A Systems View of Security
Photos placed in horizontal position with even amount of white space between photos and header
Photos placed in horizontal position with even amount of white space between photos and header
Preventing Nuclear Terrorism from the Inside Out: A Systems View of Security
Program on Nuclear Issues 2013 Summer Conference August 1, 2013 Marie Arrieta Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. SAND NO. 2011-XXXXP
SAND Number: 2013-6261 C
Integrated Nuclear Material Security Terrorist groups can be complex, adaptive organizations. Non-proliferation measures can be viewed as a complex system of systems that can be purposefully integrated to combat the evolving terrorist threat.
Full Spectrum Nuclear Material Security
Nuclear Material Design
Safeguards and Security
Nuclear Energy System Design
Deterrence, Detection, and Interdiction
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Nuclear Material Design How can we design nuclear fuels that are less attractive to terrorist organizations? Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Reduced Enrichment of Research and Test Reactors Initiative: To reduce and eventually eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium that could be used in an improvised nuclear device. Conversion from HEU to LEU
U-Mo Dispersion Fuel
Safeguards and Security How can we reduce the vulnerability of existing systems? Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Mission: To reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide Initiative: Protect high priority nuclear and radiological materials from theft.
Program provides system analysis as well as security design, implementation, and training
Nuclear Energy System Design How can we incorporate security into future system designs? Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems Emphasis on proliferation resistance and physical protection
proliferation resistance and physical protection
Nuclear Energy System Design Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems (NES) -Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) Working Group Evaluation Methodology for PR&PP of Gen IV Nuclear Energy Systems NES designers can consider modifications to increase the probability of adversary detection as well as the difficulty of adversary success NES designers to consider modifications to increase the probability of adversary detection as well as the difficulty of adversary success Can also implement possible mitigation measures that would reduce the consequences of an attack
Deterrence, Detection, and Interdiction How can we detect and interdict the smuggling of nuclear material? Second Line of Defense Mission: To strengthen the capability of foreign countries to deter, detect, and interdict smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders, at points of entry/exit, and through the global maritime shipping network.
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Deterrence, Detection, and Interdiction Network Model
Trade System Model Layers: • Border crossings and ports • Trade routes • Trade statistics by commodity • Locations of material of interest Algorithm designed to predict trade routes
Conclusion Our program goals are to meet our energy needs while minimizing the risk of nuclear proliferation and terrorism These goals can be achieved through integration of: Material Design Nuclear Energy System Design Safeguards and Security Deterrence, Detection, and Interdiction
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Photos placed in horizontal position with even amount of white space between photos and header
Preventing Nuclear Terrorism from the Inside Out: A Systems View of Security
Program on Nuclear Issues 2013 Summer Conference August 1, 2013 Marie Arrieta Sandia National Laboratories Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. SAND NO. 2011-XXXXP
SAND Number: 2013-6261 C
Integrated Nuclear Material Security Terrorist groups can be complex, adaptive organizations. Non-proliferation measures can be viewed as a complex system of systems that can be purposefully integrated to combat the evolving terrorist threat.
Full Spectrum Nuclear Material Security
Nuclear Material Design
Safeguards and Security
Nuclear Energy System Design
Deterrence, Detection, and Interdiction
2
Nuclear Material Design How can we design nuclear fuels that are less attractive to terrorist organizations? Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Reduced Enrichment of Research and Test Reactors Initiative: To reduce and eventually eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium that could be used in an improvised nuclear device. Conversion from HEU to LEU
U-Mo Dispersion Fuel
Safeguards and Security How can we reduce the vulnerability of existing systems? Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Mission: To reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide Initiative: Protect high priority nuclear and radiological materials from theft.
Program provides system analysis as well as security design, implementation, and training
Nuclear Energy System Design How can we incorporate security into future system designs? Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems Emphasis on proliferation resistance and physical protection
proliferation resistance and physical protection
Nuclear Energy System Design Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems (NES) -Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) Working Group Evaluation Methodology for PR&PP of Gen IV Nuclear Energy Systems NES designers can consider modifications to increase the probability of adversary detection as well as the difficulty of adversary success NES designers to consider modifications to increase the probability of adversary detection as well as the difficulty of adversary success Can also implement possible mitigation measures that would reduce the consequences of an attack
Deterrence, Detection, and Interdiction How can we detect and interdict the smuggling of nuclear material? Second Line of Defense Mission: To strengthen the capability of foreign countries to deter, detect, and interdict smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders, at points of entry/exit, and through the global maritime shipping network.
7
Deterrence, Detection, and Interdiction Network Model
Trade System Model Layers: • Border crossings and ports • Trade routes • Trade statistics by commodity • Locations of material of interest Algorithm designed to predict trade routes
Conclusion Our program goals are to meet our energy needs while minimizing the risk of nuclear proliferation and terrorism These goals can be achieved through integration of: Material Design Nuclear Energy System Design Safeguards and Security Deterrence, Detection, and Interdiction
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