RECD: 22 MAR 15 17Z
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
P 221236Z MAR 73 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1702
RECD: 22 MAR 15 17Z
E.O. 11652: GDS 1981 TAGS: PINT, PFOR, MARR, MOPS, TH SUBJECT: THAILAND POLITICAL С LIMATE AND US MILITARY PRESENCE REF:A.BNGKO31 BANGKOK 2643 C. BANGKOK 4622
В .
SUMARY:IAMPERSUADE THA OUROVERAL POLICYINTERST ANDOBJECTIVESINTHAILNDWOULDBE ST ERVDBYANOUNCIGBEFORETHE NDOFAPRILAMODEST,INTIALREDUCTIONI USFORCES TAIONED HER . I FUL Y RECOGNIZE THE IMPERATIVES OF MAINTAIN G A STRONG DET R ENT/RETALI TORY POSTURE IN THAIL ND HO ELP AS URE NV ADHER NCE TO CEAS FIRE AGRE M NTS, AS WEL AS NE D TO AVOID GIV NG "WRONG SIGNAL" TO HANOI. HOWEV R, OUR COMBAT POSTURE H RE WOULD NOT BE MATERIAL Y AF ECT D BY A MODEST CUTBACK AND RAPID REINTRODUCTION COULD BE F ECT D IF REQUIRED. ON THER HAND, IN CUR ENT HAI CLIMATE POLIT CAL BEN FITS OF IRST CUTBACK, HOWEV R MODEST, WOULD BE V RY SUB TAN IAL. WITHOUT COM IT NG OURSELV S AT HIS TIME TO ANY FURTHER WITHDRAW LS WE OUD IND CATE A TREND FUL Y IN AC ORD WITH RTG HINK G. THIS WOULD MATERIAL Y AS I T R G IN COPING WITH DOMESTIC DIS ENT WHIC ONTI UES TO F CUS ON US PRES NCE. ACTION REQU STED: THA WASHINGTON GIVE S RIOUS CONSIDERATION TO WITHDRAW L AN OUNCEM NT PRIO TO END OF APRIL. FURTH
1 IN A NUMBER OF MESSAGES WE HVE REPORTED ON THAI ATTITUDES TOWARD THE US MILITARY PRESENCE. IN REF A WE HAVE ANALYZED ITS POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS WHICH CUT ACROSS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ASPECTS OF THAI POLICY. THE US PRESENCE IS PROBABLY THE MOST
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
SЕСRЕТ BANGKOK
4623 ,
NODIS,
ТНAI RELATIONS IMPORTANT AND POTENTIALILY DIFFICULT ISSUE IN USTODAY, HARDLY A DAY GOES BY WITHOUT SOME REFERENCE TO I Т IN THE HOW WE MANAGE ТН IS ISSUE WILL AFFECT PRESS OR BY PUBLIC FIGURES. OUR RELATIONSHIPS HERE AND IN SEA GENERALLY FOR A LONG TIE WE SUGGESTED (REF A PARA 17) ТНЕ DEVELOP WITH THIS IN MIND, MЕNТ OF A POLICY FRAMEWORK WITH THE PURPOSE OF MAKING IT CLEAR THAT WE WILL GRADUALLY REDUCE OUR FORCES HERE FROM 'THEIR PRESENT HIGH LEVELS, CIRCUMSTANCES PERMITTING, I.E. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SEASIA AND HANOI'S ADHERENCE TO THE PARIS AGREEMEN Т S AND THE LAOS CEASEFIRE. 2. WHILE THAI DOMESТIC DEBATE HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT DEFUSED BY DEPFONMIN CHARTCHAI'S STATMENT ТНАТ US PRESENCE IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED PERMANENT (REF B), WE HAVE NUMEROUS INDICATIONS THAT ISSUE CONTINUES То SMОULDЕR AND MAY FLARE UP ANY ТIMЕ (REF C) NVN DECISION ТО INTRODUCE ТТ МНЕ SPECIFICALLY INTO VIE NTIAN REPATRIATION NEGOTIATIONS OR AN АТТAСK ON A BAS E HERE NO DOUBT WOULD REOPEN ISSUE PERНAPS IN ACUТE FORM. (BASE COURSE, WOULD POIGNANTLY DRIVE НОME WHITLAM'S REMARKS WHICH CIRCLES CONTINUEHERE.) TO PROVIDE FOOD FOR THOUGHT IN POLITICAL L AN) PRESS
