Nuclear Waste Storage Issues
New Nuclear Build and Global Security
Sharon Squassoni Senior Fellow and Director, Proliferation Prevention Program Nuclear Energy Roundtable, Connect US Fund Washington, DC March 11, 2010
Big Picture •Nuclear energy -•Great enthusiasm but limited infrastructure & supply for now •Enrichment and reprocessing done by a handful, but no legal limitations
•Nuclear proliferation – •Iran openly defiant on uranium enrichment •New ideas for both technical and institutional fixes to limit proliferation potential but lukewarm enthusiasm
•Can expansion of nuclear power for all sidestep enrichment/ reprocessing issues? How best to manage risks? www.csis.org | 2
Snapshot of Nuclear Energy Today •16% global electricity demand (and declining…) •30 countries (and Taiwan) operating 435 reactors (369 GW) • 80% in OECD
•Construction: 45 reactors, 25 of which in Asia (not all are new) •Enrichment: 9 countries hosting 50 million SWU •Spent fuel separation: 6 countries •UK phasing out, China phasing in •Waste: 0 countries with geologic repositories for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) www.csis.org |
Nuclear Energy Capacity Today (Gigawatts electric, GWe)
22 13 18.5 OECD EUROPE 129.5 JAPAN 46
UNITED STATES 99
9
0.5 1
2
1
2
4
18
5
Commercial Enrichment of Uranium, 2009
www.csis.org |
Commercial Reprocessing of Spent Fuel, 2009
www.csis.org |
Nuclear “enthusiasm”: More than just numbers… •Numbers •Number of states with nuclear power could more than double – from 31 to 80 (if believe the IAEA)
•New kinds of reactors? •Different choices for advanced vs. developing states –Gen IV, grid-appropriate, nuclear batteries?
•New locations •Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa
•New capabilities oRecycling techniques + closed fuel cycles for more states? oMore states with uranium enrichment?
Meanwhile, efforts to restrict spread of sensitive nuclear technologies are flagging; security and safety regimes not mandatory. www.csis.org |
Proposed “New” Nuclear States Proposals as of 2009
Nuclear Expansion Scenarios Current Capacity: 370 GWe in 30 countries + Taiwan
•Scenario I: •Scenario II: •Scenario III:
Realistic growth to 2030 (economic model EIA) +140 GW Wildly optimistic (states’ plans) to 2030) +474 GW Fourfold increase (based on climate change, MIT’s “high scenario for 2050) +1300 GW www.csis.org | 9
Reactor Capacities for all Scenarios*
Impact of Nuclear Energy Expansion 22
5 13 OECD EUROPE 129.5 UNITED STATES 100
10 4 18.5 0.5 8 1
1
5
4
1
1
1
18
9 1
1 5
1
4
1
JAPAN 46
1
3 5 10
0.5
4
5 2 2
4 15 1
4
3 6 2
KEY: Current Capacity 10
I. 2030 – EIA Forecast II. 2030 – Proposed Expansion
1
2
II. 2030 – Proposed New Capacity IIIb. 2050 – MIT Expansion IIIb. 2050 – MIT New Capacity
www.csis.org | 10
Enrichment Implications of Expansion
Millions SWU/Year
250
112-225
200
150
150
72-108 100 50
40-50
52
0
2007
2030 Growth (EIA) 2030 States' Plans Scenario
1000 GWe ("Wedge")
1500 GWe Capacity (MIT)
Enrichment Capacities for all Scenarios (million SWU/year)
TENEX 22 9
URENCO 8.1
3
6
EURODIF 10.8
1
8
6
1 1
CNNC
1 8
1
6
8
1 RESENDE 0.12
KEY:
6
Current Capacity I. 2030 – EIA Forecast II. 2030 – Proposed Expansion II. 2030 – Proposed New Capacity IIIb. 2050 – MIT Expansion IIIb. 2050 – MIT New Capacity
3 0.5
JNFL
Spent Fuel Implications of Growth •1 GWe = 20 tons spent fuel/year •“New” nuclear states will store SNF, or lease fuel •More storage requires more safety, security measures •Fuel leasing = more transportation, greater safety, security measures
•But, open or closed fuel cycle is a “choice.” •Some advanced states still pursuing fast reactors, but no need for uranium alternatives now, if ever. Recycling will continue to produce Pu.
