The Revolution Grows Up
September 2009
The Revolution Grows Up
A League of Their Own
by Jon B. Alterman
..................................................................
The government of Iran struggled for decades to fit into the broader Middle East, and it has finally succeeded: it now sees its people principally as a source of instability rather than a source of legitimacy. Thirty years after the Revolution, the Iranian government has concluded it is far better to anesthetize the population than mobilize it. It is a conclusion from which there is no turning back. The Middle East has no shortage of formerly youthful revolutionary regimes that have slunk into middle age. In decades past, coups in Egypt, Iraq and Libya all tossed out corrupt Western-oriented monarchies in favor of populist military men who promised to return power to the people. These new leaders oversaw the creation of cadres of young people who took to the streets, filled new bureaucracies, and enthusiastically supported the new regime. After a time, enthusiasms flagged and colorless leaders replaced the charismatic young firebrands who had led coups and revolutions. The press, which had been a reliable mobilizer of public sentiment, grew increasingly distrusted. The only people with increased power, it seems, were the internal intelligence agencies. No longer advancing the revolutionary vanguard, they were intent on reinforcing the status quo, and they did so with increasing efficiency. Over time, governments invoked their revolutionary ideology with increasing disinterest until they rarely bothered to do so at all. Political power spoke for itself, and it needed no justification or excuse. It was, it is, and it will be the governing force in society, and it makes no apologies for being so. While many remain republics in name—Libya continues to use the neologism “jamahariya”, a creative blending of the words for “republic” and “masses”—they have become monarchies in practice, ruled by cliques rather than extended families. For decades, Iran resisted this trend. Long after revolutionary rhetoric faded among its neighbors, that rhetoric remained deeply imbedded in the Islamic Republic. Millions of Iranians turned out for demonstrations in the streets year (continued on page 2)
New Staff The Middle East Program is pleased to welcome Michael Dziuban as the new Program Coordinator and Research Assistant. Michael graduated Phi Beta Kappa and magna cum laude from Yale University in 2008 with a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science, and wrote his senior thesis on presidential elections in authoritarian states of the Middle East. Following graduation, Michael studied advanced Arabic under a full-year fellowship at the CASA program at the American University in Cairo. He replaces Lindsey Stephenson, who is moving on to pursue opportunities abroad. You can reach Michael at (202) 775-3179 or mdziuban@ csis.org.■
Saudi men may still have the roads to themselves, but the gym is no longer a male-only preserve. From the Hejaz to the Eastern Province, women across the Kingdom are creating sports clubs and joining basketball, volleyball, and soccer teams—often to the chagrin of religious authorities. There are more than a dozen female-only basketball teams in Jeddah alone, and many clubs have quickly grown to include over 100 members. Operating without official licenses, the exercise centers often attempt to hide swimming pools, saunas, and gyms by disguising themselves as beauty salons or “natural treatment clinics.” Other sports facilities escape state scrutiny by affiliating with women’s charities or private high schools and universities. Proponents of this fitness revolution hope that sports will provide a healthier alternative to the shopping and other idle habits of most Saudi women. According to a WHO study, as many as 75 percent of Saudi women are either overweight or obese, and increasing numbers of Saudis suffer from diabetes or high cholesterol every year. Heart disease is now the Kingdom’s biggest killer, accounting for 30 percent of all deaths. Despite these urgent health concerns, however, female recreational leagues have not won widespread approval from government officials. The Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs has already closed two unlicensed clubs in Jeddah and one in Dammam, and the state still bans physical education programs for girls in public schools. Religious leaders worry aloud that building more gyms for women could “open the doors wide for spreading decadence.”■ NH
1800 K Street NW, Washington DC 20006 | p. 202.775.3179 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org/mideast
2 | CSIS Middle East Notes and Comment | September 2009 after year, albeit sometimes more out of obligation than enthusiasm. An American reporter swept up in several days of Iranian rioting in the summer of 1999 said afterward that it wasn’t until state television showed huge crowds pumping their fists and shouting “Death to America!” that she finally felt safe to venture out. She had seen flamboyant public displays of anti-Americanism countless times before, they were predictable, and she did not find them threatening. The Iranian revolution was not merely about rhetoric, however. Alongside the public fervor, the Iranian leadership has engaged in a thirty-year effort to define the concept of velayat-e faqih, the “rule of the jurisprudent.” Ayatollah Khomeini, who popularized the concept in opposition and then rose to be the jurisprudent himself, had a clear notion how it might be done. His successor, Ayatollah Khamenei, has led with a less sure hand, relying on surrogates and paramilitary groups and taking clear political positions where Khomeini would have remained above the fray. Even so, the basic bargain in Iranian governance has remained. Clerics are interspersed throughout the system and clerical bodies are strategically positioned to block unwelcome change. In return, the clerical establishment has provided legitimacy for Iran’s government. The people in turn have granted their acquiescence, often with less enthusiasm than the ayatollahs but with a belief among many that the system gave them a voice. In the aftermath of June’s presidential elections in Iran, the deal is off. