G ENilE RAL
11
UN I rE D N AT ION S " !,I
Distr. GENERAL
11
G ENilE RAL A 5 SI~ M B LY,
A/2Bo6. 26 November 1954 , ENGLISH ORIGINAL: FRENCH
I!
Ninth session Agen~$. item 51 "WESTION OF DEFINING AGGRESSION: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE QUESTION OF DEFINING AGGRESSION Report of the Rapporteur:
Committee
~lr. F. ADAMIYAT (J:ran)
At its 477th plenary meeting held on ,.24 September 1954, the
":\,.. :' I'
Sixt~
GeneJ.':~l
,
.
"
.
Assembly decided; in accordance with its resolution 688'ev:tI).: of
,
20
D~~ember
1952, to place the following item on the agenda of its ninth
reguJ,<jr session: : "Q.uestion, of defining' aggression: Co~ttee on 'the Question of Defining Aggression".
Report of the Special At its 478th plenary
meet~g on 25 September, the Generai Assembly decided to refer that item to
the S'.;l]xth Committee for' study and report.
~.
The Sixth Committee studied the item at its 403rd to 420th meetings
held :between 14 October and 10 November 1954. of
th~
Special Committee on the Q.uestion of
It had before it the report
Def1ningAggresSion,~/together
with :~he text of the comments received from Governments regarding that
rep~'
(A/2689 and COIT.li
A/2689/Add.1).
,.
:" •., The' following dra.ft resolutions, each containing a definition of
aggre'~,"ion, were successively submitted tcithe Committee: ,(la) a, draft resolution proposed by the Union' of SoViet Socialist ~FPUb1irS (A/C.6/L.332/Rev.l). (ib)adraft resolution proposed by Paraguay (A/c.6/L.Y;4/ReV.l) ~;
I' :I
.",",''11
A/2806 English Page 2 (c) a draft resolution proposed jo:intly by ~ and Panama (A/c.6/L.?/55) which was later superseded by a rev:ised dratt resolution proposed by the same countries (A/c.6/L"'5/Rav.l). (d) a draft resolution proposed by Chine. (AjC.6/L.336) which ;las replaced successively by two revised draft resolutions proposed by the se.me country (A/c.6/L.536/Rev.l and a). 4. The Committee also had before it 'two proposals relating to a procedural question. 5. The first, put forward orally by Iran, proposed the establishment of a working group to draw up a single text of a definition wh:ich would be acceptable to the great majority of Member States. 6. The second proposal formed the SUbject of the draft resolut:ion proposed jointly by Lebanon, Stria and Yemen (A/C.6/L.'37). , Under the terms of that draft resolution, the General Assembly was, to decide to establ:ish a special committee which would be requested to subm:it to the General Assembly ~t its tenth sess:ion a deta:iled report followed by a draft def:in:l.t:ion of aggression, hav:ing regard to the ideas expressed at the n:inth sess:ion and to the draft resolut:ions and amendments submitted. That draft resolut:ion l?aS SUbsequently replaced by a rev:ised text, (A/C.6/L.337/Rev.l) which prOVided that the special committee l~ould SUbmit, its report to the General Assembly at the eleventh (:instead of the'tenth) session. 7. The sponsors of the joint draft resolution (A/c.6/L.337/Rev.l) proposed orally that the special committee referred to in the text should meet at United Nations Headquarters in 1956. 8. The Sixth Committee opened the debate with a general discussion of the various problems raised by the quest:ion of defining aggression. 9. With regard to the preliminary question whether it l;as possible and desirable to define aggression, many delegations considered that·the matter had been decided affirmatively by the General Asse~bly in its resolutions 559 (VI) and 688 (VII), adopted'on 31 January and 20 December 1952 respectively. 10. Some delegations pointed out, however, that that affirmative,decision of the General Assembly had been adopted by a small majority. others stated that it would have been more prudent to determine firs't of all whether a
A/2806 English Page :; sat~,factory
definition of aggression was possible; if no satisfactory defi~ition of, aggression was possible, any definition of that concept would be J:l~t only undesirable but dangerous. It was also said that while the Gen~~al Assembly had decided that it was juridically possible to define aggr~ssion, the subsequent proceedings of the General Assembly-alone would show'whether it was practically and politically feasible to draft sueh a defillition. 11. Certain delegations contended that -aggression was undefinable. They.argued that the failure of past attempts wade to define aggression proved that·it was impossible to reach agreement on an a priori definition. Moreover, such ,a def;l.nition could not inspir'e confidence. . It would be wuch better to allow the .law.to evolve empirically from specific· cases. ,
