Sharon Squassoni
ASEAN Regional Forum Workshops Sharon Squassoni Director, Proliferation Prevention Program Third Meeting of CSCAP Study Group on Nonproliferation and Disarmament in the Asia- Pacific Auckland, March 6-7, 2017
Backdrop Objectives of ASEAN Regional Forum are to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and
security issues of common interest and concern; and to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidencebuilding and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.
ARF workshops tend to focus on practical topics
Management of Marine Hazards in the Asia-Pacific Medium- to Long-Term Support for Victims of Terrorism Mainstreaming the Prevention of Violent Extremism in the ARF Region Establishment of the ARF Transnational Threat Information-sharing Centre (ATTIC) Trafficking in Persons
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
Practical Set of Issues SEANWFZ Nuclear security governance in Asia
Expanding the International Partnership for Nuclear
Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) to Asia
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
What do we mean by nuclear security governance? How we structure laws, regulations, standards of
behavior (e.g., corporate responsibility) to reflect nuclear security objectives Site/facility/domestic levels National levels Regional levels International levels
Spectrum of standards from voluntary to legally binding We know that the “regime” is patchwork. Start with what we
have. PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
Nuclear Security vs. Safety, Safeguards Three S’s: Safety, Security, Safeguards (nonproliferation) Globally, strongest standards & regulations are found in
safeguards, followed by safety, then security.
Nuclear Security Summits tried to beef this up through
INFCIRC/869 – Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation Still voluntary, but a start Adherents in Asia: Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Philippines, Vietnam
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
Nuclear security governance Why is this important/relevant for Asia? Asia will expand nuclear energy while US & Europe won’t
= More fissile material, more nuclear uses, more radiological sources All countries have an interest in better nuclear governance Although nuclear capacities vary widely in the region, release of radiation could affect even those without nuclear programs With end of the nuclear security summits, ARF could provide institutional home for nuclear security collaboration or at least a forum within which to exchange information Growing institutional arrangements in Centers of Excellence (Japan, ROK, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, etc.) PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
Potential workshop topics on nuclear security governance Nuclear security implementation in the region
Individual countries; Summit gift basket implementation; INFCIRC/869 implementation
Challenges particular to Asia: threat profiles; responses
to external, internal threats Opportunities in ASEAN region on nuclear security (e.g., radiological source security, training) Collaborative efforts (e.g., Top Regulators Meetings, Centers of
Excellence)
ASEAN and beyond: Coordination with 5 successors to
summit process (GCINT, IAEA, Interpol, UN, Global Partnership) PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
Strawman agenda for ARF nuclear security governance workshop Day 1, Session 1-2
and
Status update of nuclear security implementation in the region Individual countries report on summit gift basket INFCIRC/869 implementation
Day 1, Sessions 3-4 Threats and Responses in Asia Terrorism profiles, cybersecurity, cultural issues
Day 2, Sessions 1-2 Opportunities in ASEAN (e.g., Collaborative efforts (e.g., Top Regulators Meetings, Centers of Excellence)
Day 2, Sessions 3-4 ASEAN and beyond Coordination with 5 successors to summit process (GCINT, IAEA, Interpol, UN, Global Partnership) PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
An Alternative Approach Broader vision could look at how Asia applies nuclear security
objectives to all nuclear activities For example, if we aimed to minimize the availability of weapons-grade material (HEU, separated Pu) or uncontrolled radioactive sources, would we conduct nuclear business differently? Case Study: Management of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Who decides? Utilities? Outside vendors? Government? National Policy. Nuclear security and nonproliferation are not primary drivers of decisions about storage, handling, processing, and disposal of SNF/waste. Rather, economics, public opinion, etc. Greater focus on nuclear security could affect decisions about:
When to move SNF from wet to dry storage How/whether to consolidate storage and/or reprocess Desirability of coordinating storage/repository requirements regionally Waste disposal options PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
IPNDV Background Begun in 2014 by U.S. State Department and Nuclear
Threat Initiative. Expansion of UK-Norway Verification Initiative and US-UK Technical Cooperation Program Objectives: to build international capacity for finding technical solutions for disarmament monitoring and verification challenges; to improve and broaden the level of understanding of the challenges posed by nuclear disarmament verification; and to provide international leadership by facilitating technical projects designed to meet these challenges.
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
IPNDV Snapshot Plenary meetings (Washington, Oslo, Tokyo,
UAE, next is Argentina) Working groups Monitoring and Verification Objectives (NL, Italy) On-site Inspections (Australia, Poland) Technical Challenges and Solutions (Sweden, US)
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
IPNDV in Asia Why expand IPNDV to Asia? Members of ARF already involved in IPNDV IPNDV is a trust-building enterprise, which could be
valuable for ARF Although many may now rightly be skeptical about progress toward nuclear disarmament, verification issues don’t disappear just because progress is slow and do require sustained attention
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
IPNDV/ARF participation overlap Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
Canada, China*, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russia*, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, United States, and Viet Nam. *Russia and China have observer status
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
Strawman Agenda for a workshop Goals and objectives of IPNDV Results so far Terms of Reference, Collaborative efforts from Working Groups
Future Work Planned Possible new participants from ARF Research capacities in individual countries
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
Practical considerations re: IPNDV No new members until end of Phase I (end of 2017) “Bare bones” approach to funding participation –
governments funding themselves Participation of other NGOs (besides NTI) unclear Potential conflict between Ban activities and IPNDV
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
Contact [email protected] www.csis.org Facebook: proliferation-prevention-program-at-CSIS515527405239166/ Twitter: @csis_ppp; @squassonisharon
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
Backdrop Objectives of ASEAN Regional Forum are to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and
security issues of common interest and concern; and to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidencebuilding and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.