www.csis.org | 13
There are limits Industrial
•No more than 10 reactors/yr connected to grid for last 20 years •Bottlenecks for key components (heavy forgings, etc.) •Skilled labor shortage oNot just engineers, but craft labor, qualified construction
•Management experience
oOlkiluoto and Flammanville
Physical
•According to World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2008 (Mycle Schneider & Antony Froggatt), 339 reactors will reach retirement age by 2030. The IAEA’s low growth scenario posits oClosing 145 units oBuilding 178 new units oExtending lives of 193 units beyond 40 years. www.csis.org |
www.csis.org |
By 2050, how many still in operation?
Limits in new nuclear states Physical, intellectual nuclear infrastructure •Where are they in the IAEA process?
oKnowledgeable commitment (Milestone 1) oReadiness to invite bids (Milestone 2) oReady to commission and operate (Milestone 3)
Legal, financing, regulatory frameworks Safety, security cultures? Funding?
www.csis.org |
Plans in the Middle East Country Plans
Date
Safeguards INFCIRC/153
Safety AP
(CNS)
Security
Liability
(CPPNM)
Algeria
5 GWe
2027
Y
Not in force
Y
Y
N
Bahrain
--
--
Y + SQP
N
N
N
N
Egypt
4 GWe
2022
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Iran
6 GWe
2016
Yes, but…
Not in force
N
N
N
Jordan
5 GWe
2015
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Kuwait
--
--
Y + SQP
Y
Y
Y
N
Libya
1 GWe
2050
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Morocco
1 GWe
?
Y
Not in force
Y
Y
Y
Oman
--
--
Y + SQP
N
N
Y
N
Qatar
--
--
Y + SQP
N
N
Y
N
S. Arabia
--
--
Y + SQP
N
N
N
N
Tunisia
.5 GWe
2030
Y
Not in force
Y
Y
N
Turkey
3-4 GWe
2014
Y
Y
Y
UAE
3 GWe
2017
Y + SQP
Not in force
N
Y www.csis.org | Y
N N
Nuclear Plans and Failed State Index 2009
www.csis.org |
Challenges associated with More reactors Different kinds of reactors New Locations Fuel Cycle Capabilities
www.csis.org | 19
Implications for Security More
•
Kinds
•
Locations
•
Capabilities
•
Terrorism threat •
Sabotage power plants, fuel storage
•
Steal weapons-usable nuclear material from civilian facilities
Some reactors more appealing targets (e.g., PHWR, anything fueled with HEU or Pu); others less (nuclear batteries?) It matters where plants are, how SNF pools are designed, and how tight security is. More countries with enrichment, reprocessing are a problem. More stockpiles of separated Pu (for fast reactors) are a problem.
www.csis.org | 20
Implications for Proliferation More
•
More reactors = more expertise, materials in flow, more enrichment. Reprocessing still likely to remain domain of NWS, but if recycling seen as necessary” for nuclear power, what then?
Kinds
•
If India becomes new supplier, will it sell heavy water reactors? Proliferation risks will rise.
Locations
•
Regional security matters; regional competitions matter.
Capabilities
•
Still no legal barrier to development of entire fuel cycle, no taboo on building fast reactors, and no progress on “Cradle-to-Grave” nuclear supply www.csis.org | 21
Limiting risks for nuclear security & proliferation • WHAT: Limit sensitive capabilities (or offer better alternatives like renewables) • HOW: Voluntary approaches (supply & demand), legally binding restrictions o Supply: Adopt IAEA Additional Protocol as standard of supply o Demand: Help promote all energy options (incl. efficiency) and all approaches, including regional facilities, cross-border electricity transmission, regional fuel cycle centers o Phase out national ownership of most sensitive fuel cycle facilities (enrichment, reprocessing). Use FMCT as legally binding vehicle. If not making fissile material for weapons, do we need national facilities?
