Stewarding a Reduced Stockpile
Performance Measures x.x, x.x, and x.x
Stewarding a Reduced Stockpile Presented To:
Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) June 19, 2008
Bruce T. Goodwin Principal Associate Director Weapons and Complex Integration Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is operated by Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, P.O. Box 808, Livermore, CA 94551-0808
LL-WCI-U-2008-013145
The U.S. nuclear arsenal is guided by two drivers: preserve peace and prevent further proliferation • Stewarding the stockpile of the future requires maintaining vital capabilities to meet any challenge • Enduring deterrent — Build upon SSP (Stockpile Stewardship Program) success: essential human capital with forefront capabilities — Sustainable stockpile — Right-sized modern production complex
Congressional Commission on U.S. Strategic Posture and posture Review will help define the future deterrent framework Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 2
Today’s Nuclear Stockpile B61, W80, B83
B61
W76, W88 SSBN
F-16
B-52
D5 B61
W80
F-15E
ALCM
W62 W78 W87
W80
B61, B83
W80
ACM B-2A
MM III ICBM
TLAM-N
Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 3
International considerations are important • Russia, China, France, and the UK are modernizing their deterrents • India and Pakistan have become nuclear states • North Korea has conducted a nuclear test • Over 30 countries rely on an extended nuclear deterrent, and many will be threatened if our deterrent is weakened
US deterrent must be affordable and consistent with deterrence, nonproliferation, and international obligations Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 4
1996 PEIS established modern configuration of nuclear weapons complex
Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 5
Laboratory workforce history Full Time Equivalent (FTE) 9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Fiscal year
2007
2008
2008 Endpoint
LLNL Supplemental Labor
Retiree
Term/Flex Term
Summer Students
Post Doc
Career/Indefinite
Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 6
A short history of stockpile stewardship • September 1992: last U.S. nuclear test, beginning of 9-month “Hatfield” moratorium • July 1993: recommendation by Energy Secretary O’Leary not to pursue allowed nuclear test options; Presidential direction for an SSP • June 1995: Stockpile Confidence Conference at STRATCOM—DOE plan for maintaining weapons presented to DoD • August 1995: President Clinton pledges U.S. commitment to zero-yield CTB, with stockpile stewardship the approach to maintaining confidence in the stockpile. Established “Annual Certification” reporting requirement. • April 2001: W87 becomes first warhead with modified nuclear system certified using SSP capabilities • January 2002: Nuclear Posture Review identifies possible need for modifications to nuclear stockpile • August 2003: Stewardship Review Conference in Omaha • W80 LEP (Life Extension Program) cancelled. B61 and W76 LEPs emerging • 2008: RRW (Reliable Replacement Warhead) cancelled
Congressional Commission on U.S. Strategic Posture will help define the future Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 7
The NNSA Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) • The SSP is the U.S. approach to ensuring confidence in the nuclear deterrent in the context of the current nuclear testing moratorium • We have been successfully implementing the SSP since early FY1996 • SSP presents major scientific and technical challenges requiriing dramatic S&T advances — National Ignition Facility (NIF): achieve fusion ignition in the laboratory — Advanced Simulation Capability (ASC): enhance simulation capability more than a million-fold — Materials: understand their properties (and aging) from the atomistic to engineering scale Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 8
In the absence of nuclear testing, improved validated computational capabilities coupled with experimental data enables high confidence to evaluate weapon performance
Potential Stockpile Issue
UGT Data
Calculate current condition on the warhead
Replicate underground test data using validated computational simulations
Validate advanced computational simulations using AGEX data
Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 9
Major systems are routinely deployed without full system testing Standard for Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties (QMU): Margins Margins against against known known failure failure modes modes help help us us manage manage system system risks risks in in Margin Confidence Ratio = >1 light light of of known known and and unknown unknown uncertainties uncertainties in in our our knowledge knowledge Sum of uncertainties
Standard Standard for for changes: changes: Confidence Confidence Ratio Ratio ==
Margin >> 11 Sum of uncertainties
Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 10
An appropriate balance must be established between production and scientific stewardship • We must be able to credibly assess the stockpile — QMU assessments — Resolution of defects due to original design/production flaws, aging, better understanding — How long aged components can stay in the stockpile before repairs are needed − If repairs are needed, what effect there is on margins and uncertainties • Production facilities must be designed to retain capability with sensibly sized and flexible capacity Sustained capability investments allow a smaller stockpile with enhanced safety and security Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 11
Stockpile Stewardship (SSP) is a great success • Annual assessment of the stockpile without the need to return to testing
NIF
• First LEP warhead—W87 ICBM • Restart of pit manufacturing capability • Rapid dismantlement of retired weapons • RRW—first warhead designed after the cessation of testing • Addressing defects without returning to nuclear testing
DARHT
• Pu aging study • W76 and B61 LEPs emerging with rigorous peer reviews
Blue Gene/L
SSP has achieved more than $10B in LEP cost avoidance and eliminated more than $4B in pit manufacturing facility cost Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 12
