Condemning the Missile Launch and Next Steps
Condemning the Missile Launch and Next Steps By Jae-kyung Park April 20, 2012 Jae-Kyung Park joined the CSIS Korea Chair in February 2012 as a visiting fellow in the newly established ROK-U.S. Policy Scholars Program. He is a Korean diplomat by profession, with experience in overseas missions at the Korean embassies in Belgrade and London. From 2008 through 2011, a time when ASEAN-ROK relations upgraded toward strategic partnership, he was one of the leading officials in designing ROK policies in East Asian multilateral diplomacy, including ASEAN+3, the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). His research interests cover U.S.-China relations in East Asia. Mr. Park graduated from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in 2001. He earned his bachelor’s degree at Seoul National University in 1992. He also has a military background, having served in the ROK Air Force for three years. It is not often the case that one hears such heavy rhetoric as “strongly condemns,” “deplores,” and “aggressive behavior” in referring to a country or regime in international relations. Yet, when it comes to North Korea, it may no longer be a surprise. The UN Security Council issued a Presidential Statement on April 16 in response to the missile launch by North Korea on April 13. Even though it is a Presidential Statement by the Security Council, it is well worth being regarded as a unified stance of the international community. There has surely been a consensus among the fifteen member states representing various regions: China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Colombia, and South Africa are there, just to name a few. Faced with provocative actions like nuclear and missile tests, a consistent and unified message should be given to North Korea. When it comes to non-proliferation issues, the international community should continue to be insistent and persistent. The dilemma is, however, that such a response alone does not seem to be enough to reach the final goal of achieving peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the region. For the ROK, the northern compatriotic regime has continuously been the single most serious threat since as early as the 1950s. Even though the situation has become far more complicated because of the nuclear and missile conundrum, the fundamental issue is still the inter-Korean bilateral relations rather than the WMD program itself. Just a couple of days before the start of P5+1 talks with Iran on the nuclear issue in Istanbul on April 14, Ali Akbar Salehi, the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote an article in the Washington Post and his key word in it was ‘TRUST.’ Though it is in a different dimension
whether Iran is trustworthy on the nuclear issue, and whatever the Minister’s intention was, his emphasis on trust properly touched the point. Yes. It is the question of trust and, therefore, the important thing is how to build trust. On April 13, in addressing the topic of America’s foreign policy leadership role, Dr. Condoleezza Rice said at the Heritage Foundation that we should be careful not to just focus on the ‘nuclear side’ in the Iranian issue and that the reason why ‘Iran with nuclear weapons’ would be unacceptable is that Iran itself is an existential threat to the region. With regard to North Korea, the key is then how to change North Korea in a way that is more acceptable to the outside world, more than addressing the WMD issues. Through a statement of April 17, Pyongyang argued that the Leap Day Deal had been breached by the U.S. Of course, the claim is ridiculous. However, a careful reading of the statement can provide interesting insights. In the statement, they repeatedly mention dignity and respect for sovereignty. And then, their version of the main reason for the deal’s nullification is that the U.S. did not respect Pyongyang’s dignity. It seems to be more than the issue of suspending the 240,000 tons of nutritional assistance. This indicates that their key interest from the U.S. statement of February 29 lies in, among others, “The U.S. reaffirms that it does not have hostile intent toward the DPRK and is prepared to take steps to improve our bilateral relationship in the spirit of mutual respect for sovereignty and equality.” Given this analysis of the situation, I offer a few thoughts on prescriptions for the future; First, Pyongyang should read clearly the statement the outside world made in response to their provocative action. Provocative action does not pay and will not muster support, regardless of what their genuine intention is. If North Korea is really serious in talks with the U.S. for an improved relationship, as it mentioned in the statement of February 29, it must demonstrate this, not only by words, but also by deeds. And in doing so, they must be careful not to miss a line in the statement of the White House of April 13, which included, even amidst strong sentences, “The President has been clear he is prepared to engage constructively with North Korea.” Second, China may help in achieving Pyongyang’s better relations with the outside world. Though China has supported denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, it has been quite reticent in its responses to North Korea’s provocative actions, much to the disappointment of the ROK and the U.S. It is not easy to ascertain whether China does not want to deeply intervene in the issue of the Korean peninsula, or whether China has an effective leverage towards Pyongyang. One obvious fact is that China’s relation with Pyongyang differs from that of the ROK and the U.S. Or China does not feel a security threat from North Korea anyway. There remains room for China to play a role as a facilitator not only for the nuclear talks, but also for improving Pyongyang’s bilateral relations with the outside world. It may be argued that if the missile launch was INEVITABLE from Pyongyang’s perspective, or had a strategically foremost importance to them on the occasion of the leadership change coinciding with the centennial anniversary of their “Great Leader’s Birthday,” the Leap Day Deal was from the beginning destined to be short-lived. Now, the timing is not good for all the parties concerned to reset the process of confidence building. Even so, there should always be
hope for peace and stability by making conducive atmosphere for dialogue and by averting the prospect of escalation of tensions on the Korean peninsula. There are a number of experts who see it probable that Pyongyang will conduct another nuclear test in the foreseeable future. However, it is not whether the forecast will be accurate or wrong that matters. Rather, we all must try to prevent confrontational situations.