• WHEN: Before too many countries forge ahead www.csis.org | 22
Sharon Squassoni Senior Fellow and Director, Proliferation Prevention Program Nuclear Energy Roundtable, Connect US Fund Washington, DC March 11, 2010
Big Picture •Nuclear energy -•Great enthusiasm but limited infrastructure & supply for now •Enrichment and reprocessing done by a handful, but no legal limitations
•Nuclear proliferation – •Iran openly defiant on uranium enrichment •New ideas for both technical and institutional fixes to limit proliferation potential but lukewarm enthusiasm
•Can expansion of nuclear power for all sidestep enrichment/ reprocessing issues? How best to manage risks? www.csis.org | 2
Snapshot of Nuclear Energy Today •16% global electricity demand (and declining…) •30 countries (and Taiwan) operating 435 reactors (369 GW) • 80% in OECD
•Construction: 45 reactors, 25 of which in Asia (not all are new) •Enrichment: 9 countries hosting 50 million SWU •Spent fuel separation: 6 countries •UK phasing out, China phasing in •Waste: 0 countries with geologic repositories for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) www.csis.org |
Nuclear Energy Capacity Today (Gigawatts electric, GWe)
22 13 18.5 OECD EUROPE 129.5 JAPAN 46
UNITED STATES 99
9
0.5 1
2
1
2
4
18
5
Commercial Enrichment of Uranium, 2009
www.csis.org |
Commercial Reprocessing of Spent Fuel, 2009
www.csis.org |
Nuclear “enthusiasm”: More than just numbers… •Numbers •Number of states with nuclear power could more than double – from 31 to 80 (if believe the IAEA)
•New kinds of reactors? •Different choices for advanced vs. developing states –Gen IV, grid-appropriate, nuclear batteries?
•New locations •Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa
•New capabilities oRecycling techniques + closed fuel cycles for more states? oMore states with uranium enrichment?
Meanwhile, efforts to restrict spread of sensitive nuclear technologies are flagging; security and safety regimes not mandatory. www.csis.org |
Proposed “New” Nuclear States Proposals as of 2009
Nuclear Expansion Scenarios Current Capacity: 370 GWe in 30 countries + Taiwan
•Scenario I: •Scenario II: •Scenario III:
Realistic growth to 2030 (economic model EIA) +140 GW Wildly optimistic (states’ plans) to 2030) +474 GW Fourfold increase (based on climate change, MIT’s “high scenario for 2050) +1300 GW www.csis.org | 9
Reactor Capacities for all Scenarios*
Impact of Nuclear Energy Expansion 22
5 13 OECD EUROPE 129.5 UNITED STATES 100
10 4 18.5 0.5 8 1
1
5
4
1
1
1
18
9 1
1 5
1
4
1
JAPAN 46
1
3 5 10
0.5
4
5 2 2
4 15 1
4
3 6 2
KEY: Current Capacity 10
I. 2030 – EIA Forecast II. 2030 – Proposed Expansion
1
2
II. 2030 – Proposed New Capacity IIIb. 2050 – MIT Expansion IIIb. 2050 – MIT New Capacity
www.csis.org | 10
Enrichment Implications of Expansion
Millions SWU/Year
250
112-225
200
150
150
72-108 100 50
40-50
52
0
2007
2030 Growth (EIA) 2030 States' Plans Scenario
1000 GWe ("Wedge")
1500 GWe Capacity (MIT)
Enrichment Capacities for all Scenarios (million SWU/year)
TENEX 22 9
URENCO 8.1
3
6
EURODIF 10.8
1
8
6
1 1
CNNC
1 8
1
6
8
1 RESENDE 0.12
KEY:
6
Current Capacity I. 2030 – EIA Forecast II. 2030 – Proposed Expansion II. 2030 – Proposed New Capacity IIIb. 2050 – MIT Expansion IIIb. 2050 – MIT New Capacity
3 0.5
JNFL
Spent Fuel Implications of Growth •1 GWe = 20 tons spent fuel/year •“New” nuclear states will store SNF, or lease fuel •More storage requires more safety, security measures •Fuel leasing = more transportation, greater safety, security measures
•But, open or closed fuel cycle is a “choice.” •Some advanced states still pursuing fast reactors, but no need for uranium alternatives now, if ever. Recycling will continue to produce Pu.