З. IN MY VIEW, ТIME HAS NOW REPEAT NOW СОME TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY FIRST REDUCTION IN THE US СOMBAT PRESENCE AS A CLEAR D EMONSTRATION THAT WE DO NO Т INTEND TO MAINTAIN PERMANENТLY OUR STRENGTH AT PRESENT LEVELS. I RECOMMEND THAT, BARRING A SERIOUSLY ADVERSE TURN OF EVEN Т S IN INDOCHINA, WE ANNOUNCE NOT LATER THAN THE END OF APRIL OUR INTENTION TO REМOVE SOME FORCES FROM LAND AND ТHAТ THIS BE CARRIED OUT BEFORE THE END OF MAY. A
4. I THOROUGHLY APPRECIATE WASHINGTON THINKING THAT HANOI MUST BE LEFT IN NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR CAPABILITY AND DEТERMINATION TO US FORCE IF CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS ARE ТО BE МADE ТО WORK. NEVERTHELESS, I AM PERSUADED THAT NECESSITY TO CONVEY THIS POLITICAL SIGNAL DOES NOТ REPEAT NOT REQUIRED RETENTION OF FULL AUGMENTATION FORCE BROUGНТ IN LAST SPRING. (ABOUT 5 РERCENT) REDUCTION OF РRESENT FORCE LEVELS CAN BE CARRIED ОUT WITHOUT GIVING RISE TO INTERPRETATIONS Т 0 NS WE WISH AVOID, ESPECIALLY WНEN РRESENTED IN CONTEXT OUR ABILITY TO REINTRODUCE FORCES RAPIDLY, AS WE DID MOST EFFECTIVELY LAST SРRING.
5. ON
HAND,
A MODES REDUCTION WOULD GO
A LONG
WAY ТO
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
SECRET BANGKOK 4623, NODIS MAR 22 WARD ALLEVIATING PRESENT AND ANTICIPATED POLITICAL PRESSURES HERE IN VERY СOMPLEX SITUATION DESCRIBED REF А . BY POINТING TREND ТОWARD FORCE REDUCTION , WITHOUT ACTUALLY COMMITTING OURSELVES то SPECIFIC FURТНER REDUCTION АТ ANY РARTICULAR Т I Е OR ТО ANY ANY ULTIMATE FORCE POSTURE IN THAILAND, WE WOULD ENABLE RTC, LEADERS TO DEFUSE ТНЕ ARGUMENTS OF ТНE CRITICS, WНILE GIVING SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT TO THOSE WHO ARE BASICALLY WELLDISPOSED ТОWARD US, BUT HESIТАТЕ Т O TAKE A POSITION IN IGNORANCE OF OUR ULTIMATE INTENTIONS (SEE REF C. PROPOSE THAT PROMPT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN б . SPECIFICALLY, I THE IDENTIFICATION OF A UNIT FOR EARLY REDEPLOYMENТ AND 1 RECOMMEND AS MOST SUITABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE THE MARINE WING (TASK FORCE DELTA) AT NAM РНОNG.
ТО
7.
THERE ARE AT LEAST FOUR GOOD REASONS FOR REMOVING THE MARINES AND ТО SO WITHIN] ТIME FRAME SUGGESTED ABOVE: A. WITH ABOUT 2 з 00 PERSONNEL AND ONLY 39 COMBAT АIRCRAFT IN ITS THREE SQUADRONS, TASK FORCE DELTA IS THE SMALLEST, MOST READILY IDENTIFIABLE UNIT WHOSE REMOVAL WILL VACATE AN ENTIRE BASE THUS YIELDING OPTIMUM POLITICAL RETURN FOR THE LEA ST DIMINUATION OF REAL COMBAT SТRЕNGTH. 5
