Philosophy- Euthyphro
Philosophy- Euthyphro http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/euthyphro/summary.html I.
Beginning of text a. Surprised why are you at court? Socrates out of his element b. Socrates wrestler; gymnastics, how to wrestle, how to argue i. Accused of 1.) Making new gods and denying the old ones and… 2.) Corrupting the youth (because he is telling lies about the gods) c. Miletus must know the truth if he is accusing Socrates of these accusations; he also therefor must know who and what corrupts the youth d. Euthyphro must be a great expert in religious matters if he is willing to prosecute his own father on such a questionable charge; he believes he knows all there is to know about what is holy i. Euthyphro doesn’t care that Socrates is related to him he did wrong; only thing that matters is the crime that was committed; believes Socrates is a pollutant and he needs to purify the city e. Servant killed someone in his wild drunk and rage f. Euthyphro responds to the comment, “well your dad didn’t kill anyone…,” – they don’t know; the many are ignorant i. The many don’t know ii. The one (Euthyphro) knows g. Socrates goes to Euthyphro asking him to be his teacher (so he can get out of his charges) h. Socrates wants to start his lesson immediately i. He asks Euthyphro “What is piety? Is piety one thing or many things? What is the opposite of piety?” ii. ^^absolute definition a definition that will completely satisfy; covers everything & doesn’t leave out anything; universal^^ iii. Euthyphro answers: 1. 1st definition of piety: “piety is what I do, what I’m doing” and the story of Zeus and Cronus
a. Socrates responds that Euthyphro didn’t
even answer his question; he just gave him a pious action nd 2. 2 definition of piety: “what is pleasing to the gods is pious and what isn’t, is not pious” a. Socrates responds to this by saying, “Cronus didn’t want to get vanquished and killed, so you destroying your father is not pleasing the gods” b. Therefor what is pleasing to one god may not be pleasing to another; contradict one another 3. Euthyphro says there is one thing that all gods agree on “if someone does wrong, they deserve some kind of penalty” a. Everyone seems to agree that wrongdoing is wrong, but people disagree about what is actually wrong b. Example: people in court plead not guilty (they don’t think they did anything wrong) 4. Euthyphro says he is going to show it to Socrates clearly 5. There is piety in itself, and then there are these other things about piety that relate to other things; Euthyphro keeps giving ideas about piety but not piety within itself i. Being vs. Becoming i. The being of piety and how it becomes in the world ii. Do we love things because it is delicious, or is it delicious because we love it? iii. Piety is love by gods (being of piety) piety=god loved 1. If x=y then godloved is loved by gods 2. Aka its bullshit and tells us nothing; waste of time 3. **Not that its holy because the gods love it, they love it because its holy** 4. to claim that you know what is pleasing to the gods is to claim that you know how something appears to the gods iv. Everyone is now just frustrated, pissed off, Euthyphro cannot say anything that will stay put and stick
v. What is definition? 1. It will define and stay put presumably vi. How can the definition of piety stay put? Trace the
vii.
viii. ix. x. xi. xii. xiii.
outline of piety where everything enclosed is pious, and everything outside is not pious Random poet “where there is fear there is shame because fear is a bigger set than shame” 1. Socrates disagrees with him 2. We are scared of hurricanes but not ashamed that we run from them 3. We are scared of getting caught by police and ashamed of doing a crime in the first place Socrates is trying to define piety by looking at justice Euthyphro divides justice just like he divided piety being & becoming Piety is the kind of justice that relates to gods; that means that the rest of justice is ungodly 3rd definition of piety: what is pleasing to all of the gods 4th definition of piety: service to the gods (which brings you back to 2nd definition—pleasing the gods) If Euthyphro is doing the 1st definition of gods, he is doing what the gods are doing, mimicking the gods, and being godlike; (condemning his father is also being godlike)
j. Truth Aletheia i. [A] = not; [letheia]= hidden ii. Socrates shows his unknowingness, humility, ignorance
by not accusing other people and withholding his accusations
SPARKNOTES: 2a 4e Note: There are no natural breaks in the text as Plato wrote it. These notes on the text have been divided artificially, sections beginning or breaking off where a new theme or topic is introduced or dropped. Because page numbers may vary from edition to edition, these sections have been 1.
demarcated according to the Stephanus numbers, the page numbers from the 1578 complete works edited by Henri Estienne ("Stephanus" in Latin). The Stephanus numbers are the standard page references in scholarly work on Plato, and most editions of his work contain the Stephanus numbers along the margins. Summary Socrates and Euthyphro meet by the Porch of the King Archon, one of the judges responsible for overseeing religious law. Euthyphro, surprised to see Socrates, asks what brings him here. Socrates answers that he is being prosecuted by Meletusa young unknown with straight hair, a sparse beard, and a hooked nose. Meletus believes Socrates is corrupting the youth of Athens, and wants to prosecute him. Socrates remarks what a promising young start this Meletus is making, weeding out the corruptors of the city's youth: Socrates himself believes that the excellence of the youth should be of utmost concern. Meletus has also accused Socrates of inventing new gods and not recognizing those that exist. Euthyphro remarks that this accusation is probably connected to the divine sign that Socrates claims to be visited by on occasion. Euthyphro, too, is often disbelieved when he speaks about divine matters or predicts the future. He reassures Socrates that one must simply endure these prejudices, and asserts his confidence that Socrates will come out fine in the end. Socrates inquires as to why Euthyphro has come to court, and Euthyphro answers that he is prosecuting his father for murder (which was considered a religious crime by the Greeks). Socrates is amazed that Euthyphro should want to prosecute his own father, remarking that Euthyphro must have very advanced knowledge of these sorts of matters to be making such a bold move. And, Socrates suggests, his father must have killed another family member: surely, Euthyphro would not go to such pains on behalf of an outsider. Euthyphro replies that he is indeed an expert in these matters, and that, contrary to Socrates' suggestion, the murdered man is not of Euthyphro's family. All that matters in these cases, Euthyphro asserts, is whether or not the killer killed with justification: we should make no exceptions even if the murderer is our father and the murdered man is not close to us. His father has committed an impious act that pollutes Euthyphro and his whole family, and this sin must be purged by means of prosecution. It turns out that the murdered man was a hired hand of Euthyphro's, helping with the farming on Naxos. The man got drunk and, in a rage, slit the throat of one of Euthyphro's servants. Euthyphro's father bound this murderer, a)
threw him in a ditch, and sent for the Interpreter, the official who is responsible for dealing with such crimes. But before the Interpreter could arrive, the hired hand died of exposure in the ditch. Euthyphro notes that his family is angry with him for carrying out such a prosecution on behalf of a murderer, but Euthyphro asserts that he knows better than they do the position of divine law regarding what is holy and what is unholy. 1.