12. A number of delegations held that even if a definition of aggression were worked out, it would be not only useless but actually dangerous. Far frOlll!'discouraging a would-be aggressor, it .would merely ,wrk to his victim's disadvantage. Only the risks involved, the chances of success or the possibilities of failure, would determine the conduct of aggressors. Moreover, , a de$inition of aggression adopted under a General Assembly resolution - and hence binding neither on the Security Council nor on Member States -- would have no effect of itself.. In an actual case of aggression it would do little gootland might -even be harmful, as it ;Iould lead to long theoretical disc~ssions which would delay a solution. A definition, even if accepted and solemnly embodied in a treaty, would be of little practical value as an effective means of preventing aggression •. A definition of aggression, however wortled, would be easily evaded and 'flould carry with it grave. threats which migl),t well assume as yet unforeseeable forms. Everyone could recognize ag~ession when it occurred and, apart, perhaps, from definitions applicable regi6nally, it would be better not to have a.definition. As far as the United Nations ,>as concerned, however, the competent organs shOUld be allow~d to determine in each specific case whether or not aggression had occurred. Furthermore, it would be appropriate to defer any action in the matter until the new disarmament proposals had been. studied at greater length and El decision .
.
,
takeI;l on them. .
A!2806
English Page 4
13. Many delegations, on the other hand, considered t!:'at a definition of aggression ,TaS necessary and oould be. useful for the maintenance of international peace and security and that an attempt should therefore be made to formulate a definition which would be generally acceptable. Those delegations argued that a definiti.on of aggression would consolidate the system of collective security established 9Y the Charter and would promote the development of international law. Even if it would not per ~ prevent aggression it would be an important factor in the resistance against possible aggressors. In a world which lived in fear of asgression, the existence , of a definition would do something to ease men 1 s minds. A definition of aggression "ould enlighten public opinion and would ensure that any decisions made by the international organs called upon to designate the aggressor in a given dispute would be equitable. It was argued that while a definitlonof aggression adopted:by the General Assembly would admittedly have merely the value ofa recommendation and hence· would not bind the Security Council, which would retain its complete freedom of action under Article 39 of the Charter, the Gencral.Assembly's recommendations yet hed a certain legal value. A definition solemnly adopted by .the General Assembly might become a general principle of law recognized by the civilized world and so might in future become an integral part of international law, which the Sectu'ity Council could not violate. 14. Many delegations IJtated that no definition of aggression would be really UEeful t1!lless it was accepted by a large majority of Member States. Some expressed the opinion that the majority should include the permanent members of the Security Council. Othe:cs suggested that the -definition should be approved by at least a two-thirds. majority, but not necessarily including all the permanent membel's of the Security Council. 15. With regard to the type of definition to be adopted, most. delegations which favoured a definition of aggression recommended a mixed definition, that is, one in which a fleXible description, couched in general terms, .would precede and govern a list of definite acts 'of aggression, which would be included merely to illustrate and not to restrict the general description. . It was said . that a definition of that type would combine the advantages and avoid the defects of the two other t~es of definition, the general and the enumerative;
A/2806 English Page 5 It*OUld accord with the opinion that a definition should be neither li~itctive norl,',igid. It should not be lililitative, not only for the practical reason I'
th~t, all possibilities in such a complex ·matter could not be foreseen, but
also, because any limitation would be contrary to the' wide powers of judgment ,
conferred· upon the Security Council by Articles 24 and 39 of the Charter., It spould.not be rigid in the sense that it must not take the form of an orde:rbinding on States and on the competent organs of the UnHed Nations. "16. Some delegations criticized a definition of that type as combining the, ilefects of the other two types. In fact , it ~TS,S suggested that a mixed definition would be,in itself contradictory.• as,if'it started' With the stat~ment,
for example, that aggression 'was the use of armed 'force for purposes
"
othe~,than
.