Challenges to maintaining the deterrent remain • Maintaining a capable workforce • Contradictions inherent maintaining an aging, low-margin stockpile with the lowest number of warheads • Establishing a responsive cost-effective weapons complex — Production — R&D • Post-Cold War: nuclear deterrence plays a smaller but no less important role in national security
We must identify and develop better, faster, and cheaper options to maintain the stockpile and support deterrence Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 13
A range of options can be considered for the future stockpile More warheads Higher cost Less safety and security Higher risk of testing
Cold War Warhead
Incremental LEP
Reuse LEP
RRW Warhead
Smaller number of warheads Less cost Greater safety and security Lower risk of testing Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 14
RRW has many inherent advantages • Designed with large margins, certifiable without nuclear testing • Insensitive high explosives • Multipoint safety • Fire safety and reduced intrinsic radiation • No safety exception • No hazardous materials → ease of manufacture and maintenance • Enhanced security • Easier surveillance for defects
At present, Congress has constrained stockpile actions to only incremental LEPs (iLEPs) Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 15
Extensive reuse LEPs (erLEPs) can provide much, but not all, of the advantages of RRW • A very large number of components from nuclear-tested designs are in storage — Either separated from weapons or weapons slated for disassembly • Smart choices for pits can result in higher margin systems, eliminate hazardous materials, and improve safety — Recent advances have identified advanced surety technologies achievable in erLEPs with relaxed yield-to-weight requirements • Even greater benefits can be achieved if reuse extends to other components — Large numbers of appropriately-made secondary parts, vetted in surveillance, are available erLEPs offer a high confidence alternative to iLEPs Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 16
erLEPs can be a valuable asset in meeting production requirements • erLEPs, used in conjunction with new production, can assure retention of capability to manufacture new components plus capacity to meet required numbers — Baseline production rates using new production — Strategic reserve and reconstitution rates using erLEPs • Allows flexibility to respond to changes in international conditions • Limits investment required for new production facilities
Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 17
An appropriate balance must be established between production and scientific stewardship • We must be able to credibly assess the stockpile — QMU assessments — Resolution of defects discovered by surveillance and R&D — How long aged components can stay in the stockpile before repairs are needed − If repairs are needed, what effect there is on margins and uncertainties • Production facilities must be designed to retain capability with sensibly sized and flexible capacity
Sustained capability investments allow a smaller stockpile with enhanced safety and security Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 18
Stewarding a Reduced Stockpile Presented To:
Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) June 19, 2008
Bruce T. Goodwin Principal Associate Director Weapons and Complex Integration Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is operated by Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, P.O. Box 808, Livermore, CA 94551-0808
LL-WCI-U-2008-013145
The U.S. nuclear arsenal is guided by two drivers: preserve peace and prevent further proliferation • Stewarding the stockpile of the future requires maintaining vital capabilities to meet any challenge • Enduring deterrent — Build upon SSP (Stockpile Stewardship Program) success: essential human capital with forefront capabilities — Sustainable stockpile — Right-sized modern production complex
Congressional Commission on U.S. Strategic Posture and posture Review will help define the future deterrent framework Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 2
Today’s Nuclear Stockpile B61, W80, B83
B61
W76, W88 SSBN
F-16
B-52
D5 B61
W80
F-15E
ALCM
W62 W78 W87
W80
B61, B83
W80
ACM B-2A
MM III ICBM
TLAM-N
Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 3
International considerations are important • Russia, China, France, and the UK are modernizing their deterrents • India and Pakistan have become nuclear states • North Korea has conducted a nuclear test • Over 30 countries rely on an extended nuclear deterrent, and many will be threatened if our deterrent is weakened
US deterrent must be affordable and consistent with deterrence, nonproliferation, and international obligations Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 4
1996 PEIS established modern configuration of nuclear weapons complex
Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 5
Laboratory workforce history Full Time Equivalent (FTE) 9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Fiscal year
2007
2008
2008 Endpoint
LLNL Supplemental Labor
Retiree
Term/Flex Term
Summer Students
Post Doc
Career/Indefinite
Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 6
A short history of stockpile stewardship • September 1992: last U.S. nuclear test, beginning of 9-month “Hatfield” moratorium • July 1993: recommendation by Energy Secretary O’Leary not to pursue allowed nuclear test options; Presidential direction for an SSP • June 1995: Stockpile Confidence Conference at STRATCOM—DOE plan for maintaining weapons presented to DoD • August 1995: President Clinton pledges U.S. commitment to zero-yield CTB, with stockpile stewardship the approach to maintaining confidence in the stockpile. Established “Annual Certification” reporting requirement. • April 2001: W87 becomes first warhead with modified nuclear system certified using SSP capabilities • January 2002: Nuclear Posture Review identifies possible need for modifications to nuclear stockpile • August 2003: Stewardship Review Conference in Omaha • W80 LEP (Life Extension Program) cancelled. B61 and W76 LEPs emerging • 2008: RRW (Reliable Replacement Warhead) cancelled
Congressional Commission on U.S. Strategic Posture will help define the future Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 7