4e 6e
Summary Surprised by Euthyphro's willingness to prosecute his father on so questionable a charge, Socrates remarks that Euthyphro must have a very exact understanding of religious matters to proceed in such a way. Euthyphro proudly claims that he is an expert in all religious matters, and that this is what differentiates him from the common man. In response to this claim, Socrates suggests that perhaps Euthyphro could teach him about religious matters. That way, if Meletus were to prosecute him, Socrates could say that he is now under the tutelage of Euthyphro, whose authority on these matters is unquestionable. If Meletus were to prosecute him even so, Socrates could point out that Euthyphro is in fact the one responsible for teaching him and that Meletus should prosecute Euthyphro instead. Euthyphro encourages this suggestion, pointing out that with his expertise in religious matters, Meletus' claims could not stand up long against Socrates in court. Socrates insists that Euthyphro begin to instruct him regarding what is holy and what is unholy. Socrates has Euthyphro agree with him that there must be one form or standard by which everything holy is holy and everything unholy, by contrast with the holy, is unholy. That is, all holy deeds must be holy by virtue of some feature or other that all holy deeds share in common. Socrates asks Euthyphro what this feature is. Euthyphro suggests that prosecuting those who commit injustices is holy, and not prosecuting them is unholy. Here, Euthyphro appeals to two Greek myths, noting that Zeus imprisoned his father, Kronos, and that Kronos castrated his father, Uranus. Zeus is the best and most just of all the gods, and so if he behaves rightly in imprisoning his father for injustice, Euthyphro should be lauded for following this example. Socrates is somewhat surprised by Euthyphro's example, and asks him if he believes literally all the myths about the godsthat they quarrel and have great battles as is depicted in Greek art and told in the stories of Homer and Hesiod. Euthyphro confirms that he believes all this and more. He says that b)
his knowledge of divine matters is such that he could teach Socrates a great deal that Socrates did not know about the gods. Socrates suggests that perhaps that can wait for another time. His present concern is with the definition of holiness, which he feels Euthyphro has not yet properly dealt with. That one should prosecute those who commit injustices is holy is merely an example of a holy act, and not a definition of holiness itself. Euthyphro concedes that there are a great many holy deeds that do not consist in prosecuting a religious offender. Socrates then urges Euthyphro to give a more general definition and to identify a standard by which all holy deeds can be recognized as holy. 1.
7a 9e
Summary After Euthyphro's definition of holiness as persecuting religious offenders has been dismissed by Socrates, Euthyphro posits a second definition: that holiness is what is agreeable to the gods. Socrates is quite pleased with the generality allowed by this definition, and is eager to investigate whether or not it is accurate. First, he points out that the gods themselves often quarrel, as is recounted in the tales of Hesiod and Homer that Euthyphro believes in so literally. Socrates points out that quarrels do not arise over questions of fact, since agreements can be reached through calculation or investigation, but over questions of value, such as what is just and what is good. Socrates points out that if the gods quarrel over what is just and what is good, then there is clearly no agreement among them on these questions. And if they have different opinions as to what is just and what is good, they must approve of different things. It follows that there must be certain things that are approved of by some gods and disapproved of by other gods. But according to Euthyphro's definition, that would mean that those things are both holy and unholy, since they are approved of by some gods and disapproved of by others. For instance, Zeus might approve of punishing one's father, while Kronos or Uranus might not. Euthyphro replies that surely the gods all agree that a person who kills someone unjustly should be punished. Socrates points out that disputes do not arise as to whether an acknowledged wrongdoer should be punished, but as to whether or not the person has in fact acted unjustly. For Euthyphro's argument to have any weight, he must show not that all the gods agree that someone who kills unjustly should be punished, but that all the gods agree that a certain killing was unjust. Socrates presses Euthyphro to prove that all the gods would agree that Euthyphro is acting justly in prosecuting his father c)
for unintentionally having left a man to die of exposure when that man had killed someone in a drunken rage. Euthyphro assures Socrates that he could convince both him and the jury at the trial that his actions are just. He shifts his definition of what is holy slightly, arguing that it is not simply what is agreeable to the gods, since the gods tend to disagree, but that it is what is approved of by all the gods. 1.