В. THE MARINES HAVE FLOWN NO COMBAT SORTIES SINCE 25 FEBRUARY. THEIR UTILIZATION IN THE ONLY CURREN T COMBAT AREA (CAMBODIA) WOULD NO Т BE COST-EF FECTIVE IN VIEW OF MUCH GREATER PROXIMITY OF СОMPARABLE USAF UNITS BASED AT UB ОN AND KORAT. MARINES HAVE BEEN FLYING SOME TRAINING MISSIONS; WE MUST ASSUME THEIR CONTINUING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS WILL СOMPLETE WITH ТНО S Е OF USAF FOR ЕXTREMELY SCARCE TRAINING AIR SPACE IN THAILAND THUS COMPOUNDING ANOTHER TROUBLESOME PROBLEM ASSOCIATED AN UNЕMPLOYED COMBAT FORCE. С. NA М PHONG IS LARGEST AND M ОSТ SUITABLE OF ONLY THREE FACILITIES WHERE THAI VOLUNTEERS REТURNING FRO М LAOS CAN BE ACCOMODATED WITHOUT INCURRING ADDITIONAL CONSTRUCTION EXPENDITURES WHICH U.S. WOULD HAVE TO UNDERRITE IF VOLUNTEERS ARE BE KEPT IN A READINESS POSTURE. ASSUMING MAY 23 I.E., 60 DAYS AFTER FORMATION OF NEW RLG) IS MASIC DATE BY WHICH FOREIGN FORCES IN LAOS WILL HAVE TO НАVЕ FADED AWAY, REQUIREMENT FOR FACILIТY TO THAILAND (
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
D WINESLIVE IN TENTS AND CONDITIONS AT NAM PHONG ARE МО S Т ТЕ USMC PRIDE IN ROUGHING AUSTERE OF ANY US-ТЕ NANTED BASE; DESPI CIRCUMSTANCES AND EXCELLENT п UNDER МОSТ ADVERSE S LEADERSHIP CONDITIONS AT NAM PHONG MAY LEAD TO MORALE PROВLEМ WITH ATTENDANT RISE IN INCIDENTS, DRUG ABUSE, ETC. 8. I AM PERSUADED THAT AN INITIATIVE OF THE KIND RECOMMENDED ABOVE WILL PAY US GREAT DIVIDENDS IN HELPING THE THAI LEADERSHIP TO HANDLE ТHE GROWING QUESTIONING OF CONTINUED US MILITARY PRESENCE HERE WITHOUT OUR IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY REDUCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR DETERRENT ON HANOI. 9. DЕРARТMЕNТ PLEASE PASS EMBASSIES VIENTIANE, SAIGON AND РН N ОМ PENH, CINPAC, CINCUSSAG FOR INFO. U NO ER
ВТ #4623 NOTE NOT PASSED VIENTIANE, SAIGON, PHNOM PENH, CINCPAC
AND CINCUSSAG BY OC/T-- 3/22/73
P 221236Z MAR 73 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1702
RECD: 22 MAR 15 17Z
E.O. 11652: GDS 1981 TAGS: PINT, PFOR, MARR, MOPS, TH SUBJECT: THAILAND POLITICAL С LIMATE AND US MILITARY PRESENCE REF:A.BNGKO31 BANGKOK 2643 C. BANGKOK 4622
В .
SUMARY:IAMPERSUADE THA OUROVERAL POLICYINTERST ANDOBJECTIVESINTHAILNDWOULDBE ST ERVDBYANOUNCIGBEFORETHE NDOFAPRILAMODEST,INTIALREDUCTIONI USFORCES TAIONED HER . I FUL Y RECOGNIZE THE IMPERATIVES OF MAINTAIN G A STRONG DET R ENT/RETALI TORY POSTURE IN THAIL ND HO ELP AS URE NV ADHER NCE TO CEAS FIRE AGRE M NTS, AS WEL AS NE D TO AVOID GIV NG "WRONG SIGNAL" TO HANOI. HOWEV R, OUR COMBAT POSTURE H RE WOULD NOT BE MATERIAL Y AF ECT D BY A MODEST CUTBACK AND RAPID REINTRODUCTION COULD BE F ECT D IF REQUIRED. ON THER HAND, IN CUR ENT HAI CLIMATE POLIT CAL BEN FITS OF IRST CUTBACK, HOWEV R MODEST, WOULD BE V RY SUB TAN IAL. WITHOUT COM IT NG OURSELV S AT HIS TIME TO ANY FURTHER WITHDRAW LS WE OUD IND CATE A TREND FUL Y IN AC ORD WITH RTG HINK G. THIS WOULD MATERIAL Y AS I T R G IN COPING WITH DOMESTIC DIS ENT WHIC ONTI UES TO F CUS ON US PRES NCE. ACTION REQU STED: THA WASHINGTON GIVE S RIOUS CONSIDERATION TO WITHDRAW L AN OUNCEM NT PRIO TO END OF APRIL. FURTH