www.csis.org | 13
There are limits Industrial
•No more than 10 reactors/yr connected to grid for last 20 years •Bottlenecks for key components (heavy forgings, etc.) •Skilled labor shortage oNot just engineers, but craft labor, qualified construction
•Management experience
oOlkiluoto and Flammanville
Physical
•According to World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2008 (Mycle Schneider & Antony Froggatt), 339 reactors will reach retirement age by 2030. The IAEA’s low growth scenario posits oClosing 145 units oBuilding 178 new units oExtending lives of 193 units beyond 40 years. www.csis.org |
www.csis.org |
By 2050, how many still in operation?
Limits in new nuclear states Physical, intellectual nuclear infrastructure •Where are they in the IAEA process?
oKnowledgeable commitment (Milestone 1) oReadiness to invite bids (Milestone 2) oReady to commission and operate (Milestone 3)
Legal, financing, regulatory frameworks Safety, security cultures? Funding?
www.csis.org |
Plans in the Middle East Country Plans
Date
Safeguards INFCIRC/153
Safety AP
(CNS)
Security
Liability
(CPPNM)
Algeria
5 GWe
2027
Y
Not in force
Y
Y
N
Bahrain
--
--
Y + SQP
N
N
N
N
Egypt
4 GWe
2022
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Iran
6 GWe
2016
Yes, but…
Not in force
N
N
N
Jordan
5 GWe
2015
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Kuwait
--
--
Y + SQP
Y
Y
Y
N
Libya
1 GWe
2050
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Morocco
1 GWe
?
Y
Not in force
Y
Y
Y
Oman
--
--
Y + SQP
N
N
Y
N
Qatar
--
--
Y + SQP
N
N
Y
N
S. Arabia
--
--
Y + SQP
N
N
N
N
Tunisia
.5 GWe
2030
Y
Not in force
Y
Y
N
Turkey
3-4 GWe
2014
Y
Y
Y
UAE
3 GWe
2017
Y + SQP
Not in force
N
Y www.csis.org | Y
N N
Nuclear Plans and Failed State Index 2009
www.csis.org |
Challenges associated with More reactors Different kinds of reactors New Locations Fuel Cycle Capabilities
www.csis.org | 19
Implications for Security More
•
Kinds
•
Locations
•
Capabilities
•
Terrorism threat •
Sabotage power plants, fuel storage
•
Steal weapons-usable nuclear material from civilian facilities
Some reactors more appealing targets (e.g., PHWR, anything fueled with HEU or Pu); others less (nuclear batteries?) It matters where plants are, how SNF pools are designed, and how tight security is. More countries with enrichment, reprocessing are a problem. More stockpiles of separated Pu (for fast reactors) are a problem.
www.csis.org | 20
Implications for Proliferation More
•
More reactors = more expertise, materials in flow, more enrichment. Reprocessing still likely to remain domain of NWS, but if recycling seen as necessary” for nuclear power, what then?
Kinds
•
If India becomes new supplier, will it sell heavy water reactors? Proliferation risks will rise.
Locations
•
Regional security matters; regional competitions matter.
Capabilities
•
Still no legal barrier to development of entire fuel cycle, no taboo on building fast reactors, and no progress on “Cradle-to-Grave” nuclear supply www.csis.org | 21
Limiting risks for nuclear security & proliferation • WHAT: Limit sensitive capabilities (or offer better alternatives like renewables) • HOW: Voluntary approaches (supply & demand), legally binding restrictions o Supply: Adopt IAEA Additional Protocol as standard of supply o Demand: Help promote all energy options (incl. efficiency) and all approaches, including regional facilities, cross-border electricity transmission, regional fuel cycle centers o Phase out national ownership of most sensitive fuel cycle facilities (enrichment, reprocessing). Use FMCT as legally binding vehicle. If not making fissile material for weapons, do we need national facilities?
• WHEN: Before too many countries forge ahead www.csis.org | 22