10a 11a
Summary Socrates now changes the direction of the inquiry, asking Euthyphro whether holy deeds are approved by the gods because they are holy or whether they are holy because they are approved by the gods. To illustrate his point, Socrates draws the distinction between being x and getting x. Something carried is being carried because it gets carried: it does not get carried because it is being carried. "Being carried" is the state of the object that is being carried, the state of the object that is acted upon. "Getting carried" is the action of which that the object is on the receiving end. In saying that something is being carried because it gets carried, Socrates is arguing that an object can only be in the state of being carried if someone decides to carry itthat is, if it gets carried. A thing becomes changed because something else changes it: it does not get changed by something else because it is already a changed thing. Socrates then draws a similar distinction between being approved and getting approved. A thing is being approved because it gets approved, and not the other way around. We cannot say that it gets approvedthat someone decides to approve of itbecause it is already being approved by that someone. According to Euthyphro's definition, something gets approved by the gods because it is holy and not the other way around: it is not holy because it gets approved by the gods. And because it gets approved it is being approved, and thus is something that is approved by the gods. It follows from this argument however, that what is holy is something different from what is approved of by the gods. Something holy gets approved because it is holy, and something that is being approved by the gods is being approved of because it gets approved. If what is being approved of by the gods were the same thing as what is holy, and if what is holy gets approved because it is holy, then what is being approved of by the gods would get approved because it is being approved of, when in fact the opposite is true. Alternatively, if we accept that what is being approved of is d)
being approved of because it gets approved, then the holy, too, would have to be holy because it gets approved, and not the other way around. 1.
11b 14a
Summary Socrates asks Euthyphro once more to give a definition of holiness, since his earlier definition, that what is holy is what is approved of by the gods, does not seem to hold. Euthyphro complains that Socrates makes his arguments go around in circles and never stay in place so that he no longer knows where he stands. Socrates corrects Euthyphro, pointing out that he is only asking questions, and it is Euthyphro's answers and Euthyphro's arguments that are going around in circles. Socrates then urges Euthyphro to continue the inquiry. To help him along, he suggests that perhaps everything that is holy is just. He then asks whether, in turn, everything that is just is holy, or whether only part of what is just is holy. To illustrate his point, he quotes a line of poetry: "where is found fear, there is also found shame." Socrates disagrees with this line, pointing out that there are many things that we fear, such as disease and poverty, of which we are not necessarily ashamed. However, he points out, where there is shame, there is also fear: a feeling of shame can be characterized as a fear of a bad reputation. His question regarding justice and holiness is similar: his suggestion is that where there is holiness, there is also justice, but that perhaps there are cases of justice where holiness is not a concern. Euthyphro agrees with this suggestion. Then, if holiness is a division of justice, Socrates urges Euthyphro to point out what kind of division of justice holiness is. That is, if we can identify that part of justice which is included under holiness, then we will have an adequate definition of holiness. Euthyphro suggests that the part of justice that is concerned with looking after the gods is holiness, whereas the part of justice that is concerned with looking after men is not. Socrates is somewhat satisfied with this definition, but asks Euthyphro if he could be clearer as to what he means by "looking after." For instance, a groom looks after a horse, a kennel master looks after a dog, and a cattle farmer looks after cattle. These animals benefit from being looked after by these sorts of people; they are made better, whereas the ordinary person would probably do more harm than good. Socrates asks if Euthyphro similarly thinks that the gods are made better by deeds of holiness, and that every time Euthyphro does something holy, the gods are somehow improved. Euthyphro denies that he means this sort of relationship, e)
suggesting instead that we look after the gods in the way that a slaves look after their masters. Socrates points out that people who serve are always being used to achieve some sort of goal: service to a shipbuilder, for instance, is done with the goal of building a ship. What, Socrates asks, is the goal of the gods which we help them to achieve? Euthyphro evades the question, suggesting that the gods use us for a multitude of reasons. Socrates replies that we could just as well say a general uses his underlings for a multitude of reasons, but that the principal reason is still the goal of winning a war. Thus, he presses Euthyphro once more to identify 14b 16a 1.
Summary At this point, Euthyphro becomes frustrated with Socrates, telling him that it is very difficult to learn about holiness with accuracy. Euthyphro instructs Socrates that it is a matter of gratifying the gods through prayer and sacrifice, and that such holiness will bring salvation and happiness to those who practice it. Socrates points out that if that is Euthyphro's view, Euthyphro could have summed things up far sooner and in far fewer words. It seems, Socrates suggests, that holiness for Euthyphro is a kind of science of sacrifice and prayer, where sacrifice is giving something to the gods and prayer is asking something of them. Euthyphro assents to this definition, suggesting that holiness is a kind of skill in trading. We get what we want from the gods through prayer, and they get what they want from us through our sacrifices. Socrates remarks that certainly we get a great deal of good from the gods, but asks what the gods get in return. What is it, Socrates wants to know, that the gods gain from our sacrifices? Euthyphro answers that there is no way that the gods can actually benefit from our sacrifices: they are allpowerful and do not need our help. Instead, our sacrifices honor and give gratification to the gods. Socrates leads Euthyphro to assent that if he is saying the gods find our sacrifices gratifying, he is then suggesting that our sacrifices are what is approved of by the gods. But, Socrates points out, this leads us back to where we were before, asserting that what is holy is what is approved of by the gods. Either the argument put against it earlier was wrong, or the present position is also wrong. Socrates urges Euthyphro to start again from the beginning and provide him with a more suitable definition of holiness. Frustrated, Euthyphro insists that f)
he has a pressing appointment and uses this as an excuse to scurry off. Socrates calls after him, expressing his disappointment, and worrying that he will now be no better off in his trial against Meletus. the one goal that our service to the gods helps them to achieve.