The NNSA Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) • The SSP is the U.S. approach to ensuring confidence in the nuclear deterrent in the context of the current nuclear testing moratorium • We have been successfully implementing the SSP since early FY1996 • SSP presents major scientific and technical challenges requiriing dramatic S&T advances — National Ignition Facility (NIF): achieve fusion ignition in the laboratory — Advanced Simulation Capability (ASC): enhance simulation capability more than a million-fold — Materials: understand their properties (and aging) from the atomistic to engineering scale Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 8
In the absence of nuclear testing, improved validated computational capabilities coupled with experimental data enables high confidence to evaluate weapon performance
Potential Stockpile Issue
UGT Data
Calculate current condition on the warhead
Replicate underground test data using validated computational simulations
Validate advanced computational simulations using AGEX data
Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 9
Major systems are routinely deployed without full system testing Standard for Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties (QMU): Margins Margins against against known known failure failure modes modes help help us us manage manage system system risks risks in in Margin Confidence Ratio = >1 light light of of known known and and unknown unknown uncertainties uncertainties in in our our knowledge knowledge Sum of uncertainties
Standard Standard for for changes: changes: Confidence Confidence Ratio Ratio ==
Margin >> 11 Sum of uncertainties
Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 10
An appropriate balance must be established between production and scientific stewardship • We must be able to credibly assess the stockpile — QMU assessments — Resolution of defects due to original design/production flaws, aging, better understanding — How long aged components can stay in the stockpile before repairs are needed − If repairs are needed, what effect there is on margins and uncertainties • Production facilities must be designed to retain capability with sensibly sized and flexible capacity Sustained capability investments allow a smaller stockpile with enhanced safety and security Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 11
Stockpile Stewardship (SSP) is a great success • Annual assessment of the stockpile without the need to return to testing
NIF
• First LEP warhead—W87 ICBM • Restart of pit manufacturing capability • Rapid dismantlement of retired weapons • RRW—first warhead designed after the cessation of testing • Addressing defects without returning to nuclear testing
DARHT
• Pu aging study • W76 and B61 LEPs emerging with rigorous peer reviews
Blue Gene/L
SSP has achieved more than $10B in LEP cost avoidance and eliminated more than $4B in pit manufacturing facility cost Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 12
Challenges to maintaining the deterrent remain • Maintaining a capable workforce • Contradictions inherent maintaining an aging, low-margin stockpile with the lowest number of warheads • Establishing a responsive cost-effective weapons complex — Production — R&D • Post-Cold War: nuclear deterrence plays a smaller but no less important role in national security
We must identify and develop better, faster, and cheaper options to maintain the stockpile and support deterrence Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 13
A range of options can be considered for the future stockpile More warheads Higher cost Less safety and security Higher risk of testing
Cold War Warhead
Incremental LEP
Reuse LEP
RRW Warhead
Smaller number of warheads Less cost Greater safety and security Lower risk of testing Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 14
RRW has many inherent advantages • Designed with large margins, certifiable without nuclear testing • Insensitive high explosives • Multipoint safety • Fire safety and reduced intrinsic radiation • No safety exception • No hazardous materials → ease of manufacture and maintenance • Enhanced security • Easier surveillance for defects
At present, Congress has constrained stockpile actions to only incremental LEPs (iLEPs) Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 15
Extensive reuse LEPs (erLEPs) can provide much, but not all, of the advantages of RRW • A very large number of components from nuclear-tested designs are in storage — Either separated from weapons or weapons slated for disassembly • Smart choices for pits can result in higher margin systems, eliminate hazardous materials, and improve safety — Recent advances have identified advanced surety technologies achievable in erLEPs with relaxed yield-to-weight requirements • Even greater benefits can be achieved if reuse extends to other components — Large numbers of appropriately-made secondary parts, vetted in surveillance, are available erLEPs offer a high confidence alternative to iLEPs Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 16
erLEPs can be a valuable asset in meeting production requirements • erLEPs, used in conjunction with new production, can assure retention of capability to manufacture new components plus capacity to meet required numbers — Baseline production rates using new production — Strategic reserve and reconstitution rates using erLEPs • Allows flexibility to respond to changes in international conditions • Limits investment required for new production facilities
Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 17
An appropriate balance must be established between production and scientific stewardship • We must be able to credibly assess the stockpile — QMU assessments — Resolution of defects discovered by surveillance and R&D — How long aged components can stay in the stockpile before repairs are needed − If repairs are needed, what effect there is on margins and uncertainties • Production facilities must be designed to retain capability with sensibly sized and flexible capacity
Sustained capability investments allow a smaller stockpile with enhanced safety and security Weapons and Complex Integration LL-WCI-U-2008-013145. 18
