Redacted Redacted Redacted
MAA NPA Form Revised May 17
Ref No: MAA/NPA/17/21
NOTICE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT: MAA/NPA/17/21 TITLE OF PROPOSAL: RA 3293 – Surveillance Radar Approach Stage of Development:
Consultation
Organizations and business sectors affected:
MAA Regulated Air Traffic Control Units providing SRA, associated command structures and equipment project teams.
MAA-NPA Serial No:
MAA/NPA/17/21
RFC Serial No:
MAA/RFC/2016/139
MAA Originator:
DSA-MAA-RegATM1-Gen
Redacted
Date: 20 Sep 17
MAA Supervisor:
DSA-MAA-RegATM
Redacted
Date: 20 Sep 17
MAA Independent:
DSA-MAA-CertES3-ATM
Redacted
Date: 20 Sep 17
MAA LegAd (if required):
Post
Rank/Name
Date:
Cross-reference to other relevant amendment proposals or documents:
RA 3291 – Precision Approach Radar
MRPT Point of Contact details Rank and Name:
MAA Regulatory Publications Team Enquiries
Telephone Number mil/civ:
9679 - 84189 / 83914 / 82504
Email address:
[email protected]
Ver 6.1
Page 1 of 4
030 679 - 84189 / 83914 / 82504
Ref No: MAA/NPA/17/21
MAA NPA Form Revised May 17
[Desk Officers are to refer to Annex B for completion guidance.] Feedback Notes The Regulated Community are invited to offer feedback (where applicable) on the impact of the proposed change to publications covered under this NPA on the operation of your business, including:
Timescale for implementation. Cost of implementation. Amendment to contract. Amendment to internal processes/orders. Resourcing the outcome of change.
The format for feedback is illustrated at Annex A and is available within a single Excel file on both internal and external MAA websites.
SUMMARY OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT Change: This is the 3rd NPA for this RA containing updates from the feedback received from the RC. First NPA Updated Rationale to provide the context, hazard and defence for the Regulation. Inclusion of AMC and Guidance Material (GM) to address the requirement that vertical guidance issued by controllers meets any restrictions specified for that procedure. Inclusion of AMC for undercarriage check and clearance requirements for completeness and alignment with RA 3291- Precision Approach Radar. Inclusion of QNH approaches to align with requirement and use by the Regulated Community (RC). Expansion of GM for azimuth control for clarity. Textual changes to AMC and GM to improve clarity of regulation. Second NPA Inclusion of AMC for rotation rate and method of confirming positional data accuracy to determine where the SRA terminates. Inclusion of AMC to ensure the correct position of the SRA approach line. Third NPA Inclusion of GM to support SRA Termination and SRA Approach Line Impact Assessment: Units are required to assess the elevation guidance in use to ensure it does not contradict restrictions specified for the published SRA. More accurate calculation of advisory heights, including a consideration for the minimum threshold crossing height, may be required. Some units may need to liaise with No1 Aeronautical Information Documents Unit (AIDU) for changes to publications.
Ver 6.1
Page 2 of 4
Ref No: MAA/NPA/17/21
MAA NPA Form Revised May 17
Units will need to take into account anticipated future equipment or airfield infrastructure changes. Units are to ensure that SRAs terminate iaw equipment capability and the radar map is correctly aligned. Any subsequent change to procedures will require appropriate change management processes to be undertaken. Objective: To provide Regulation that ensures the RC understand their responsibilities for safe control of Air Systems undertaking a published approach procedure. Courses of Action - Risk Evaluation. Do nothing: Not recommended. Not amending the RA would enable advisory heights passed by controllers to be lower than the calculated obstacle clearances and a SRA to be provided when insufficient primary surveillance coverage exists. Both aspects present an increased RtL. Partial amendment: Not recommended. Partial amendment would fail to address the requirements for the regulatory change and reduce the planned improvements for aviation safety and coherent regulation. Full amendment: Recommended. Incorporation of the amendments in full will allow appropriate regulation to ensure safe provision of SRAs and provide the RC with greater clarity to understand their responsibilities. Post Implementation Review: This RA will be reviewed one year after the publication of this amendment, or sooner should feedback indicate it is required. Consultation period ends: 25 Oct 17 The consultation period for this proposed amendment ends on the stated date. Please send your feedback, using the Response Form, via email to [email protected].