Analysis and Themes
The Euthyphro is a paradigmatic early dialogue of Plato's: it is brief, deals with a question in ethics, consists of a conversation between Socrates and one other person who claims to be an expert in a certain field of ethics, and ends inconclusively. It is also riddled with Socratic irony: Socrates poses as the ignorant student hoping to learn from a supposed expert, when in fact he shows Euthyphro to be the ignorant one who knows nothing about the subject (holiness). Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the dialogue is the inconclusiveness with which it ends. This inconclusiveness is hardly unique to the Euthyphro, but it is worth investigating. Is Plato suggesting that there is no such thing as a definition of holiness, that there is no one feature that all holy deeds have in common? And if he does think that there is a common link, why does he not reveal it to us in the dialogue? We may link the inconclusiveness of the dialogue to the dialogue form itself and the irony Socrates employs. Plato's main goal is to teach us, and he believes firmly (as we gather in other dialogues, notably the Meno) that knowledge only comes when we are able to justify and account for our true beliefs. Thus, teaching is not simply a matter of giving the right answers. It is a matter of leading the student toward the right answers and ensuring that the student can explain and justify the answers rather than simply repeat them. The dialogue form is ideal for this kind of teaching; it shows Socrates leading Euthyphro through Euthyphro's own reasoning, and thereby letting Euthyphro sort things out for himself. The irony is present because Socrates is treating Euthyphro as the teacher when in fact Socrates is teaching Euthyphro. This setup is necessary in order to encourage Euthyphro to present and analyze his own arguments, and thus to lead him to see their faults for himself. The dialogue ends inconclusively perhaps in order to urge the reader to think independently and struggle to formulate an adequate definition without Plato's help. There is some suggestion that Euthyphro is not thinking along the right lines at all. The definition that Euthyphro holds equates what is holy with what is approved of by the gods. Socrates' skillful argument shows that this definition is insufficient: though what is holy may be approved of by the
gods, the two cannot be the same thing. If the gods approve of something because it is holy, then their approval cannot be what makes it holy. Alternatively, if it is holy because the gods approve of it, then we still don't know for what reason the gods approve of it. It seems that any attempt to ground our definition of holiness in the will or approval of the gods is bound to fail. We might normally associate holiness with some sort of divine will, but Plato seems to be suggesting that we should think along another line altogether. Perhaps this other line is the Theory of Forms (discussed in the Phaedo), which would posit the Form of Holiness as the defining characteristic of all holy things. There are hints toward this position in the dialogue, though it is highly unlikely that Plato had developed any kind of technical theory by the time the Euthyphro was written. Perhaps the absence of this formulated theory is what leads the dialogue to end inconclusively.
Characters:
Socrates The protagonist of the Euthyphro (as well as all of Plato's other dialogues). Socrates seems to be a very simple man, not having many material possessions and speaking in a plain, conversational manner. However, this apparent plainness is all a part of the irony characteristic of Socrates' method. Professing his own ignorance, he would engage in conversation with someone claiming to be an expert, usually in ethical matters. By asking simple questions, Socrates would gradually reveal that his interlocutor was in fact very confused and did not know anything clear about the matters about which he claimed to be an expert. The quest for wisdom and the instruction of others through dialogue and inquiry were considered by Socrates to be the highest aims in life: one of his most famous sayings is that "the unexamined life is not worth living." Socrates himself arguably never advanced any theories of his own, and certainly many of the doctrines that appear in the later dialogues are of Plato's invention. In early dialogues, such as the Euthyphro, Plato presents us with a Socrates less informed by Platonic philosophy; he is, rather, more of a foil for his interlocutors who claim to have positive knowledge. Euthyphro The interlocutor of the dialogue, and its namesake. Euthyphro is an orthodox and dogmatically religious man, believing he knows everything there is to know about holy matters. He often makes prophecies to others, and has brought his father to trial on a questionable murder charge. We do not know whether or not Euthyphro is a historical personage or whether he is a fictitious invention of Plato's.
Meletus The man chiefly responsible for pressing charges against Socrates, bringing him to trial, and having him executed. Little is known about Meletus and by all accounts, he seems to have been a rather insignificant figure. Plato's portrayal of him, both in The Apology and in the Euthyphro, is far from sympathetic; Socrates' crossexamination of him in The Apology puts him to shame. He does not actually appear in the Euthyphro, but he is mentioned on a number of occasions.
Review Questions: 1. Where does this dialogue take place? a. The Porch of the King Archon
2. Who of the following has NOT killed anybody? a. Euthyphro’s servant 3. Which of the following has Meletus NOT accused Socrates of? a. Charging a fee for his teaching 4. Which of the following is NOT part of the description of Meletus? a. He’s not very smart 5. How does Socrates suggest Euthyphro might help him in his case
against Meletus? a. Euthyphro could teach Socrates about religious matters 6. Which of the following is NOT the father or son of one of the others? a. Hesiod 7. Why does Socrates not accept Euthyphro’s definition of prosecuting criminals is holy? a. Because there are no acts which are also holy 8. What is the elenchus? a. Cross examination 9. On which of the following questions might the gods disagree, according to Socrates? a. Whether or not it is just to punish one’s father 10. On what grounds do we argue over whether or not someone should be punished, according to Socrates? a. We disagree about whether or not the person committed the crime was stated
11. Which of the following claims is Euthyphro NOT committed to? a. Something is holy because it is approved by the gods 12. Which of the following is an unwanted consequence of Euthyphro’s
reasoning? a. Something is approved by the gods because it is holy 13. What is the relationship between being x and getting x? a. Something is being x because it is getting x
14. Which of the following is NOT offered by Euthyphro as a definition
of holiness? a. Holiness is loving your fellow person 15. Which of the following relationships does Euthyphro think is UNLIKE the relationship between gods and men? a. The groomhorse relationship 16. Why do the gods want our sacrifices, according to Euthyphro? a. They find them gratifying 17. Which of the following two definitions prove to be similar? (A) Holiness is persecuting religious criminals, (B) Holiness is what the gods find agreeable, (C) Holiness is what is approved of by all the gods, (D) Holiness is a matter of gratifying the gods a. C & D Holiness is what is approved of by all the gods and Holiness is a matter of gratifying the gods 18. How does the dialogue end? a. Euthyphro gets frustrated and leaves
