P-5 Cooperation on Emerging Nuclear Challenges Possibilities and ...
P-5 Cooperation on Emerging Nuclear Challenges Possibilities and Obstacles Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) Conference September 28, 2005 Presentation by Mary Beth Nikitin CSIS International Security Program [email protected]
Shared Status & Shared Responsibility
China, France, Russia, UK, USA
UN Security Council Permanent Membership and Veto (“P-5”) NPT-recognized Nuclear-Weapon States with Article I & VI obligations IAEA Board of Governors G-8 + China?
A Shared Threat A changing Great-Power dynamic post 9/11 Growing consensus, shared nonproliferation interests ¾No new nuclear states ¾No terrorist use of WMD Bilateral and multilateral P-5 engagement
Preventing New Nuclear States
Crises: North Korea, Iran Export & Border Controls Illicit Trafficking Fuel Cycle Limits IAEA Verification
Preventing Nuclear Terrorism UNSC 1540 Lab to Lab Research Intelligence Sharing Interdiction best practices Global partnership
Managing P-5 Arsenals Assuring Integrity of Nuclear Arsenals Against Terrorist Attack Preventing Theft or Diversion Warhead Security – transport & storage MPC&A Nuclear Complex Consolidation Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Warhead Safety & Security US, US, UK UK and and France France assistance assistance to to Russia Russia for for warhead warhead transport transport safety safety and and security security
US, UK, France assistance for Russian warhead storage security
(DTRA (DTRA photos) photos)
Preventing Nuclear Accidents
De-alerting De-targeting Hack-proofing Communication
Nuclear weapons incident response system provided by CTR/DOD to Russian MOD, for mitigation and response in case of a nuclear accident (DTRA Photo)
Obstacles to Cooperation
US & CTBT “Access” Strategic modernization Competing priorities
What More? P-5 Dialogue on NonProliferation and WMD Terrorism, enhanced role of Security Council CTR in China? Additional Protocol universal adherence FMCT Global Cleanout Fuel Cycle freeze on transfers Arsenal security best practices
Shared Status & Shared Responsibility
China, France, Russia, UK, USA
UN Security Council Permanent Membership and Veto (“P-5”) NPT-recognized Nuclear-Weapon States with Article I & VI obligations IAEA Board of Governors G-8 + China?
A Shared Threat A changing Great-Power dynamic post 9/11 Growing consensus, shared nonproliferation interests ¾No new nuclear states ¾No terrorist use of WMD Bilateral and multilateral P-5 engagement
Preventing New Nuclear States
Crises: North Korea, Iran Export & Border Controls Illicit Trafficking Fuel Cycle Limits IAEA Verification
Preventing Nuclear Terrorism UNSC 1540 Lab to Lab Research Intelligence Sharing Interdiction best practices Global partnership
Managing P-5 Arsenals Assuring Integrity of Nuclear Arsenals Against Terrorist Attack Preventing Theft or Diversion Warhead Security – transport & storage MPC&A Nuclear Complex Consolidation Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Warhead Safety & Security US, US, UK UK and and France France assistance assistance to to Russia Russia for for warhead warhead transport transport safety safety and and security security
US, UK, France assistance for Russian warhead storage security
(DTRA (DTRA photos) photos)
Preventing Nuclear Accidents
De-alerting De-targeting Hack-proofing Communication
Nuclear weapons incident response system provided by CTR/DOD to Russian MOD, for mitigation and response in case of a nuclear accident (DTRA Photo)
Obstacles to Cooperation
US & CTBT “Access” Strategic modernization Competing priorities
What More? P-5 Dialogue on NonProliferation and WMD Terrorism, enhanced role of Security Council CTR in China? Additional Protocol universal adherence FMCT Global Cleanout Fuel Cycle freeze on transfers Arsenal security best practices
