PSYC 354 Summer 2014 Lecture Six: Animal Communication and ...
PSYC 354 Summer 2014 Lecture Six: Animal Communication and Meaning Assignment 1 Debriefing – Commentary Paper: Concerns: Narrow interpretation based on what the researchers want to find Goes beyond data Interpretations assume more about cognition than the findings represent A very rich interpretation More than moral understanding Selfsupporting Same research group Replication with unfamiliar objects Variation What kind of knowledge are we talking about? Infants have exactly what kind of knowledge at their age (Innate Nativism) “Human Nature” (Loaded premises) Culture relativism Social conditioning (or Human universal) Just because the capacity emerges early does not imply that it is innate… Issue of triadic interactions Theory of mind Very ambiguous Methodological critique Perceptual compounds Philosophically complicated Benefits: Replication of previous research Same research group Rigorous methodological standpoint Born into a social setting where you are able to develop knowledge internally (nativist) Are Animal Communication Systems Similar to Human Language? Do other animals have “simple” language? Is it unique to humans? Minds “Like a black box” Mysteries of the Animal Mind Video: The Nature of Things (April 23rd, 2014) Do animals (e.g. fellow primates) have morality and do they behave like us? Ground Squirrels Signal to let others know whether predators are airborne or on the ground, share information (concept of reliability) and can distinguish between individual humans and squirrels Animals with concepts and mental interpretation Definition of Language: The definition varies depending on who you ask Defining language is very difficult people just come up with components of languages (lists of characteristics) Essential Characteristics of Language: Reference: Refers to something here or there Displacement: Describing something that isn’t in exactly in front of you Creativity/Productivity: The ability to create new words or meanings
PSYC 354 Summer 2014 Vervet Monkeys They have 3 different alarm calls: 1) Snake 2) Eagle 3) Lions & Leopards Reference: Yes, referring to 3 different predators Displacement: No physical displacement – it is more to do with stimulusresponse Creativity: No, alarm calls cannot be used in different ways Ground Squirrels They have alarm calls They can distinguish between individual humans and squirrels Complex calls but arguably doesn’t stand up to the 3 criteria of language Bees Ethologist: Karl von Frisch (1967) They have 2 different dances (angled off perpendicular of the sun) 1) Round Dance: Sources close to the hive (10 m or less) 2) Waggle Dance: Far sources, direction, distance (related to the sun) Reference: Yes, showing the sources of pollen Displacement: Yes, physical displacement and yes, temporal displacement (can’t denote information, but there is an aspect of adjustment of their dance to cater to the movement of the sun) Creativity/Productivity: No, they can adjust their dances (flexibility to denote the movement of the sun not used for new creative ways) Animal Communication Is animal communication similar to human language? Reference: There’s a difference between functional v. intentional reaction to stimuli Displacement: The systems have some form of displacement physical v. temporal Creativity/Productivity: It may seem as though the animals are creative but that could be misconstrued through displacement Can other species be taught human languages? Noam Chomsky Only humans have language (speciesspecific) However, humans and chimps share 98.7% of the same DNA Can’t deny the relationship between us and other primates (common ancestors) Two Generations of Ape Language Research 1) 1st Round in the Chimp Language Wars: Language Trained Apes Early research tried to get apes to speak Furness (1916) young orangutan Hayes & Hayes (1951): “Viki”
