Am I My Brothers Keeper
Vayikra 26:37 And a man will stumble on his brother as one [who falls] in front of a sword, though there is no pursuer…
וְר ֹדֵ ף ָאיִן,ח ֶֶרב-בְָאחִיו ְכ ִמ ְפנֵי-ְוכָשְ לּו אִ יש
Talmud Sanhedrin 27b “And a man will stumble on his brother” – a man [will stumble] on the mistakes of his brother, this teaches us that [all Jews] are responsible for one another(i.e. we take the fall for our buddy’s mistakes)! Specifically, this is when they had the opportunity to protest the bad behavior and didn’t. What seemingly counterintuitive conclusion does the Talmud draw from the verse in Vayikra? What principle does the Talmud base derive from this conclusion? What factor does the Talmud say limits when we would apply this principle? Do you think this factor should matter? Why or why not?
Devarim 29:28 “The hidden things (sins) are for Hashem our G-d; and the revealed ones (sins) are for us and our children forever…”
Talmud Sanhedrin 43b “The secret things are for Hashem our G-d and the revealed ones are for us and our children forever”. Why are the words “us and our children”… dotted (see the Hebrew text above)? It teaches us that [the entire Jewish people] were only punished on the hidden [communal] sins after they initially crossed over the Jordan (into the land of Israel)…
--עֹולָם- עַד, אֱ ֹלהֵינּו; ְו ַהנִגְֹלת לָנּו ּו ְל ָבנֵינּו,לַיהוָה--ַהנִסְתָ ר ֹת
At what point in Jewish History does the Talmud say the nation became obligated in national sins? Do you think moving into the Land of Israel should make a difference in this regard? Why or why not?
The Halacha (Jewish Law) is that if a Jewish Court makes a ruling that is observed by the majority of the nation and we realize afterward the court’s ruling was wrong there is a special Korban (sacrifice) that must be brought at the Beit Hamikdash (this obviously does not apply nowadays). The following source discusses how we define the “majority of the nation”:
Talmud Horayos 3a R. Assi said: In [the case of an incorrect] ruling [of a court] only the majority of the inhabitants of the Land of Israel (but not Jews out of the land) are taken into account, because the verse says (I Kings 8:65), “So Solomon held the feast at that time, and all Israel with him, a great congregation, from the entrance of Hamath until the Brook of Egypt, before the Hashem our G-d…” Now, let’s check this out: it says, “and all Israel with him a great congregation”, why do we need it tell us, “from the entrance of Hamath until the Brook of Egypt?” From this we see that only Jews in Israel are included in the 'congregation' (for purposes of this law) but not those who aren’t.
Which segment of the population does the Talmud say the term “kahal” or “congregation” refers exclusively to? What difference between the people in Israel and the people out of Israel accounts for this definition? How does this help us understand the onset of national sins in the previous source and the earlier source which stated “this is when the community had the opportunity to protest but did not”?
Talmud Rosh Hashana 29a Ahava the son of Rebbi Zeira taught: Regarding all types of blessings: even though you have already fulfilled your own obligation you can make another one on behalf of somebody else [who has not yet done it for himself].
Rashi on Rosh Hashana 29a “Even though you have fulfilled your obligation you can make another on behalf of somebody else”: because all of the Jewish people are responsible for one another regarding mitzvos.
What novel Halacha (Jewish law) does the Talmud highlight? Generally, when you fulfill a mitzvah you have completed your obligation and can no longer do it again; why do you think this is different?
She’iltos D’Rav Achai Gaon 54 Regarding one who makes Kiddush [on Shabbos] and fulfills his own obligation; do we say that since he fulfilled his obligation he is no longer able to make it on behalf of another who has not fulfilled it or do we perhaps say that the obligation continues indefinitely as every member of the Jewish people is responsible for his fellow and it is as though he has not fulfilled his own obligation until his fellow has as well?
How does the She’iltos explain the possibility (which we saw above the Talmud codifies as law) that one who has fulfilled his obligation may still do it on anothers’ behalf? What does this explanation tell us about the nature of Jewish community?
Talmud Shabbos 4a Rav Bibi the son of Abaye asked: one [who violated Shabbos by] placing a loaf of bread in the oven do we allow him to remove it (a minor violation ) before [it bakes fully (a major violation) and] obligates him in bringing a sin offering? Rav Acha the son of Abaye said to Ravina: what are the circumstances? [He answered]...we are dealing with a person who placed the loaf in the oven by accident; and for whom are we asking to permit the removal of the loaf? For others (i.e. not the one who placed it there originally). Rav Sheishes strongly questioned this suggestion: Would we tell one person to sin in order for his friend to benefit?!
