The Delicate Balance Between Assurance and Deterrence
John K. Warden WSD-Handa Fellow, Pacific Forum CSIS PONI Conference, March 4, 2015
Maui Table-Top Exercise Deterrence in Alliance Relationships Assurance in Adversary Relationships Challenges of Deterrence and Assurance Today Key Takeaways
Move 1: the sinking of a Japanese vessel by North Korea in the Sea of Japan/East Sea ◦ Reaction: the US, with logistical support from Japan, responds with a decisive yet proportional strike against the North Korean naval base that supported the attack
Move 2: a North Korean artillery barrage against South Korean farmland north of Seoul (killing several people) and nuclear detonation over the Sea of Japan/East Sea (with no initial casualties) ◦ Reaction: a large-scale strike against North Korea’s nuclear weapons and related missiles
South Korean participants stressed that retaliation against Pyongyang following its attack would be “automatic”—initiated by commanders in the field before consultation with Washington, and possibly even Seoul—and go beyond a proportionate response ◦ Americans, fully recognized South Korea’s right to respond unilaterally, but warned against a military responses that would escalate the conflict
The US team proved anxious to maintain control over South Korea and was prepared to wield its power to restrain, and possibly even deter, some of its actions
Victor Cha explains that Washington established alliances with Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan to contain the Soviet threat and to exercise maximum control over potentially “rogue allies” that could entrap the US in unwanted wars Three mechanisms of restraint:
◦ Consultations to persuade allies of the need for caution ◦ Mechanisms for joint decisions that constrain an ally’s options ◦ Implicitly threaten: ‘if you escalate too far, the United States may not support you.’
In response to South Korea’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons in the 1970s, US diplomats told their ROK counterparts that Washington would “review the entire spectrum of its relations with [Seoul], including security and economic arrangements.”
North Korea was provided “off-ramps” throughout the exercise
◦ The US-Japan response to North Korea’s initial aggression was decisive but proportional ◦ The US strike aimed to end North Korea’s active nuclear weapons and delivery systems, but stopped short of regime change Some even suggested a more limited strike that would hit key military targets without attempting to eradicate North Korea’s active nuclear capability
US Strategic Command’s Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept stresses considering the adversary’s “perception of the consequences of restraint or inaction”—the need to give North Korea an exit that Pyongyang can live with
Schelling: “the threat of massive destruction may deter an enemy only if there is a corresponding implicit promise of non-destruction in the event he complies.” Arms control requires the US and Russia to maintain effective and survivable second-strike capabilities and to assure each other that they would remain mutually vulnerable to nuclear retaliation With allies, the US often provides positive guarantees—promises to do something to address a problem—whereas adversaries are generally provided negative guarantees— commitments not to do something threatening.
Challenge 1—Promoting burden sharing while avoiding entrapment
◦ In Maui, some Americans recommended that Japan shore up its defenses by developing its own long-range strike capability ◦ Americans insisted, however, that new capabilities be used strictly for coordinated actions within the framework of the US-Japan alliance
Challenge 2—Avoiding the negative effects of mixed messages
◦ US expectations of European and Northeast Asian allies about extended nuclear deterrence differ considerably— reach-back capabilities vs. forward-deployed systems ◦ Proponents of nuclear weapons in South Korea and Japan note the tension in US policy
The US adopts different approaches for different potential adversaries: Russia and China (strategic stability) vs. North Korea and Iran (all options on the table) Missile defense example: the US is researching and deploying new interceptors to match the latter’s missile capabilities, which complicates the task of assuring the former that BMD will not affect the strategic balance
Too much US deterrence of adversaries can put US allies off guard, just as too much US assurance of adversaries can create fears of abandonment among US allies
◦ Maui TTX: while Japan and South Korea were anxious to get the United States to intervene during the first move—to ensure that they would not have to deal with the crisis alone, they worked hard to restrain US actions during the second move—to avoid unnecessary escalation
Avoiding too much assurance: US-China mutual vulnerability and Japan Avoiding too much deterrence: the DPP’s push for Taiwan’s independence
The US must constantly dance between deterrence and assurance with both its allies and its adversaries Washington cannot speak to its allies without also speaking to its adversaries, and vice versa
◦ It also can’t speak to certain allies or adversaries without others listening
Washington is forced to accept less-than-optimal choices ◦ In deploying a more advanced missile-defense architecture, the United States assures South Korea and Japan, but complicates its relationships with China ◦ By keeping nuclear weapons in Europe, it maintains assurance of NATO members, but raises concern among its Asian allies
