Towards an International Nuclear Forensics Capability
Towards an International Nuclear Forensics Capability Brett Isselhardt University of California, Berkeley Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) Conference U.S. Naval Academy April 3, 2008
Introduction • Post-detonation nuclear forensics is a critical tool • Pre-detonation nuclear forensics is under-utilized as a technological capability “Although the focus of today’s hearing is nuclear forensics and attribution, I must reiterate that our number one priority is to keep fissile materials – plutonium or highly enriched uranium – out of the hands of terrorists.” ~ Dr. Steven Aoki, Dep. Undersecretary for Counterterrorism, House subcommittee hearing, Oct 10, 2007.
• International collaboration can and should be utilized to strengthen nuclear forensics and its application
Advantages of Pre-Det approach • A simpler problem to solve • Time is less critical • Provides concrete demonstrations, recommendations and exercises • Builds critical database and capabilities for future applications • Entire spectrum of response is available
Nuclear Attribution Interdiction/ Detonation
• Characterization – Scientific methods (experiments) – Physical, chemical, and isotopic.
• Forensics – “Known” signatures • Characteristics that distinguish one material from another. • Comparative samples • Predictive models – Source, Processes, and Route
• Attribution – Intelligence – Nuclear Forensics – Traditional Forensics
Degree of Sensitivity Low Medium High
Material
Characterization Methods
Scientific Data
Signatures
Forensics Methods
Intelligence
Forensics Data
Attribution
International Framework • •
Build on existing infrastructure to centralize non-sensitive forensics data at IAEA. Regime of participating states agree to: – – – – – –
•
Create a Forensics Management Team (FMT) Nuclear forensics laboratory qualification through ITWG. Share results of non-sensitive forensics data. Produce capability of self-attributing sensitive materials. Interdiction and pre-detonation protocols overseen by ITWG. Participate in international attribution board reporting to the IAEA board of governors.
Initial structure is centralized network – –
Non-sensitive forensics data transparency Attribution results presented by Forensics Management Teams (FMT) to IAEA Attribution Board.
FMT
FMT
Board
ITWG
Data
IAEA FMT Non-sensitive
Data
Sensitive
Data
Attribution
BUILDING INTERNATIONAL CAPABILITY • Nuclear materials databases in progress – Under development (mostly commercial fuels) – US, Russia, Europe (JRC), and IAEA
• Partial participation still helpful – Exclusion is a useful result – 87% of fissile material controlled by US/Russia (Albright 2005) – Involuntary or historic sampling conceivable
• Challenges to sample collection, analysis and verification – Standards & Protocols – International Technical Working Group (ITWG)
International Cooperation Yellowcake
• Evaluating risks and benefits for sharing information. – U.S. – Others • Preparing to share information, need based disclosure • Establishing credibility of methods internationally • Resolving real-world cases and conclusions
Conclusion • Nuclear Forensics is a difficult but important problem. • Pre-detonation forensics provides an opportunity for measureable, actionable prevention of unattributed nuclear detonations by identifying high risk sources. • Expanding international capability and cooperation in nuclear forensics will strengthen international security.
Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) Conference U.S. Naval Academy April 3, 2008
Introduction • Post-detonation nuclear forensics is a critical tool • Pre-detonation nuclear forensics is under-utilized as a technological capability “Although the focus of today’s hearing is nuclear forensics and attribution, I must reiterate that our number one priority is to keep fissile materials – plutonium or highly enriched uranium – out of the hands of terrorists.” ~ Dr. Steven Aoki, Dep. Undersecretary for Counterterrorism, House subcommittee hearing, Oct 10, 2007.
• International collaboration can and should be utilized to strengthen nuclear forensics and its application
Advantages of Pre-Det approach • A simpler problem to solve • Time is less critical • Provides concrete demonstrations, recommendations and exercises • Builds critical database and capabilities for future applications • Entire spectrum of response is available
Nuclear Attribution Interdiction/ Detonation
• Characterization – Scientific methods (experiments) – Physical, chemical, and isotopic.
• Forensics – “Known” signatures • Characteristics that distinguish one material from another. • Comparative samples • Predictive models – Source, Processes, and Route
• Attribution – Intelligence – Nuclear Forensics – Traditional Forensics
Degree of Sensitivity Low Medium High
Material
Characterization Methods
Scientific Data
Signatures
Forensics Methods
Intelligence
Forensics Data
Attribution
International Framework • •
Build on existing infrastructure to centralize non-sensitive forensics data at IAEA. Regime of participating states agree to: – – – – – –
•
Create a Forensics Management Team (FMT) Nuclear forensics laboratory qualification through ITWG. Share results of non-sensitive forensics data. Produce capability of self-attributing sensitive materials. Interdiction and pre-detonation protocols overseen by ITWG. Participate in international attribution board reporting to the IAEA board of governors.
Initial structure is centralized network – –
Non-sensitive forensics data transparency Attribution results presented by Forensics Management Teams (FMT) to IAEA Attribution Board.
FMT
FMT
Board
ITWG
Data
IAEA FMT Non-sensitive
Data
Sensitive
Data
Attribution
BUILDING INTERNATIONAL CAPABILITY • Nuclear materials databases in progress – Under development (mostly commercial fuels) – US, Russia, Europe (JRC), and IAEA
• Partial participation still helpful – Exclusion is a useful result – 87% of fissile material controlled by US/Russia (Albright 2005) – Involuntary or historic sampling conceivable
• Challenges to sample collection, analysis and verification – Standards & Protocols – International Technical Working Group (ITWG)
International Cooperation Yellowcake
• Evaluating risks and benefits for sharing information. – U.S. – Others • Preparing to share information, need based disclosure • Establishing credibility of methods internationally • Resolving real-world cases and conclusions
Conclusion • Nuclear Forensics is a difficult but important problem. • Pre-detonation forensics provides an opportunity for measureable, actionable prevention of unattributed nuclear detonations by identifying high risk sources. • Expanding international capability and cooperation in nuclear forensics will strengthen international security.