Beginning of text a. Surprised why are you at court? Socrates out of his element b. Socrates wrestler; gymnastics, how to wrestle, how to argue i. Accused of 1.) Making new gods and denying the old ones and… 2.) Corrupting the youth (because he is telling lies about the gods) c. Miletus must know the truth if he is accusing Socrates of these accusations; he also therefor must know who and what corrupts the youth d. Euthyphro must be a great expert in religious matters if he is willing to prosecute his own father on such a questionable charge; he believes he knows all there is to know about what is holy i. Euthyphro doesn’t care that Socrates is related to him he did wrong; only thing that matters is the crime that was committed; believes Socrates is a pollutant and he needs to purify the city e. Servant killed someone in his wild drunk and rage f. Euthyphro responds to the comment, “well your dad didn’t kill anyone…,” – they don’t know; the many are ignorant i. The many don’t know ii. The one (Euthyphro) knows g. Socrates goes to Euthyphro asking him to be his teacher (so he can get out of his charges) h. Socrates wants to start his lesson immediately i. He asks Euthyphro “What is piety? Is piety one thing or many things? What is the opposite of piety?” ii. ^^absolute definition a definition that will completely satisfy; covers everything & doesn’t leave out anything; universal^^ iii. Euthyphro answers: 1. 1st definition of piety: “piety is what I do, what I’m doing” and the story of Zeus and Cronus
a. Socrates responds that Euthyphro didn’t
even answer his question; he just gave him a pious action nd 2. 2 definition of piety: “what is pleasing to the gods is pious and what isn’t, is not pious” a. Socrates responds to this by saying, “Cronus didn’t want to get vanquished and killed, so you destroying your father is not pleasing the gods” b. Therefor what is pleasing to one god may not be pleasing to another; contradict one another 3. Euthyphro says there is one thing that all gods agree on “if someone does wrong, they deserve some kind of penalty” a. Everyone seems to agree that wrongdoing is wrong, but people disagree about what is actually wrong b. Example: people in court plead not guilty (they don’t think they did anything wrong) 4. Euthyphro says he is going to show it to Socrates clearly 5. There is piety in itself, and then there are these other things about piety that relate to other things; Euthyphro keeps giving ideas about piety but not piety within itself i. Being vs. Becoming i. The being of piety and how it becomes in the world ii. Do we love things because it is delicious, or is it delicious because we love it? iii. Piety is love by gods (being of piety) piety=god loved 1. If x=y then godloved is loved by gods 2. Aka its bullshit and tells us nothing; waste of time 3. **Not that its holy because the gods love it, they love it because its holy** 4. to claim that you know what is pleasing to the gods is to claim that you know how something appears to the gods iv. Everyone is now just frustrated, pissed off, Euthyphro cannot say anything that will stay put and stick
v. What is definition? 1. It will define and stay put presumably vi. How can the definition of piety stay put? Trace the
vii.
viii. ix. x. xi. xii. xiii.
outline of piety where everything enclosed is pious, and everything outside is not pious Random poet “where there is fear there is shame because fear is a bigger set than shame” 1. Socrates disagrees with him 2. We are scared of hurricanes but not ashamed that we run from them 3. We are scared of getting caught by police and ashamed of doing a crime in the first place Socrates is trying to define piety by looking at justice Euthyphro divides justice just like he divided piety being & becoming Piety is the kind of justice that relates to gods; that means that the rest of justice is ungodly 3rd definition of piety: what is pleasing to all of the gods 4th definition of piety: service to the gods (which brings you back to 2nd definition—pleasing the gods) If Euthyphro is doing the 1st definition of gods, he is doing what the gods are doing, mimicking the gods, and being godlike; (condemning his father is also being godlike)
j. Truth Aletheia i. [A] = not; [letheia]= hidden ii. Socrates shows his unknowingness, humility, ignorance
by not accusing other people and withholding his accusations
SPARKNOTES: 2a 4e Note: There are no natural breaks in the text as Plato wrote it. These notes on the text have been divided artificially, sections beginning or breaking off where a new theme or topic is introduced or dropped. Because page numbers may vary from edition to edition, these sections have been 1.
demarcated according to the Stephanus numbers, the page numbers from the 1578 complete works edited by Henri Estienne ("Stephanus" in Latin). The Stephanus numbers are the standard page references in scholarly work on Plato, and most editions of his work contain the Stephanus numbers along the margins. Summary Socrates and Euthyphro meet by the Porch of the King Archon, one of the judges responsible for overseeing religious law. Euthyphro, surprised to see Socrates, asks what brings him here. Socrates answers that he is being prosecuted by Meletusa young unknown with straight hair, a sparse beard, and a hooked nose. Meletus believes Socrates is corrupting the youth of Athens, and wants to prosecute him. Socrates remarks what a promising young start this Meletus is making, weeding out the corruptors of the city's youth: Socrates himself believes that the excellence of the youth should be of utmost concern. Meletus has also accused Socrates of inventing new gods and not recognizing those that exist. Euthyphro remarks that this accusation is probably connected to the divine sign that Socrates claims to be visited by on occasion. Euthyphro, too, is often disbelieved when he speaks about divine matters or predicts the future. He reassures Socrates that one must simply endure these prejudices, and asserts his confidence that Socrates will come out fine in the end. Socrates inquires as to why Euthyphro has come to court, and Euthyphro answers that he is prosecuting his father for murder (which was considered a religious crime by the Greeks). Socrates is amazed that Euthyphro should want to prosecute his own father, remarking that Euthyphro must have very advanced knowledge of these sorts of matters to be making such a bold move. And, Socrates suggests, his father must have killed another family member: surely, Euthyphro would not go to such pains on behalf of an outsider. Euthyphro replies that he is indeed an expert in these matters, and that, contrary to Socrates' suggestion, the murdered man is not of Euthyphro's family. All that matters in these cases, Euthyphro asserts, is whether or not the killer killed with justification: we should make no exceptions even if the murderer is our father and the murdered man is not close to us. His father has committed an impious act that pollutes Euthyphro and his whole family, and this sin must be purged by means of prosecution. It turns out that the murdered man was a hired hand of Euthyphro's, helping with the farming on Naxos. The man got drunk and, in a rage, slit the throat of one of Euthyphro's servants. Euthyphro's father bound this murderer, a)
threw him in a ditch, and sent for the Interpreter, the official who is responsible for dealing with such crimes. But before the Interpreter could arrive, the hired hand died of exposure in the ditch. Euthyphro notes that his family is angry with him for carrying out such a prosecution on behalf of a murderer, but Euthyphro asserts that he knows better than they do the position of divine law regarding what is holy and what is unholy. 1.