…
The following source concludes an argument between Rebbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel about a learned person offering produce to a non-learned person. The dispute revolves around whether we can assume the learned person observed even the smallest details of the laws of terumah (tithes):
Talmud Eruvin 32a What are they arguing about? Rebbi held that a learned person would sooner perform a lower level forbidden act to prevent a non-learned person from committing a higher-level forbidden act. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel held that a learned person would rather the non-learned person perform a higher-level forbidden act and he not have himself perform even a small forbidden act.
What is the difference between the opinion of Rav Sheishes in the case in Shabbos and Rebbi in the case in Eruvin?
Tosafos on Shabbos 4a “And do we tell a man to sin in order to benefit his friend?!”: And that which is stated in the Talmud in Eruvin 32b ‘Rebbi held that a learned man would rather perform a lower level sin than have a non-learned man perform a high-level sin was only stated in that situation where the non-learned man might eat untithed foods via direct cause of the learned man. [We only allow a person to a person to sin to prevent his friends’ sin when he himself caused his friends’ sin.]
Opinion brought in the Ritva on Eruvin 32a Regarding the [contradictory] statement in Shabbos, there are those who say that we do not tell people to sin to prevent a friend from sinning when the friend put himself in the position by placing the bread in the oven on Shabbos. Even though he did it accidentally (i.e. not intending to violate Shabbos) he should have paid better attention.
According to Tosafos, when do we say to perform a lower-level violation to prevent your friend from performing a higher level violation? When do we say you can’t? What about for the opinion brought in the Ritva in Eruvin?
Ritva on Shabbos 4a And it is a question in my view that which is stated in Eruvin according to Rebbi – and the law follows his view – that it is preferable to a learned man to violate a lower level violation by taking terumah from a portion which is not in proximity of the rest of the produce rather than have the non-learned man violate the great violation of eating untithed foods. We can answer that the case in Shabbos (of the bread in the oven) is not comparable to the case in Eruvin at all … there (in Eruvin) the Rebbi is saying that he may choose to violate the lower level violation, here (in Shabbos) we are saying that we have no right to force him to.
According to the Ritva, when do we say to perform a lower-level violation to prevent your friend from performing a higher level violation? When do we say you can’t? Is there anything surprising about the Ritva’s focus on personal choice? What does this tell you about living in a community of responsibility?
…
וְר ֹדֵ ף ָאיִן,ח ֶֶרב-בְָאחִיו ְכ ִמ ְפנֵי-ְוכָשְ לּו אִ יש
Talmud Sanhedrin 27b “And a man will stumble on his brother” – a man [will stumble] on the mistakes of his brother, this teaches us that [all Jews] are responsible for one another(i.e. we take the fall for our buddy’s mistakes)! Specifically, this is when they had the opportunity to protest the bad behavior and didn’t. What seemingly counterintuitive conclusion does the Talmud draw from the verse in Vayikra? What principle does the Talmud base derive from this conclusion? What factor does the Talmud say limits when we would apply this principle? Do you think this factor should matter? Why or why not?
Devarim 29:28 “The hidden things (sins) are for Hashem our G-d; and the revealed ones (sins) are for us and our children forever…”
Talmud Sanhedrin 43b “The secret things are for Hashem our G-d and the revealed ones are for us and our children forever”. Why are the words “us and our children”… dotted (see the Hebrew text above)? It teaches us that [the entire Jewish people] were only punished on the hidden [communal] sins after they initially crossed over the Jordan (into the land of Israel)…
--עֹולָם- עַד, אֱ ֹלהֵינּו; ְו ַהנִגְֹלת לָנּו ּו ְל ָבנֵינּו,לַיהוָה--ַהנִסְתָ ר ֹת
At what point in Jewish History does the Talmud say the nation became obligated in national sins? Do you think moving into the Land of Israel should make a difference in this regard? Why or why not?
The Halacha (Jewish Law) is that if a Jewish Court makes a ruling that is observed by the majority of the nation and we realize afterward the court’s ruling was wrong there is a special Korban (sacrifice) that must be brought at the Beit Hamikdash (this obviously does not apply nowadays). The following source discusses how we define the “majority of the nation”:
Talmud Horayos 3a R. Assi said: In [the case of an incorrect] ruling [of a court] only the majority of the inhabitants of the Land of Israel (but not Jews out of the land) are taken into account, because the verse says (I Kings 8:65), “So Solomon held the feast at that time, and all Israel with him, a great congregation, from the entrance of Hamath until the Brook of Egypt, before the Hashem our G-d…” Now, let’s check this out: it says, “and all Israel with him a great congregation”, why do we need it tell us, “from the entrance of Hamath until the Brook of Egypt?” From this we see that only Jews in Israel are included in the 'congregation' (for purposes of this law) but not those who aren’t.