1 IN A NUMBER OF MESSAGES WE HVE REPORTED ON THAI ATTITUDES TOWARD THE US MILITARY PRESENCE. IN REF A WE HAVE ANALYZED ITS POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS WHICH CUT ACROSS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ASPECTS OF THAI POLICY. THE US PRESENCE IS PROBABLY THE MOST
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
SЕСRЕТ BANGKOK
4623 ,
NODIS,
ТНAI RELATIONS IMPORTANT AND POTENTIALILY DIFFICULT ISSUE IN USTODAY, HARDLY A DAY GOES BY WITHOUT SOME REFERENCE TO I Т IN THE HOW WE MANAGE ТН IS ISSUE WILL AFFECT PRESS OR BY PUBLIC FIGURES. OUR RELATIONSHIPS HERE AND IN SEA GENERALLY FOR A LONG TIE WE SUGGESTED (REF A PARA 17) ТНЕ DEVELOP WITH THIS IN MIND, MЕNТ OF A POLICY FRAMEWORK WITH THE PURPOSE OF MAKING IT CLEAR THAT WE WILL GRADUALLY REDUCE OUR FORCES HERE FROM 'THEIR PRESENT HIGH LEVELS, CIRCUMSTANCES PERMITTING, I.E. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SEASIA AND HANOI'S ADHERENCE TO THE PARIS AGREEMEN Т S AND THE LAOS CEASEFIRE. 2. WHILE THAI DOMESТIC DEBATE HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT DEFUSED BY DEPFONMIN CHARTCHAI'S STATMENT ТНАТ US PRESENCE IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED PERMANENT (REF B), WE HAVE NUMEROUS INDICATIONS THAT ISSUE CONTINUES То SMОULDЕR AND MAY FLARE UP ANY ТIMЕ (REF C) NVN DECISION ТО INTRODUCE ТТ МНЕ SPECIFICALLY INTO VIE NTIAN REPATRIATION NEGOTIATIONS OR AN АТТAСK ON A BAS E HERE NO DOUBT WOULD REOPEN ISSUE PERНAPS IN ACUТE FORM. (BASE COURSE, WOULD POIGNANTLY DRIVE НОME WHITLAM'S REMARKS WHICH CIRCLES CONTINUEHERE.) TO PROVIDE FOOD FOR THOUGHT IN POLITICAL L AN) PRESS
З. IN MY VIEW, ТIME HAS NOW REPEAT NOW СОME TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY FIRST REDUCTION IN THE US СOMBAT PRESENCE AS A CLEAR D EMONSTRATION THAT WE DO NO Т INTEND TO MAINTAIN PERMANENТLY OUR STRENGTH AT PRESENT LEVELS. I RECOMMEND THAT, BARRING A SERIOUSLY ADVERSE TURN OF EVEN Т S IN INDOCHINA, WE ANNOUNCE NOT LATER THAN THE END OF APRIL OUR INTENTION TO REМOVE SOME FORCES FROM LAND AND ТHAТ THIS BE CARRIED OUT BEFORE THE END OF MAY. A
4. I THOROUGHLY APPRECIATE WASHINGTON THINKING THAT HANOI MUST BE LEFT IN NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR CAPABILITY AND DEТERMINATION TO US FORCE IF CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS ARE ТО BE МADE ТО WORK. NEVERTHELESS, I AM PERSUADED THAT NECESSITY TO CONVEY THIS POLITICAL SIGNAL DOES NOТ REPEAT NOT REQUIRED RETENTION OF FULL AUGMENTATION FORCE BROUGНТ IN LAST SPRING. (ABOUT 5 РERCENT) REDUCTION OF РRESENT FORCE LEVELS CAN BE CARRIED ОUT WITHOUT GIVING RISE TO INTERPRETATIONS Т 0 NS WE WISH AVOID, ESPECIALLY WНEN РRESENTED IN CONTEXT OUR ABILITY TO REINTRODUCE FORCES RAPIDLY, AS WE DID MOST EFFECTIVELY LAST SРRING.