PSYC 354 Summer 2014 4 “words”: Papa, Mama, Cup and Up Kellogg & Kellogg (1933): Gua Raised a chimp named Gua (7.5 months) along with their own son Donald (9 months) Raised together for 9 months Production: None Comprehension: Similar Gardners (1966): Washoe 1 year old chimpanzee Taught American Sign Language (ASL) Raised like a human child Operant learning then Natural learning Learned 350 signs Creativity/Productivity? “Water Bird” for swan? Patterson: Koko Gorilla 1000 signs of ASL Understands 2000 words Creativity/Productivity: EYE HAT Mask, WHITE TIGER Zebra, COOKIE ROCK Sweet, Stale Roll, ME CRY THERE Terrace (1979): Nim Chimpsky Major criticism (Clever Hans effect) 1) Only requests 2) Nonspontaneous and imitative 3) High redundant (e.g. “give orange me give me eat orange me eat orange give me you?”) 2) 2nd Round in the Chimp Language Wars: SavageRumbaugh: Bonobo, Kanzi “Enculturated Apes”, PanHomo culture Pretty controversial (sleeps at the place) Not trying to fit humans into it Focus of comprehension, production through lexigrams Linguistic environment; Based on shared understanding of routines (through observation, immersed in a language) Learnt from observing the researchers teaching his mother Matata Is This Language? Evaluate in terms of the key aspects of language: What do you think? Take 3 Minutes Overemphasis on speech, production v. comprehension, “classroom” learning Study of Comprehension (SavageRumbaugh et al., 1993) Careful experimentation: Avoid “Clever Hans” effect Compared a 2yearold child (Ali) and an 8yearold bonobo (Kanzi) on their understanding of 660 novel sentences
PSYC 354 Summer 2014 Nonblind trials (240): E in room Blind trials (420): E behind oneway mirror; person in room cannot hear Test Questions: Novel Sentences “Can you make the snake bite the doggy?” “Take the lettuce out of microwave.” “Give the peas and the sweet potatoes to Rose.” “Knife the sweet potato.” “The surprise is hiding in the dishwasher.” “Take the potatoes outdoors and get the apple.” Word Order: “Put the hat on your ball.” “Put the ball on the hat.” Meaning Based on Role: “Give the knife to Rose.” “Can you knife the sweet potatoes.” Cannot be imitation because there is nothing to imitate (never heard these sentences before) Results: Kanzi: Correct on 72% of all trials Ali: Correct on 66% of all trials Partially correct scored as incorrect (e.g., “put some water on the carrots.”) Replicated with other bonobos and chimpanzees SavageRumbaugh et al.’s (1993) Conclusion: “Kanzi’s ability to understand complex speech and to use written symbols spontaneously suggests that present day apes possess the capacity for a simple language system and thus that our common ancestor was capable of some sort of symbolic communication.” Critical Response Noam Chomsky (1991): Biological miracle if an species had an very useful ability that they didn’t think to use until a researcher taught them. Steven Pinker (1994, p. 341): “Kanzi’s language abilities, if one is being charitable, are just above those of his common cousins by a justnoticeable difference, but not more.” Further Questions How do chimpanzees and bonobos communicated in the wild? Dyadic not triadic (as in human language) Learned through ritualization (social shaping) not imitation, Therefore, not reciprocally understood. (However, there is “directed scratching”...is this reciprocally understood?) Questions About Meaning What does this research teach us about meaning? What did Nim Chimpsky and Kanzi teach us?
PSYC 354 Summer 2014 Nim had different training program, one based on a Chimskian theory of language Kanzi seems to roll Nim in terms of language abilities Pragmatics: Language in Use Semantics and syntax not enough Pragmatics (e.g. Sarcasm/irony “I really enjoy your class, Tyler!”, “This is really useful!”) Message Model/Code Model of Meaning/Language Common View: The speaker encodes a message and the hearer decodes it Computer Metaphor: Code sent via a conduit Problems with Message/Code Model Communicative intention is not determined by expressions: E.g., “I’ll be there tonight” – Could be a prediction, a promise, a threat, etc. We often speak nonliterally E.g. Irony, sarcasm, metaphor, etc. We sometimes speak indirectly E.g. “Can you pass the salt?” Speech Acts: Doing Things With Words Language is used for purposes other than transmitting information E.g., to perform acts, makes requests, issue orders Speech acts: “How to do things with words” (Austin) Statements don’t just describe states of affairs they do things Assumptions about Language and Meaning Rarely explicitly discussed in psychology, but our ideas about language are based on our assumptions about meaning “Commonsense” View of Language and Meaning Will contrast Augustinian and Wittgensteinian perspectives 1) How infants learn language 2) How words derive their meanings Augustinian View: “a particular view of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objectssentences are combinations of such names. In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for with the word stands” (Wittgenstein, 1968, §1) The Augustinian View of Language and Learning “Associative Learning” Account 1) The child perceives adults naming objects moving towards things 2) The child infers that such and such an object is signified by a given sound 3) The child gradually comes to use the words to express desires