ARF workshops tend to focus on practical topics
Management of Marine Hazards in the Asia-Pacific Medium- to Long-Term Support for Victims of Terrorism Mainstreaming the Prevention of Violent Extremism in the ARF Region Establishment of the ARF Transnational Threat Information-sharing Centre (ATTIC) Trafficking in Persons
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
Practical Set of Issues SEANWFZ Nuclear security governance in Asia
Expanding the International Partnership for Nuclear
Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) to Asia
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
What do we mean by nuclear security governance? How we structure laws, regulations, standards of
behavior (e.g., corporate responsibility) to reflect nuclear security objectives Site/facility/domestic levels National levels Regional levels International levels
Spectrum of standards from voluntary to legally binding We know that the “regime” is patchwork. Start with what we
have. PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
Nuclear Security vs. Safety, Safeguards Three S’s: Safety, Security, Safeguards (nonproliferation) Globally, strongest standards & regulations are found in
safeguards, followed by safety, then security.
Nuclear Security Summits tried to beef this up through
INFCIRC/869 – Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation Still voluntary, but a start Adherents in Asia: Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Philippines, Vietnam
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
Nuclear security governance Why is this important/relevant for Asia? Asia will expand nuclear energy while US & Europe won’t
= More fissile material, more nuclear uses, more radiological sources All countries have an interest in better nuclear governance Although nuclear capacities vary widely in the region, release of radiation could affect even those without nuclear programs With end of the nuclear security summits, ARF could provide institutional home for nuclear security collaboration or at least a forum within which to exchange information Growing institutional arrangements in Centers of Excellence (Japan, ROK, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, etc.) PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
Potential workshop topics on nuclear security governance Nuclear security implementation in the region
Individual countries; Summit gift basket implementation; INFCIRC/869 implementation
Challenges particular to Asia: threat profiles; responses
to external, internal threats Opportunities in ASEAN region on nuclear security (e.g., radiological source security, training) Collaborative efforts (e.g., Top Regulators Meetings, Centers of
Excellence)
ASEAN and beyond: Coordination with 5 successors to
summit process (GCINT, IAEA, Interpol, UN, Global Partnership) PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
Strawman agenda for ARF nuclear security governance workshop Day 1, Session 1-2
and
Status update of nuclear security implementation in the region Individual countries report on summit gift basket INFCIRC/869 implementation
Day 1, Sessions 3-4 Threats and Responses in Asia Terrorism profiles, cybersecurity, cultural issues
Day 2, Sessions 1-2 Opportunities in ASEAN (e.g., Collaborative efforts (e.g., Top Regulators Meetings, Centers of Excellence)
Day 2, Sessions 3-4 ASEAN and beyond Coordination with 5 successors to summit process (GCINT, IAEA, Interpol, UN, Global Partnership) PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
An Alternative Approach Broader vision could look at how Asia applies nuclear security
objectives to all nuclear activities For example, if we aimed to minimize the availability of weapons-grade material (HEU, separated Pu) or uncontrolled radioactive sources, would we conduct nuclear business differently? Case Study: Management of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Who decides? Utilities? Outside vendors? Government? National Policy. Nuclear security and nonproliferation are not primary drivers of decisions about storage, handling, processing, and disposal of SNF/waste. Rather, economics, public opinion, etc. Greater focus on nuclear security could affect decisions about:
When to move SNF from wet to dry storage How/whether to consolidate storage and/or reprocess Desirability of coordinating storage/repository requirements regionally Waste disposal options PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
IPNDV Background Begun in 2014 by U.S. State Department and Nuclear
Threat Initiative. Expansion of UK-Norway Verification Initiative and US-UK Technical Cooperation Program Objectives: to build international capacity for finding technical solutions for disarmament monitoring and verification challenges; to improve and broaden the level of understanding of the challenges posed by nuclear disarmament verification; and to provide international leadership by facilitating technical projects designed to meet these challenges.
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
IPNDV Snapshot Plenary meetings (Washington, Oslo, Tokyo,
UAE, next is Argentina) Working groups Monitoring and Verification Objectives (NL, Italy) On-site Inspections (Australia, Poland) Technical Challenges and Solutions (Sweden, US)
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
IPNDV in Asia Why expand IPNDV to Asia? Members of ARF already involved in IPNDV IPNDV is a trust-building enterprise, which could be
valuable for ARF Although many may now rightly be skeptical about progress toward nuclear disarmament, verification issues don’t disappear just because progress is slow and do require sustained attention
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
IPNDV/ARF participation overlap Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
Canada, China*, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russia*, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, United States, and Viet Nam. *Russia and China have observer status
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
Strawman Agenda for a workshop Goals and objectives of IPNDV Results so far Terms of Reference, Collaborative efforts from Working Groups
Future Work Planned Possible new participants from ARF Research capacities in individual countries
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
Practical considerations re: IPNDV No new members until end of Phase I (end of 2017) “Bare bones” approach to funding participation –
governments funding themselves Participation of other NGOs (besides NTI) unclear Potential conflict between Ban activities and IPNDV
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
Contact [email protected] www.csis.org Facebook: proliferation-prevention-program-at-CSIS515527405239166/ Twitter: @csis_ppp; @squassonisharon
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM