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which conservatives had bolstered almost a decade ago in order to check the efforts of Iran’s Reformist movement, is clearly ascendant. Their paramilitary cadres, the Basij militia, took to the streets in June with accountability to no one. The new guard portrayed the old revolutionary elites—warhorses such as Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mir Hossein Mousavi, and Saeed Hajjarian—as enemies of the Revolution, thereby implicating them, the millions they led into the streets, and a whole generation of Iran’s political leadership. The people, once confronted with deadly force, retreated. This month, the government has reportedly cancelled a series of public Ramadan celebrations and moved others to smaller venues that can be more easily controlled, all out of fear that they would become anti-government rallies. The days of mass mobilization are over. In this way, Iran has become like many of its neighbors, drawing the lesson that it does not need the veil of revolutionary rhetoric to preserve its rule. Straightforward authoritarianism, with its control of the economy and a willingness to coerce opponents, has been the backbone of many Middle Eastern regimes for decades. The masses have no role but to follow. So it is now in Iran. Iran’s leadership is betting that it can make this pivot without forcing important parts of the clerical establishment into opposition. In this, the odds are clearly with the leadership. Clerics, and especially those on the state payroll, tend to support evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. But many clerical leaders were clearly repulsed by the government’s acts of violence against Iranian civilians in June, and they have been slow to acknowledge the government’s proclaimed victory, if they have done so at all. We may be seeing an important split opening up within Iran’s ruling elite, with unpredictable results. What is starkly clear, however, is that this Iranian government has crossed a threshold from which there is no turning back. The revolutionary promise of the Iranian regime, and the mobilization of the public to support that promise, is no more. The government will do as it wishes, and it will seek to sustain itself in power. The people’s role is to stay at home, not go into the streets. The revolution has grown up, and the revolution is over. Iran is no longer a singular revolutionary state; it is an ordinary authoritarian one.■ 9/10/09
Links of Interest Jon Alterman was interviewed by the BBC about Iran’s leadership.
Jon Alterman was quoted by The Forward in “Obama’s New Emphasis On Reciprocity Also Pressures Arabs.”
The Middle East Notes and Comment electronic newsletter is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2009 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The CSIS Middle East Program Jon B. Alterman Director Haim Malka Deputy Director Michael Dziuban Program Coordinator/Research Assistant Nicholas Hilgeman Allison Hutchings Daniel Charles Amanda Rudman Interns
1800 K Street NW, Washington DC 20006 | p. 202.775.3179 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org/mideast
The Revolution Grows Up
A League of Their Own
by Jon B. Alterman
..................................................................
The government of Iran struggled for decades to fit into the broader Middle East, and it has finally succeeded: it now sees its people principally as a source of instability rather than a source of legitimacy. Thirty years after the Revolution, the Iranian government has concluded it is far better to anesthetize the population than mobilize it. It is a conclusion from which there is no turning back. The Middle East has no shortage of formerly youthful revolutionary regimes that have slunk into middle age. In decades past, coups in Egypt, Iraq and Libya all tossed out corrupt Western-oriented monarchies in favor of populist military men who promised to return power to the people. These new leaders oversaw the creation of cadres of young people who took to the streets, filled new bureaucracies, and enthusiastically supported the new regime. After a time, enthusiasms flagged and colorless leaders replaced the charismatic young firebrands who had led coups and revolutions. The press, which had been a reliable mobilizer of public sentiment, grew increasingly distrusted. The only people with increased power, it seems, were the internal intelligence agencies. No longer advancing the revolutionary vanguard, they were intent on reinforcing the status quo, and they did so with increasing efficiency. Over time, governments invoked their revolutionary ideology with increasing disinterest until they rarely bothered to do so at all. Political power spoke for itself, and it needed no justification or excuse. It was, it is, and it will be the governing force in society, and it makes no apologies for being so. While many remain republics in name—Libya continues to use the neologism “jamahariya”, a creative blending of the words for “republic” and “masses”—they have become monarchies in practice, ruled by cliques rather than extended families. For decades, Iran resisted this trend. Long after revolutionary rhetoric faded among its neighbors, that rhetoric remained deeply imbedded in the Islamic Republic. Millions of Iranians turned out for demonstrations in the streets year (continued on page 2)
New Staff The Middle East Program is pleased to welcome Michael Dziuban as the new Program Coordinator and Research Assistant. Michael graduated Phi Beta Kappa and magna cum laude from Yale University in 2008 with a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science, and wrote his senior thesis on presidential elections in authoritarian states of the Middle East. Following graduation, Michael studied advanced Arabic under a full-year fellowship at the CASA program at the American University in Cairo. He replaces Lindsey Stephenson, who is moving on to pursue opportunities abroad. You can reach Michael at (202) 775-3179 or mdziuban@ csis.org.■