Which segment of the population does the Talmud say the term “kahal” or “congregation” refers exclusively to? What difference between the people in Israel and the people out of Israel accounts for this definition? How does this help us understand the onset of national sins in the previous source and the earlier source which stated “this is when the community had the opportunity to protest but did not”?
Talmud Rosh Hashana 29a Ahava the son of Rebbi Zeira taught: Regarding all types of blessings: even though you have already fulfilled your own obligation you can make another one on behalf of somebody else [who has not yet done it for himself].
Rashi on Rosh Hashana 29a “Even though you have fulfilled your obligation you can make another on behalf of somebody else”: because all of the Jewish people are responsible for one another regarding mitzvos.
What novel Halacha (Jewish law) does the Talmud highlight? Generally, when you fulfill a mitzvah you have completed your obligation and can no longer do it again; why do you think this is different?
She’iltos D’Rav Achai Gaon 54 Regarding one who makes Kiddush [on Shabbos] and fulfills his own obligation; do we say that since he fulfilled his obligation he is no longer able to make it on behalf of another who has not fulfilled it or do we perhaps say that the obligation continues indefinitely as every member of the Jewish people is responsible for his fellow and it is as though he has not fulfilled his own obligation until his fellow has as well?
How does the She’iltos explain the possibility (which we saw above the Talmud codifies as law) that one who has fulfilled his obligation may still do it on anothers’ behalf? What does this explanation tell us about the nature of Jewish community?
Talmud Shabbos 4a Rav Bibi the son of Abaye asked: one [who violated Shabbos by] placing a loaf of bread in the oven do we allow him to remove it (a minor violation ) before [it bakes fully (a major violation) and] obligates him in bringing a sin offering? Rav Acha the son of Abaye said to Ravina: what are the circumstances? [He answered]...we are dealing with a person who placed the loaf in the oven by accident; and for whom are we asking to permit the removal of the loaf? For others (i.e. not the one who placed it there originally). Rav Sheishes strongly questioned this suggestion: Would we tell one person to sin in order for his friend to benefit?!
…
The following source concludes an argument between Rebbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel about a learned person offering produce to a non-learned person. The dispute revolves around whether we can assume the learned person observed even the smallest details of the laws of terumah (tithes):
Talmud Eruvin 32a What are they arguing about? Rebbi held that a learned person would sooner perform a lower level forbidden act to prevent a non-learned person from committing a higher-level forbidden act. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel held that a learned person would rather the non-learned person perform a higher-level forbidden act and he not have himself perform even a small forbidden act.
What is the difference between the opinion of Rav Sheishes in the case in Shabbos and Rebbi in the case in Eruvin?
Tosafos on Shabbos 4a “And do we tell a man to sin in order to benefit his friend?!”: And that which is stated in the Talmud in Eruvin 32b ‘Rebbi held that a learned man would rather perform a lower level sin than have a non-learned man perform a high-level sin was only stated in that situation where the non-learned man might eat untithed foods via direct cause of the learned man. [We only allow a person to a person to sin to prevent his friends’ sin when he himself caused his friends’ sin.]
Opinion brought in the Ritva on Eruvin 32a Regarding the [contradictory] statement in Shabbos, there are those who say that we do not tell people to sin to prevent a friend from sinning when the friend put himself in the position by placing the bread in the oven on Shabbos. Even though he did it accidentally (i.e. not intending to violate Shabbos) he should have paid better attention.
According to Tosafos, when do we say to perform a lower-level violation to prevent your friend from performing a higher level violation? When do we say you can’t? What about for the opinion brought in the Ritva in Eruvin?
Ritva on Shabbos 4a And it is a question in my view that which is stated in Eruvin according to Rebbi – and the law follows his view – that it is preferable to a learned man to violate a lower level violation by taking terumah from a portion which is not in proximity of the rest of the produce rather than have the non-learned man violate the great violation of eating untithed foods. We can answer that the case in Shabbos (of the bread in the oven) is not comparable to the case in Eruvin at all … there (in Eruvin) the Rebbi is saying that he may choose to violate the lower level violation, here (in Shabbos) we are saying that we have no right to force him to.
According to the Ritva, when do we say to perform a lower-level violation to prevent your friend from performing a higher level violation? When do we say you can’t? Is there anything surprising about the Ritva’s focus on personal choice? What does this tell you about living in a community of responsibility?
…