The Office of the Korea Chair invites applications for consideration for the US-Korea Policy Scholars Program. For inquiries, please email [email protected]. This article is published by the Office of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
whether Iran is trustworthy on the nuclear issue, and whatever the Minister’s intention was, his emphasis on trust properly touched the point. Yes. It is the question of trust and, therefore, the important thing is how to build trust. On April 13, in addressing the topic of America’s foreign policy leadership role, Dr. Condoleezza Rice said at the Heritage Foundation that we should be careful not to just focus on the ‘nuclear side’ in the Iranian issue and that the reason why ‘Iran with nuclear weapons’ would be unacceptable is that Iran itself is an existential threat to the region. With regard to North Korea, the key is then how to change North Korea in a way that is more acceptable to the outside world, more than addressing the WMD issues. Through a statement of April 17, Pyongyang argued that the Leap Day Deal had been breached by the U.S. Of course, the claim is ridiculous. However, a careful reading of the statement can provide interesting insights. In the statement, they repeatedly mention dignity and respect for sovereignty. And then, their version of the main reason for the deal’s nullification is that the U.S. did not respect Pyongyang’s dignity. It seems to be more than the issue of suspending the 240,000 tons of nutritional assistance. This indicates that their key interest from the U.S. statement of February 29 lies in, among others, “The U.S. reaffirms that it does not have hostile intent toward the DPRK and is prepared to take steps to improve our bilateral relationship in the spirit of mutual respect for sovereignty and equality.” Given this analysis of the situation, I offer a few thoughts on prescriptions for the future; First, Pyongyang should read clearly the statement the outside world made in response to their provocative action. Provocative action does not pay and will not muster support, regardless of what their genuine intention is. If North Korea is really serious in talks with the U.S. for an improved relationship, as it mentioned in the statement of February 29, it must demonstrate this, not only by words, but also by deeds. And in doing so, they must be careful not to miss a line in the statement of the White House of April 13, which included, even amidst strong sentences, “The President has been clear he is prepared to engage constructively with North Korea.” Second, China may help in achieving Pyongyang’s better relations with the outside world. Though China has supported denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, it has been quite reticent in its responses to North Korea’s provocative actions, much to the disappointment of the ROK and the U.S. It is not easy to ascertain whether China does not want to deeply intervene in the issue of the Korean peninsula, or whether China has an effective leverage towards Pyongyang. One obvious fact is that China’s relation with Pyongyang differs from that of the ROK and the U.S. Or China does not feel a security threat from North Korea anyway. There remains room for China to play a role as a facilitator not only for the nuclear talks, but also for improving Pyongyang’s bilateral relations with the outside world. It may be argued that if the missile launch was INEVITABLE from Pyongyang’s perspective, or had a strategically foremost importance to them on the occasion of the leadership change coinciding with the centennial anniversary of their “Great Leader’s Birthday,” the Leap Day Deal was from the beginning destined to be short-lived. Now, the timing is not good for all the parties concerned to reset the process of confidence building. Even so, there should always be
hope for peace and stability by making conducive atmosphere for dialogue and by averting the prospect of escalation of tensions on the Korean peninsula. There are a number of experts who see it probable that Pyongyang will conduct another nuclear test in the foreseeable future. However, it is not whether the forecast will be accurate or wrong that matters. Rather, we all must try to prevent confrontational situations.
The Office of the Korea Chair invites applications for consideration for the US-Korea Policy Scholars Program. For inquiries, please email [email protected]. This article is published by the Office of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