APPROVAL
Post
Approved by: (IAW MAA SOP 20 Matrix)
Name Redacted
Ver 6.1
Rank
Page 3 of 4
DSA-MAA-Reg-DepHd
Redacted
Original, non-redacted, signed
Annex A to MAA NPA Form Revised Jan 17
NOTICE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT RESPONSE SHEET Respondent details: Organization Comments: RA No./ Manual
Name
Chapter & Para No.
Impact assessment: RA No./ Chapter & Para No. Manual
Ver 6.1
Contact Number:
Comment
Email Address:
Proposed Amendment
Impact assessment
Page 4 of 4
UNCONTROLLED COPY WHEN PRINTED
Regulatory Article 3293
RA 3293 – Surveillance Radar Approach Rationale
►A Surveillance Radar Approach (SRA) provides an Air System with the means of descending below terrain safe level in poor weather to conduct an approach without a precision approach aid. Descent below terrain safe level in poor weather increases the Risk to Life (RtL) associated with controlled flight into terrain. This Regulation ensures a SRA approach given by a controller is safe and therefore provides mitigation towards the RtL.◄
Contents
3293(1): Surveillance Radar Approach
Regulation 3293(1)
Surveillance Radar Approach 3293(1) Controllers shall provide SRA ►◄ in accordance with specified procedures.
Acceptable Means of Compliance 3293(1)
Surveillance Radar Approach 1. ►Published Procedure. Controllers should conduct SRAs according to the published approach procedures.
Dra
2. SRA Termination. Heads of Establishment (HoE) and Aviation Duty Holder (ADH)-Facing Organizations should utilise the following to determine the point where the SRA terminates (Radar Termination Range (RTR))1:
ft fo
a. A non-cooperative Surveillance system providing the positional data for the following services should provide regular updates with at least the following update periodicity: (1) (2)
rN PA
SRA to 2 nm from touchdown point; 6 seconds update periodicity. SRA to 1 nm from touchdown point; 4 seconds update periodicity.
(3) SRA to 0.5 nm from touchdown point, 3 seconds update periodicity.
b. When used for SRA purpose, the accuracy of the position information should be justified as suitable for SRA within the range where SRAs are performed. c.
The radar coverage should be suitable for the RTR.
3. ATM staff should produce pre-computed data relating range from touchdown point2 to the correlated height for the direction of the approach. This should be immediately available to the controller, either on the surveillance display screen or on a separate reference document. 4. SRA Approach Line. Prior to conducting a SRA, units should ensure that the SRA approach line is orientated accurately and in the correct position. 5. QNH approaches. Where SRAs are conducted using QNH, references to height in this RA should be converted to altitude. 6.
When controlling a SRA,◄ controllers should: a.
►Identify the Air System.
b. Obtain readback of correct altimeter setting from the pilot◄ before commencing final approach. c. Pass to the pilot ►ranges from the touchdown point◄ together with precomputed advisory heights at intervals of ½ nm, until the Air System reaches a
►DefStan 00-972: Military Air Traffic Services Equipment Safety and Performance Standards (Aerodrome, Terminal and Naval Air Traffic Services) with supporting extracts from CAP 670: Air Traffic Services Safety Requirements. 2 Touchdown point is the point where the nominal glidepath intercepts the runway.◄ 1
RA 3293 Draft for NPA
UNCONTROLLED COPY WHEN PRINTED
Page 1 of 4
Regulatory Article 3293
UNCONTROLLED COPY WHEN PRINTED
range equivalent to the pilot’s Minimum Descent Height (MDH), after which only ►ranges◄ from touchdown at intervals of ½ nm ►should◄ be given3.
Acceptable Means of Compliance 3293(1)
d. Pass to the pilot heading instructions to intercept, and maintain, the centreline until the Air System reaches the Missed Approach Point ►(MAPt)◄ and thereafter to pass advice related to the Air System’s position from the projected runway centreline. e. ►Obtain a notification that the undercarriage is down prior to obtaining a clearance. There is no requirement to check fixed undercarriage Air Systems, but if the controller is in any doubt a ‘check gear, acknowledge’ instruction should be given.◄ f.
