Nuclear Waste Storage Issues
New Nuclear Build and Nuclear Security
Sharon Squassoni Senior Fellow and Director, Proliferation Prevention Program Is Existing Nuclear Security Legal Framework Sufficient to Combat Nuclear Terrorism? March 12, 2010, Washington, DC
Focus •New Nuclear Build in the Middle East •Nuclear security – •No particular reason why new nuclear build should create new nuclear security threats but… •Need to conduct due diligence in meeting nuclear security “standards”
www.csis.org | 2
Nuclear Security Issues •
•
• •
Terrorism threat (vice proliferation threat) •
Sabotage power plants, fuel storage
•
Steal weapons-usable nuclear material from civilian facilities
Some reactors more appealing targets (e.g., PHWR, anything fueled with HEU or Pu) than others (nuclear batteries?) It matters where plants are, how SNF pools are designed, and how tight security is. Restricting sensitive fuel cycle facilities makes sense. But how?
www.csis.org | 3
Proposed “New” Nuclear States Proposals as of 2009
Nuclear Plans and Failed State Index 2009
www.csis.org |
Country
Plans
Date
Safeguards INFCIRC/153
Safety AP
Security
(CNS)
NTC
(CPPNM)
Algeria
5 GWe
2027
Y
Not in force
Y
Y
N
Bahrain
--
--
Y + SQP
N
N
N
N
Egypt
4 GWe
2022
Y
Signed
Y
N
Signed
Iran
6 GWe
2016
Yes, but…
Not in force
N
N
N
Jordan
5 GWe
2015
Y
Y
Y
N
Signed
Kuwait
--
--
Y + SQP
Y
Y
Y
Signed
Libya
1 GWe
2050
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Morocco
1 GWe
?
Y
Not in force
Signed
Y
Signed
Oman
--
--
Y + SQP
N
N
Y
N
Qatar
--
--
Y + SQP
N
N
Y
Signed
S. Arabia
--
--
Y + SQP
N
N
N
Y
Tunisia
.5 GWe
2030
Y
Not in force
Signed
Y
N
Turkey
3-4 GWe
2014
Y
Y
Y
UAE
3 GWe
2017
Y + SQP
Not in force
Y
Y www.csis.org | Y
Signed
Y
UAE Example • Pursued nuclear cooperation agreement with United States, which contained two new limits o Voluntary agreement to abjure enrichment and reprocessing o Provision to send spent fuel abroad either for storage or reprocessing
• Acceded to many relevant international conventions o Still question of developing safety, security cultures
• Chose South Korea as nuclear supplier o o o o
Based on cost. South Korea’s first export contract Complaints by French about safety ratings Not clear what happens to spent fuel Did UAE “use” nonproliferation credentials boost from US cooperation just as India has done? www.csis.org | 7
Limiting risks for nuclear security • WHAT: Limit sensitive capabilities, weapons-usable fissile material • HOW: Best domestic and international practices
• Promote: o Adoption of IAEA Additional Protocol o Cradle-to-Grave fuel services (which requires substantial work by nuclear suppliers to put in place) o Compliance with all relevant safeguards, security and safety protocols
www.csis.org | 8
Sharon Squassoni Senior Fellow and Director, Proliferation Prevention Program Is Existing Nuclear Security Legal Framework Sufficient to Combat Nuclear Terrorism? March 12, 2010, Washington, DC
Focus •New Nuclear Build in the Middle East •Nuclear security – •No particular reason why new nuclear build should create new nuclear security threats but… •Need to conduct due diligence in meeting nuclear security “standards”
www.csis.org | 2
Nuclear Security Issues •
•
• •
Terrorism threat (vice proliferation threat) •
Sabotage power plants, fuel storage
•
Steal weapons-usable nuclear material from civilian facilities
Some reactors more appealing targets (e.g., PHWR, anything fueled with HEU or Pu) than others (nuclear batteries?) It matters where plants are, how SNF pools are designed, and how tight security is. Restricting sensitive fuel cycle facilities makes sense. But how?
www.csis.org | 3
Proposed “New” Nuclear States Proposals as of 2009
Nuclear Plans and Failed State Index 2009
www.csis.org |
Country
Plans
Date
Safeguards INFCIRC/153
Safety AP
Security
(CNS)
NTC
(CPPNM)
Algeria
5 GWe
2027
Y
Not in force
Y
Y
N
Bahrain
--
--
Y + SQP
N
N
N
N
Egypt
4 GWe
2022
Y
Signed
Y
N
Signed
Iran
6 GWe
2016
Yes, but…
Not in force
N
N
N
Jordan
5 GWe
2015
Y
Y
Y
N
Signed
Kuwait
--
--
Y + SQP
Y
Y
Y
Signed
Libya
1 GWe
2050
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Morocco
1 GWe
?
Y
Not in force
Signed
Y
Signed
Oman
--
--
Y + SQP
N
N
Y
N
Qatar
--
--
Y + SQP
N
N
Y
Signed
S. Arabia
--
--
Y + SQP
N
N
N
Y
Tunisia
.5 GWe
2030
Y
Not in force
Signed
Y
N
Turkey
3-4 GWe
2014
Y
Y
Y
UAE
3 GWe
2017
Y + SQP
Not in force
Y
Y www.csis.org | Y
Signed
Y
UAE Example • Pursued nuclear cooperation agreement with United States, which contained two new limits o Voluntary agreement to abjure enrichment and reprocessing o Provision to send spent fuel abroad either for storage or reprocessing
• Acceded to many relevant international conventions o Still question of developing safety, security cultures
• Chose South Korea as nuclear supplier o o o o
Based on cost. South Korea’s first export contract Complaints by French about safety ratings Not clear what happens to spent fuel Did UAE “use” nonproliferation credentials boost from US cooperation just as India has done? www.csis.org | 7
Limiting risks for nuclear security • WHAT: Limit sensitive capabilities, weapons-usable fissile material • HOW: Best domestic and international practices
• Promote: o Adoption of IAEA Additional Protocol o Cradle-to-Grave fuel services (which requires substantial work by nuclear suppliers to put in place) o Compliance with all relevant safeguards, security and safety protocols
www.csis.org | 8
