The Reliable Replacement Warhead and a Responsive Infrastructure
The Reliable Replacement Warhead and a Responsive Infrastructure Benn Tannenbaum, Ph.D. Project Director Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy American Association for the Advancement of Science
RRW vs. Responsive Insfrastructure
Background z AAAS and APS assembled expert panel to examine some issues surrounding RRW program z Bruce Tarter is chair z Members include Johnnie Foster, Sig Hecker, Charlie Curtis, Raymond Jeanloz z Have received excellent briefings from NNSA, DOD, LANL, LLNL and Congress
z Am not representing the views of this panel
2
RRW vs. Responsive Insfrastructure
Problem: Current Infrastructure Not Responsive z
In current state, complex cannot meet manufacturing needs, including pit production capabilities
z
Complex not just laboratories
z
z
Labs (Los Alamos, Livermore & Sandia) critical for design work & some production
z
Plants (Y-12, Savannah River, Pantex, & Kansas City) critical for pit production & assembly
Two suggested paths to addressing these problems: 1) make improvements to existing path/program; or 2) develop an RRW program
3
z
Both paths have potential to establish responsive infrastructure
z
In evaluating which path to pursue, highest priority must be to adequately modernize nuclear weapons complex– both labs and plants
RRW vs. Responsive Insfrastructure
Some evident points
4
z
History strongly suggests that RRW can be deployed without testing
z
Even with RRW, the legacy stockpile will be sustained for decades
z
Long term: weapons beyond RRW needed so long as DOE believes development & deployment of new weapons necessary to sustain weapons design capabilities
z
Unlikely RRW saves money in long term and likely costs more in near term
z
RRW may be first time new design not originated by services; consequently is unclear whether DOD is adequately engaged
z
Regardless of path pursued to transform complex, infrastructure will be established that could develop new capabilities that address new missions
z
RRW will likely lead to reductions in hedge, but will not contribute to reduction in deployed arsenal
RRW vs. Responsive Insfrastructure
An example: reliability z Everything, from automobiles to nuclear weapons, has “bathtub”shaped reliability curve z LEP designed to push “end of life” as far away as possible z Concern is that RRW will have “infant mortality” rate higher than current, constant failure rate 5
Taken from http://www.weibull.com/hotwire/issue21/hottopics21.htm
RRW vs. Responsive Insfrastructure
Bottom line z NNSA/DOE’s attention may be misplaced at this time: It’s not the design, it’s the complex z Needs attention of not just NNSA/DOE, but also DOD (STRATCOM, OSD & services) and President "We've got to get DoD engaged again," she said, "in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with awareness that many levels of leadership need to pay attention to the nuclear weapons enterprise." Sandia Vice President Mim John, in the Albuquerque Journal, September 4, 2006
z Critical question not yet addressed: what are future nuclear weapons needs/missions to defend nation? 6
RRW vs. Responsive Insfrastructure
Background z AAAS and APS assembled expert panel to examine some issues surrounding RRW program z Bruce Tarter is chair z Members include Johnnie Foster, Sig Hecker, Charlie Curtis, Raymond Jeanloz z Have received excellent briefings from NNSA, DOD, LANL, LLNL and Congress
z Am not representing the views of this panel
2
RRW vs. Responsive Insfrastructure
Problem: Current Infrastructure Not Responsive z
In current state, complex cannot meet manufacturing needs, including pit production capabilities
z
Complex not just laboratories
z
z
Labs (Los Alamos, Livermore & Sandia) critical for design work & some production
z
Plants (Y-12, Savannah River, Pantex, & Kansas City) critical for pit production & assembly
Two suggested paths to addressing these problems: 1) make improvements to existing path/program; or 2) develop an RRW program
3
z
Both paths have potential to establish responsive infrastructure
z
In evaluating which path to pursue, highest priority must be to adequately modernize nuclear weapons complex– both labs and plants
RRW vs. Responsive Insfrastructure
Some evident points
4
z
History strongly suggests that RRW can be deployed without testing
z
Even with RRW, the legacy stockpile will be sustained for decades
z
Long term: weapons beyond RRW needed so long as DOE believes development & deployment of new weapons necessary to sustain weapons design capabilities
z
Unlikely RRW saves money in long term and likely costs more in near term
z
RRW may be first time new design not originated by services; consequently is unclear whether DOD is adequately engaged
z
Regardless of path pursued to transform complex, infrastructure will be established that could develop new capabilities that address new missions
z
RRW will likely lead to reductions in hedge, but will not contribute to reduction in deployed arsenal
RRW vs. Responsive Insfrastructure
An example: reliability z Everything, from automobiles to nuclear weapons, has “bathtub”shaped reliability curve z LEP designed to push “end of life” as far away as possible z Concern is that RRW will have “infant mortality” rate higher than current, constant failure rate 5
Taken from http://www.weibull.com/hotwire/issue21/hottopics21.htm
RRW vs. Responsive Insfrastructure
Bottom line z NNSA/DOE’s attention may be misplaced at this time: It’s not the design, it’s the complex z Needs attention of not just NNSA/DOE, but also DOD (STRATCOM, OSD & services) and President "We've got to get DoD engaged again," she said, "in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with awareness that many levels of leadership need to pay attention to the nuclear weapons enterprise." Sandia Vice President Mim John, in the Albuquerque Journal, September 4, 2006
z Critical question not yet addressed: what are future nuclear weapons needs/missions to defend nation? 6