'
self-defence or action undertaken in conformity with the Charter, it would not be possible to proceed further by giving examples in illustration of t~at concept. The act given as an example either would, or would not, I
,
accq~ding,to the
circumstances of the case, be covered by the general formula stated at the beginning. The opiniOn was a+so expressed that there would be no point in attac4ing El. list of examples to the general statement. Thus the most£amiliar types of military aggression would be too standard to need enun(eration, and a list might give the impression on the one hand, that they cou1~ be isolated from the peculiar circumstances in which they occurred and on th~ other hand, that all other forms of armed aggression were only of secondary importance. 17. Other delegations· declared themselves in favour of a general defiJ;1:1.tion,that is, one which, instead of giving a list of acts of aggression, contain a general formula covering all the cases to be designated. International organs would be left with the responsibility of establishing the spope of the formUla in specific'cases brOUght before them. Some of these woul~
dele~tions
pointed out that a definition of that kind, which covered all the e~ements constituting aggression in,general terms, would render any enumeration of definite acts of aggression superfluous.' Others suggested ,that the general definitionshoald be based on the Charter, which ;~s said to contl;l.tl.n all the elements of a definition of aggression.
I: : , , I,
.ii
It should incorporat"
A/2806 English l'age 6·
the principles of Article 2
(4) and Article 51 of the Charter. Such a
definition would have the double advantage of covering all csses conceivable by the most fertile imagination and allo'dng the competent organ or organs of the United Natiol1s full freedom o~ jUdgment. 18. That t~~e of definition was, however, criticized by some delegations as being a mere repetition, in one form or another, of elementar'J truths; it could therefore be of no value. It was also 3aid that a general ~efinition would be less dangerous than an enumerative definition, but would be of little value because it would inevitably ce drafted in terms which would themselves call for definition. Furthermore, a general definition whose basic elements could be found in the Charter 1lould not be enough;· it was just because the Charter confined Uself to deaJ.inB with the question in· general terms that the General Assembly had thought it necessary to define agg:·ession by reference to the elements which constituted it • ., 19. Some delegations criticized purely enumerative definitions. That kiud of def1nitioD, which would be limitative and rigid and which would deprive States and the organs of the United Nations of freedum of .judgment, would in their opinion not be in conformity ldth the Charter. It would be incompatible with Articles 2 (1),24 a:ld 39 of the Charter and with the sovereignty of States and the princip~e of unanimity in the Security Council. Furthermore, such a definition would necessarily be i.ncomplete and would leave loopholes for possible aggl'essors. It would also have the disadvantage that the acts listed might, in specific cases, not constitute acts of aggression. 20. With regard to content) the definition should in the view of certain delegations be confined to the notion of armed attack. It was said that, i f the definition were extended to include the notion of indirect, economic,
and ideological aggressiou, it would be a departure from the Charter, and neither the letter nor the spirit of the Charter would justify a broad interpretation of the word "aggression". Article;59 listed reprehensible acts in order of gravit~, and to suggest that indirect, economic and ideological aggression constituted acts of aggression would be tantamount to considering them as more serious than threats to, or.creaches of the peace. Those concepts came under the heading of threats to the peace rather than under that of
A/2806 English Page 7
