International Nuclear Forensics Regime: A Framework for ...
LOCATING AND PLUGGING FISSILE MATERIAL LEAKS Jonathan S. Snider University of California, Davis Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) Conference U.S. Naval Academy April 3, 2008
EVOLVING MODERN DETERRENCE STRATEGY •
“Nuclear forensics is a critical nuclear deterrence capability” (Oxford, DNDO)
•
Deterrence is the policy consequence when nuclear attribution is equated with post-detonation forensics • Deter state transfer of nuclear weapons/materials (Bush 2006) • Deter direct and indirect transfers/nuclear theft (Biden 2007) - Nuclear forensics “brings deterrence into the 21st century” - Residual benefit is increased physical protection of fissile materials
SHORTCOMINGS OF A DETERRENCE-CENTRIC APPROACH • Inherently passive strategy - Does not prevent terrorist acquisition of material/weapon, only use
• Does not make explicit what state actions are needed to improve physical protection of fissile materials - Does not actively prevent nuclear theft/diversion at the source
• State accountability of fissile material cannot rest with the threat of retaliation alone - Need to get out of retaliation framework
• Hope is a non-trivial component, but hope is not a policy - “We are hoping for deterrence. We don’t want anybody to think they can get away with it.” (Charles Richardson, Sandia project leader for nuclear identification)
PRE-DETONATION NUCLEAR ATTRIBUTION • International Technical Working Group on Nuclear Smuggling (ITWG) • Deter illicit traffickers through prosecution (Smith/Neimeyer 2007)
- Treats symptom rather than problem (leak)
LOCATING AND PLUGGING FISSILE MATERIAL LEAKS • •
Pre-detonation nuclear attribution promises to identify leaks Where is the “leak?” 1. State nuclear facility 2. Last legal owner -
Determining the state source may not be most important finding for accountability of fissile material
“Nuclear terrorism … must be stopped at its source.” Ash Carter (Harvard) “The quality and scope of nuclear material security must be enhanced if we are to prevent nuclear terrorism.” Andrew Semmel (State Dept)
PERFORMANCE-BASED PROTECTION UNSCR 1540 Implementation - Qualitative standard subject to multiple interpretations - Slow implementation by states - How to measure quality of implementation?
Proposed Solutions 1. 2007 Stanford CISAC Report - Need to go beyond UNSCR 1540 reporting requirements - “Implementation Indicators” – detailed questionnaire for states 2. Pre-detonation nuclear attribution -measurable fissile material security standard -the ultimate implementation indicator
INTERNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
1. Domestic issue until fissile material escapes MODEL: 2005 Conv. on Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism
2. Reliable confirmation of material origin/owner 3. Response/discipline options span spectrum 4. Not supporting scheme will be difficult if state perceives itself a likely victim of terrorism 5. ‘Loose fissile material’ as threat to international peace and security makes non-support difficult - UNSCR 1373 (Art. IV) & 1540 (Preamble)
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Establish new physical protection norm. 2. Communicate international response to violations. 3. Establish cooperative international and domestic attribution capabilities within and across states. 4. Legitimize attribution scheme through IAEA.
EVOLVING MODERN DETERRENCE STRATEGY •
“Nuclear forensics is a critical nuclear deterrence capability” (Oxford, DNDO)
•
Deterrence is the policy consequence when nuclear attribution is equated with post-detonation forensics • Deter state transfer of nuclear weapons/materials (Bush 2006) • Deter direct and indirect transfers/nuclear theft (Biden 2007) - Nuclear forensics “brings deterrence into the 21st century” - Residual benefit is increased physical protection of fissile materials
SHORTCOMINGS OF A DETERRENCE-CENTRIC APPROACH • Inherently passive strategy - Does not prevent terrorist acquisition of material/weapon, only use
• Does not make explicit what state actions are needed to improve physical protection of fissile materials - Does not actively prevent nuclear theft/diversion at the source
• State accountability of fissile material cannot rest with the threat of retaliation alone - Need to get out of retaliation framework
• Hope is a non-trivial component, but hope is not a policy - “We are hoping for deterrence. We don’t want anybody to think they can get away with it.” (Charles Richardson, Sandia project leader for nuclear identification)
PRE-DETONATION NUCLEAR ATTRIBUTION • International Technical Working Group on Nuclear Smuggling (ITWG) • Deter illicit traffickers through prosecution (Smith/Neimeyer 2007)
- Treats symptom rather than problem (leak)
LOCATING AND PLUGGING FISSILE MATERIAL LEAKS • •
Pre-detonation nuclear attribution promises to identify leaks Where is the “leak?” 1. State nuclear facility 2. Last legal owner -
Determining the state source may not be most important finding for accountability of fissile material
“Nuclear terrorism … must be stopped at its source.” Ash Carter (Harvard) “The quality and scope of nuclear material security must be enhanced if we are to prevent nuclear terrorism.” Andrew Semmel (State Dept)
PERFORMANCE-BASED PROTECTION UNSCR 1540 Implementation - Qualitative standard subject to multiple interpretations - Slow implementation by states - How to measure quality of implementation?
Proposed Solutions 1. 2007 Stanford CISAC Report - Need to go beyond UNSCR 1540 reporting requirements - “Implementation Indicators” – detailed questionnaire for states 2. Pre-detonation nuclear attribution -measurable fissile material security standard -the ultimate implementation indicator
INTERNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
1. Domestic issue until fissile material escapes MODEL: 2005 Conv. on Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism
2. Reliable confirmation of material origin/owner 3. Response/discipline options span spectrum 4. Not supporting scheme will be difficult if state perceives itself a likely victim of terrorism 5. ‘Loose fissile material’ as threat to international peace and security makes non-support difficult - UNSCR 1373 (Art. IV) & 1540 (Preamble)
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Establish new physical protection norm. 2. Communicate international response to violations. 3. Establish cooperative international and domestic attribution capabilities within and across states. 4. Legitimize attribution scheme through IAEA.