4e 6e
Summary Surprised by Euthyphro's willingness to prosecute his father on so questionable a charge, Socrates remarks that Euthyphro must have a very exact understanding of religious matters to proceed in such a way. Euthyphro proudly claims that he is an expert in all religious matters, and that this is what differentiates him from the common man. In response to this claim, Socrates suggests that perhaps Euthyphro could teach him about religious matters. That way, if Meletus were to prosecute him, Socrates could say that he is now under the tutelage of Euthyphro, whose authority on these matters is unquestionable. If Meletus were to prosecute him even so, Socrates could point out that Euthyphro is in fact the one responsible for teaching him and that Meletus should prosecute Euthyphro instead. Euthyphro encourages this suggestion, pointing out that with his expertise in religious matters, Meletus' claims could not stand up long against Socrates in court. Socrates insists that Euthyphro begin to instruct him regarding what is holy and what is unholy. Socrates has Euthyphro agree with him that there must be one form or standard by which everything holy is holy and everything unholy, by contrast with the holy, is unholy. That is, all holy deeds must be holy by virtue of some feature or other that all holy deeds share in common. Socrates asks Euthyphro what this feature is. Euthyphro suggests that prosecuting those who commit injustices is holy, and not prosecuting them is unholy. Here, Euthyphro appeals to two Greek myths, noting that Zeus imprisoned his father, Kronos, and that Kronos castrated his father, Uranus. Zeus is the best and most just of all the gods, and so if he behaves rightly in imprisoning his father for injustice, Euthyphro should be lauded for following this example. Socrates is somewhat surprised by Euthyphro's example, and asks him if he believes literally all the myths about the godsthat they quarrel and have great battles as is depicted in Greek art and told in the stories of Homer and Hesiod. Euthyphro confirms that he believes all this and more. He says that b)
his knowledge of divine matters is such that he could teach Socrates a great deal that Socrates did not know about the gods. Socrates suggests that perhaps that can wait for another time. His present concern is with the definition of holiness, which he feels Euthyphro has not yet properly dealt with. That one should prosecute those who commit injustices is holy is merely an example of a holy act, and not a definition of holiness itself. Euthyphro concedes that there are a great many holy deeds that do not consist in prosecuting a religious offender. Socrates then urges Euthyphro to give a more general definition and to identify a standard by which all holy deeds can be recognized as holy. 1.
7a 9e
Summary After Euthyphro's definition of holiness as persecuting religious offenders has been dismissed by Socrates, Euthyphro posits a second definition: that holiness is what is agreeable to the gods. Socrates is quite pleased with the generality allowed by this definition, and is eager to investigate whether or not it is accurate. First, he points out that the gods themselves often quarrel, as is recounted in the tales of Hesiod and Homer that Euthyphro believes in so literally. Socrates points out that quarrels do not arise over questions of fact, since agreements can be reached through calculation or investigation, but over questions of value, such as what is just and what is good. Socrates points out that if the gods quarrel over what is just and what is good, then there is clearly no agreement among them on these questions. And if they have different opinions as to what is just and what is good, they must approve of different things. It follows that there must be certain things that are approved of by some gods and disapproved of by other gods. But according to Euthyphro's definition, that would mean that those things are both holy and unholy, since they are approved of by some gods and disapproved of by others. For instance, Zeus might approve of punishing one's father, while Kronos or Uranus might not. Euthyphro replies that surely the gods all agree that a person who kills someone unjustly should be punished. Socrates points out that disputes do not arise as to whether an acknowledged wrongdoer should be punished, but as to whether or not the person has in fact acted unjustly. For Euthyphro's argument to have any weight, he must show not that all the gods agree that someone who kills unjustly should be punished, but that all the gods agree that a certain killing was unjust. Socrates presses Euthyphro to prove that all the gods would agree that Euthyphro is acting justly in prosecuting his father c)
for unintentionally having left a man to die of exposure when that man had killed someone in a drunken rage. Euthyphro assures Socrates that he could convince both him and the jury at the trial that his actions are just. He shifts his definition of what is holy slightly, arguing that it is not simply what is agreeable to the gods, since the gods tend to disagree, but that it is what is approved of by all the gods. 1.