aggression, and it was the latter concept that the Sixth Committee was supposed to be defininll' The definition of the other concepts might be considered after the preparation of a definition of armed aggression, or at least separllotely from it. It \la6 also maintlloined that aggression as enVisaged in Article ;9 of the Charter ~nd the Ilormed attack mentioned in Article 51 were one and the same and would ents,il the saJlIe legal consequences. If the definition included forms of aggression not accompllonied by the use of Ilormad force, there would be a considerable increase in the number of cases in which the use of force would be justified by the right of self-defence. It was also 'said that by extending the dafinitionof e.ggression to cases of indirect, economic and ideological aggression,~the gravity of armed attack might be reduced and the term "aggression" 'WoUld lose ita force and acqUire simply the meaning of "offence". 21.' Other delegations pointed out that under the Charter aggression was not donfined to the use of arlllCd force. It was maintained that under Article 2(4) of, the Charter the term "aggreSSion" would include not only armed attack but also indir.ect aggression, economic aggression, and ideological aggression. The principle of prohibiting economic aggression might also be ini'erred from other provisions of the Charter, such as p8.ragraph 4 of the PreaJllble and Article 55. 22. Some delegations, however, which thought that under the Charter indirect aggression, economic aggression, and ideological aggreSSion might be included in the definition, pointed out that it would be better for the time being to confine the definition to armed attack, without prejudice to r~cognition of otb~r forms of aggression. 2;. Som~ delegations stress~d th~ fact that, if the definition did not cove~ economic aggression or idological aggression, it should at least include subversion, which was the most typical form of indirect aggre,ssion. While subversion was a fol'lll of aggression less alarming than ~Iar, 'it was ,mUCh, more insidious, and fully as dangerous. War was armed attack from outside, SUbversion armed attack from inside and accordingly should be outlawed equally with war. Any State which encouraged and assisted the people
A/2806 English Page 8
of another State to. take up arms against its own Government was not.less guilty than if it had itself taken part in an armed attack. The principle that the instigator of a crime is as 'guilty as the person committing it should apply b~th in international law and in domestic criminal law. 24. The opinion was expressed that the threat of force should be included in the defin~tion. It was mai.nte,ined that Article 2 (4) of the Charter wpuld make it .poss1'ble to put the threat of force on the same footing aB aggression. The terms "the threat or use of force" mentioned in that paragraph corresponded to the term "aggression" in, Article '39 and hardly had the same meaning as "threat to the peace" in th'e BWlle Article. But the threat of force must have a certain degree of gravity before it could constitute a~ession. In determining that degree of gravity, it would be advisable to reIJember that in the ChartSr the word "aggression" had been used , '.' " : " . . instead or the "ord "war". The decisive factor would not be the int·eiit10ii· .... ",'-"-' of ·the a~eBsor but the effect of the act. It was also stated, in relation . to the question of wheth English Page 11
11
2.
~auests
the said Special COllllll1ttee to submit to the General Assembly at
its el;~venth session a detailed report followe
UN I rE D N AT ION S " !,I
Distr. GENERAL
11
G ENilE RAL A 5 SI~ M B LY,
A/2Bo6. 26 November 1954 , ENGLISH ORIGINAL: FRENCH
I!
Ninth session Agen~$. item 51 "WESTION OF DEFINING AGGRESSION: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE QUESTION OF DEFINING AGGRESSION Report of the Rapporteur:
Committee
~lr. F. ADAMIYAT (J:ran)
At its 477th plenary meeting held on ,.24 September 1954, the
":\,.. :' I'
Sixt~
GeneJ.':~l
,
.
"
.
Assembly decided; in accordance with its resolution 688'ev:tI).: of
,
20
D~~ember
1952, to place the following item on the agenda of its ninth
reguJ,<jr session: : "Q.uestion, of defining' aggression: Co~ttee on 'the Question of Defining Aggression".
Report of the Special At its 478th plenary
meet~g on 25 September, the Generai Assembly decided to refer that item to
the S'.;l]xth Committee for' study and report.
~.
The Sixth Committee studied the item at its 403rd to 420th meetings
held :between 14 October and 10 November 1954. of
th~
Special Committee on the Q.uestion of
It had before it the report
Def1ningAggresSion,~/together
with :~he text of the comments received from Governments regarding that
rep~'
(A/2689 and COIT.li
A/2689/Add.1).
,.