PSYC 354 Summer 2014 Wittgenstein Outline of Augustine’s View of Language 1) Every word has a meaning 2) This meaning is correlated with the object, event, action, in the world (“one to one”) 3) The form of explanation “this is…” (i.e. ostensive explanation) constitutes the foundation of language 4) The child can think in the language of thought (a private language) before she learns to talk (this language of thought “points” to the sensation) Steven Pinker • “...a species with a remarkable ability: we can shape events in each other’s brains with exquisite precision...That ability is language. Simply by making noises with our mouths, we can reliably cause precise new combinations of ideas to arise in each other’s minds” (Pinker, 1994, p. 15). Problems… 1) Every word has a meaning 2) This meaning is correlated with the object, event, action, in the world (“one to one”) Augustinian View: Words as names for things/words as labels Only a part of language How about words like “hello” or “they?” Or, “how”, “about”, “like”, and “or?” and “and” Same word can mean different things (e.g. Thingy) 3) The form of explanation “this is ..” (i.e. ostensive explanation) constitutes the foundation of language But, ostensive definition presupposes meaning of a point… E.g. “Gavagai” Quine (1960) “Indeterminacy of translation” 4) The child can think in the language of thought (a private languages) before she learns to talk (this language of thought “points” to the sensation) A language of thought presupposes structure that English/Ukrainian/Manitobian/Klingon is based on Is this a developmental view? On this view, where does meaning come from? Wittgenstein Wittgenstein does not provide a theory of language acquisition: He challenges the Augustinian account by asserting a different view of meaning in language Language Games Meaning of words from use in language
PSYC 354 Summer 2014 – Words are like tools: have different uses – “Slab!”: order, warning, request, surprise, etc. “Understanding” is not “pointing to something in your head”: it is an ability to use the language Meaning derived from a word’s correct use in a community of language users Language Learning for Wittgenstein Being able to participate and interact in a variety of structured activities that essentially employ language – means mastering different language games. Based on natural responses: – So crying is replaced by new pain behaviour, new the language games of “pain” i.e. “booboo!”, “ouch!”, “damn it!” Language as Activity Language as an extension of, and a part, of human activity Problematizes Pinker’s idea purpose of language is to spookily download ideas into each other’s heads Meaning and Context – Indexicality Gary Larsen on indexicality (E.g. thingthing) Meaning and Context – Pauses (Turnbull) Exchange between husband and wife: – A: “I’m getting fat.” – B: (3 second pause) – A: “Do you really think so?” Overheard in an art gallery: C: “I really like that.” D: (3 second pause) C: “Well, I mean, I think it’s the type of work that kinda grows on you.” Meaning and Context Wittgeinstein: Meaning is not attached to representations Still in an inference that you make! Conclusion: Views like those of Chomsky and Pinker are based on some potentially problematic assumptions about the nature of language and meaning The “commonsense” (“code model”) view of language as a “bridge between minds”: Assumes words are labels Lots more to language: Pragmatics and context contribute to meaning
PSYC 354 Summer 2014 We use words to do things: we come to master a language in which use of theses words has meaning to the users
PSYC 354 Summer 2014 Vervet Monkeys They have 3 different alarm calls: 1) Snake 2) Eagle 3) Lions & Leopards Reference: Yes, referring to 3 different predators Displacement: No physical displacement – it is more to do with stimulusresponse Creativity: No, alarm calls cannot be used in different ways Ground Squirrels They have alarm calls They can distinguish between individual humans and squirrels Complex calls but arguably doesn’t stand up to the 3 criteria of language Bees Ethologist: Karl von Frisch (1967) They have 2 different dances (angled off perpendicular of the sun) 1) Round Dance: Sources close to the hive (10 m or less) 2) Waggle Dance: Far sources, direction, distance (related to the sun) Reference: Yes, showing the sources of pollen Displacement: Yes, physical displacement and yes, temporal