10a 11a
Summary Socrates now changes the direction of the inquiry, asking Euthyphro whether holy deeds are approved by the gods because they are holy or whether they are holy because they are approved by the gods. To illustrate his point, Socrates draws the distinction between being x and getting x. Something carried is being carried because it gets carried: it does not get carried because it is being carried. "Being carried" is the state of the object that is being carried, the state of the object that is acted upon. "Getting carried" is the action of which that the object is on the receiving end. In saying that something is being carried because it gets carried, Socrates is arguing that an object can only be in the state of being carried if someone decides to carry itthat is, if it gets carried. A thing becomes changed because something else changes it: it does not get changed by something else because it is already a changed thing. Socrates then draws a similar distinction between being approved and getting approved. A thing is being approved because it gets approved, and not the other way around. We cannot say that it gets approvedthat someone decides to approve of itbecause it is already being approved by that someone. According to Euthyphro's definition, something gets approved by the gods because it is holy and not the other way around: it is not holy because it gets approved by the gods. And because it gets approved it is being approved, and thus is something that is approved by the gods. It follows from this argument however, that what is holy is something different from what is approved of by the gods. Something holy gets approved because it is holy, and something that is being approved by the gods is being approved of because it gets approved. If what is being approved of by the gods were the same thing as what is holy, and if what is holy gets approved because it is holy, then what is being approved of by the gods would get approved because it is being approved of, when in fact the opposite is true. Alternatively, if we accept that what is being approved of is d)
being approved of because it gets approved, then the holy, too, would have to be holy because it gets approved, and not the other way around. 1.
11b 14a
Summary Socrates asks Euthyphro once more to give a definition of holiness, since his earlier definition, that what is holy is what is approved of by the gods, does not seem to hold. Euthyphro complains that Socrates makes his arguments go around in circles and never stay in place so that he no longer knows where he stands. Socrates corrects Euthyphro, pointing out that he is only asking questions, and it is Euthyphro's answers and Euthyphro's arguments that are going around in circles. Socrates then urges Euthyphro to continue the inquiry. To help him along, he suggests that perhaps everything that is holy is just. He then asks whether, in turn, everything that is just is holy, or whether only part of what is just is holy. To illustrate his point, he quotes a line of poetry: "where is found fear, there is also found shame." Socrates disagrees with this line, pointing out that there are many things that we fear, such as disease and poverty, of which we are not necessarily ashamed. However, he points out, where there is shame, there is also fear: a feeling of shame can be characterized as a fear of a bad reputation. His question regarding justice and holiness is similar: his suggestion is that where there is holiness, there is also justice, but that perhaps there are cases of justice where holiness is not a concern. Euthyphro agrees with this suggestion. Then, if holiness is a division of justice, Socrates urges Euthyphro to point out what kind of division of justice holiness is. That is, if we can identify that part of justice which is included under holiness, then we will have an adequate definition of holiness. Euthyphro suggests that the part of justice that is concerned with looking after the gods is holiness, whereas the part of justice that is concerned with looking after men is not. Socrates is somewhat satisfied with this definition, but asks Euthyphro if he could be clearer as to what he means by "looking after." For instance, a groom looks after a horse, a kennel master looks after a dog, and a cattle farmer looks after cattle. These animals benefit from being looked after by these sorts of people; they are made better, whereas the ordinary person would probably do more harm than good. Socrates asks if Euthyphro similarly thinks that the gods are made better by deeds of holiness, and that every time Euthyphro does something holy, the gods are somehow improved. Euthyphro denies that he means this sort of relationship, e)
suggesting instead that we look after the gods in the way that a slaves look after their masters. Socrates points out that people who serve are always being used to achieve some sort of goal: service to a shipbuilder, for instance, is done with the goal of building a ship. What, Socrates asks, is the goal of the gods which we help them to achieve? Euthyphro evades the question, suggesting that the gods use us for a multitude of reasons. Socrates replies that we could just as well say a general uses his underlings for a multitude of reasons, but that the principal reason is still the goal of winning a war. Thus, he presses Euthyphro once more to identify 14b 16a 1.
Summary At this point, Euthyphro becomes frustrated with Socrates, telling him that it is very difficult to learn about holiness with accuracy. Euthyphro instructs Socrates that it is a matter of gratifying the gods through prayer and sacrifice, and that such holiness will bring salvation and happiness to those who practice it. Socrates points out that if that is Euthyphro's view, Euthyphro could have summed things up far sooner and in far fewer words. It seems, Socrates suggests, that holiness for Euthyphro is a kind of science of sacrifice and prayer, where sacrifice is giving something to the gods and prayer is asking something of them. Euthyphro assents to this definition, suggesting that holiness is a kind of skill in trading. We get what we want from the gods through prayer, and they get what they want from us through our sacrifices. Socrates remarks that certainly we get a great deal of good from the gods, but asks what the gods get in return. What is it, Socrates wants to know, that the gods gain from our sacrifices? Euthyphro answers that there is no way that the gods can actually benefit from our sacrifices: they are allpowerful and do not need our help. Instead, our sacrifices honor and give gratification to the gods. Socrates leads Euthyphro to assent that if he is saying the gods find our sacrifices gratifying, he is then suggesting that our sacrifices are what is approved of by the gods. But, Socrates points out, this leads us back to where we were before, asserting that what is holy is what is approved of by the gods. Either the argument put against it earlier was wrong, or the present position is also wrong. Socrates urges Euthyphro to start again from the beginning and provide him with a more suitable definition of holiness. Frustrated, Euthyphro insists that f)
he has a pressing appointment and uses this as an excuse to scurry off. Socrates calls after him, expressing his disappointment, and worrying that he will now be no better off in his trial against Meletus. the one goal that our service to the gods helps them to achieve.