Advise the pilot that he is approaching his MDH.
g. Advise the pilot that he is approaching ►MAPt◄. When the MDH is within ½ nm of the ►MAPt◄ the phrase ‘approaching MDH’ is not included. h.
►Obtain clearances in the same manner as RA 32914.
i.
Terminate the SRA at the RTR.◄
7. Elevation Control.►Descent should be commenced at a range from touchdown and at a height above the relevant datum which corresponds to the required rate of descent. The controller should pass pre-computed advisory heights with range information to assist the pilot in maintaining a rate of descent for a glidepath (GP) angle equivalent to the published procedure, and to meet all associated restrictions5◄.
Dra 8.
►◄
ft fo
9. Clutter. If the Air System return enters an area of continuous clutter and ►identification◄ cannot be maintained, the approach should be terminated. The pilot should be informed of the loss of ►◄ radar contact, and a Missed Approach Procedure initiated if the pilot cannot continue his approach visually.
rN PA
10. Separation/Avoidance of Other Contacts. If the SRA controller observes a ►◄ radar contact which is in confliction with the track of the Air System completing an SRA, he should immediately check the ►elevation indication if available.◄ If collision risk is apparent in both azimuth and elevation ►(either assessed from elevation indication, or due to unknown elevation),◄ advice on suitable action for collision avoidance should be passed to the pilot together with information on conflicting traffic. Instructions for manoeuvres in a vertical plane should normally only result in stopping descent or applying a climb. Where a heading change is involved, the Air System should be climbed to the relevant ►height according to the◄ Radar Vector Chart/Surveillance Minimum Altitude Chart.
Guidance Material 3293(1)
Surveillance Radar Approach 11. ►SRA Termination. Aerodromes and aviation capable ships that intend to use non-cooperative surveillance systems to provide SRAs must check for correct radar positioning and alignment based on Permanent Echoes, as stated in Def Stan 00-972, Part 3. 12. SRA Approach Line. Where the prescribed marker configuration is not practicable the Aviation Duty Holder-Facing Organization must meet the requirements of RA 1020(4)6 by defining the alternative configuration or solution that assures positional accuracy of the system and how controllers are able to confirm the correct SRA approach centreline.◄ 13. When providing a SRA, the controller passes instructions and information to the pilot to enable him to follow a pre-determined approach path to a position from which a visual landing or circuit can be made. This type of approach is not as accurate as a precision approach in that no electronic GP information is available, nor is there a similar degree of accuracy in azimuth.
3
At RN aerodromes, ranges will normally be passed at 1/2 nm intervals and heights at 1/3 nm intervals. ►RA 3291 - Precision Approach Radar. 5 Such as Minimum Obstacle Clearance Areas (MOCA) and Step-Down Fix (SDF). 6 RA 1020(4) - Responsibilities of ADH-Facing Organizations◄ 4
Page 2 of 4
UNCONTROLLED COPY WHEN PRINTED
RA 3293 Draft for NPA
UNCONTROLLED COPY WHEN PRINTED
Guidance Material 3293(1)
Regulatory Article 3293
14. ►Azimuth control. Control is based upon the non-cooperative surveillance return. Adjustments to headings are made with the intention to guide the Air System smoothly onto the centreline before MDH and maintain this azimuth position. The update rate of the surveillance system in use needs to be considered when assessing corrective headings. 15. Centreline information will be passed as per Figure 1 or 2 dependent on the nature of the surveillance display. When the Air System passes the MAPt, the information the controller passes becomes advisory, and the controller will only pass the direction of turn and number of degrees. Figure 1 - SRA relationship to the centreline (Watchman Display)
Dra
ft fo