displacement (can’t denote information, but there is an aspect of adjustment of their dance to cater to the movement of the sun) Creativity/Productivity: No, they can adjust their dances (flexibility to denote the movement of the sun not used for new creative ways) Animal Communication Is animal communication similar to human language? Reference: There’s a difference between functional v. intentional reaction to stimuli Displacement: The systems have some form of displacement physical v. temporal Creativity/Productivity: It may seem as though the animals are creative but that could be misconstrued through displacement Can other species be taught human languages? Noam Chomsky Only humans have language (speciesspecific) However, humans and chimps share 98.7% of the same DNA Can’t deny the relationship between us and other primates (common ancestors) Two Generations of Ape Language Research 1) 1st Round in the Chimp Language Wars: Language Trained Apes Early research tried to get apes to speak Furness (1916) young orangutan Hayes & Hayes (1951): “Viki”
PSYC 354 Summer 2014 4 “words”: Papa, Mama, Cup and Up Kellogg & Kellogg (1933): Gua Raised a chimp named Gua (7.5 months) along with their own son Donald (9 months) Raised together for 9 months Production: None Comprehension: Similar Gardners (1966): Washoe 1 year old chimpanzee Taught American Sign Language (ASL) Raised like a human child Operant learning then Natural learning Learned 350 signs Creativity/Productivity? “Water Bird” for swan? Patterson: Koko Gorilla 1000 signs of ASL Understands 2000 words Creativity/Productivity: EYE HAT Mask, WHITE TIGER Zebra, COOKIE ROCK Sweet, Stale Roll, ME CRY THERE Terrace (1979): Nim Chimpsky Major criticism (Clever Hans effect) 1) Only requests 2) Nonspontaneous and imitative 3) High redundant (e.g. “give orange me give me eat orange me eat orange give me you?”) 2) 2nd Round in the Chimp Language Wars: SavageRumbaugh: Bonobo, Kanzi “Enculturated Apes”, PanHomo culture Pretty controversial (sleeps at the place) Not trying to fit humans into it Focus of comprehension, production through lexigrams Linguistic environment; Based on shared understanding of routines (through observation, immersed in a language) Learnt from observing the researchers teaching his mother Matata Is This Language? Evaluate in terms of the key aspects of language: What do you think? Take 3 Minutes Overemphasis on speech, production v. comprehension, “classroom” learning Study of Comprehension (SavageRumbaugh et al., 1993) Careful experimentation: Avoid “Clever Hans” effect Compared a 2yearold child (Ali) and an 8yearold bonobo (Kanzi) on their understanding of 660 novel sentences
PSYC 354 Summer 2014 Nonblind trials (240): E in room Blind trials (420): E behind oneway mirror; person in room cannot hear Test Questions: Novel Sentences “Can you make the snake bite the doggy?” “Take the lettuce out of microwave.” “Give the peas and the sweet potatoes to Rose.” “Knife the sweet potato.” “The surprise is hiding in the dishwasher.” “Take the potatoes outdoors and get the apple.” Word Order: “Put the hat on your ball.” “Put the ball on the hat.” Meaning Based on Role: “Give the knife to Rose.” “Can you knife the sweet potatoes.” Cannot be imitation because there is nothing to imitate (never heard these sentences before) Results: Kanzi: Correct on 72% of all trials Ali: Correct on 66% of all trials Partially correct scored as incorrect (e.g., “put some water on the carrots.”) Replicated with other bonobos and chimpanzees SavageRumbaugh et al.’s (1993) Conclusion: “Kanzi’s ability to understand complex speech and to use written symbols spontaneously suggests that present day apes possess the capacity for a simple language system and thus that our common ancestor was capable of some sort of symbolic communication.” Critical Response Noam Chomsky (1991): Biological miracle if an species had an very useful ability that they didn’t think to use until a researcher taught them. Steven Pinker (1994, p. 341): “Kanzi’s language abilities, if one is being charitable, are just above those of his common cousins by a justnoticeable difference, but not more.” Further Questions How do chimpanzees and bonobos communicated in the wild? Dyadic not triadic (as in human language) Learned through ritualization (social shaping) not imitation, Therefore, not reciprocally understood. (However, there is “directed scratching”...is this reciprocally understood?) Questions About Meaning What does this research teach us about meaning? What did Nim Chimpsky and Kanzi teach us?
