URGENT INFORMATION August 6, 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009 MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
URGENT INFORMATION August 6, 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM:
THOMAS J. BARNES[TJBinitialed]
SUBJECT:
Marcos-Robinson Meeting August 6, 1976 and Philippine Negotiating Strategy
The GOP used Deputy Secretary Robinson's visit to p r e s s the U.S. for a more explicit statement of its obligations under the U . S . - R P Mutual Defense Treaty. President Marcos made c l e a r (Tab B) in his first meeting with Deputy Secretary Robinson and Ambassador Sullivan, and in an aide m e m o i r e (Tab C), that he is seeking this statement primarily in connection with Philippine claims to the Reed Bank. In addition, M a r c o s , Romulo and Enrile all rehashed with some show of bitterness the alleged U.S. failure to be responsive to their need for military equipment when Muslim attacks began in Mindanao in 1972. They stressed that this failure gave them cause to doubt that, in a future c r i s i s , the U.S. would be willing to respond positively to assist the Philippines„ The aide m e m o i r e given to Robinson quotes the 1969 testimony of the Deputy Chief of Mission James Wilson before the Symington Subcommittee, and statements of Ambassador Sullivan ; as proof that the U.S. will respond only to attacks on the Philippines which endanger U. S„ bases. Secretary Romulo echoed this same line in an August 3 interview with the London Times (Tab D). Romulo also used that interview to emphasize that the GOP wants to have Philippine Base Commanders in charge of U.S. bases to "prevent unilateral action by the United States." He then used a h y p o thetical situation in which Thailand would ask for U.S. military help against "Indochina" to demonstrate his point. Romulo said that such a use of the Philippine bases would adversely affect Manila's current efforts to improve its relations with Indochina, and therefore the GOP needs to have control of the bases to insure that the U.S. does not unilaterally act to the detriment of the Philippines. Robinson reported to the Secretary (Tab A) that in their following private 20 minute session Marcos expressed appreciation for the S e c r e t a r y ' s
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
concern over the base negotiations. Marcos added, however, that he believes any final solution will require some fundamental political decision on which he hopes to deal with the Secretary more directly. Marcos reiterated that he needs a reaffirmation of our commitment to defend the Philippines, and a further clarification of the specific response we would make to an attack against the Philippines or its flag v e s s e l s in connection with the Reed Bank dispute. Marcos said this response need not be written; however, he expects it to c o m e from the highest level of government, presumably President Ford and the Secretary, to him personally. Marcos agreed we should continue the base negotiations and mentioned the possibility of finalizing them in a month if we provided a satisfactory response to the aide m e m o i r e removing the ambiguities of our defense commitment. An intelligence report (Tab E) from a reliable source quotes Emmanuel Pelaez, a senior m e m b e r of the Philippine negotiating panel as saying July 29 that the GOP believes a Jimmy Carter victory would be favorable to it. The Philippine delegation considers Carter a "hawk" who would place more value on the U.S. bases. Pelaez added that the GOP is prepared to wait until after the Republican convention before really getting down to serious negotiations, and therefore is "digging in its heels now" to slow down the talks. In addition, Pelaez said Marcos believes a strong stand against the U.S. will help him achieve a preferred status at the forthcoming Non-aligned Summit. Our View In light of the intelligence report, M a r c o s ' arguments may be purely tactical. He could be trying to stall the negotiations until after the U.S. Presidential elections. Alternatively, although the GOP has not presented the bargain in the following t e r m s , the quid pro quo may be our agreeing to militarily support their claims in the Spratlys against the PRC and Vietnam in exchange for a free hand in use of the bases. Since we cannot give the Philippines assurances that we will defend them in a military conflict that occurs in contested territory, early conclusion of the base agreement appears unlikely.
URGENT INFORMATION August 6, 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM:
THOMAS J. BARNES[TJBinitialed]
SUBJECT:
Marcos-Robinson Meeting August 6, 1976 and Philippine Negotiating Strategy
The GOP used Deputy Secretary Robinson's visit to p r e s s the U.S. for a more explicit statement of its obligations under the U . S . - R P Mutual Defense Treaty. President Marcos made c l e a r (Tab B) in his first meeting with Deputy Secretary Robinson and Ambassador Sullivan, and in an aide m e m o i r e (Tab C), that he is seeking this statement primarily in connection with Philippine claims to the Reed Bank. In addition, M a r c o s , Romulo and Enrile all rehashed with some show of bitterness the alleged U.S. failure to be responsive to their need for military equipment when Muslim attacks began in Mindanao in 1972. They stressed that this failure gave them cause to doubt that, in a future c r i s i s , the U.S. would be willing to respond positively to assist the Philippines„ The aide m e m o i r e given to Robinson quotes the 1969 testimony of the Deputy Chief of Mission James Wilson before the Symington Subcommittee, and statements of Ambassador Sullivan ; as proof that the U.S. will respond only to attacks on the Philippines which endanger U. S„ bases. Secretary Romulo echoed this same line in an August 3 interview with the London Times (Tab D). Romulo also used that interview to emphasize that the GOP wants to have Philippine Base Commanders in charge of U.S. bases to "prevent unilateral action by the United States." He then used a h y p o thetical situation in which Thailand would ask for U.S. military help against "Indochina" to demonstrate his point. Romulo said that such a use of the Philippine bases would adversely affect Manila's current efforts to improve its relations with Indochina, and therefore the GOP needs to have control of the bases to insure that the U.S. does not unilaterally act to the detriment of the Philippines. Robinson reported to the Secretary (Tab A) that in their following private 20 minute session Marcos expressed appreciation for the S e c r e t a r y ' s
DECLASSIFIED A/ISS/IPS, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended February 27, 2009
concern over the base negotiations. Marcos added, however, that he believes any final solution will require some fundamental political decision on which he hopes to deal with the Secretary more directly. Marcos reiterated that he needs a reaffirmation of our commitment to defend the Philippines, and a further clarification of the specific response we would make to an attack against the Philippines or its flag v e s s e l s in connection with the Reed Bank dispute. Marcos said this response need not be written; however, he expects it to c o m e from the highest level of government, presumably President Ford and the Secretary, to him personally. Marcos agreed we should continue the base negotiations and mentioned the possibility of finalizing them in a month if we provided a satisfactory response to the aide m e m o i r e removing the ambiguities of our defense commitment. An intelligence report (Tab E) from a reliable source quotes Emmanuel Pelaez, a senior m e m b e r of the Philippine negotiating panel as saying July 29 that the GOP believes a Jimmy Carter victory would be favorable to it. The Philippine delegation considers Carter a "hawk" who would place more value on the U.S. bases. Pelaez added that the GOP is prepared to wait until after the Republican convention before really getting down to serious negotiations, and therefore is "digging in its heels now" to slow down the talks. In addition, Pelaez said Marcos believes a strong stand against the U.S. will help him achieve a preferred status at the forthcoming Non-aligned Summit. Our View In light of the intelligence report, M a r c o s ' arguments may be purely tactical. He could be trying to stall the negotiations until after the U.S. Presidential elections. Alternatively, although the GOP has not presented the bargain in the following t e r m s , the quid pro quo may be our agreeing to militarily support their claims in the Spratlys against the PRC and Vietnam in exchange for a free hand in use of the bases. Since we cannot give the Philippines assurances that we will defend them in a military conflict that occurs in contested territory, early conclusion of the base agreement appears unlikely.
