First steps toward nuclear disarmament
First steps toward nuclear disarmament Adam Mount, Georgetown University CSIS:
18 December, 2013
Mount CSIS PONI
18 Dec., 2013
Commitments to disarm •
• •
The United States has issued several commitments to eliminate its nuclear arsenal, most recently at Prague, April 2009 Incredible commitments are counterproductive. How to enhance commitment credibility? – – –
Actions that advance other norms of nuclear restraint Actions that decrease reliance on the nuclear arsenal Actions that assist the verification of a global disarmament treaty.
Mount CSIS PONI
18 Dec., 2013
Nuclear disarmament treaty •
Once a regime is in place, things are straightforward (if risky) –
• • • •
Fetter & Oelrich (2010), Acton (2011), others
Getting into a regime is hard False initial declarations make would undermine the entire system —so they prevent negotiations in the first place Large, advanced states like the U.S. have the greatest credibility problems A credible initial declaration lowers the risks of → verification
High confidence in the expected accuracy of initial declarations will make negotiations more likely
→
Steps taken now to enhance the credibility of an initial declaration make a disarmament treaty more likely
Mount CSIS PONI
18 Dec., 2013
Preparing data • Successive releases of overlapping and mutually consistent sets of data on nuclear materials and weapons makes cheating more difficulty • The Obama administration has shown a willingness to release nuclear data – May, 2010: overall size of arsenal – 2011: U.S., Russia swap large databases on delivery vehicles under New START
Data on: •
Storage, movement, and maintenance of: – – – – –
• • •
Specific warheads Delivery vehicles Reprocessing facilities Nuclear material Spent fuel stocks
could be: a) Unilaterally compiled and reserved b) Distributed to allies, perhaps encrypted c) Deposited with IAEA (NPT 2010 Revcon) d) Released publicly
Weapons tests Life extension programs DU munitions and armor Mount CSIS PONI
18 Dec., 2013
Designing facilities •
Facilities can be designed from the start to meet anticipated safeguards standards
•
This signals an expectation that comprehensive safeguards will enter into force in the facility’s lifetime
•
Collaboration with the IAEA, public anticipation ties hands
•
Enhances Safeguards by Design (SBD) standards by preemptive compliance
Mount CSIS PONI
18 Dec., 2013
Weapon systems •
•
•
Dual capable systems are difficult to verify, plausibly controlled under a comprehensive verification scheme Cutting the nuclear mission from certain selected systems now can decrease future suspicion about dual capability Preventing the F-35 from carrying B61 would be a major step •
F-35 nuclear variant has been delayed from 2017 to the Block IV upgrade in 2010
•
Several overseas bases might have reduced inspections requirements
•
USAF saves money now on procurement, B61 LEP
•
USAF saves later on NORI
•
B-1B is precedent
Mount CSIS PONI
18 Dec., 2013
Conclusions •
No verification scheme can succeed in a world where states feel threatened.
•
The steps described here (data, facilities, weapons) may tip the balance for some expectant but unconvinced states.
•
Many of these steps are being taken already, because they are safe, counter-proliferative, and cost-saving.
•
Signaling these steps is crucial to securing gains from existing disarmament commitments. –
Repackaging existing steps as directed at disarmament
–
Clearly announcing new related steps
Mount CSIS PONI
18 Dec., 2013
18 December, 2013
Mount CSIS PONI
18 Dec., 2013
Commitments to disarm •
• •
The United States has issued several commitments to eliminate its nuclear arsenal, most recently at Prague, April 2009 Incredible commitments are counterproductive. How to enhance commitment credibility? – – –
Actions that advance other norms of nuclear restraint Actions that decrease reliance on the nuclear arsenal Actions that assist the verification of a global disarmament treaty.
Mount CSIS PONI
18 Dec., 2013
Nuclear disarmament treaty •
Once a regime is in place, things are straightforward (if risky) –
• • • •
Fetter & Oelrich (2010), Acton (2011), others
Getting into a regime is hard False initial declarations make would undermine the entire system —so they prevent negotiations in the first place Large, advanced states like the U.S. have the greatest credibility problems A credible initial declaration lowers the risks of → verification
High confidence in the expected accuracy of initial declarations will make negotiations more likely
→
Steps taken now to enhance the credibility of an initial declaration make a disarmament treaty more likely
Mount CSIS PONI
18 Dec., 2013
Preparing data • Successive releases of overlapping and mutually consistent sets of data on nuclear materials and weapons makes cheating more difficulty • The Obama administration has shown a willingness to release nuclear data – May, 2010: overall size of arsenal – 2011: U.S., Russia swap large databases on delivery vehicles under New START
Data on: •
Storage, movement, and maintenance of: – – – – –
• • •
Specific warheads Delivery vehicles Reprocessing facilities Nuclear material Spent fuel stocks
could be: a) Unilaterally compiled and reserved b) Distributed to allies, perhaps encrypted c) Deposited with IAEA (NPT 2010 Revcon) d) Released publicly
Weapons tests Life extension programs DU munitions and armor Mount CSIS PONI
18 Dec., 2013
Designing facilities •
Facilities can be designed from the start to meet anticipated safeguards standards
•
This signals an expectation that comprehensive safeguards will enter into force in the facility’s lifetime
•
Collaboration with the IAEA, public anticipation ties hands
•
Enhances Safeguards by Design (SBD) standards by preemptive compliance
Mount CSIS PONI
18 Dec., 2013
Weapon systems •
•
•
Dual capable systems are difficult to verify, plausibly controlled under a comprehensive verification scheme Cutting the nuclear mission from certain selected systems now can decrease future suspicion about dual capability Preventing the F-35 from carrying B61 would be a major step •
F-35 nuclear variant has been delayed from 2017 to the Block IV upgrade in 2010
•
Several overseas bases might have reduced inspections requirements
•
USAF saves money now on procurement, B61 LEP
•
USAF saves later on NORI
•
B-1B is precedent
Mount CSIS PONI
18 Dec., 2013
Conclusions •
No verification scheme can succeed in a world where states feel threatened.
•
The steps described here (data, facilities, weapons) may tip the balance for some expectant but unconvinced states.
•
Many of these steps are being taken already, because they are safe, counter-proliferative, and cost-saving.
•
Signaling these steps is crucial to securing gains from existing disarmament commitments. –
Repackaging existing steps as directed at disarmament
–
Clearly announcing new related steps
Mount CSIS PONI
18 Dec., 2013