Figure 2 - SRA relationship to the centreline (Plot Extracted Display)
Normal size markers
rN PA
Long size markers (5nm/10nm)
16. Elevation control. Procedures designed according to the International Convention on Civil Aviation’s Procedures for Air Navigation - Aircraft Operations (ICAO PANS-OPS) utilise measures for ensuring safe separation from obstacles, including Threshold Crossing Height (TCH), SDF and MOCA. Units providing PANSOPS designed procedures must ensure that advisory heights passed as vertical guidance during a SRA do not contradict the requirements of the procedure. For example, advisory heights calculated using 300ft per nm to approximate a three degree GP, will not be suitable if they result in vertical guidance that is lower than a SDF or MOCA. Instead, units may elect to use more accurately calculated advisory heights to allow controllers to issue continuous descent advice that meet the criteria of any restrictions in the procedure and exemplar range/height calculations are included at Annex A. 17. Separation/Avoidance of Other Contacts. The application of the type of Air Traffic Control Service provided rests with the Director (or equivalent role), not with the SRA controller.◄ The SRA controller ►◄ will provide the pilot with the necessary information to avoid a collision rather than to maintain any specified separation distance. RA 3293 Draft for NPA
UNCONTROLLED COPY WHEN PRINTED
Page 3 of 4
Regulatory Article 3293
UNCONTROLLED COPY WHEN PRINTED ►ANNEX A to RA 3293 SRA Advsory Height and Range Guidance Example Table 1 Range (from touch down point)
2.5° GP Height (See Note 1)
0.5
190
210
1.0
320
370
1.5
450
530
2.0
580
690
2.5
720
850
3.0
850
1010
3.5
980
1170
4.0
1110
1330
4.5
1250
1490
5.0
1380
1640
5.5
1510
1800
6.0
1640
1960
6.5
1780
2120
7.0
1910
ft fo
2280
2040
2440
2170
2600
2310
2760
Dra 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.5
10.0
2440 2570 2700
3° GP Height (see Note 2)
rN PA 2920 3080 3230
Note 1: Calculation method. ((Range) x (Accurate 2.5° ft per nm)) + (TCH) = (height), round up to nearest 10 ft. The accurate 2.5° ft per nm equals 265ft and the TCH is a procedure design standard 50ft.
Note 2: Calculation method. ((Range) x (Accurate 3° ft per nm)) + (TCH) = (height), round up to nearest 10 ft. The accurate 3° ft per nm equals 318ft and the TCH is a procedure design standard 50ft.◄
Page 4 of 4
UNCONTROLLED COPY WHEN PRINTED
RA 3293 Draft for NPA
Ref No: MAA/NPA/17/21
NOTICE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT: MAA/NPA/17/21 TITLE OF PROPOSAL: RA 3293 – Surveillance Radar Approach Stage of Development:
Consultation
Organizations and business sectors affected:
MAA Regulated Air Traffic Control Units providing SRA, associated command structures and equipment project teams.
MAA-NPA Serial No:
MAA/NPA/17/21
RFC Serial No:
MAA/RFC/2016/139
MAA Originator:
DSA-MAA-RegATM1-Gen
Redacted
Date: 20 Sep 17
MAA Supervisor:
DSA-MAA-RegATM
Redacted
Date: 20 Sep 17
MAA Independent:
DSA-MAA-CertES3-ATM
Redacted
Date: 20 Sep 17
MAA LegAd (if required):
Post
Rank/Name
Date:
Cross-reference to other relevant amendment proposals or documents:
RA 3291 – Precision Approach Radar
MRPT Point of Contact details Rank and Name:
MAA Regulatory Publications Team Enquiries
Telephone Number mil/civ:
9679 - 84189 / 83914 / 82504
Email address:
[email protected]
Ver 6.1
Page 1 of 4
030 679 - 84189 / 83914 / 82504
Ref No: MAA/NPA/17/21
MAA NPA Form Revised May 17
[Desk Officers are to refer to Annex B for completion guidance.] Feedback Notes The Regulated Community are invited to offer feedback (where applicable) on the impact of the proposed change to publications covered under this NPA on the operation of your business, including:
Timescale for implementation. Cost of implementation. Amendment to contract. Amendment to internal processes/orders. Resourcing the outcome of change.
The format for feedback is illustrated at Annex A and is available within a single Excel file on both internal and external MAA websites.