Saudi men may still have the roads to themselves, but the gym is no longer a male-only preserve. From the Hejaz to the Eastern Province, women across the Kingdom are creating sports clubs and joining basketball, volleyball, and soccer teams—often to the chagrin of religious authorities. There are more than a dozen female-only basketball teams in Jeddah alone, and many clubs have quickly grown to include over 100 members. Operating without official licenses, the exercise centers often attempt to hide swimming pools, saunas, and gyms by disguising themselves as beauty salons or “natural treatment clinics.” Other sports facilities escape state scrutiny by affiliating with women’s charities or private high schools and universities. Proponents of this fitness revolution hope that sports will provide a healthier alternative to the shopping and other idle habits of most Saudi women. According to a WHO study, as many as 75 percent of Saudi women are either overweight or obese, and increasing numbers of Saudis suffer from diabetes or high cholesterol every year. Heart disease is now the Kingdom’s biggest killer, accounting for 30 percent of all deaths. Despite these urgent health concerns, however, female recreational leagues have not won widespread approval from government officials. The Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs has already closed two unlicensed clubs in Jeddah and one in Dammam, and the state still bans physical education programs for girls in public schools. Religious leaders worry aloud that building more gyms for women could “open the doors wide for spreading decadence.”■ NH
1800 K Street NW, Washington DC 20006 | p. 202.775.3179 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org/mideast
2 | CSIS Middle East Notes and Comment | September 2009 after year, albeit sometimes more out of obligation than enthusiasm. An American reporter swept up in several days of Iranian rioting in the summer of 1999 said afterward that it wasn’t until state television showed huge crowds pumping their fists and shouting “Death to America!” that she finally felt safe to venture out. She had seen flamboyant public displays of anti-Americanism countless times before, they were predictable, and she did not find them threatening. The Iranian revolution was not merely about rhetoric, however. Alongside the public fervor, the Iranian leadership has engaged in a thirty-year effort to define the concept of velayat-e faqih, the “rule of the jurisprudent.” Ayatollah Khomeini, who popularized the concept in opposition and then rose to be the jurisprudent himself, had a clear notion how it might be done. His successor, Ayatollah Khamenei, has led with a less sure hand, relying on surrogates and paramilitary groups and taking clear political positions where Khomeini would have remained above the fray. Even so, the basic bargain in Iranian governance has remained. Clerics are interspersed throughout the system and clerical bodies are strategically positioned to block unwelcome change. In return, the clerical establishment has provided legitimacy for Iran’s government. The people in turn have granted their acquiescence, often with less enthusiasm than the ayatollahs but with a belief among many that the system gave them a voice. In the aftermath of June’s presidential elections in Iran, the deal is off. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which conservatives had bolstered almost a decade ago in order to check the efforts of Iran’s Reformist movement, is clearly ascendant. Their paramilitary cadres, the Basij militia, took to the streets in June with accountability to no one. The new guard portrayed the old revolutionary elites—warhorses such as Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mir Hossein Mousavi, and Saeed Hajjarian—as enemies of the Revolution, thereby implicating them, the millions they led into the streets, and a whole generation of Iran’s political leadership. The people, once confronted with deadly force, retreated. This month, the government has reportedly cancelled a series of public Ramadan celebrations and moved others to smaller venues that can be more easily controlled, all out of fear that they would become anti-government rallies. The days of mass mobilization are over. In this way, Iran has become like many of its neighbors, drawing the lesson that it does not need the veil of revolutionary rhetoric to preserve its rule. Straightforward authoritarianism, with its control of the economy and a willingness to coerce opponents, has been the backbone of many Middle Eastern regimes for decades. The masses have no role but to follow. So it is now in Iran. Iran’s leadership is betting that it can make this pivot without forcing important parts of the clerical establishment into opposition. In this, the odds are clearly with the leadership. Clerics, and especially those on the state payroll, tend to support evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. But many clerical leaders were clearly repulsed by the government’s acts of violence against Iranian civilians in June, and they have been slow to acknowledge the government’s proclaimed victory, if they have done so at all. We may be seeing an important split opening up within Iran’s ruling elite, with unpredictable results. What is starkly clear, however, is that this Iranian government has crossed a threshold from which there is no turning back. The revolutionary promise of the Iranian regime, and the mobilization of the public to support that promise, is no more. The government will do as it wishes, and it will seek to sustain itself in power. The people’s role is to stay at home, not go into the streets. The revolution has grown up, and the revolution is over. Iran is no longer a singular revolutionary state; it is an ordinary authoritarian one.■ 9/10/09
Links of Interest Jon Alterman was interviewed by the BBC about Iran’s leadership.
Jon Alterman was quoted by The Forward in “Obama’s New Emphasis On Reciprocity Also Pressures Arabs.”
The Middle East Notes and Comment electronic newsletter is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2009 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The CSIS Middle East Program Jon B. Alterman Director Haim Malka Deputy Director Michael Dziuban Program Coordinator/Research Assistant Nicholas Hilgeman Allison Hutchings Daniel Charles Amanda Rudman Interns
1800 K Street NW, Washington DC 20006 | p. 202.775.3179 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org/mideast