:" •., The' following dra.ft resolutions, each containing a definition of
aggre'~,"ion, were successively submitted tcithe Committee: ,(la) a, draft resolution proposed by the Union' of SoViet Socialist ~FPUb1irS (A/C.6/L.332/Rev.l). (ib)adraft resolution proposed by Paraguay (A/c.6/L.Y;4/ReV.l) ~;
I' :I
.",",''11
A/2806 English Page 2 (c) a draft resolution proposed jo:intly by ~ and Panama (A/c.6/L.?/55) which was later superseded by a rev:ised dratt resolution proposed by the same countries (A/c.6/L"'5/Rav.l). (d) a draft resolution proposed by Chine. (AjC.6/L.336) which ;las replaced successively by two revised draft resolutions proposed by the se.me country (A/c.6/L.536/Rev.l and a). 4. The Committee also had before it 'two proposals relating to a procedural question. 5. The first, put forward orally by Iran, proposed the establishment of a working group to draw up a single text of a definition wh:ich would be acceptable to the great majority of Member States. 6. The second proposal formed the SUbject of the draft resolut:ion proposed jointly by Lebanon, Stria and Yemen (A/C.6/L.'37). , Under the terms of that draft resolution, the General Assembly was, to decide to establ:ish a special committee which would be requested to subm:it to the General Assembly ~t its tenth sess:ion a deta:iled report followed by a draft def:in:l.t:ion of aggression, hav:ing regard to the ideas expressed at the n:inth sess:ion and to the draft resolut:ions and amendments submitted. That draft resolut:ion l?aS SUbsequently replaced by a rev:ised text, (A/C.6/L.337/Rev.l) which prOVided that the special committee l~ould SUbmit, its report to the General Assembly at the eleventh (:instead of the'tenth) session. 7. The sponsors of the joint draft resolution (A/c.6/L.337/Rev.l) proposed orally that the special committee referred to in the text should meet at United Nations Headquarters in 1956. 8. The Sixth Committee opened the debate with a general discussion of the various problems raised by the quest:ion of defining aggression. 9. With regard to the preliminary question whether it l;as possible and desirable to define aggression, many delegations considered that·the matter had been decided affirmatively by the General Asse~bly in its resolutions 559 (VI) and 688 (VII), adopted'on 31 January and 20 December 1952 respectively. 10. Some delegations pointed out, however, that that affirmative,decision of the General Assembly had been adopted by a small majority. others stated that it would have been more prudent to determine firs't of all whether a
A/2806 English Page :; sat~,factory
definition of aggression was possible; if no satisfactory defi~ition of, aggression was possible, any definition of that concept would be J:l~t only undesirable but dangerous. It was also said that while the Gen~~al Assembly had decided that it was juridically possible to define aggr~ssion, the subsequent proceedings of the General Assembly-alone would show'whether it was practically and politically feasible to draft sueh a defillition. 11. Certain delegations contended that -aggression was undefinable. They.argued that the failure of past attempts wade to define aggression proved that·it was impossible to reach agreement on an a priori definition. Moreover, such ,a def;l.nition could not inspir'e confidence. . It would be wuch better to allow the .law.to evolve empirically from specific· cases. ,
12. A number of delegations held that even if a definition of aggression were worked out, it would be not only useless but actually dangerous. Far frOlll!'discouraging a would-be aggressor, it .would merely ,wrk to his victim's disadvantage. Only the risks involved, the chances of success or the possibilities of failure, would determine the conduct of aggressors. Moreover, , a de$inition of aggression adopted under a General Assembly resolution - and hence binding neither on the Security Council nor on Member States -- would have no effect of itself.. In an actual case of aggression it would do little gootland might -even be harmful, as it ;Iould lead to long theoretical disc~ssions which would delay a solution. A definition, even if accepted and solemnly embodied in a treaty, would be of little practical value as an effective means of preventing aggression •. A definition of aggression, however wortled, would be easily evaded and 'flould carry with it grave. threats which migl),t well assume as yet unforeseeable forms. Everyone could recognize ag~ession when it occurred and, apart, perhaps, from definitions applicable regi6nally, it would be better not to have a.definition. As far as the United Nations ,>as concerned, however, the competent organs shOUld be allow~d to determine in each specific case whether or not aggression had occurred. Furthermore, it would be appropriate to defer any action in the matter until the new disarmament proposals had been. studied at greater length and El decision .
.
,
takeI;l on them. .
