Wither the Nuclear Umbrella?
Wither the Nuclear Umbrella? U. S. N U C L EAR A SSU RA NC ES TO JA PA N I N A C HA N G ING N ORT HEAST A SI A N SEC U RI TY EN VI RON MENT G A RY J. SA M P SON S A S A K AWA P E AC E F O U N D AT I O N N O N - R E S I D E N T F E L LO W, PAC I F I C F O R U M C S I S
The disclaimer “The views represented in this presentation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.”
So what?
Overview The status quo What has changed Nuclear latency Criticisms of U.S. extended deterrence Non-nuclear deterrence and related concepts
“The way things ought to be…” U.S. – Japan security alliance Extended deterrence Nuclear triad “Bases and faces”
Changes Competition China North Korea
Domestic influences Defense policies 3/11
The Alliance U.S. rebalancing Fiscal austerity Nuclear rot?
Indicators
A nuclear Japan? “Threshold state” concept Possible timeline
Criticisms of extended nuclear deterrence “Allies should not keep asking [the United States] to multiply strategic assurances that we cannot possibly mean, or, if we do mean, we should not want to execute, because if we execute we risk the destruction of civilization.” --Kissinger, 1979
“This ‘strategic triad,’ too, now became enshrined as an essential component of U.S. policy. The net effect was to render permanent the oversized, multidimensional nuclear strike force that the Kennedy administration had declared an urgent necessity. Even today, nearly fifty years after it creation, twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the triad, although modified and updated many times, survives.” --Bacevich, 2010
Non-nuclear deterrence and related concepts Conventional Prompt Global Strike Air-Sea Battle
Concluding thoughts
The disclaimer “The views represented in this presentation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.”
So what?
Overview The status quo What has changed Nuclear latency Criticisms of U.S. extended deterrence Non-nuclear deterrence and related concepts
“The way things ought to be…” U.S. – Japan security alliance Extended deterrence Nuclear triad “Bases and faces”
Changes Competition China North Korea
Domestic influences Defense policies 3/11
The Alliance U.S. rebalancing Fiscal austerity Nuclear rot?
Indicators
A nuclear Japan? “Threshold state” concept Possible timeline
Criticisms of extended nuclear deterrence “Allies should not keep asking [the United States] to multiply strategic assurances that we cannot possibly mean, or, if we do mean, we should not want to execute, because if we execute we risk the destruction of civilization.” --Kissinger, 1979
“This ‘strategic triad,’ too, now became enshrined as an essential component of U.S. policy. The net effect was to render permanent the oversized, multidimensional nuclear strike force that the Kennedy administration had declared an urgent necessity. Even today, nearly fifty years after it creation, twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the triad, although modified and updated many times, survives.” --Bacevich, 2010
Non-nuclear deterrence and related concepts Conventional Prompt Global Strike Air-Sea Battle
Concluding thoughts