Analysis and Themes
The Euthyphro is a paradigmatic early dialogue of Plato's: it is brief, deals with a question in ethics, consists of a conversation between Socrates and one other person who claims to be an expert in a certain field of ethics, and ends inconclusively. It is also riddled with Socratic irony: Socrates poses as the ignorant student hoping to learn from a supposed expert, when in fact he shows Euthyphro to be the ignorant one who knows nothing about the subject (holiness). Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the dialogue is the inconclusiveness with which it ends. This inconclusiveness is hardly unique to the Euthyphro, but it is worth investigating. Is Plato suggesting that there is no such thing as a definition of holiness, that there is no one feature that all holy deeds have in common? And if he does think that there is a common link, why does he not reveal it to us in the dialogue? We may link the inconclusiveness of the dialogue to the dialogue form itself and the irony Socrates employs. Plato's main goal is to teach us, and he believes firmly (as we gather in other dialogues, notably the Meno) that knowledge only comes when we are able to justify and account for our true beliefs. Thus, teaching is not simply a matter of giving the right answers. It is a matter of leading the student toward the right answers and ensuring that the student can explain and justify the answers rather than simply repeat them. The dialogue form is ideal for this kind of teaching; it shows Socrates leading Euthyphro through Euthyphro's own reasoning, and thereby letting Euthyphro sort things out for himself. The irony is present because Socrates is treating Euthyphro as the teacher when in fact Socrates is teaching Euthyphro. This setup is necessary in order to encourage Euthyphro to present and analyze his own arguments, and thus to lead him to see their faults for himself. The dialogue ends inconclusively perhaps in order to urge the reader to think independently and struggle to formulate an adequate definition without Plato's help. There is some suggestion that Euthyphro is not thinking along the right lines at all. The definition that Euthyphro holds equates what is holy with what is approved of by the gods. Socrates' skillful argument shows that this definition is insufficient: though what is holy may be approved of by the
gods, the two cannot be the same thing. If the gods approve of something because it is holy, then their approval cannot be what makes it holy. Alternatively, if it is holy because the gods approve of it, then we still don't know for what reason the gods approve of it. It seems that any attempt to ground our definition of holiness in the will or approval of the gods is bound to fail. We might normally associate holiness with some sort of divine will, but Plato seems to be suggesting that we should think along another line altogether. Perhaps this other line is the Theory of Forms (discussed in the Phaedo), which would posit the Form of Holiness as the defining characteristic of all holy things. There are hints toward this position in the dialogue, though it is highly unlikely that Plato had developed any kind of technical theory by the time the Euthyphro was written. Perhaps the absence of this formulated theory is what leads the dialogue to end inconclusively.
Characters:
Socrates The protagonist of the Euthyphro (as well as all of Plato's other dialogues). Socrates seems to be a very simple man, not having many material possessions and speaking in a plain, conversational manner. However, this apparent plainness is all a part of the irony characteristic of Socrates' method. Professing his own ignorance, he would engage in conversation with someone claiming to be an expert, usually in ethical matters. By asking simple questions, Socrates would gradually reveal that his interlocutor was in fact very confused and did not know anything clear about the matters about which he claimed to be an expert. The quest for wisdom and the instruction of others through dialogue and inquiry were considered by Socrates to be the highest aims in life: one of his most famous sayings is that "the unexamined life is not worth living." Socrates himself arguably never advanced any theories of his own, and certainly many of the doctrines that appear in the later dialogues are of Plato's invention. In early dialogues, such as the Euthyphro, Plato presents us with a Socrates less informed by Platonic philosophy; he is, rather, more of a foil for his interlocutors who claim to have positive knowledge. Euthyphro The interlocutor of the dialogue, and its namesake. Euthyphro is an orthodox and dogmatically religious man, believing he knows everything there is to know about holy matters. He often makes prophecies to others, and has brought his father to trial on a questionable murder charge. We do not know whether or not Euthyphro is a historical personage or whether he is a fictitious invention of Plato's.
Meletus The man chiefly responsible for pressing charges against Socrates, bringing him to trial, and having him executed. Little is known about Meletus and by all accounts, he seems to have been a rather insignificant figure. Plato's portrayal of him, both in The Apology and in the Euthyphro, is far from sympathetic; Socrates' crossexamination of him in The Apology puts him to shame. He does not actually appear in the Euthyphro, but he is mentioned on a number of occasions.
Review Questions: 1. Where does this dialogue take place? a. The Porch of the King Archon
2. Who of the following has NOT killed anybody? a. Euthyphro’s servant 3. Which of the following has Meletus NOT accused Socrates of? a. Charging a fee for his teaching 4. Which of the following is NOT part of the description of Meletus? a. He’s not very smart 5. How does Socrates suggest Euthyphro might help him in his case
against Meletus? a. Euthyphro could teach Socrates about religious matters 6. Which of the following is NOT the father or son of one of the others? a. Hesiod 7. Why does Socrates not accept Euthyphro’s definition of prosecuting criminals is holy? a. Because there are no acts which are also holy 8. What is the elenchus? a. Cross examination 9. On which of the following questions might the gods disagree, according to Socrates? a. Whether or not it is just to punish one’s father 10. On what grounds do we argue over whether or not someone should be punished, according to Socrates? a. We disagree about whether or not the person committed the crime was stated
11. Which of the following claims is Euthyphro NOT committed to? a. Something is holy because it is approved by the gods 12. Which of the following is an unwanted consequence of Euthyphro’s
reasoning? a. Something is approved by the gods because it is holy 13. What is the relationship between being x and getting x? a. Something is being x because it is getting x
14. Which of the following is NOT offered by Euthyphro as a definition
of holiness? a. Holiness is loving your fellow person 15. Which of the following relationships does Euthyphro think is UNLIKE the relationship between gods and men? a. The groomhorse relationship 16. Why do the gods want our sacrifices, according to Euthyphro? a. They find them gratifying 17. Which of the following two definitions prove to be similar? (A) Holiness is persecuting religious criminals, (B) Holiness is what the gods find agreeable, (C) Holiness is what is approved of by all the gods, (D) Holiness is a matter of gratifying the gods a. C & D Holiness is what is approved of by all the gods and Holiness is a matter of gratifying the gods 18. How does the dialogue end? a. Euthyphro gets frustrated and leaves