Policymakers and analysts alike must explicitly acknowledge these tensions and recognize that tradeoffs are inevitable
Maui Table-Top Exercise Deterrence in Alliance Relationships Assurance in Adversary Relationships Challenges of Deterrence and Assurance Today Key Takeaways
Move 1: the sinking of a Japanese vessel by North Korea in the Sea of Japan/East Sea ◦ Reaction: the US, with logistical support from Japan, responds with a decisive yet proportional strike against the North Korean naval base that supported the attack
Move 2: a North Korean artillery barrage against South Korean farmland north of Seoul (killing several people) and nuclear detonation over the Sea of Japan/East Sea (with no initial casualties) ◦ Reaction: a large-scale strike against North Korea’s nuclear weapons and related missiles
South Korean participants stressed that retaliation against Pyongyang following its attack would be “automatic”—initiated by commanders in the field before consultation with Washington, and possibly even Seoul—and go beyond a proportionate response ◦ Americans, fully recognized South Korea’s right to respond unilaterally, but warned against a military responses that would escalate the conflict
The US team proved anxious to maintain control over South Korea and was prepared to wield its power to restrain, and possibly even deter, some of its actions
Victor Cha explains that Washington established alliances with Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan to contain the Soviet threat and to exercise maximum control over potentially “rogue allies” that could entrap the US in unwanted wars Three mechanisms of restraint:
◦ Consultations to persuade allies of the need for caution ◦ Mechanisms for joint decisions that constrain an ally’s options ◦ Implicitly threaten: ‘if you escalate too far, the United States may not support you.’
In response to South Korea’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons in the 1970s, US diplomats told their ROK counterparts that Washington would “review the entire spectrum of its relations with [Seoul], including security and economic arrangements.”
North Korea was provided “off-ramps” throughout the exercise
◦ The US-Japan response to North Korea’s initial aggression was decisive but proportional ◦ The US strike aimed to end North Korea’s active nuclear weapons and delivery systems, but stopped short of regime change Some even suggested a more limited strike that would hit key military targets without attempting to eradicate North Korea’s active nuclear capability
US Strategic Command’s Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept stresses considering the adversary’s “perception of the consequences of restraint or inaction”—the need to give North Korea an exit that Pyongyang can live with
Schelling: “the threat of massive destruction may deter an enemy only if there is a corresponding implicit promise of non-destruction in the event he complies.” Arms control requires the US and Russia to maintain effective and survivable second-strike capabilities and to assure each other that they would remain mutually vulnerable to nuclear retaliation With allies, the US often provides positive guarantees—promises to do something to address a problem—whereas adversaries are generally provided negative guarantees— commitments not to do something threatening.
Challenge 1—Promoting burden sharing while avoiding entrapment
◦ In Maui, some Americans recommended that Japan shore up its defenses by developing its own long-range strike capability ◦ Americans insisted, however, that new capabilities be used strictly for coordinated actions within the framework of the US-Japan alliance
Challenge 2—Avoiding the negative effects of mixed messages
◦ US expectations of European and Northeast Asian allies about extended nuclear deterrence differ considerably— reach-back capabilities vs. forward-deployed systems ◦ Proponents of nuclear weapons in South Korea and Japan note the tension in US policy
The US adopts different approaches for different potential adversaries: Russia and China (strategic stability) vs. North Korea and Iran (all options on the table) Missile defense example: the US is researching and deploying new interceptors to match the latter’s missile capabilities, which complicates the task of assuring the former that BMD will not affect the strategic balance
Too much US deterrence of adversaries can put US allies off guard, just as too much US assurance of adversaries can create fears of abandonment among US allies
◦ Maui TTX: while Japan and South Korea were anxious to get the United States to intervene during the first move—to ensure that they would not have to deal with the crisis alone, they worked hard to restrain US actions during the second move—to avoid unnecessary escalation
Avoiding too much assurance: US-China mutual vulnerability and Japan Avoiding too much deterrence: the DPP’s push for Taiwan’s independence
The US must constantly dance between deterrence and assurance with both its allies and its adversaries Washington cannot speak to its allies without also speaking to its adversaries, and vice versa
◦ It also can’t speak to certain allies or adversaries without others listening
Washington is forced to accept less-than-optimal choices ◦ In deploying a more advanced missile-defense architecture, the United States assures South Korea and Japan, but complicates its relationships with China ◦ By keeping nuclear weapons in Europe, it maintains assurance of NATO members, but raises concern among its Asian allies
Policymakers and analysts alike must explicitly acknowledge these tensions and recognize that tradeoffs are inevitable