SUMMARY OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT Change: This is the 3rd NPA for this RA containing updates from the feedback received from the RC. First NPA Updated Rationale to provide the context, hazard and defence for the Regulation. Inclusion of AMC and Guidance Material (GM) to address the requirement that vertical guidance issued by controllers meets any restrictions specified for that procedure. Inclusion of AMC for undercarriage check and clearance requirements for completeness and alignment with RA 3291- Precision Approach Radar. Inclusion of QNH approaches to align with requirement and use by the Regulated Community (RC). Expansion of GM for azimuth control for clarity. Textual changes to AMC and GM to improve clarity of regulation. Second NPA Inclusion of AMC for rotation rate and method of confirming positional data accuracy to determine where the SRA terminates. Inclusion of AMC to ensure the correct position of the SRA approach line. Third NPA Inclusion of GM to support SRA Termination and SRA Approach Line Impact Assessment: Units are required to assess the elevation guidance in use to ensure it does not contradict restrictions specified for the published SRA. More accurate calculation of advisory heights, including a consideration for the minimum threshold crossing height, may be required. Some units may need to liaise with No1 Aeronautical Information Documents Unit (AIDU) for changes to publications.
Ver 6.1
Page 2 of 4
Ref No: MAA/NPA/17/21
MAA NPA Form Revised May 17
Units will need to take into account anticipated future equipment or airfield infrastructure changes. Units are to ensure that SRAs terminate iaw equipment capability and the radar map is correctly aligned. Any subsequent change to procedures will require appropriate change management processes to be undertaken. Objective: To provide Regulation that ensures the RC understand their responsibilities for safe control of Air Systems undertaking a published approach procedure. Courses of Action - Risk Evaluation. Do nothing: Not recommended. Not amending the RA would enable advisory heights passed by controllers to be lower than the calculated obstacle clearances and a SRA to be provided when insufficient primary surveillance coverage exists. Both aspects present an increased RtL. Partial amendment: Not recommended. Partial amendment would fail to address the requirements for the regulatory change and reduce the planned improvements for aviation safety and coherent regulation. Full amendment: Recommended. Incorporation of the amendments in full will allow appropriate regulation to ensure safe provision of SRAs and provide the RC with greater clarity to understand their responsibilities. Post Implementation Review: This RA will be reviewed one year after the publication of this amendment, or sooner should feedback indicate it is required. Consultation period ends: 25 Oct 17 The consultation period for this proposed amendment ends on the stated date. Please send your feedback, using the Response Form, via email to [email protected].
APPROVAL
Post
Approved by: (IAW MAA SOP 20 Matrix)
Name Redacted
Ver 6.1
Rank
Page 3 of 4
DSA-MAA-Reg-DepHd
Redacted
Original, non-redacted, signed
Annex A to MAA NPA Form Revised Jan 17
NOTICE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT RESPONSE SHEET Respondent details: Organization Comments: RA No./ Manual
Name
Chapter & Para No.
Impact assessment: RA No./ Chapter & Para No. Manual
Ver 6.1
Contact Number:
Comment
Email Address:
Proposed Amendment
Impact assessment
Page 4 of 4
UNCONTROLLED COPY WHEN PRINTED
Regulatory Article 3293
RA 3293 – Surveillance Radar Approach Rationale
►A Surveillance Radar Approach (SRA) provides an Air System with the means of descending below terrain safe level in poor weather to conduct an approach without a precision approach aid. Descent below terrain safe level in poor weather increases the Risk to Life (RtL) associated with controlled flight into terrain. This Regulation ensures a SRA approach given by a controller is safe and therefore provides mitigation towards the RtL.◄
Contents
3293(1): Surveillance Radar Approach
Regulation 3293(1)
Surveillance Radar Approach 3293(1) Controllers shall provide SRA ►◄ in accordance with specified procedures.
Acceptable Means of Compliance 3293(1)
Surveillance Radar Approach 1. ►Published Procedure. Controllers should conduct SRAs according to the published approach procedures.
Dra
2. SRA Termination. Heads of Establishment (HoE) and Aviation Duty Holder (ADH)-Facing Organizations should utilise the following to determine the point where the SRA terminates (Radar Termination Range (RTR))1:
ft fo
a. A non-cooperative Surveillance system providing the positional data for the following services should provide regular updates with at least the following update periodicity: (1) (2)
rN PA
SRA to 2 nm from touchdown point; 6 seconds update periodicity. SRA to 1 nm from touchdown point; 4 seconds update periodicity.
