :Thenafter the m e e t i n g
we can start the drawdown.
After we
get s o m e satisfaction, we can start to m o v e things down but I want to k e e p something t h e r e for a while. Clements:
Brown:
We have in mind keeping s o m e of the F-111's in K o r e a .
We have sent Stilwell a planning m e s s a g e outlining our v i e w s
about drawing down f r o m our current a l e r t but they have been told t o make no changes without execute o r d e r . c o m m e n t s f r o m Stilwell on our plan. through Sunday.
If we a l l o w t h e m to
So far, w e have not had any
The B - 5 2 ' s w i l l continue flying down for a while, we would
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
then have the option of r e s u m i n g t h e m as a p r e s s u r e t a c t i c if the N o r t h K o r e a n s keep giving us t r o u b l e . Kissinger:
(to Habib) A s k for a M A C m e e t i n g on F r i d a y .
Demand
a s s u r a n c e s f r o m the North K o r e a n s for the safety of our m e n and then d i s c u s s the deployment of our s e c u r i t y p e r s o n n e l . to get the guard p o s t s r e m o v e d .
The f i r s t t h i n g is
Then we can let the S e c r e t a r i e s w o r k
out m o v e m e n t of p e r s o n n e l in the JSA. Habib:
I don't think w e should make an a s s u r a n c e about safety a p r e -
condition. Kissinger: Habib:
I want the
principle
accepted
first of a l l .
Why don't we imply that they have a c c e p t e d it o r
talk
on the
assumption that they a r e a c c e p t i n g it? Kissinger:
You can say on the assumption that the North K o r e a n s a c c e p t
demand for a s s u r a n c e s for the safety of our p e r s o n n e l , w e a r e p r e p a r e d to have t h e m r e m o v e t h e i r guardposts on our side and to d i s c u s s the deployment of our s e c u r i t y p e r s o n n e l , while maintaining the p r i n c i p l e of f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t in the JSA. We w i l l d i s c u s s the future of B - 5 2 o p e r a t i o n s next M o n d a y .