5. ON
HAND,
A MODES REDUCTION WOULD GO
A LONG
WAY ТO
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
SECRET BANGKOK 4623, NODIS MAR 22 WARD ALLEVIATING PRESENT AND ANTICIPATED POLITICAL PRESSURES HERE IN VERY СOMPLEX SITUATION DESCRIBED REF А . BY POINТING TREND ТОWARD FORCE REDUCTION , WITHOUT ACTUALLY COMMITTING OURSELVES то SPECIFIC FURТНER REDUCTION АТ ANY РARTICULAR Т I Е OR ТО ANY ANY ULTIMATE FORCE POSTURE IN THAILAND, WE WOULD ENABLE RTC, LEADERS TO DEFUSE ТНЕ ARGUMENTS OF ТНE CRITICS, WНILE GIVING SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT TO THOSE WHO ARE BASICALLY WELLDISPOSED ТОWARD US, BUT HESIТАТЕ Т O TAKE A POSITION IN IGNORANCE OF OUR ULTIMATE INTENTIONS (SEE REF C. PROPOSE THAT PROMPT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN б . SPECIFICALLY, I THE IDENTIFICATION OF A UNIT FOR EARLY REDEPLOYMENТ AND 1 RECOMMEND AS MOST SUITABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE THE MARINE WING (TASK FORCE DELTA) AT NAM РНОNG.
ТО
7.
THERE ARE AT LEAST FOUR GOOD REASONS FOR REMOVING THE MARINES AND ТО SO WITHIN] ТIME FRAME SUGGESTED ABOVE: A. WITH ABOUT 2 з 00 PERSONNEL AND ONLY 39 COMBAT АIRCRAFT IN ITS THREE SQUADRONS, TASK FORCE DELTA IS THE SMALLEST, MOST READILY IDENTIFIABLE UNIT WHOSE REMOVAL WILL VACATE AN ENTIRE BASE THUS YIELDING OPTIMUM POLITICAL RETURN FOR THE LEA ST DIMINUATION OF REAL COMBAT SТRЕNGTH. 5
В. THE MARINES HAVE FLOWN NO COMBAT SORTIES SINCE 25 FEBRUARY. THEIR UTILIZATION IN THE ONLY CURREN T COMBAT AREA (CAMBODIA) WOULD NO Т BE COST-EF FECTIVE IN VIEW OF MUCH GREATER PROXIMITY OF СОMPARABLE USAF UNITS BASED AT UB ОN AND KORAT. MARINES HAVE BEEN FLYING SOME TRAINING MISSIONS; WE MUST ASSUME THEIR CONTINUING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS WILL СOMPLETE WITH ТНО S Е OF USAF FOR ЕXTREMELY SCARCE TRAINING AIR SPACE IN THAILAND THUS COMPOUNDING ANOTHER TROUBLESOME PROBLEM ASSOCIATED AN UNЕMPLOYED COMBAT FORCE. С. NA М PHONG IS LARGEST AND M ОSТ SUITABLE OF ONLY THREE FACILITIES WHERE THAI VOLUNTEERS REТURNING FRO М LAOS CAN BE ACCOMODATED WITHOUT INCURRING ADDITIONAL CONSTRUCTION EXPENDITURES WHICH U.S. WOULD HAVE TO UNDERRITE IF VOLUNTEERS ARE BE KEPT IN A READINESS POSTURE. ASSUMING MAY 23 I.E., 60 DAYS AFTER FORMATION OF NEW RLG) IS MASIC DATE BY WHICH FOREIGN FORCES IN LAOS WILL HAVE TO НАVЕ FADED AWAY, REQUIREMENT FOR FACILIТY TO THAILAND (
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
D WINESLIVE IN TENTS AND CONDITIONS AT NAM PHONG ARE МО S Т ТЕ USMC PRIDE IN ROUGHING AUSTERE OF ANY US-ТЕ NANTED BASE; DESPI CIRCUMSTANCES AND EXCELLENT п UNDER МОSТ ADVERSE S LEADERSHIP CONDITIONS AT NAM PHONG MAY LEAD TO MORALE PROВLEМ WITH ATTENDANT RISE IN INCIDENTS, DRUG ABUSE, ETC. 8. I AM PERSUADED THAT AN INITIATIVE OF THE KIND RECOMMENDED ABOVE WILL PAY US GREAT DIVIDENDS IN HELPING THE THAI LEADERSHIP TO HANDLE ТHE GROWING QUESTIONING OF CONTINUED US MILITARY PRESENCE HERE WITHOUT OUR IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY REDUCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR DETERRENT ON HANOI. 9. DЕРARТMЕNТ PLEASE PASS EMBASSIES VIENTIANE, SAIGON AND РН N ОМ PENH, CINPAC, CINCUSSAG FOR INFO. U NO ER
ВТ #4623 NOTE NOT PASSED VIENTIANE, SAIGON, PHNOM PENH, CINCPAC
AND CINCUSSAG BY OC/T-- 3/22/73