(3) SRA to 0.5 nm from touchdown point, 3 seconds update periodicity.
b. When used for SRA purpose, the accuracy of the position information should be justified as suitable for SRA within the range where SRAs are performed. c.
The radar coverage should be suitable for the RTR.
3. ATM staff should produce pre-computed data relating range from touchdown point2 to the correlated height for the direction of the approach. This should be immediately available to the controller, either on the surveillance display screen or on a separate reference document. 4. SRA Approach Line. Prior to conducting a SRA, units should ensure that the SRA approach line is orientated accurately and in the correct position. 5. QNH approaches. Where SRAs are conducted using QNH, references to height in this RA should be converted to altitude. 6.
When controlling a SRA,◄ controllers should: a.
►Identify the Air System.
b. Obtain readback of correct altimeter setting from the pilot◄ before commencing final approach. c. Pass to the pilot ►ranges from the touchdown point◄ together with precomputed advisory heights at intervals of ½ nm, until the Air System reaches a
►DefStan 00-972: Military Air Traffic Services Equipment Safety and Performance Standards (Aerodrome, Terminal and Naval Air Traffic Services) with supporting extracts from CAP 670: Air Traffic Services Safety Requirements. 2 Touchdown point is the point where the nominal glidepath intercepts the runway.◄ 1
RA 3293 Draft for NPA
UNCONTROLLED COPY WHEN PRINTED
Page 1 of 4
Regulatory Article 3293
UNCONTROLLED COPY WHEN PRINTED
range equivalent to the pilot’s Minimum Descent Height (MDH), after which only ►ranges◄ from touchdown at intervals of ½ nm ►should◄ be given3.
Acceptable Means of Compliance 3293(1)
d. Pass to the pilot heading instructions to intercept, and maintain, the centreline until the Air System reaches the Missed Approach Point ►(MAPt)◄ and thereafter to pass advice related to the Air System’s position from the projected runway centreline. e. ►Obtain a notification that the undercarriage is down prior to obtaining a clearance. There is no requirement to check fixed undercarriage Air Systems, but if the controller is in any doubt a ‘check gear, acknowledge’ instruction should be given.◄ f.
Advise the pilot that he is approaching his MDH.
g. Advise the pilot that he is approaching ►MAPt◄. When the MDH is within ½ nm of the ►MAPt◄ the phrase ‘approaching MDH’ is not included. h.
►Obtain clearances in the same manner as RA 32914.
i.
Terminate the SRA at the RTR.◄
7. Elevation Control.►Descent should be commenced at a range from touchdown and at a height above the relevant datum which corresponds to the required rate of descent. The controller should pass pre-computed advisory heights with range information to assist the pilot in maintaining a rate of descent for a glidepath (GP) angle equivalent to the published procedure, and to meet all associated restrictions5◄.
Dra 8.
►◄
ft fo
9. Clutter. If the Air System return enters an area of continuous clutter and ►identification◄ cannot be maintained, the approach should be terminated. The pilot should be informed of the loss of ►◄ radar contact, and a Missed Approach Procedure initiated if the pilot cannot continue his approach visually.
rN PA
10. Separation/Avoidance of Other Contacts. If the SRA controller observes a ►◄ radar contact which is in confliction with the track of the Air System completing an SRA, he should immediately check the ►elevation indication if available.◄ If collision risk is apparent in both azimuth and elevation ►(either assessed from elevation indication, or due to unknown elevation),◄ advice on suitable action for collision avoidance should be passed to the pilot together with information on conflicting traffic. Instructions for manoeuvres in a vertical plane should normally only result in stopping descent or applying a climb. Where a heading change is involved, the Air System should be climbed to the relevant ►height according to the◄ Radar Vector Chart/Surveillance Minimum Altitude Chart.
Guidance Material 3293(1)
Surveillance Radar Approach 11. ►SRA Termination. Aerodromes and aviation capable ships that intend to use non-cooperative surveillance systems to provide SRAs must check for correct radar positioning and alignment based on Permanent Echoes, as stated in Def Stan 00-972, Part 3. 12. SRA Approach Line. Where the prescribed marker configuration is not practicable the Aviation Duty Holder-Facing Organization must meet the requirements of RA 1020(4)6 by defining the alternative configuration or solution that assures positional accuracy of the system and how controllers are able to confirm the correct SRA approach centreline.◄ 13. When providing a SRA, the controller passes instructions and information to the pilot to enable him to follow a pre-determined approach path to a position from which a visual landing or circuit can be made. This type of approach is not as accurate as a precision approach in that no electronic GP information is available, nor is there a similar degree of accuracy in azimuth.