PSYC 354 Summer 2014 Nim had different training program, one based on a Chimskian theory of language Kanzi seems to roll Nim in terms of language abilities Pragmatics: Language in Use Semantics and syntax not enough Pragmatics (e.g. Sarcasm/irony “I really enjoy your class, Tyler!”, “This is really useful!”) Message Model/Code Model of Meaning/Language Common View: The speaker encodes a message and the hearer decodes it Computer Metaphor: Code sent via a conduit Problems with Message/Code Model Communicative intention is not determined by expressions: E.g., “I’ll be there tonight” – Could be a prediction, a promise, a threat, etc. We often speak nonliterally E.g. Irony, sarcasm, metaphor, etc. We sometimes speak indirectly E.g. “Can you pass the salt?” Speech Acts: Doing Things With Words Language is used for purposes other than transmitting information E.g., to perform acts, makes requests, issue orders Speech acts: “How to do things with words” (Austin) Statements don’t just describe states of affairs they do things Assumptions about Language and Meaning Rarely explicitly discussed in psychology, but our ideas about language are based on our assumptions about meaning “Commonsense” View of Language and Meaning Will contrast Augustinian and Wittgensteinian perspectives 1) How infants learn language 2) How words derive their meanings Augustinian View: “a particular view of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objectssentences are combinations of such names. In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for with the word stands” (Wittgenstein, 1968, §1) The Augustinian View of Language and Learning “Associative Learning” Account 1) The child perceives adults naming objects moving towards things 2) The child infers that such and such an object is signified by a given sound 3) The child gradually comes to use the words to express desires
PSYC 354 Summer 2014 Wittgenstein Outline of Augustine’s View of Language 1) Every word has a meaning 2) This meaning is correlated with the object, event, action, in the world (“one to one”) 3) The form of explanation “this is…” (i.e. ostensive explanation) constitutes the foundation of language 4) The child can think in the language of thought (a private language) before she learns to talk (this language of thought “points” to the sensation) Steven Pinker • “...a species with a remarkable ability: we can shape events in each other’s brains with exquisite precision...That ability is language. Simply by making noises with our mouths, we can reliably cause precise new combinations of ideas to arise in each other’s minds” (Pinker, 1994, p. 15). Problems… 1) Every word has a meaning 2) This meaning is correlated with the object, event, action, in the world (“one to one”) Augustinian View: Words as names for things/words as labels Only a part of language How about words like “hello” or “they?” Or, “how”, “about”, “like”, and “or?” and “and” Same word can mean different things (e.g. Thingy) 3) The form of explanation “this is ..” (i.e. ostensive explanation) constitutes the foundation of language But, ostensive definition presupposes meaning of a point… E.g. “Gavagai” Quine (1960) “Indeterminacy of translation” 4) The child can think in the language of thought (a private languages) before she learns to talk (this language of thought “points” to the sensation) A language of thought presupposes structure that English/Ukrainian/Manitobian/Klingon is based on Is this a developmental view? On this view, where does meaning come from? Wittgenstein Wittgenstein does not provide a theory of language acquisition: He challenges the Augustinian account by asserting a different view of meaning in language Language Games Meaning of words from use in language
PSYC 354 Summer 2014 – Words are like tools: have different uses – “Slab!”: order, warning, request, surprise, etc. “Understanding” is not “pointing to something in your head”: it is an ability to use the language Meaning derived from a word’s correct use in a community of language users Language Learning for Wittgenstein Being able to participate and interact in a variety of structured activities that essentially employ language – means mastering different language games. Based on natural responses: – So crying is replaced by new pain behaviour, new the language games of “pain” i.e. “booboo!”, “ouch!”, “damn it!” Language as Activity Language as an extension of, and a part, of human activity Problematizes Pinker’s idea purpose of language is to spookily download ideas into each other’s heads Meaning and Context – Indexicality Gary Larsen on indexicality (E.g. thingthing) Meaning and Context – Pauses (Turnbull) Exchange between husband and wife: – A: “I’m getting fat.” – B: (3 second pause) – A: “Do you really think so?” Overheard in an art gallery: C: “I really like that.” D: (3 second pause) C: “Well, I mean, I think it’s the type of work that kinda grows on you.” Meaning and Context Wittgeinstein: Meaning is not attached to representations Still in an inference that you make! Conclusion: Views like those of Chomsky and Pinker are based on some potentially problematic assumptions about the nature of language and meaning The “commonsense” (“code model”) view of language as a “bridge between minds”: Assumes words are labels Lots more to language: Pragmatics and context contribute to meaning
PSYC 354 Summer 2014 We use words to do things: we come to master a language in which use of theses words has meaning to the users
