Stockpile Stewardship after RRW:
Stockpile Stewardship after RRW: Criteria for Life Extension Programs Stephen Young, Union of Concerned Scientists March 26, 2009
RRW Envisioned: • Building new plutonium pits • Using a design of a tested but never fielded design • Incorporating a host of new safety and surety measures • Probably a modified NEP for above Subcritical test at NTS
LEP Alternatives • Current LEP – “preference” for rebuilding as is • “Extended Reuse” LEP – using pits and components from other warhead designs • “Enhanced” LEP - ?? • Reliability requirements
"The designers were not asked or permitted to design a nuclear weapon that would go bad after 20 years."
"Remanufacture," S. Drell, R. Jeanloz et al (Jasons), JSR-99-300, October 1999, p. 4.
Criteria for LEP • • • •
No new plutonium pits No new military capabilities Limit modifications to the NEP Remain close to existing designs?
No New Pits • U.S. stores thousands of pits - ~14,000 • Current U.S. pit production very limited • Increasing pit production costly and counterproductive overall • Pit production not required for deterrent
No new military capabilities • Already a criteria? • Was RRW criteria • W-76 LEP groundburst capability • Lower yield?
Neutron pulse tubes for the W76 undergoing testing as part of warhead's LEP.
Limit Modifications to the NEP • Justified by Safety and Surety Concerns • RRW Design Incorporated Many New Features • Increasing Safety: Alternatives to NEP Changes o o
Improve security during transportation Guns, Guards, and Gates (3G)
Greenpeace photo of a truck they claimed is carrying 140 kgs of U.S. weapons-grade plutonium through France
Sure about Surety "Substantial work remains on the physical understanding of the surety mechanisms that are of high priority to the RRW program." "Reliable Replacement Warhead Executive Summary," Jasons, JSR-07-336E, September 7, 2007.
Remain Close to Existing Designs? • Best way to maintain reliability • Deterrent value: tested weapon rebuilt vs. new untested weapon • "Extended Reuse" - pits, CSAs from other warheads
B61 component parts
Reliability Requirements • Based on war-fighting scenario, end-to-end performance, and within 10 percent of design yield • Concerns at NNSA and labs are not about current LEPs but repeated cycles • Option to reduce the requirements rather than worry about LEPs
RRW Envisioned: • Building new plutonium pits • Using a design of a tested but never fielded design • Incorporating a host of new safety and surety measures • Probably a modified NEP for above Subcritical test at NTS
LEP Alternatives • Current LEP – “preference” for rebuilding as is • “Extended Reuse” LEP – using pits and components from other warhead designs • “Enhanced” LEP - ?? • Reliability requirements
"The designers were not asked or permitted to design a nuclear weapon that would go bad after 20 years."
"Remanufacture," S. Drell, R. Jeanloz et al (Jasons), JSR-99-300, October 1999, p. 4.
Criteria for LEP • • • •
No new plutonium pits No new military capabilities Limit modifications to the NEP Remain close to existing designs?
No New Pits • U.S. stores thousands of pits - ~14,000 • Current U.S. pit production very limited • Increasing pit production costly and counterproductive overall • Pit production not required for deterrent
No new military capabilities • Already a criteria? • Was RRW criteria • W-76 LEP groundburst capability • Lower yield?
Neutron pulse tubes for the W76 undergoing testing as part of warhead's LEP.
Limit Modifications to the NEP • Justified by Safety and Surety Concerns • RRW Design Incorporated Many New Features • Increasing Safety: Alternatives to NEP Changes o o
Improve security during transportation Guns, Guards, and Gates (3G)
Greenpeace photo of a truck they claimed is carrying 140 kgs of U.S. weapons-grade plutonium through France
Sure about Surety "Substantial work remains on the physical understanding of the surety mechanisms that are of high priority to the RRW program." "Reliable Replacement Warhead Executive Summary," Jasons, JSR-07-336E, September 7, 2007.
Remain Close to Existing Designs? • Best way to maintain reliability • Deterrent value: tested weapon rebuilt vs. new untested weapon • "Extended Reuse" - pits, CSAs from other warheads
B61 component parts
Reliability Requirements • Based on war-fighting scenario, end-to-end performance, and within 10 percent of design yield • Concerns at NNSA and labs are not about current LEPs but repeated cycles • Option to reduce the requirements rather than worry about LEPs