A!2806
English Page 4
13. Many delegations, on the other hand, considered t!:'at a definition of aggression ,TaS necessary and oould be. useful for the maintenance of international peace and security and that an attempt should therefore be made to formulate a definition which would be generally acceptable. Those delegations argued that a definiti.on of aggression would consolidate the system of collective security established 9Y the Charter and would promote the development of international law. Even if it would not per ~ prevent aggression it would be an important factor in the resistance against possible aggressors. In a world which lived in fear of asgression, the existence , of a definition would do something to ease men 1 s minds. A definition of aggression "ould enlighten public opinion and would ensure that any decisions made by the international organs called upon to designate the aggressor in a given dispute would be equitable. It was argued that while a definitlonof aggression adopted:by the General Assembly would admittedly have merely the value ofa recommendation and hence· would not bind the Security Council, which would retain its complete freedom of action under Article 39 of the Charter, the Gencral.Assembly's recommendations yet hed a certain legal value. A definition solemnly adopted by .the General Assembly might become a general principle of law recognized by the civilized world and so might in future become an integral part of international law, which the Sectu'ity Council could not violate. 14. Many delegations IJtated that no definition of aggression would be really UEeful t1!lless it was accepted by a large majority of Member States. Some expressed the opinion that the majority should include the permanent members of the Security Council. Othe:cs suggested that the -definition should be approved by at least a two-thirds. majority, but not necessarily including all the permanent membel's of the Security Council. 15. With regard to the type of definition to be adopted, most. delegations which favoured a definition of aggression recommended a mixed definition, that is, one in which a fleXible description, couched in general terms, .would precede and govern a list of definite acts 'of aggression, which would be included merely to illustrate and not to restrict the general description. . It was said . that a definition of that type would combine the advantages and avoid the defects of the two other t~es of definition, the general and the enumerative;
A/2806 English Page 5 It*OUld accord with the opinion that a definition should be neither li~itctive norl,',igid. It should not be lililitative, not only for the practical reason I'
th~t, all possibilities in such a complex ·matter could not be foreseen, but
also, because any limitation would be contrary to the' wide powers of judgment ,
conferred· upon the Security Council by Articles 24 and 39 of the Charter., It spould.not be rigid in the sense that it must not take the form of an orde:rbinding on States and on the competent organs of the UnHed Nations. "16. Some delegations criticized a definition of that type as combining the, ilefects of the other two types. In fact , it ~TS,S suggested that a mixed definition would be,in itself contradictory.• as,if'it started' With the stat~ment,
for example, that aggression 'was the use of armed 'force for purposes
"
othe~,than
.
'
self-defence or action undertaken in conformity with the Charter, it would not be possible to proceed further by giving examples in illustration of t~at concept. The act given as an example either would, or would not, I
,
accq~ding,to the
circumstances of the case, be covered by the general formula stated at the beginning. The opiniOn was a+so expressed that there would be no point in attac4ing El. list of examples to the general statement. Thus the most£amiliar types of military aggression would be too standard to need enun(eration, and a list might give the impression on the one hand, that they cou1~ be isolated from the peculiar circumstances in which they occurred and on th~ other hand, that all other forms of armed aggression were only of secondary importance. 17. Other delegations· declared themselves in favour of a general defiJ;1:1.tion,that is, one which, instead of giving a list of acts of aggression, contain a general formula covering all the cases to be designated. International organs would be left with the responsibility of establishing the spope of the formUla in specific'cases brOUght before them. Some of these woul~
dele~tions
pointed out that a definition of that kind, which covered all the e~ements constituting aggression in,general terms, would render any enumeration of definite acts of aggression superfluous.' Others suggested ,that the general definitionshoald be based on the Charter, which ;~s said to contl;l.tl.n all the elements of a definition of aggression.