3
At RN aerodromes, ranges will normally be passed at 1/2 nm intervals and heights at 1/3 nm intervals. ►RA 3291 - Precision Approach Radar. 5 Such as Minimum Obstacle Clearance Areas (MOCA) and Step-Down Fix (SDF). 6 RA 1020(4) - Responsibilities of ADH-Facing Organizations◄ 4
Page 2 of 4
UNCONTROLLED COPY WHEN PRINTED
RA 3293 Draft for NPA
UNCONTROLLED COPY WHEN PRINTED
Guidance Material 3293(1)
Regulatory Article 3293
14. ►Azimuth control. Control is based upon the non-cooperative surveillance return. Adjustments to headings are made with the intention to guide the Air System smoothly onto the centreline before MDH and maintain this azimuth position. The update rate of the surveillance system in use needs to be considered when assessing corrective headings. 15. Centreline information will be passed as per Figure 1 or 2 dependent on the nature of the surveillance display. When the Air System passes the MAPt, the information the controller passes becomes advisory, and the controller will only pass the direction of turn and number of degrees. Figure 1 - SRA relationship to the centreline (Watchman Display)
Dra
ft fo
Figure 2 - SRA relationship to the centreline (Plot Extracted Display)
Normal size markers
rN PA
Long size markers (5nm/10nm)
16. Elevation control. Procedures designed according to the International Convention on Civil Aviation’s Procedures for Air Navigation - Aircraft Operations (ICAO PANS-OPS) utilise measures for ensuring safe separation from obstacles, including Threshold Crossing Height (TCH), SDF and MOCA. Units providing PANSOPS designed procedures must ensure that advisory heights passed as vertical guidance during a SRA do not contradict the requirements of the procedure. For example, advisory heights calculated using 300ft per nm to approximate a three degree GP, will not be suitable if they result in vertical guidance that is lower than a SDF or MOCA. Instead, units may elect to use more accurately calculated advisory heights to allow controllers to issue continuous descent advice that meet the criteria of any restrictions in the procedure and exemplar range/height calculations are included at Annex A. 17. Separation/Avoidance of Other Contacts. The application of the type of Air Traffic Control Service provided rests with the Director (or equivalent role), not with the SRA controller.◄ The SRA controller ►◄ will provide the pilot with the necessary information to avoid a collision rather than to maintain any specified separation distance. RA 3293 Draft for NPA
UNCONTROLLED COPY WHEN PRINTED
Page 3 of 4
Regulatory Article 3293
UNCONTROLLED COPY WHEN PRINTED ►ANNEX A to RA 3293 SRA Advsory Height and Range Guidance Example Table 1 Range (from touch down point)
2.5° GP Height (See Note 1)
0.5
190
210
1.0
320
370
1.5
450
530
2.0
580
690
2.5
720
850
3.0
850
1010
3.5
980
1170
4.0
1110
1330
4.5
1250
1490
5.0
1380
1640
5.5
1510
1800
6.0
1640
1960
6.5
1780
2120
7.0
1910
ft fo
2280
2040
2440
2170
2600
2310
2760
Dra 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.5
10.0
2440 2570 2700
3° GP Height (see Note 2)
rN PA 2920 3080 3230
Note 1: Calculation method. ((Range) x (Accurate 2.5° ft per nm)) + (TCH) = (height), round up to nearest 10 ft. The accurate 2.5° ft per nm equals 265ft and the TCH is a procedure design standard 50ft.
Note 2: Calculation method. ((Range) x (Accurate 3° ft per nm)) + (TCH) = (height), round up to nearest 10 ft. The accurate 3° ft per nm equals 318ft and the TCH is a procedure design standard 50ft.◄
Page 4 of 4
UNCONTROLLED COPY WHEN PRINTED
RA 3293 Draft for NPA