I: : , , I,
.ii
It should incorporat"
A/2806 English l'age 6·
the principles of Article 2
(4) and Article 51 of the Charter. Such a
definition would have the double advantage of covering all csses conceivable by the most fertile imagination and allo'dng the competent organ or organs of the United Natiol1s full freedom o~ jUdgment. 18. That t~~e of definition was, however, criticized by some delegations as being a mere repetition, in one form or another, of elementar'J truths; it could therefore be of no value. It was also 3aid that a general ~efinition would be less dangerous than an enumerative definition, but would be of little value because it would inevitably ce drafted in terms which would themselves call for definition. Furthermore, a general definition whose basic elements could be found in the Charter 1lould not be enough;· it was just because the Charter confined Uself to deaJ.inB with the question in· general terms that the General Assembly had thought it necessary to define agg:·ession by reference to the elements which constituted it • ., 19. Some delegations criticized purely enumerative definitions. That kiud of def1nitioD, which would be limitative and rigid and which would deprive States and the organs of the United Nations of freedum of .judgment, would in their opinion not be in conformity ldth the Charter. It would be incompatible with Articles 2 (1),24 a:ld 39 of the Charter and with the sovereignty of States and the princip~e of unanimity in the Security Council. Furthermore, such a definition would necessarily be i.ncomplete and would leave loopholes for possible aggl'essors. It would also have the disadvantage that the acts listed might, in specific cases, not constitute acts of aggression. 20. With regard to content) the definition should in the view of certain delegations be confined to the notion of armed attack. It was said that, i f the definition were extended to include the notion of indirect, economic,
and ideological aggressiou, it would be a departure from the Charter, and neither the letter nor the spirit of the Charter would justify a broad interpretation of the word "aggression". Article;59 listed reprehensible acts in order of gravit~, and to suggest that indirect, economic and ideological aggression constituted acts of aggression would be tantamount to considering them as more serious than threats to, or.creaches of the peace. Those concepts came under the heading of threats to the peace rather than under that of
A/2806 English Page 7
aggression, and it was the latter concept that the Sixth Committee was supposed to be defininll' The definition of the other concepts might be considered after the preparation of a definition of armed aggression, or at least separllotely from it. It \la6 also maintlloined that aggression as enVisaged in Article ;9 of the Charter ~nd the Ilormed attack mentioned in Article 51 were one and the same and would ents,il the saJlIe legal consequences. If the definition included forms of aggression not accompllonied by the use of Ilormad force, there would be a considerable increase in the number of cases in which the use of force would be justified by the right of self-defence. It was also 'said that by extending the dafinitionof e.ggression to cases of indirect, economic and ideological aggression,~the gravity of armed attack might be reduced and the term "aggression" 'WoUld lose ita force and acqUire simply the meaning of "offence". 21.' Other delegations pointed out that under the Charter aggression was not donfined to the use of arlllCd force. It was maintained that under Article 2(4) of, the Charter the term "aggreSSion" would include not only armed attack but also indir.ect aggression, economic aggression, and ideological aggression. The principle of prohibiting economic aggression might also be ini'erred from other provisions of the Charter, such as p8.ragraph 4 of the PreaJllble and Article 55. 22. Some delegations, however, which thought that under the Charter indirect aggression, economic aggression, and ideological aggreSSion might be included in the definition, pointed out that it would be better for the time being to confine the definition to armed attack, without prejudice to r~cognition of otb~r forms of aggression. 2;. Som~ delegations stress~d th~ fact that, if the definition did not cove~ economic aggression or idological aggression, it should at least include subversion, which was the most typical form of indirect aggre,ssion. While subversion was a fol'lll of aggression less alarming than ~Iar, 'it was ,mUCh, more insidious, and fully as dangerous. War was armed attack from outside, SUbversion armed attack from inside and accordingly should be outlawed equally with war. Any State which encouraged and assisted the people
A/2806 English Page 8
of another State to. take up arms against its own Government was not.less guilty than if it had itself taken part in an armed attack. The principle that the instigator of a crime is as 'guilty as the person committing it should apply b~th in international law and in domestic criminal law. 24. The opinion was expressed that the threat of force should be included in the defin~tion. It was mai.nte,ined that Article 2 (4) of the Charter wpuld make it .poss1'ble to put the threat of force on the same footing aB aggression. The terms "the threat or use of force" mentioned in that paragraph corresponded to the term "aggression" in, Article '39 and hardly had the same meaning as "threat to the peace" in th'e BWlle Article. But the threat of force must have a certain degree of gravity before it could constitute a~ession. In determining that degree of gravity, it would be advisable to reIJember that in the ChartSr the word "aggression" had been used , '.' " : " . . instead or the "ord "war". The decisive factor would not be the int·eiit10ii· .... ",'-"-' of ·the a~eBsor but the effect of the act. It was also stated, in relation . to the question of wheth English Page 11
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2.
~auests
the said Special COllllll1ttee to submit to the General Assembly at
its el;~venth session a detailed report followe
